Sitrep for July 14-21, 2025 (as of 7:30 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

In the Sumy region, Russian forces are attempting to stabilize the situation on the western flank of the direction, where the Armed Forces of Ukraine continue their counterattacks. According to the DeepState project, in addition to the long-liberated village of Andriivka, Ukrainian forces have managed to push the Russian Armed Forces out of the village of Kindrativka, which is now considered a contested area. Ukrainian military observer Kostiantyn Mashovets also reported successful Ukrainian advances near the village of Novomykolaivka. In an effort to stabilize the front, Russian command has redeployed an additional unit of marines from the 810th Brigade to the area, as well as, according to some reports, an Akhmat regiment.

On the eastern flank of the Sumy direction, Russian forces are gradually advancing in the area around the village of Yunakivka and have captured the village of Yablunivka.

In the Toretsk direction, the situation continues to develop around the pocket south of the Kleban-Byk Reservoir, where Russian forces have effectively taken control of the village of Yablunivka and entered the village of Oleksandro-Kalynove. The position of the AFU there continues to deteriorate.

West of this section of the frontline, in the Pokrovsk direction, Russian forces have formed a salient near the outskirts of the town of Rodynske. They are attempting to bypass the town of Pokrovsk from the north and cut off the supply road leading from the Sloviansk–Kramatorsk agglomeration. Airstrikes on the town of Dobropillia are also being conducted with the same objective. If the AFU fail to contain the situation (i.e., cut off the salient near Rodynske), Russian forces will likely sever the highway, gain control of the railway station by capturing the village of Dorozhne, take Rodynske, and block the town of Myrnohrad from the north. Additionally, the RuAF would be able to advance north along the railway toward Dobropillia and push westward toward the town of Bilytske—a location of strategic importance for further offensives and force buildup. Altogether, these are further steps toward the potential encirclement of Pokrovsk. At present, this is one of the most difficult areas for the AFU.

In the Novopavlivka direction, Russian forces are advancing in the area of the village of Kotliarivka on the border of Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk regions. The RuAF have been present in this area since late May, but despite various statements made about a month ago, an offensive in the Dnipropetrovsk region has not yet begun.

In the South Donetsk direction, the situation around the villages of Yalta and Voskresenka remains ambiguous, with control shifting between the RuAF and the AFU. Nevertheless, Russian forces continue their steady advance toward the administrative border of the Donetsk region.

In the Zaporizhzhia direction, after several weeks of fighting, Russian troops managed to capture the village of Kamianske located on the bank of the Dnipro River. Notably, unlike neighboring frontline sectors, Kamianske was defended by the 128th Territorial Defense Brigade of Ukraine, which has shown weaker defensive capabilities compared to other AFU units. For example, eastward near the villages of Mali Shcherbaky and Stepove, fighting intensified as early as spring 2025, but the 128th Mountain Assault Brigade of the AFU has successfully held back enemy attacks.

On July 18, Colonel Kostiantyn Oborin and Senior Sergeant Roman Kutsenko were killed while repelling an attack by Russian drones. Oborin was the director of the Odesa Aviation Club and the commander of a squadron that defended the skies over Odesa region, shooting down Shahed-136 (Geran-2) loitering munitions, presumably using Yak-52 piston-engine training aircraft.

Ukrainian and Russian Strikes

In the early hours of July 20, Ukrainian UAVs struck a key hub substation in Kamensk-Shakhtinsky, Rostov region, causing reported train delays. OSINT analyst Def Mon noted that this substation is actively used for military logistics: about a week ago, a trainload of over 30 military vehicles was observed there.

In the early hours of July 21, another strike hit a railway hub near the town of Shakhty, also in the Rostov region.

Also, in the early hours of July 20, Ukrainian UAVs struck Zelenograd, Moscow. One of the drones hit a high-rise residential building; no casualties were reported. We believe this was a routing error rather than an intentional strike. After the attack, local residents found the nose section of a Pantsir-S1 surface-to-air missile on the sidewalk. The Polkovnyk Henshtabu Telegram channel identified it as a new TKB-1055 missile.

One person was killed and nine others injured in a Russian air attack on Kyiv in the early hours of July 21, the State Emergency Service of Ukraine confirmed after the sitrep was recorded. According to the Ukrainian Air Force, the attack on July 19 involved not only drones but also missiles.

The Brave1 defense technology cluster has reportedly launched a program called "Test in Ukraine." Foreign manufacturers will be able to send equipment to the AFU for testing in real combat conditions, conduct remote training, and receive feedback from the military personnel in forward positions.

In a segment aired by the Russian MoD’s Zvezda TV channel, the program Voennaya Priyomka (Military Quality Control) featured a visit to the Alabuga Special Economic Zone in Russia’s constituent Republic of Tatarstan, where, according to the report, Russia has established fully localized production of Shahed-type loitering munitions (Geran-2).

The broadcast claimed that every component of the drones—from engines and electronics to fuselages and warheads—is now manufactured on Russian soil. Independent observers have long noted that drone deliveries from Iran appear to have ceased, and the claim of full onshoring of production is broadly consistent with those assessments. The segment focused heavily on the scale of production, with sweeping shots of rows of Shahed fuselages lined up in a warehouse. While the report touted "thousands" of units produced, it offered no time frame, a telling omission that suggests the numbers are likely inflated for propaganda purposes. Fuselage assembly is a relatively low-tech, easily scalable process. The real bottlenecks in drone production, analysts believe, are more likely to be specialized components such as Kometa CRP antennas or certain types of electronic modules. That assessment is supported by recent Ukrainian strikes on industrial targets in the city of Cheboksary, where those antennas are reportedly produced, and in Sergiyev Posad in the Moscow region, home to facilities manufacturing warheads for the drones. Analysts also note the strategic logic of targeting these sites over Alabuga itself: Cheboksary and Sergiyev Posad are significantly closer to Ukraine’s border. Striking targets at shorter range allows Ukrainian forces to equip their drones with larger payloads and potentially inflict greater damage.

Western Assistance

In recent days, the situation surrounding the supply of Patriot missile systems to Ukraine has partially clarified, though not completely. The Wall Street Journal reported that the systems in question were originally intended for Switzerland and were ordered in 2022.

According to Czech military analyst Jiří Vojáček, Switzerland ordered 17 launchers, as well as 5 ground surveillance radars and other equipment (US President Trump had previously mentioned 17 Patriot systems). The WSJ claims that the new systems will be sent to Germany, which will in turn provide its own Patriot systems to Ukraine. However, Bild, citing its own sources, reported that Ukraine will receive the systems originally intended for Switzerland, which are still about 6–8 months away from completion. In either case, the scheme proposed by the US administration will be used, whereby a European country can transfer its Patriot systems to Ukraine and order replacements from the US on a priority basis.

Previously, German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius stated that Germany would no longer send its own weapons to Ukraine. Today, however, he announced that Germany would supply Ukraine with five Patriot systems.

An online meeting involving Pete Hegseth is scheduled for July 21, while on July 23, Lt. Gen. Alexus G. Grynkewich, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, will lead a meeting to discuss the Patriot supply to Ukraine.

According to Aleš Vytečka, Director of the Czech MoD International Cooperation Agency, since the start of this year, a total of 850,000 artillery rounds have been delivered to Ukraine since the start of this year, including 320,000 155mm rounds, while over the entire 2024, the delivery amounted to 1.5 million rounds, including 500,000 155mm rounds. Countries such as Canada, Germany, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands and Denmark are increasing their contributions to the procurement of artillery rounds for Ukraine.

Rustem Umerov, Ukraine’s ex-Defense Minister and current Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council, has proposed to Russia that negotiations between the two countries should continue. It is worth noting that about a week ago, Russian President’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov called on third parties to pressure Ukraine into holding a new round of talks. According to The Independent, a new round of negotiations is expected to take place in Istanbul on July 23 or 24. As before, it is unlikely that this will result in a breakthrough.

On July 10, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated that since Jan. 1, 2025, Russia has lost more than 100,000 soldiers killed. On July 14, during a meeting with US President Donald Trump, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte reiterated this estimate, "100,000 Russian soldiers have been killed since Jan. 1, 2025."

Meanwhile, the named list of Russian casualties compiled by Mediazona [independent Russian media outlet], BBC News Russian, and a team of volunteers currently contains just over 119,000 obituaries.

According to an estimate by Mediazona and Meduza [international Russian-language online media outlet], based on data from the National Probate Registry, approximately 95,000 Russians were killed in the war in 2024, with 50,000 of them dying in the second half of the year.

Researchers currently see no clear trend toward either a decrease or a sharp increase in Russian losses and believe that the death toll for the first half of 2025 is likely to be comparable to that of the second half of 2024: about 50,000 people, or an average of 278 per day.

Thus, Rubio’s and Rutte’s estimate appears somewhat inflated, though likely not by more than a factor of two.

We had assumed that after the Russian army shifted its tactics from armored assaults to attacks by small assault groups, there would be a significant and sustained increase in personnel losses. However, it appears that after switching to the new tactics, the rate of losses stabilized and has remained at approximately 100,000 per year.

We believe that neither side currently has the capacity to achieve a major breakthrough, so no significant changes in the course of the war should be expected in the coming months.

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