Sitrep for May 13-16, 2025 (as of 10:30 a.m. UTC+3)
Frontline Situation Update
In the Lyman direction, Russia's Ministry of Defense claimed the full capture of the village of Torske, located south of the village of Terny. Although they published a video showing Russian soldiers and a Russian flag, the capture could not be verified.
DeepState released photos of Ukrainian soldiers capturing Russian troops in Torske and stated that the flag video had been filmed before May 9—before the so-called ceasefire began.
After that, fighters from the 63rd Separate Mechanized Brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine pushed the Russian infantry out of the village. Thus, Torske can only be considered a gray zone. It is worth noting that as of May 14, civilians were still present in the village. One of them was killed in a UAV attack that day.
In the Toretsk direction, active fighting is ongoing on the western flank. The Russian Armed Forces are gradually straightening the frontline by occupying a newly formed pocket stretching from the town of Toretsk to the village of Oleksandropil. Combat operations are already taking place near the village of Romanivka and the settlement of Zoria. As of May 12, civilians were still present in Zorya—one of them was killed in Russian airstrikes. Additionally, Russian advances have been noted near the villages of Novoolenivka and Nova Poltavka, close to the Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka highway. It is worth noting that these operations appear to be preparations for a further offensive toward the town of Kostiantynivka.
On the adjacent eastern flank of the Pokrovsk direction, Russia’s Ministry of Defense reported the capture of the villages of Myroliubivka and Mykhailivka, located right next to each other.
In a video recorded in Myrolyubivka, footage first showed soldiers with a Russian flag, followed by scenes of combat and strikes on enemy equipment. This sequence does not convincingly demonstrate that the village was captured. Instead, it suggests that fighting is still ongoing. However, a later video appeared showing Russian troops moving freely through different parts of the village. Nevertheless, according to the DeepState project map, at the time of the sitrep, Myroliubivka is marked as a contested area. According to some reports, the RuAF were able to flank the Myroliubivka reservoir from the west and enter Myroliubivka through Mykhailivka from the western side.
The advance in this area is forming a future eastern "pincer" necessary for capturing the town of Pokrovsk. Although Russian positions are relatively close to the town, it is reasonable to expect that fighting in Pokrovsk itself will not begin until early summer. The Russian tactics in this direction involve encircling the city from two sides and attempting to cut off supply routes. For this, the eastern flank of the encirclement must extend to Myrnohrad, and before that, the RuAF need to advance from the villages of Malynivka and Myroliubivka to the village of Novoekonomichne. Additionally, it is necessary to continuously strengthen the flanks of the encircling group to prevent the AFU from unexpectedly cutting it off and isolating part of the Russian forces. After this, the RuAF may attempt to advance to Rodynske to approach Pokrovsk from three sides. Only after the complete formation of the pincers will the Russian forces attack the town itself. According to our preliminary assessment, completing the aforementioned tasks may extend until the end of summer.
It is difficult to estimate the time required for such maneuvers due to the unevenness of combat operations and the need for Russian command to constantly seek weak points in the Ukrainian defense to avoid getting bogged down in fighting with Ukrainian reinforcements. This is what happened in the South Donetsk direction, where Ukrainian military observer Kostiantyn Mashovets suggested back in January 2025 that the RuAF would attempt to occupy the territory between the villages of Novopil, Zelene Pole, and Novosilka in the Donetsk region. In early February, Russian troops indeed made an attempt to advance toward Novosilka, but then their offensive stalled until early May—although fighting continued, there was no progress. In the first half of May, however, they managed to achieve some success.
There have been some personnel changes in the RuAF: Colonel General Andrey Mordvichev was removed from his position as Commander of the Central Military District and appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces of the RuAF. Previously, this position was held by General Oleg Salyukov, who has now been appointed Deputy Secretary of the Security Council of Russia, likely as an honorary retirement. Colonel General Valery Solodchuk has been appointed Commander of the CMD—it is not yet entirely clear whether he will also command the Group of Troops "Center." If Mordvichev continues to lead the Group of Troops "Center," then, considering that he would be facing Ukrainian General Drapatyi, who simultaneously holds the position of Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces and leads the Group of Troops "Khortytsia," a battle between two commanders-in-chief of ground forces may unfold in the Pokrovsk direction.
In the Novopavlivka (Kurakhove) direction, according to the MoD, the RuAF have captured the village of Novooleksandrivka. Recently, there has indeed been a sense that Russian soldiers were trying to reach the border with the Dnipropetrovsk region as quickly as possible—less than 10 km [6 mi] remain. It is worth noting that they did not manage to achieve this by May 9. Footage has emerged showing fighting involving both armored vehicles and motorcycles.
In the Novopavlivka (Kurakhove) direction, a local "road of death" has appeared near the village of Solone, northeast of Novooleksandrivka. However, in this case, it is not lined with burned-out vehicles (which we interpret as a sign of their shortage in the Russian army), but with the bodies of foot soldiers. It is worth noting that "roads of death" have also appeared in other directions: the Kharkiv and Pokrovsk directions (for the RuAF), and the Bakhmut and Kursk directions (for the AFU).
Russian forces have also advanced in the Novopavlivka (Kurakhove) direction, specifically in the village of Bahatyr. As in several other cases, a typical tactic was used for storming populated areas in the absence of sufficient armored vehicles: soldiers either tried to run in small groups to the first houses or ride in on motorcycles in order to gain a foothold on the outskirts as quickly as possible. Once reinforcements arrive, they would then proceed to attack enemy positions. As we have explained multiple times, it is extremely difficult to dislodge soldiers from houses — which is why both sides use artillery and airstrikes to virtually level abandoned buildings that could serve as shelters for the enemy.
Russian soldiers continue to actively use motorcycles on the frontline, and are also training to ride them at ranges, including overcoming barbed wire obstacles—in one case, a motorcycle was used as a bridge.
In addition, a video emerged showing a Russian soldier on a motorcycle crashing after failing to gain enough speed to jump over an anti-tank ditch on sandy terrain. By the way, it is possible that soldiers returning from the war in Ukraine could form criminal motorcycle gangs—a phenomenon similar to what happened in the US after World War II.
A video from the Belgorod region has surfaced, showing a woman returning to her home only to find Russian soldiers inside, along with their vehicles stored in her garage. This is not the first instance of Russian soldiers occupying civilian homes: back in March, a video was released showing residents of the Belgorod region accusing Russian soldiers of looting their homes. By occupying residential houses, Russian soldiers also pose a danger to civilians, since Ukrainian drones could detect the soldiers or their equipment and mark those houses as targets.
Peace Talks
Negotiating teams from Ukraine and Russia convened in Istanbul on May 16. A day earlier, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy criticized the level of representation in the Russian delegation, calling it "theatrical," and announced that Ukraine’s delegation would be led by Defense Minister Rustem Umerov.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated that he would not attend Friday’s discussions with the Russian side.
Within the Conflict Intelligence Team, opinions remain divided over the best strategic approach for Ukraine. Analyst Ruslan Leviev argues that Kyiv should not fear alienating Donald Trump by refusing to engage with a delegation headed by Vladimir Medinsky, and should instead insist on a direct presidential meeting. Other members of CIT more closely align with the likely stance of Zelenskyy’s office: that a willingness to engage in any format of negotiations ensures continued access to US intelligence and the military assistance allocated by President Joe Biden.
Ukrainian and Russian Strikes
​​Over the past week, only one long-range Russian missile strike was recorded. On May 14, a missile hit a factory in the city of Sumy, killing three civilians. Photos from the scene show road wheels from T-80 and T-72 tanks, suggesting that the facility may have been involved in the repair of such vehicles. While that would make the site a legitimate military target, its civilian employees are not, and the attacking side is obligated to minimize civilian casualties. Because the strike occurred during daylight hours, resulting in civilian deaths, we tend to characterize the attack as a war crime.
On May 16, Ukraine’s Air Force reported the loss of another F-16 fighter jet. During an aerial interception, the aircraft experienced technical issues. The pilot steered the plane away from populated areas before ejecting safely. There are no indications at this time that the aircraft was shot down by Russian forces.
Western Assistance
Norwegian Defense Minister Tore O. Sandvik announced that Norway will deliver the promised F-16 fighter aircraft to Ukraine by the end of 2025. It is claimed that some of the jets have already been sent to Ukraine.
On May 14, the Estonian Navy attempted to detain a tanker belonging to Russia’s shadow fleet. In response, a Russian Su-35S fighter jet prevented an Estonian helicopter from approaching the vessel to deploy boarding forces. Estonia accused Russia of violating its airspace. According to Russian sources, the tanker was sailing under the flag of Gabon, but the European side claims it was flagless, as it had been removed from Gabon's ship registry, which they argue gave legal grounds for its detention.
The UK Ministry of Defense published high-resolution satellite images showing the aftermath of the fire at the 51st GRAU arsenal in Kirzhach, Vladimir region, on April 22. The fire resulted in the largest artillery round loss of the entire war. The cause appears to be negligence or careless handling of fire.
Putin stated that the Russian army is recruiting 50,000 to 60,000 volunteer fighters per month. This figure is twice as high as the peak rate observed so far. Such a sharp increase in the number of volunteer fighters would be noticeable, therefore we doubt the accuracy of that number. Rob Lee, Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, also estimates that Russia is recruiting about 30,000 people per month.
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