Sitrep for July 11-14, 2025 (as of 7:30 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

In the Sumy region, the situation in the village of Kindrativka continues to evolve. Although no significant changes have been observed, pro-Russian sources report that Ukrainian forces are maneuvering to encircle Russian troops by advancing north and northeast of Kindrativka, suggesting that the area can now be considered contested. Some analysts have cited claims by pro-Russian blogger Anatoly Radov; however, his earlier statements about a Russian withdrawal from Kindrativka have since been deleted (he later called them disinformation). Both Radov and another milblogger, Yury Kotenok, have stated that Russian units have pushed Ukrainian troops out of the village center. However, other pro-Russian sources have mentioned partially successful Ukrainian counterattacks. Since these claims cannot be independently verified, it remains unclear who currently controls Kindrativka.

In the Kharkiv region, where the Russian Armed Forces have established a new bridgehead near the village of Milove, there have been no significant changes to the frontline, despite claims of an expanding bridgehead. A video was published showing fire from a Ukrainian tank and an armored personnel carrier targeting forest lines where Russian soldiers were allegedly hiding (the footage, after an edit cut, shows bodies). The video was geolocated to the edge of the contested area southwest of Milove, in the direction of the village of Khatnie.

There are currently no visible advances by Russian forces toward the village of Velykyi Burluk either from Milove or from the village of Dvorichna. However, the RuAF have noticeably expanded their bridgehead on the right bank of the Oskil River, northeast of Dvorichna—near the village of Kamianka—by advancing in the area of the village of Krasne Pershe. It is possible they will now attempt to link this bridgehead with the one around the villages of Stroivka and Topoli.

In addition, in the Kupiansk direction, on July 14, DeepState reported an expansion of the contested area from the village of Radkivka toward the village of Myrne (formerly Moskovka)—both villages had previously been declared "liberated" by the Russian Ministry of Defense. Even pro-Russian bloggers have expressed doubt about Russia’s purported successes in encircling the town of Kupiansk (including the so-called "capture" of the village of Sobolivka), which appear to exist only on Russian military maps.

In the Toretsk direction, the situation is worsening for Ukrainian forces near the Kleban-Byk Reservoir. Fighting continues for the villages of Yablunivka and Oleksandro-Kalynove, with new video footage showing Russian soldiers in the latter. So far, they have not been dislodged from there. Russian forces are also advancing near the village of Romanivka. Despite these Russian gains, the AFU continue to hold the remaining part of the "bulge" south of the reservoir.

A bit further west, in the Kostiantynivka (Pokrovsk) direction, Russian forces are advancing near the villages of Popiv Yar and Novotoretske, and have also captured the village of Razine on the eastern flank of the Pokrovsk direction.

The Russian MoD announced the capture of the village of Mykolaivka. The pro-Russian Dva Mayora [Two Majors] Telegram channel assumed that this referred to Mykolaivka located southwest of the town of Chasiv Yar. However, we believe that the RuAF most likely occupied the village of Mykolaivka located in the contested territory near the village of Novoekonomichne, northeast of the town of Myrnohrad—on the eastern flank of the Pokrovsk direction. Later, the Telegram channel corrected its map and marked the captured village as the Mykolaivka near Novoekonomichne, after the mistake was pointed out in the comments under the post. Currently, many settlements with the same name are located near the frontline in various areas, so this kind of confusion is likely to happen again.

In the Novopavlivka direction, the Russian MoD stated that the village of Myrne (called Karl Marx until 2016) was captured. The RuAF continue to attack from the direction of the villages of Tolstoi and Piddubne, attempting to reach the borders of the Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk regions—in particular, advancing toward the village of Novokhatske. West of Tolstoi, Russian forces are moving along the road leading to the now-destroyed bridge over the Vovcha River in the village of Iskra.

The Wall Street Journal published an article titled "A Never-Ending Supply of Drones Has Frozen the Front Lines in Ukraine," claiming that the saturation of the battlefield with drones has effectively halted movement along the frontline. The article primarily reviews the evolution of drone technology since 2022. However, we do not agree with the claim that large-scale attacks involving tanks and other armored vehicles have been almost entirely replaced by assaults carried out by small infantry or motorcycle groups. While it is true that in airspace saturated with reconnaissance drones, it has become impossible to secretly amass a column of armored vehicles for an attack, we strongly believe that the situation would look different if neither army were experiencing shortages of equipment and manpower. In such a case, the frontline would likely be moving much faster, even with active drone use.

It is worth noting that it was previously stated that neither side currently possesses the resources for a large-scale breakthrough. Even if Ukrainian defenses were breached, Russian forces would likely be unable to rapidly seize vast territories. At the same time, the AFU also lack sufficient strength and resources to launch a major counteroffensive. We acknowledge that drones play a significant role, but their impact is not decisive.

In addition to unmanned aerial vehicles, ground robots are increasingly being used on the frontline. These machines are deployed to deliver artillery rounds, evacuate wounded soldiers and transport killed soldiers' bodies. Ukraine’s 47th Mechanized Brigade has released a video showing one such robot driving up to a wounded soldier, who climbs onto the robot's platform before being transported to safety.

The Russian outlet Izvestia [The News, a pro-Kremlin daily broadsheet and TV channel] reported that the RuAF have begun using "railway drones"—remotely operated rail carts powered by batteries, with a range of about 50 km [31 mi]. These unmanned vehicles are more efficient on rails than on conventional roads, but they are also more vulnerable to detection by enemy drones, as railway tracks often run along relatively open, elevated terrain. Moreover, the tracks can be mined.

An unusual tactic is being employed by Ukraine’s 82nd Air Assault Brigade. They use drones to monitor roads where Russian motorcyclists are expected to pass, dropping spike strips capable of puncturing tires ahead of them. This approach resembles police tactics used in some countries to stop fleeing suspects.

Recently, there have been reports of alleged Shahed strikes on moving targets or checkpoints that are not located deep in the rear. It is unclear what drone actually carried out these attacks, but Ukrainian military expert Serhii "Flash" Beskrestnov explained that smaller drones, visually similar to Shahed loitering munitions, are sometimes used for such strikes. These drones are piloted like FPV drones and often carry a 15-kilogram warhead, although some may serve purely as reconnaissance drones without a payload.

Major General Christian Freuding [Head of the Situation Centre Ukraine in the German MoD] stated in an interview with the German broadcaster ZDF that the first Ukrainian long-range weapons funded by Germany will reach the Ukrainian army by the end of July. Although he did not specify exactly what kind of weapons the AFU would receive—some sources incorrectly translated them as "missiles"—most analysts agree that he was referring to the Ukrainian Bars cruise missiles. These were first mentioned by Ukraine’s Minister for Strategic Industries, Herman Smetanin, on April 11 during an event dedicated to the Ukrainian defense sector. It is worth noting that Ukraine has several other domestically developed cruise missile drones, including the Peklo, Palianytsia and Ruta. Two years ago, the only such indigenous development was the R-360 Neptune subsonic cruise missile. Smetanin clarified that the Bars missile was developed by a private company, not a state-owned one. It has a range of up to 800 km [497 mi] and a warhead weighing between 50 and 100 kg. Its main advantage is reportedly its potential for mass production within Ukraine.

According to Freuding, the AFU will receive a three-digit number of these munitions. This is particularly significant given that the 1000 km-range [624 mi] version of the Neptune appears to have been produced in limited numbers and used only sparingly. The only confirmed instance was a strike in Russia’s Krasnodar region. The extent to which the new Bars missile will affect the frontline will depend entirely on how many are made available to the Ukrainian military.

Meanwhile, South Korea’s Yonhap News Agency published an article citing the country’s military intelligence that claims North Korea supplied Russia with 28,000 containers of weapons and artillery munitions. The headline stated that Russia received up to 12 million 152mm artillery rounds from North Korea. However, even if the containers were filled exclusively with rounds of that caliber, the quantity reported would not physically fit within that number of containers.

In April, the Center for Open Data, in collaboration with Reuters, published an analysis estimating that North Korea had by that point delivered 15,000 containers of artillery munitions of various calibers to Russia. Of those, 60 percent were 122mm howitzer rounds, 25 percent were 152mm rounds and 15 percent were 122mm rockets. At the time, the delivery rate was estimated at 750 containers per month. It remains unclear how the total number has nearly doubled in the four months since—from 15,000 to 28,000 containers. Analysts may have revised upward their previous estimates of deliveries from last year, however we do not know if that is the case. It is also unknown how the proportions of different calibers may have shifted, especially as North Korea has since expanded its shipments to include 130mm shells for M-46 guns, 170mm rounds for Koksan M1989 self-propelled howitzers and 107mm rockets used by the North Korean Type 75 multiple rocket launcher.

Western Assistance

The US Congress has introduced a draft of the 2026 National Defense Authorization Act. Despite comments from Pete Hegseth last month suggesting that the administration would not seek additional funding for Ukraine’s defense, lawmakers not only extended the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative through 2028, but also increased its annual funding from $300 million to $500 million. In addition to this core allocation from the Pentagon budget, USAI has previously been supported through supplementary legislation, though it remains unclear whether those additional funding channels will continue. The bill also directs the US Department of Defense to develop a comprehensive maintenance and repair program for all Western equipment delivered to Ukraine. This likely entails creating repair and overhaul facilities—possibly in Poland, Romania, Ukraine or Germany—for tanks, armored vehicles, artillery systems and other equipment. In addition, the legislation requires the defense secretary to maintain intelligence-sharing with Ukraine and enshrines broader security cooperation—including training, supplies and joint coordination—as an official US policy. The Pentagon is also required to present a report on options for accelerating the JUMPSTART program, which facilitates arms deliveries to Ukraine through the Foreign Military Sales mechanism funded by third countries. The draft law further prohibits reducing the US military footprint in Europe or transferring the position of Supreme Allied Commander Europe without formal approval from the Secretary of Defense and an independent assessment from both the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and SACEUR.

Meanwhile, Ukraine’s Air Force has released footage of a Skynex air defense system in operation. The system, manufactured by Rheinmetall, is the most advanced of its class, and Ukraine is its first known user. Skynex uses programmable AHEAD munitions, which detonate mid-air at a calculated point to form a cloud of shrapnel—striking targets with far greater precision and lethality than conventional rounds.

While speaking with journalists, Trump stated that on July 14 he will meet with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, and that the US will send various modern weapons to NATO allies, which they will pay for. In response to a question about Patriot systems, Trump said that Ukraine will receive a certain number of systems and missiles, paid for by the EU.

Ukrainian and Russian Strikes

On July 9, in the village of Pravdyne, Kherson region, a one-year-old boy was killed in a strike by a Molniya drone, and his 64-year-old great-grandmother was injured. The General Staff of the AFU has reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed the Russian drone operators responsible for this strike.

In the evening of July 8, a Ukrainian UAV was shot down over a beach in Kursk. As a result of falling debris and the detonation of the warhead, four people, including a five-year-old boy, were killed and six others were injured.

There are increasing reports of personnel changes in the Ukrainian government. Current Defense Minister Rustem Umerov will become ambassador to the US. He will be replaced by Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal, while the new Prime Minister will be First Deputy Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko.

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