dispatches

Sitrep for May 15-17, 2024 (as of 8 a.m.) UTC+3

While the main offensive efforts of the Russian Armed Forces remain centered on the Kharkiv axis, the Russian Ministry of Defense unexpectedly announced the capture of Robotyne on the Zaporizhzhia axis. Pro-Russian bloggers promptly refuted this claim, noting that the complete capture of the village is still far from assured. After a year of fighting, Robotyne has been almost completely destroyed, its building in ruins, and its conquest holds no military significance. Previous experiences suggest that Russian forces will need to intensify their attacks in this direction so that the frontline on the ground looks closer to the one in official reports.

Sitrep for May 13-15, 2024 (as of 9 a.m.) UTC+3

The Russian offensive on the Kharkiv axis continues. According to pro-Russian sources, such as WarGonzo [war correspondent Semyon Pegov], the Russian Armed Forces are already engaged in fighting near the village of Lyptsi and on the outskirts of the town of Vovchansk. However, the Ukrainian Telegram channel DeepState has so far only confirmed attempts to gain a foothold on the northern outskirts of Vovchansk. According to DeepState, Russian forces have partially captured the village of Hlyboke on the western flank of the offensive, and they are still some distance away from Lyptsi.

Sitrep for May 10-13, 2024 (as of 8 a.m. UTC+3)

Contrary to our expectations, Putin has replaced the Russian Minister of Defense. He has proposed Andrey Belousov [former First Deputy Prime Minister] for this position, suggesting Sergei Shoigu for the post of Secretary of the Security Council, replacing Nikolai Patrushev, whose new position is still unknown. According to Putin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov, Putin’s decision to appoint a civilian official as Minister of Defense was motivated by the need to introduce innovations and to better integrate the wartime economy into the country’s overall economy. Currently, the Ministry of Defense’s budget accounts for 6.7% of GDP and is approaching the spending level of the mid-1980s. Perhaps, Belousov's appointment is intended to make the...

Sitrep for May 8-10, 2024 (as of 8:30 a.m. UTC+3)

As expected, the Russian Armed Forces failed to capture not only the town of Chasiv Yar by May 9, but also the Kanal neighborhood (if such an order ever existed). Moreover, the pace of their advance is still quite slow and the frontline has remained virtually unchanged over the past days. The video filmed in the village of Umanske with a USSR flag hoisted in the northern part of the town cannot be considered evidence of noticeable Russian advances in the Pokrovsk direction.

Sitrep for May 6-8, 2024 (as of 8:30 UTC+3 a.m.)

For the first time in recent weeks, the Russian side has failed to make significant progress on the ground, with the frontline remaining largely unchanged over the past two days. It is premature to determine the exact cause of this slowdown of the Russian Armed Forces. Possible factors could include the arrival of Western weapons in Ukraine, the transfer of reserves by the Armed Forces of Ukraine or internal issues within the Russian Army.

Sitrep for May 3-6, 2024 (as of 9:00 a.m. UTC+3)

After the capture of Kyslivka in the Kharkiv region, Russian forces proceeded to occupy the nearby village of Kotlyarivka, which was semi-encircled, as expected. It is worth noting that both of these settlements are relatively small, thus, their capture is not considered of significant importance. With the Russian Armed Forces trying to consolidate their success on the Donetsk axis, it seems somewhat illogical to increase pressure on secondary directions such as Kupiansk, Zaporizhzhia (where attacks on Robotyne continue), Vuhledar (where attacks on Urozhaine are ongoing) and even Kherson (where positions recently captured by the Armed Forces of Ukraine on Nestryha Island at the mouth of the Dnipro River have been recaptured by the RuAF...

Sitrep for May 1-3, 2024 (as of 9:00 a.m. UTC+3)

Contrary to forecasts and claims of the issuance of an order to capture Chasiv Yar by May 9, there has been little change in the pace of the Russian advance along the Donetsk axis. No significant reserves have been committed to battle, while the breach of Ukrainian defenses has not led to any maneuvers in operational areas.

Sitrep for April 29-May 1, 2024 (as of 8:30 UTC+3 a.m.)

After Russian forces advanced in Kyslivka, in the Kupiansk direction, Ukrainian forces stationed in the neighboring village of Kotlyarivka have found themselves semi-encircled. As a result, it is anticipated that they will withdraw from this village in the near future.

Sitrep for April 26-29, 2024 (as of 8:30 a.m. UTC+3) 

After the capture of Novobakhmutivka on April 25, the village of Berdychi in the Pokrovsk direction found itself close to being semi-encircled. Consequently, as explained by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, General Oleksandr Syrskyi, the Ukrainian command decided to withdraw its troops to positions west of Berdychi, as well as from the town of Semenivka and the village of Novomykhailivka. At the moment, as noted by the Ukrainian project DeepState, Berdychi is completely under Russian control.

Sitrep for April 5-8, 2024 (as of 9:00 a.m.) UTC+3

The fighting continues in the areas where it was most active last week, with no significant advances observed. However, the current situation suggests how the Russian Armed Forces will act in the near future in the Pokrovske (Avdiivka) direction. Presently, they are advancing from Tonenke towards Umanske. After capturing Umanske, they are likely to turn south towards Netailove to challenge the position of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the Pervomaiske area, where fighting has been persistent. This strategy is supported by the fact that Russian forces conducted an airstrike on the dam across the Durnaya River near Umanske to disrupt the supply routes of Ukrainian forces in the Netailove area bounded by water barriers.