Sitrep for May 20-23, 2025 (as of 8:30 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

In the Toretsk direction, the Russian army continues to build on its tactical breakthrough, with advances reported near the village of Novoolenivka. Russia’s Ministry of Defense has announced the full capture of the village of Nova Poltavka; based on the DeepState map, this may reflect reality. In this area, the Russian Armed Forces are increasingly straightening the frontline, also making gains near the villages of Stara Mykolaivka, Romanivka and Leonidivka.

Reports occasionally emerge from the town of Chasiv Yar—the future eastern flank of the Kostiantynivka direction — suggesting that Russian soldiers have established positions at various locations. However, there have been no significant changes in the situation recently.

In the Novopavlivka (Kurakhove) direction, Russian forces have advanced near the villages of Nadiivka (Nadezhdynka) and Novooleksandrivka. A frame from a video allegedly filmed at the border of the Dnipropetrovsk and Donetsk regions has been published: it shows an abandoned Ukrainian pickup truck entangled in barbed wire and Russian soldiers holding a flag. According to DeepState, citing Ukrainian troops, the video was actually filmed near the village of Troitske, although it is extremely difficult to geolocate it precisely from a single frame. Some pro-Russian bloggers claim that the soldiers were killed after withdrawing from the filming location, while others deny this.

There is little doubt that the RuAF still intend to reach the administrative border of the Dnipropetrovsk region and seize a small strip of territory along it. While currently, they can at best make it there for a flag photo op, it is likely that this objective will be achieved in the summer. As before, no large-scale offensive deeper into the Dnipropetrovsk region—such as toward Pavlohrad or other cities—is expected. Nonetheless, the current advance has negative consequences: the village of Mezhova (approximately 15 km [10mi] from the frontline), a key logistics hub for supplying Ukrainian forces near the village of Novopavlivka, is now within range of Russian drones.

Rumors have emerged about the infiltration of a Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance group into the Bryansk region. Initially, it was reported that a group of approximately 10 individuals was spotted near the village of Vygonichi, about 80 km [50 mi] from the border and 20 km [12 mi] from the city of Bryansk. As a result, nearby roads were closed, and a sweep operation began—no confirmations of this have been published. Later, there were reports of the elimination of the saboteurs, as well as claims that no such group actually existed. It is possible that local residents mistook a group of soldiers in camouflage without military insignia for a Ukrainian sabotage group.

Vladimir Putin once again stated his intention to create a buffer zone to protect the residents of the Kursk region from attacks. Some speculated that this referred to a buffer zone along the entire border between Russia and Ukraine. It is worth noting that an attempt to establish such a zone in the Kharkiv region during the offensive in May 2024 was unsuccessful—only two small bridgeheads were established near the village of Lyptsi and the town of Vovchansk, which are incapable of serving as a buffer zone, as they can be targeted by virtually any weapon and cannot protect the Russian border from drones. Currently, resources are being wasted on these bridgeheads, and from a military perspective, the RuAF should have retreated from there long ago. The RuAF currently lack the resources to create and maintain buffer zones—unless they redeploy some units from other directions, which would weaken their defense. It is worth noting that even pro-Russian bloggers doubt the feasibility of establishing such zones.

At the same time, we expect the RuAF to continue consolidating in the border area of the Sumy region; however, it is unlikely that a full-fledged buffer zone can be established there either.

The AFU have reportedly created their first motorcycle assault company based on the 425th Skala Separate Assault Regiment. Footage of combat operations involving fighters from this company has been published, geolocated in the area of the village of Novy Put in the Glushkovsky district of the Kursk region.

We consider this a sign of a shortage of armored vehicles in the AFU, as it is hard to imagine that motorcycles would have been chosen instead of Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, MRAPs like the International MaxxPro, or other armored vehicles had they been available. This is especially true since moving on motorcycles near the frontline is significantly more dangerous for soldiers due to the lack of armor. Nevertheless, assaults on motorcycles are still better than on-foot attacks. The claimed advantages—such as being able to accelerate to nearly 100 km/h [62 mph] across rough terrain or to operate at night—seem rather questionable to us. Firing small arms from the passenger seat over the driver’s shoulder, without tactical hearing protection, is harmful to the driver's hearing. Moreover, even an anti-personnel mine can stop a motorcycle, and the driver is completely unprotected from such an explosion—unlike in a car, a motorcycle cannot continue moving with a flat tire. It is also impossible to approach enemy positions undetected due to the loud noise, and defenders can simply open fire and prevent the motorcycle from getting close.

However, we do not view the use of cheap Chinese Racer Enduro motorcycles negatively (despite some pro-Russian bloggers criticizing the AFU for this), because they are essentially expendable equipment, only needed to transport soldiers to the frontline. The suicidal tactic of motorcycle assaults, as used by the RuAF, was described by the Ukrainian drone-operator Telegram channel Hostri Kartuzy [Peaky Blinders].

According to Wall Street Journal sources, Trump finally has realized that Putin does not want to end the war—this was relayed to journalists by high-ranking European officials after phone talks between Putin and Trump, during which Putin reportedly made it clear to the American president that he believes he is winning the war. We doubt this will lead to any positive actions on Trump’s part.

We believe that Ukraine's current objective is to stabilize the frontline. This would demonstrate to Russian leadership that exhausting the Ukrainian army is impossible, potentially forcing Putin to reconsider his goals or seek to freeze the war. So far, the AFU have been unable to accomplish this task.

Drones have significantly changed the war, but Russia is also trying to adapt to this problem, periodically finding weak points in Ukrainian defense and executing localized tactical breakthroughs. Jack Watling, senior research fellow for land warfare at the Royal United Services Institute from the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) wrote in a recent report that the Russian army has focused on identifying drone operator positions. It uses radio-technical reconnaissance and direction finding to locate UAV operators, then strikes them with fiber-optic drones or glide bombs. This is becoming increasingly effective–over more than three years of war, Russia's kill chain has shortened considerably.

The New York Times reported that the Russian MoD is developing military infrastructure on the Finnish border. We do not believe the activity at the tent city in Kamenka is in any way connected to a potential confrontation between Russia and Europe. The RuAF has been training recruits there for several decades, and we see nothing unusual in these images.

Analyst Covert Cabal published a new study on the amount of equipment at Russian soldiers' unit locations: from bases located far from European borders (in the CMD and EMD), virtually all equipment has been removed, while only some has been taken from others. The Kaliningrad region has somehow become an exception—almost everything has been removed from there as well. One might assume that some old equipment is being left at bases for subsequent deployment to military units along the European border, which are gradually being established in the Leningrad Military District.

Mediazona [independent Russian media outlet] analyzed data from the Central Bank, according to which more than half a million "frontline" payment holidays, granted upon signing a contract with the MoD, have been issued in Russia. This procedure can only be used once, so this data indirectly helps estimate the rate of replenishment of the ranks of the RuAF. In the first quarter of 2025, such benefits were issued almost 55.9 thousand times. This is slightly less than in the last quarter of 2024—65 thousand—which was the record quarter for recruiting new soldiers for the war to date. It should be noted that this method of calculation has some margin of error, since the time intervals between the moment of signing the contract and issuing the payment holiday and between signing the contract and receiving the sign-up bonuses from the budget differ. Also, the share of people who apply for such holidays remains unknown.

In the third quarter of 2024, according to data from the Russian national budget, about 50-60 thousand people received sign-up bonuses, while 54 thousand were granted payment holidays—a nearly 1 to 1 ratio. However, in the first quarter of 2024, 73 thousand contracts were signed, but only 33 thousand payment holidays were issued—more than 2 to 1 ratio. These calculations suggest that the actual recruitment figures are closer to Western analysts’ estimates of 25-30 thousand people per month than to the 50-60 thousand people per month claimed by Putin.

Ukrainian and Russian Strikes

On May 21, prolonged attacks by Ukrainian drones on targets within Russia began. Every 3-5 hours, the MoD reported shooting down several more Ukrainian drones. The raids continued in the early hours of May 23. RBC [Russian media group] published a map of attacks on Russian regions and an infographic on airport closures.

Due to drone raids in the Lipetsk, Tula, and Vladimir regions, mobile internet was shut down. Most drones aimed at distant targets follow a pre-programmed route and do not require mobile communication for control. We assume that they may use mobile networks to transmit their coordinates and video feed back to the operator, allowing confirmation of strike results and gathering information on areas where air defense systems are effective.

The Supernova+ Telegram channel suggested that the target of the Ukrainian attack on the Oryol region on May 21 may have been the semiconductor device plant in the town of Bolkhov. Later, the head of the region, Andrey Klychkov, confirmed that the building of the Bolkhov Semiconductor Devices Plant had been hit. The extent of the damage is currently unknown.

In the early hours of May 22, during a drone attack on the Tula region, one of the active workshops of NPO Splav, which belongs to the Rostec state corporation, was struck. Splav manufactures MLRS, air-to-surface missiles, Solntsepyok heavy flamethrower systems, and related munitions. Reports mentioned a fire breaking out, but the extent of the damage is still unclear.

On May 22, Ukrainian drones struck an oil refinery in Ryazan: NASA’s Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) detected a fire on the premises of a Rosneft facility in Ryazan.

In addition, UAVs have been targeting the Moscow region. There are video recordings of a strike on Patriot Park, but the results of the attack remain unclear.

The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed that a 9K720 Iskander mobile short-range ballistic missile system destroyed a Patriot air defense system in the Dnipropetrovsk region. However, the quality of the video does not allow for confirmation of what was actually hit.

The Ukrainian National Guard confirmed that on May 20, Russian forces launched a missile strike on a shooting range in Shostka, Sumy region, resulting in the deaths of six soldiers and injuries to over ten others. The unit commander has been dismissed, and an investigation is underway.

Former advisor to the Ukrainian mayor of Mariupol, Petro Andryushchenko, claimed that Russia is preparing to connect the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant to its own power grid in the coming weeks. Construction of a distribution hub and a compressor station has reportedly been completed in the Mariupol and Berdiansk areas. However, it remains unclear how Russia plans to fill the plant’s cooling pond or deal with temperature management, given the receding water levels of the Dnipro River following the destruction of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Station Dam.

The Pentagon’s Defense Intelligence Agency has reported that Russia has begun equipping its air-to-air missiles—likely R-37M—with tactical nuclear warheads. Rumors about these modifications have circulated since 2018. While these types of weapons were historically intended to be used against large bomber formations, it is uncertain how the Russian MoD plans to deploy them now.

Our team has published a new study analyzing the military hardware showcased in this year’s Victory Day parades. It is worth noting that 2025 marks the 80th anniversary of the Allied victory in World War II, and celebrations have been scaled up accordingly. At the main parade on Moscow’s Red Square, the number of tracked vehicles rose significantly compared to previous years. The total number of military vehicles on display in Moscow increased by 2.5 times over the previous year—from 60 to 153. This surge was largely driven by the inclusion of tanks, armored fighting vehicles, armored cars, artillery systems, and support vehicles. Aircraft presence, however, remained minimal. We anticipate that next year’s parade may see a return to the more modest vehicle counts of the 2022-24 period.

On May 20, speaking in front of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio claimed that the Syrian Government is "weeks away from potential collapse and a full-scale civil war of epic proportions." Neither we nor our Western colleagues who study Syria agree with this statement, as there is nothing to suggest an imminent collapse or conflict. Apart from some disagreements with the government, most groups, including the Kurds and Druze, are close to being unified for the first time in decades, while almost all concerns of stability are the result of terror attacks by Assadists and ISIS. It can only be assumed that Rubio’s claim is the result of influence from Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard, a long-time supporter of the Assad regime.

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