Sitrep for May 23-26, 2025 (as of 7:30 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

In recent days, numerous reports have circulated in the media claiming that Russia is massing troops near the border with the Kharkiv region, allegedly preparing for a large-scale offensive on the cities of Kharkiv and Sumy. However, there is currently no evidence to support such sweeping claims—specifically, no signs of significant redeployment of Russian Armed Forces units to the Belgorod region have been observed.

It is likely that the reports stem from the presence of elements of the Group of Troops "North," which had previously been involved in fighting in the Kursk region. The rumors about a "buildup of forces" appear to have originated from the headline of an interview given by Andriy Pomahaybus, chief of staff of Ukraine’s 13th Operational Brigade "Khartia," to the Ukrainian outlet Suspilne. While the actual comments in the interview were measured and accurate, an assessment also confirmed by DeepState analysts, the headline misrepresented the content, giving the impression that a major Russian offensive on Kharkiv and Sumy was imminent. Nevertheless, DeepState itself has not observed any major changes along this section of the frontline, a view confirmed by 13th AFU brigade servicemen. Russian units in the Belgorod region are indeed receiving reinforcements, but this appears to be aimed at replenishing losses sustained during fighting in the Kursk region.

Western analysts have also picked up the narrative. Military expert Michael Clarke suggested that the presence of paratroopers and naval infantry near the border signals preparations for a major offensive where these forces were spotted. However, based on current observations, these elite units are being redeployed to various sectors, sometimes to critical areas, as attached support units meant to stabilize the frontline, not to spearhead a new offensive.

The Agentstvo [Agency] independent media outlet cites Jack Watling, senior research fellow for land warfare at the Royal United Services Institute, who claims that Russia's stockpiles of Soviet-era military equipment, including tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and artillery systems, will be depleted by mid-autumn. After that point, Russia’s ability to replenish battlefield losses will depend entirely on the pace of new production. While Soviet reserves are inevitably running out, this is not expected to lead to a critical situation for the RuAF on the battlefield. Rather, it is likely to result in a slowdown in the tempo of the war and a reduction in the scale of combat operations. Additionally, Russia may be able to purchase a substantial number of armored vehicles from North Korea, although this would require a lengthy transport process and the training of personnel to operate the equipment.

In this context, it is also worth mentioning a statement by Yaroslav Yakimkin, head of the press center for the Group of Troops "North," who said that the RuAF have begun working on the task of creating a so-called buffer zone. In reality, however, it is reasonable to expect the establishment of small bridgeheads in the border area, which will not be capable of fully serving as an actual buffer zone.

In the Sumy region, a gradual Russian offensive continues: the Russian MoD announced the capture of the village of Loknia. Videos featuring Russian soldiers have emerged from there and south of the village of Bilovody, leading to the conclusion of a possible capture of both villages by the RuAF. (Later, on May 26, the MoD confirmed the capture of the villages of Bilovody and Volodymyrivka.) The Finnish analytical group Blackbird Group shares a similar opinion, while the DeepState map, as has often been the case recently, publishes updates with some delay.

In the Toretsk direction, which has seen increased activity recently, the RuAF advanced northeast of Toretsk near the villages of Dachne and Dyliivka. On the western flank of this direction, the MoD reported the capture of the village of Romanivka, while footage showing combat actions in the village of Zoria has also surfaced. Given that Russian forces are present in both settlements, it is highly likely that the salient south of these areas (including the villages of Hnativka and Stara Mykolaivka) has also been captured. Otherwise, it would be quite dangerous for the AFU to remain there.

Additionally, the RuAF continue to advance from the villages of Novoolenivka and Oleksandropil to the northwest towards the village of Yablunivka and to the northeast towards the village of Popiv Yar.

In the Novopavlivka (Kurakhove) direction, footage has emerged showing Russian soldiers with a flag in the village of Bohdanivka. According to the MoD, it was captured in late April. Nearby is the village of Troitske, where, according to DeepState, a video was reportedly taken showing a supposed advance to the border of the Dnipropetrovsk region.

In the South Donetsk direction, the RuAF have advanced in the village of Odradne, southwest of the village of Bahatyr. Judging by the fact that the video was filmed in different parts of the village, it has been completely taken. Our understanding of the frontline in this direction also differs from that depicted on the DeepState map. We believe that the territory south of Odradne and Bahatyr and southeast of the villages of Kostiantynopil and Andriivka has come under Russian control. It is uncertain whether the delay in updating the map is due to objective factors or to agreements between the DeepState UA team and Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense.

Additionally, the RuAF have advanced in the area of the village of Zelene Pole, which may indicate partial or full control of the territory south of Zelene Pole and the village of Novosilka, near the border with the Zaporizhzhia region.

The railway line passing through the occupied territories in southern Ukraine is in focus again. Russian authorities intended to restore this line to establish direct rail connections from the Krasnodar region through the entire south of Ukraine to Crimea. Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense posted a video of UAV strikes on a fuel train, geolocated on the railway section from Melitopol to Molochansk. Thus, we cannot claim that the entire line is fully operational, but at least it is partially functioning.

The Washington Post published an article assessing the strategic outlook of the war based on comments from senior American and European officials and military experts. It states that Russia's advantage on the battlefield in Ukraine has begun to diminish, and by next year, the RuAF may face a serious shortage of manpower and weapons. According to some reports, the current recruitment rate is about 30,000 contract soldiers per month. Due to the lack of verified information, we cannot confirm or deny this information. As we've noted earlier, the depletion of armored vehicle stocks will undoubtedly affect the army's capabilities. It is worth noting that Michael Kofman, in his War on the Rocks podcast, has repeatedly stated that the peak of the Russian army's combat capabilities occurred in 2024, and from now on, its potential will steadily decline.

According to a DeepState chart tracking RuAF advances in Ukraine, the peak of Russian success came in October–November 2024, and in recent months, a decline has been observed. Nevertheless, Putin apparently believes he is winning, and that the moment is approaching when the Ukrainian army will be exhausted, the frontline will collapse, and soldiers will flee. This, in his view, would allow Russia to seize much more territory and win the war. We are confident that such a scenario is not feasible in the foreseeable future: the current level of artillery and equipment supplies to Ukraine is sufficient to maintain the ongoing pace of the war. Despite the continued shortage of personnel, Ukraine’s mobilization base is generally large enough, and in a truly critical situation, mobilization measures could be expanded to quickly replenish troop numbers.

On the other hand, it is unrealistic to expect the rapid depletion of the Russian army—an outcome that would enable Ukraine to persuade the US and Europe to urgently supply large quantities of weapons and help liberate all occupied territories. In the event of a critical situation, Putin is likely to announce a second wave of mobilization and send newly conscripted soldiers into battle without adequate support from armored vehicles.

Claims that the Russian army’s use of outdated weapons such as the M-46 130mm towed field gun indicates a shortage of artillery or barrels are not entirely accurate. In fact, the reintroduction of these guns is reportedly linked to the availability of 130mm shells, a rare caliber compatible with these older systems, thanks to Russia’s allies. It appears that the Russian army is not experiencing shortages of barrels for 152mm and 122mm calibers. Over the course of three years of war, the defense industry has managed to resume production of barrels up to six meters in length, suitable for systems such as the Msta-B howitzer, the Msta-S SPH, and the 2S1 Gvozdika 122mm SPH. However, challenges persist with large-caliber artillery—specifically the Giatsint and Pion gun families. As a substitute for the latter, Russia has reportedly begun procuring Koksan M1989 SPHs from North Korea. Currently, the primary limitation facing Russian artillery is not the availability of guns or barrels, but rather a shortage of shells. Nevertheless, it would be misguided to expect the Russian army to become so depleted that Putin would be compelled to end the war. Russia retains sufficient reserves to sustain prolonged fighting, even with minimal strategic gains.

The JPMorganChase Center for Geopolitics has issued a report stating that the war has entered its final stage and reviewing scenarios for ending it. About two or three months ago, it would have been reasonable to consider a ceasefire, as there have been no significant advances on the battlefield. In this context, it would have been logical for Putin to freeze the war and reap the benefits of the Trump administration's favorable attitude, such as the lifting of sanctions, an end to international isolation, and economic recovery. However, in recent weeks the Kremlin continues to put forward ultimatums, threatening to advance into the Sumy and Kharkiv regions and continue fighting for another 20 years, which leads us to believe that Russia is not prepared to halt this war.

The Wall Street Journal reports that since February 2025 only about 500 men have signed contracts with the AFU as part of the recruitment program for young men between 18 and 24 years of age. This can hardly be seen as a sign of the program's failure, since it was originally initiated as a response to the Biden administration’s demand to bring down the mobilization age. In the absence of pressure on Zelenskyy it is possible that the program was no longer actively promoted.

On May 25, a large-scale 1,000 for 1,000 prisoner exchange was completed. In addition to Ukrainian servicemen, 120 civilians returned to Ukraine. Colonel General Alexander Fomin, Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, stated that the agreements reached in Istanbul regarding the exchange had been fully implemented. Of the 120 Russian civilians, around 70 were individuals convicted by Ukrainian courts for collaborating with Russian authorities in occupied territories. The remaining individuals are likely Russian citizens who were evacuated from a combat zone in the Kursk region to Ukrainian territory. They are now unable to return to Russia because they crossed the Ukrainian border illegally.

Ukrainian and Russian Strikes

On May 23, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement promising an "adequate response" to the mass Ukrainian drone attacks that had taken place since May 20. In recent days, Russia has once again launched large-scale airstrikes on Ukrainian cities using Iskander ballistic missiles, Kh-101, Kh-22 and Kh-59/69 cruise missiles, Kalibr cruise missiles, and Shahed-136 (Geran-2) loitering munitions.

Yurii Ihnat, spokesman for the Air Force Command of the AFU, has recently raised eyebrows claiming that Russia had upgraded its Iskander-M ballistic missiles, making them harder to intercept. According to Ihnat, the Russian military has begun equipping the Iskander missiles with thermal decoys and programming them to maneuver during the terminal phase of flight.

Such assertions, however, appear to be at odds with technical realities. Even if thermal decoy flares were added to the Iskander missiles, they would have little impact on interception rates, as the PAC-3 interceptors used by the Patriot missile defense system do not rely on heat signatures for targeting. Instead, interceptor missiles use radar-guided homing to engage targets.

Moreover, recent modifications to the Iskander system reportedly involved replacing countermeasure containers in the missile’s tail section with a Kometa satellite navigation antenna, improving the missile’s spatial accuracy. Similarly, the Iskander's ability to perform in-flight maneuvers is not new and has long been acknowledged.

The real concern regarding the PAC-3 missiles lies elsewhere: the high frequency of aerial assaults has led to a significant expenditure of interceptors, with large quantities of missiles expanded to counter each attack. Each PAC-3 missile carries a price tag of $3 million to $5 million, and annual production is limited to roughly 650 units. This imbalance has prompted concerns about an impending shortage.

It has also been known for some time that Russian Kh-101 cruise missiles are equipped with thermal decoys. However, MIM-23 Hawk interceptors, like the PAC-3s, do not rely on thermal targeting; they use radar guidance, allowing them to engage cruise missiles effectively despite the decoys.

Over the weekend, at least 27 people were killed on both sides of the frontline amid ongoing strikes, including one fatality from a UAV attack in Russia’s Bryansk region. An additional 131 civilians were reportedly injured.

Meanwhile, President Donald Trump took to his Truth Social platform to denounce both Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Trump called Putin "crazy" and accused him of killing innocent Ukrainian civilians without justification. At the same time, he criticized Zelenskyy for his public remarks. Despite Trump’s sharp rhetoric, there is little expectation that it will translate into increased military aid for Ukraine.

Ukraine continues to carry out strikes on various targets within Russian territory. The Russian Ministry of Defense reported that over 1,000 Ukrainian UAVs had been shot down over the course of 2.5 days. Unlike Russian forces, the AFU targets industrial facilities rather than cities. However, the strike near a gas station in the town of Lgov, Kursk region, on the evening of May 22, is considered controversial. The HIMARS MLRS is an area-effect weapon, and its use within populated areas is prohibited. The strike targeted a concentration of military vehicles, killing three servicemen and injuring nine others, but it also affected 12 civilians, including two children. International law experts will assess the proportionality of the military advantage versus the harm to civilians.

On March 24, the AFU struck the Azot chemical plant in Novomoskovsk, Tula region, which produces, among other things, nitric acid used in the manufacturing of explosives and gunpowder.

In the early hours of May 23, the AFU struck the Energiya plant in Yelets, Lipetsk region, where batteries for UAVs, Iskander missiles and glide bombs are produced. Footage of the aftermath shows damage to the workshops, but we doubt this will have a significant impact on the plant’s operations.

A published video showing a Ukrainian Mitsubishi L200 driving with shredded tires clearly illustrates a point made in the previous sitrep: motorcycles are poorly suited for assault operations, as unlike a car, a motorcycle would already be immobilized in such a situation.

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