Sitrep for Oct. 12-15, 2026 (as of 10 a.m. UTC+3)
In the Oleksandrivka direction, the Armed Forces of Ukraine continue their offensive. After the Russian Armed Forces command redeployed units of the 90th Tank Division from this direction to the Kostiantynivka direction and elements of the 41st Combined Arms Army to the Dobropillia direction, Russian defensive positions at the junction of the Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk regions weakened. The AFU thus took advantage of the fact that Russian forces had made the Sloviansk–Kramatorsk, Dobropillia, and Kostiantynivka directions their priorities and launched counteroffensive operations in areas that were less of a priority for the RuAF.
Sitrep for Oct. 5-12, 2026 (as of 10 a.m. UTC+3)
In the Oleksandrivka direction, the Armed Forces of Ukraine continue their offensive operations and, according to Ukrainian military observer Kostiantyn Mashovets, have reestablished the Velyka Novosilka direction. At present, the village of Velyka Novosilka lies deep in the Russian rear. Ukrainian forces previously crossed the Mokri Yaly River and advanced near the village of Komar, intending to push toward Velyka Novosilka if successful. Mashovets’s report hints that the advance has already begun, but this cannot yet be confirmed.
Sitrep for Oct. 1-5, 2026 (as of 10 a.m. UTC+3)
The pro-Russian Slivochnyi Kapriz [Creamy Caprice] project published a video allegedly filmed near the railway station in the village of Kupiansk-Vuzlovyi and, based on it, claimed that Russian forces had advanced. However, the station building in the opening shots, which show a strike hitting the building, appears to be much more damaged than in the subsequent shots, which show soldiers against the backdrop of the building. Thus, the footage is either old or, as In Factum believes, AI-generated. We tend to agree, as the soldiers’ facial expressions also look unnatural. Slivochnyi Kapriz, meanwhile, rushed to report Russian gains and did not correct the post, even though all the posts in the original source had been deleted.
Sitrep for Sept. 28-Oct. 1, 2026 (as of 10 a.m. UTC+3)
DeepState has updated its map in the Dobropillia direction, marking advances by Russian forces near the village of Shevchenko, north of the town of Pokrovsk, as well as near the town of Bilytske. It is worth noting that, according to our team and other analysts, the RuAF achieved a local breakthrough in this direction in August, advancing toward the village of Vodianske north of Shevchenko. As has been the case in recent months, advances are reflected on the DeepState map with a significant delay. At the same time, the contested area can be extended as far as the outskirts of the town of Dobropillia and the village of Hannivka, which Russian assault troops have already reached.
Sitrep for Sept. 24-28, 2026 (as of 10:00 a.m. UTC+3)
There have been no significant changes along the frontline in recent days.
Sitrep for Sept. 21-24, 2026 (as of 10 a.m. UTC+3)
In the Kupiansk direction, in the Kharkiv region, DeepState has expanded the area under the control of the Armed Forces of Ukraine west of the village of Dvorichna and north of the town of Kupiansk, which first appeared on its map at the end of August. Forces of the 2nd Khartia Corps of the National Guard of Ukraine have now advanced farther south and liberated the village of Zapadne—according to reports, the 23rd Assault Regiment is taking part in the fighting, with many foreign nationals serving in its ranks. It is worth noting that former journalist Pyotr Ruzavin also serves as a drone operator with the 13th Khartia Brigade.
Sitrep for Sept. 14-21, 2026 (as of 10 a.m. UTC+3)
On Sept. 20, parliamentary elections were held in Russia. Contrary to our expectations, the Russian Ministry of Defense did not stage an operation beforehand to send assault troops to the outskirts of Sloviansk to record footage with a flag. Instead, it merely reported fighting "on the immediate approaches to Sloviansk, Kramatorsk, and Druzhkivka." The same statement said that in Lyman and Sviatohirsk, "the clearing of residential areas of isolated AFU servicemen continues."
Sitrep for Sept. 10-14, 2026 (as of 10 a.m. UTC+3)
Rybar, a prominent pro-Russian Telegram channel, appears to have acknowledged the loss of the Shandryholove salient: in its Sept. 9 sitrep, it reported a deterioration in the situation, with the salient marked as a combat zone, while by Sept. 13 its map showed that the Russian Armed Forces had lost control of the territory. At the same time, it reported that fighting was taking place around the base of the salient, including in the area of the village of Kolodiazi, while individual groups were reaching the Zherebets River. This further confirms that the Armed Forces of Ukraine were able to cut off the salient and are apparently continuing to clear it.
Sitrep for Sept. 7-10, 2026 (as of 10 a.m. UTC+3)
Playfra has partially confirmed AMK Mapping’s assessment that the Russian Armed Forces have reached the Dobropillia-Kramatorsk highway. In particular, Russian soldiers have been spotted south and southeast of the village of Novotroitske, as well as in the northern part of the village of Raiske. Later, Playfra, citing the 1st Azov Corps of the National Guard, reported that three Russian soldiers were captured in the village of Staroraiske, in the immediate vicinity of the western outskirts of the town of Druzhkivka. Thus, the situation in the Dobropillia direction remains difficult: the RuAF continue to infiltrate the area and are gradually moving closer to Druzhkivka.
Sitrep for Sept. 3-7, 2026 (as of 10 a.m. UTC+3)
According to estimates by the Finnish independent monitoring group Black Bird Group, the pace of the Russian Armed Forces’ advance increased slightly in August compared with July, with Russian forces gaining 133 square kilometers versus 106 square kilometers. However, compared with the previous summer, this summer can reasonably be described as unsuccessful: Black Bird Group recorded Russian gains of 430 square kilometers in August and 502 square kilometers in July last year. That said, the war is developing differently this year than in previous years, and monthly territorial statistics should therefore be treated primarily as operational indicators useful for assessing changes from month to month. Comparisons with the corresponding...