Sitrep for Jan. 24-27, 2025 (as of 10:30 a.m. UTC+3)
Frontline Situation Update
On the Vremivka salient, Russian forces appear to have captured the village of Velyka Novosilka. This is evidenced by geolocated videos showing Russian soldiers raising flags in various parts of the village and freely moving through its streets. Russia's Ministry of Defense has already announced the capture of Velyka Novosilka on its Telegram channel. However, since Ukrainian command has not officially confirmed the loss of the village, and the 110th Mechanized Brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which is operating in this area, reported on Jan. 26 that fighting for the village is still ongoing, analysts from DeepState seem to be refraining from explicitly confirming its capture.
The 110th Mechanized Brigade's statement also noted that there was no threat of encirclement and that troops managed to retreat from areas where such a threat had materialized, "taking advantage of weather conditions." It emphasized that all actions were aimed at minimizing losses. However, this claim raises doubts, as pro-Russian Telegram channels have posted footage showing the bodies of soldiers wearing yellow armbands.
While some of these troops may have been killed earlier, the fact that their bodies were not evacuated suggests that the retreat might have been sudden rather than planned. This is further supported by a video reportedly found on the phone of an AFU soldier during the capture of the village. In the footage, soldiers harshly criticize the leadership of the Khortytsia Operational Group of Forces for ordering them to remain in Velyka Novosilka at all costs.
Even if Ukrainian forces did manage to retreat without significant losses, we believe that the command delayed the withdrawal of troops from operational encirclement. In similar situations, such a strategy could lead to complete encirclement and unnecessary losses.
Additionally, the 110th Mechanized Brigade's statement mentioned that there was parity between the AFU and the RuAF in terms of artillery and UAVs. However, the Ukrainian garrison was significantly outnumbered in infantry, which ultimately became the decisive factor.
In the Kurakhove (Novopavlivka) direction, where what we assumed to be rear-guard fighting began about a week ago near the villages of Shevchenko and Zelenivka, the withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from the remaining part of the bulge in the suburbs of Kurakhove has still not occurred. We may have been mistaken in our earlier assessment, and it appears that Ukrainian units in this pocket were ordered to hold their positions as long as possible. The fighting near Shevchenko and Zelenivka might have been aimed at preventing Russian forces from advancing toward the N-15 highway. Over the past two days, however, Russian forces regained some positions in these areas and advanced toward the village of Andriivka. The DeepState map marks a small area of territory under Russian control on the outskirts of Andriivka, separated by a contested zone from the captured territories in the villages of Shevchenko and Petropavlivka. This configuration reflects a common Russian tactic when a group of assault troops disembarks on the outskirts of a settlement and occupies buildings. Pushing them out in such cases often proves to be quite difficult. Additionally, Russian forces have slightly expanded their zone of control in the Sukhi Yaly River valley.
In this and similar situations, the Ukrainian command has faced a dilemma, to retreat from a dangerous area a week earlier, saving the lives of soldiers but officially announcing the loss of the territory, or to hold positions as long as possible with significant losses to emphasize the defenders' resilience and announce the retreat much later. We believe the first scenario to be preferable and hope that the new leadership of the Khortytsia operational-strategic group will improve the situation on the frontline in the Donetsk region.
Volodymyr Zelenskyy has appointed Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi as the commander of this group, who will retain his position as commander of the AFU ground forces. Previously, the Khortytsia group was led by Brigadier General Andrii Hnatov, who has now been appointed Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the AFU to "improve coordination between the staff and the frontline." Drapatyi, regarded by many as an experienced commander, is known for leading the liberation of Mariupol in 2014 and commanding the Kharkiv operational-tactical group in 2024 during the RuAF offensive in the Kharkiv region.
In the Pokrovsk direction, Russian forces continue advancing on the western flank, however, no significant changes have been observed.
In the Toretsk direction, the RuAF are expanding their zone of control within the town limits. In the near future, Toretsk will most likely be completely captured and the direction renamed the Kostyantynivka direction.
Last week, we reported on the statement by the Russian side about the discovery of bodies of civilians in the basements of houses in the village of Russkoye Porechnoye in the Kursk region. It is worth noting that since the beginning of the Kursk operation of the AFU, this village, situated in the contested area, has never been occupied or been a part of the Ukrainian rear. Izvestia [The News, a Russian pro-Kremlin daily broadsheet newspaper and a news channel], citing Russian courts, reported the arrest of captured AFU soldier Yevhen Fabrisenko on suspicion of raping and murdering six women in Russkoye Porechnoye. According to investigators, Fabrisenko and other Ukrainian servicemen killed at least six residents of the village between Sept. 29 and Oct. 1, 2024. They were also accused of raping, “other sexual acts,” and then murdering six women. The rapid attribution of guilt raises doubts about the integrity of the investigators, especially given the poor preservation of the bodies of the victims. It can be assumed that after the news about a cellar with presumably killed civilians started to emerge, the Russian side tortured the first Ukrainian prisoner of war they came across to confess to murders and rapes.
Ukrainian Telegram channels have shared a video featuring two Russian men, reportedly residents of the village of Makhnovka in Russia’s Kursk region. The village, located southeast of the Ukrainian bridgehead, had long been a contested area before coming under the control of the AFU last week. According to Ukrainian sources, the men decided to leave Makhnovka and seek help from the Ukrainian commandant's office in Sudzha because North Korean soldiers had entered the village. The men themselves say that in early January they were hiding from the North Koreans, who were shooting at the windows of houses. Later they were discovered by the soldiers and hid together in a cellar until the AFU stormed the area. Perhaps the language barrier the language barrier may prevent the North Korean soldiers from distinguishing Russian civilians from Ukrainian servicemen, creating additional dangers for residents of the Kursk region who have not been evacuated.
Ukrainian and Russian Strikes
Ukrainian strikes on the Russian oil industry and military-industrial complex facilities continue. The Tochnyi [Accurate] project has compiled a timeline of attacks on Russian territory, showing that the most extensive strikes targeted oil refineries in the spring of 2024. By the end of last year and January 2025, the primary targets had shifted to oil storage facilities.
On Jan. 24, during a massive Ukrainian drone attack, the Kremny El plant near Bryansk, which produces microelectronics, including components for the Pantsir-S1 and the 9K720 Iskander systems, was attacked again.
Previously, this military factory had been targeted by UAVs on Oct. 19, 2024. At that time, a statement on the plant’s website announced a suspension of operations due to the attack. However, researchers from the CyberBoroshno project, after analyzing satellite images, concluded that the damage was minor and that the official statement was disinformation intended to prevent further attacks on the facility. After the latest attack, the consequences of which have not yet been independently verified, the plant’s press service again announced a suspension of operations. Notably, in recent months, Ukrainian forces have begun striking previously targeted facilities again, such as oil depots in the Voronezh and Ryazan regions.
Western Assistance
On Jan 24, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio approved the State Department order to suspend expenditure on most existing foreign aid grants for 90 days, including FMF, Foreign Military Financing. The freeze will not affect military aid to Ukraine which is channelled through USAI, Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, and PDA, Presidential Drawdown Authority, though humanitarian projects in Ukraine, such as support for education, health care and energy infrastructure, have been temporarily suspended. It is likely to prove challenging for other countries to quickly step in and supply much needed transformers, which are crucial in winter due to the item’s long production cycle.
On Jan. 23 and 26, American C-17 military transports were involved in a number of very unusual flights. They left the Ramstein Air Base in Germany and landed at Nevatim Air Base in Israel. A few hours later, they flew to Rzeszów in Poland which serves as the key logistic hub for Western supplies to Ukraine. It is possible that the flights were, in fact, transporting Russian-made weapons to Ukraine seized by Israel from Hezbollah in Lebanon. It is worth noting that on Jan. 22, on the eve of the first flight, Zelenskyy met with Israeli President Isaac Herzog in Davos.
On Jan. 24, the US Senate reached a deadlock in its final vote on the nomination of Pete Hegseth for Secretary of Defense, with the tally evenly split at 50-50, including three Republican senators voting against the nominee. Vice President JD Vance cast the tie-breaking vote, as per Senate rules, securing Hegseth’s confirmation. This outcome marks the weakest level of support for a SecDef since the position was established in 1947. Similar situations have arisen with other cabinet posts, notably during President Donald Trump’s first term, when Betsy DeVos—an influential Republican donor with little experience in public education—was confirmed as Secretary of Education through a tie-breaking vote by then-Vice President Mike Pence. On Jan. 30, the Senate is set to vote on another contentious nominee, Tulsi Gabbard, who is seeking confirmation as Director of National Intelligence.
The Ukrainian analytical publication Vishchun Military has examined satellite images of the 94th GRAU Arsenal, which houses 2S7 Pion self-propelled cannons. A comparison with 2023 images has revealed no changes in the number of stored units. It was previously reported that many of the systems had been cannibalized for spare parts. According to the analysts, the lack of changes in inventory suggests that Russia is unable to resume production of 203mm barrels or ammunition for these systems.
In 2024, we reported that Russia likely cannot manufacture barrels of this caliber, which may explain why North Korean Koksan M1989 self-propelled howitzers are seemingly being supplied as replacements.
A fan of Syrian actor Ghanfan Ghanum posted a humorous tweet about his return to the country, captioning a photo with the name Maher al-Assad, a character Ghanum portrayed in a TV series about the brutality and corruption of Bashar al-Assad's regime. Prominent pro-Assad media figure Omar Rahmon failed to recognize the joke, claiming that armed groups had withdrawn from coastal areas and that Maher al-Assad had returned to Syria under Russian air cover. Some Assad supporters from sleeper cells, believing the claim, celebrated the regime's "return," and took to the streets, firing assault rifles into the air or threatening revolution-minded Syrians on social media. As a result, they were arrested by the new Syrian authorities.
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