Sitrep for Aug. 22-29, 2025 (as of 10 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

In the Pokrovsk direction, fighting continues in the area of the Dobropillia breakthrough. Units of the 1st Azov Corps of the National Guard of Ukraine (specifically the 12th Brigade of the NGU), are attacking Russian forces at the base of the salient from the western side, and, judging by reports, they managed to liberate the village of Nove Shakhove.

From the eastern side in this area, the 253rd Assault Battalion is operating, which liberated the village of Volodymyrivka.

Thus, the corridor at the base of the salient has become extremely narrow, critically complicating the supply of Russian forces. Partial resupply is possible with drones, but providing full support for a company (reports indicate that between 60 and 100 Russian soldiers are present near the village of Kucheriv Yar) in this way is highly problematic. Since Russian attacks in this sector relied mainly on infantry, their supply requirements are limited to food, water, radio batteries, and small arms ammunition. Unlike fuel for armored vehicles or heavy munitions, these basic supplies can actually be delivered by drone to Russian forces. According to information obtained from prisoners, Russian assault groups positioned in remote areas are receiving only minimal amounts of food and ammunition, which may allow them to hold out for some time even if the salient is completely cut off at its base. For the Armed Forces of Ukraine, conducting a full and thorough clearance of the remaining cut-off portion of the salient poses difficulties due to manpower shortages. Under such conditions, to fully eliminate this breakthrough, they would literally have to move through every forest line, trench and settlement.

The AFU are also attacking Russian positions south of the salient on the eastern flank of the Pokrovsk direction. Ukrainian forces have been spotted near the villages of Myrne and Malynivka.

It is too early to speak of their liberation; fighting is currently ongoing there. It is possible that the AFU may attempt to carry out an ambitious plan to cut off the entire salient on the eastern flank, also attacking from the area of the village of Stepanivka (northeast of the captured village of Novoolenivka) or in the direction of the village of Koptieve. Whether they have enough forces and resources for this remains an open question.

Meanwhile, combat operations are ongoing in the town of Pokrovsk. Although the southern and southwestern parts of the city were reportedly cleared recently, Russian assault troops are still holding positions in some areas. Footage has been published showing a Ukrainian Leopard 2A4 tank firing point-blank at a multistory building in the southern part of Pokrovsk where enemy soldiers are believed to be located.

Another case of torture and extrajudicial execution of prisoners of war by Russian soldiers has been documented in this direction. A Ukrainian soldier whose throat was slit and who was left for dead spoke about the incident. Despite his severe injury, he crawled back to AFU positions over the course of five days and received medical assistance. We believe the extreme cruelty toward POWs is partly due to the large number of ex-convicts in the RuAF ranks, whose moral standards are significantly lower than those of regular military personnel.

Fighting continues in the south of the Donetsk region, in the Novopavlivka direction—primarily between the villages of Temyrivka in the Zaporizhzhia region and Maliivka in the Dnipropetrovsk region.

According to DeepState, the RuAF have captured the villages of Zaporizke and Novoheorhiivka in the Dnipropetrovsk region; however, the General Staff of the AFU denies this, stating that Zaporizke is being held and that fighting is ongoing for Novoheorhiivka. DeepState also marks salients of the contested area in the direction of the villages of Vorone and Novoselivka in the Dnipropetrovsk region. At the same time, some analysts believe Vorone is already under the control of Russian forces. Additionally, DeepState marked occupied RuAF positions on the outskirts of Novoselivka—apparently, soldiers were able to reach it and gain a foothold.

In the Kupiansk direction, fighting for the town of Kupiansk continues: Russian infantry periodically infiltrates the northern part of the town and attempts to gain a foothold in residential buildings, which forces AFU units to conduct mopping-up operations and dislodge enemy soldiers from occupied positions.

Meanwhile, according to the DeepState map, a situation similar to that in the Pokrovsk direction has developed near Kupiansk: a salient with a narrow base stretching from the villages of Radkivka and Myrne (formerly Moskovka) to the village of Sobolivka. Although its base is very narrow, it is not yet possible to speak of a potential encirclement of Russian units.

In the Lyman direction, the situation for Ukrainian forces in the Serebrianske forestry continues to deteriorate.

As summer draws to a close, we can now conclusively state that there has been no "summer offensive," despite Bild journalist Julian Röpcke declaring that it has happened and has failed. The Russian objectives he cites were far too ambitious to be achieved during the current campaign, which began in the spring and will continue for at least several more weeks.

Russia’s territorial gains over the past few months have been modest, but by the end of summer dangerous trends have started to emerge. The shortage of personnel in the AFU has given rise to a strategy of "total infiltration," exemplified by the penetration of Russian assault troops into various Ukrainian towns and the breakthrough near Dobropillia. As we have already noted, further breakthroughs remain possible: to eliminate the current one, Ukrainian command was forced to redeploy significant forces, inevitably creating vulnerabilities elsewhere along the frontline.

Looking ahead, Ukraine’s situation is likely to deteriorate further. While we consider it possible that Russia could capture Pokrovsk or even Kostiantynivka, we do not expect larger shifts in the frontline in the short term.

Contrary to the views of some Western analysts, we believe Ukraine’s command still has room to alter the trajectory of recent developments by intensifying mobilization and making it more effective, while also enforcing stricter measures against desertion and AWOLs. Without these steps, conditions will continue to worsen and new breakthroughs could emerge, making the prospect of defeat more likely. By this, we mean an unfavorable outcome in eventual negotiations, should they take place on Putin’s terms. For now, Ukrainian society faces a stark dilemma: either accept the loss of territory or escalate the fighting. Yet, official media channels inside the country too often continue to obscure the depth and reality of this dilemma.

Desertion and going AWOL constitute a serious problem for the AFU. Since 2022, more than 200,000 cases of going AWOL have been opened in Ukraine, including more than 110,000 since the beginning of 2025, and over 50,000 more on charges of desertion. Given the extremely limited inflow of new servicemen, this has led to a severe shortage of personnel, which is evident in the "perforation" of the frontline against RuAF.

Former commander of the National Guard of Ukraine's Azov Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Bohdan "Tavr" Krotevych, described problems in the Ukrainian army as early as July. In his view, the leadership style of AFU Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi is ineffective and even harmful. The main problem lies in the absence of strategic planning, which is replaced by chaotic orders to redeploy forces without consideration of their purpose. Reserves were used irrationally: instead of maneuvers and flank strikes, they were left encircled or thrown into unprepared sectors of the frontline, leading to pointless losses. The command structure is overly fragmented, and commanders often do not actually control their own forces. This has resulted in total disorganization and distorted reporting. Adding to this problem is the widespread practice of understating real losses and problems in order to produce "polished" reports. Furthermore, servicemen who speak openly about the actual situation face pressure and even internal investigations. According to Krotevych, the main systemic flaw is the absence of reserves and rotation, which leads to the exhaustion of brigades and the loss of their combat capability.

Ukrainian and Russian Strikes

On Aug. 28, Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense carried out an FPV drone strike on a Russian missile ship in the Sea of Azov. The extent of the damage remains unknown and is likely minor.

In the early hours of Aug. 28, Russian unmanned surface vessels struck the Ukrainian Navy’s intelligence ship Simferopol in the Danube Delta near the town of Vylkove, Odesa region. As a result, the vessel capsized; two crew members were killed, and several others are reported missing. It remains unclear why the vessel’s mooring site had not been secured with boom defenses against maritime drones.

On Aug. 28, Russian forces detected a ground-based launcher of the R-360 Neptune subsonic cruise missile in the Zaporizhzhia region and targeted it with an Iskander mobile short-range ballistic missile. The missile struck close to the launcher, likely damaging it with shrapnel. Although no detonation is visible in the footage, ignition of one Neptune missile engine was recorded.

In the early hours of Aug. 28, the RuAF launched a massive combined air strike. The Ukrainian Air Force reports that nearly 600 drones and dozens of missiles were used. The strikes on Kyiv killed at least 23 people and injured 63 others, with rescue operations ongoing. An Intercity passenger train standing in a depot was heavily damaged.

Reports indicate that the attack on Kyiv included the use of Geran-3 loitering munition (jet-powered Shaheds, first spotted in January). They fly at twice the altitude (about 9 km [30,000 ft]) compared to Shahed-136 (Geran-2), but carry a smaller warhead (50 kg instead of 90). The jet engine provides greater speed and makes them less vulnerable to mobile air defense crews equipped with machine and anti-aircraft guns.

In recent months, we have increasingly observed that Russian drone strikes are causing major destruction and the collapse of entire sections of residential buildings. This may indicate an increase in the power of the warheads being used.

As we reported, in fall 2024, Turkish defense firm Baykar announced plans to construct a Bayraktar drone manufacturing facility in the Kyiv region by August 2025. At the time, we assumed this was more a declaration of intent and that actual production would only begin after a halt in combat operations to avoid risking investments from Russian strikes on strategic infrastructure. Contrary to those expectations, the factory was completed on schedule. However, in the early hours of Aug. 28, the facility was targeted by the RuAF. According to Ihor Zinkevych, a member of the Lviv City Council, this marks the fourth strike on the facility within the past six months. It appears increasingly unlikely that the factory will be permitted to reach full operational capacity under current conditions.

In the early hours of Aug. 28, the AFU launched another round of precision strikes against Russian energy infrastructure, targeting the Kuybyshev Oil Refinery in Samara and the Afipsky Oil Refinery in the Krasnodar region. However, we believe, according to Sergey Vakulenko, an economist with the Carnegie Endowment in Berlin, the direct impact of these strikes on Russia’s military capabilities may be limited. Vakulenko notes that Russia’s diesel production—critical for fueling military vehicles—has historically exceeded domestic demand by more than twofold, suggesting a degree of resilience in its supply chain.

According to Reuters sources, Steve Witkoff violated protocol during his visit to Moscow by not bringing a State Department stenographer to the meeting with Putin, despite having no diplomatic experience. As a result, Putin's specific proposals were not documented. Witkoff later falsely claimed that Putin was ready to make major concessions and had agreed to withdraw troops from the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions. Trump based his decision to meet with Putin in Alaska on this inaccurate information.

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