Sitrep for Jan. 17-20, 2025 (as of 10 a.m. UTC+3)
Frontline Situation Update
Fighting has begun for the village of Velyka Novosilka in the Vremivka salient, where the situation has worsened significantly in recent days. After Russian forces advanced from the village of Novyi Komar, Velyka Novosilka became encircled on three sides, with the Mokri Yaly River forming the fourth boundary. Escape routes have been cut off, although Ukrainian forces could still cross the river, leaving behind their military equipment. It is plausible that the Armed Forces of Ukraine have already withdrawn from Velyka Novosilka, though no confirmation has been provided. In any case, the capture of the village appears imminent, as the AFU have little strategic advantage in continuing to hold it.
A somewhat similar situation was observed in the Kursk region during the AFU’s attacks on the Glushkovsky district. At that time, the Russian Armed Forces withdrew from a dangerous area by crossing the shallow Seym River.
The remaining part of the salient in the suburbs of the town of Kurakhove, along with the southern segment of the Pokrovsk direction, is often referred to by researchers as the Novopavlivka direction, named after the village of Novopavlivka in the Dnipropetrovsk region, located west of this section of the frontline.
In the vicinity of the village of Zelenivka, situated in the Sukhi Yaly River valley, the AFU are engaged in rear-guard fighting. They have recaptured some RuAF positions which has allowed units stationed in the village of Dachne to withdraw from the pocket without incurring significant losses.
In the Pokrovsk direction, Russian forces continue their gradual advance on the western flank near the villages of Kotlyne and Pishchane.
In the Kursk direction, the AFU managed to recapture RuAF positions in the village of Makhnovka near the town of Sudzha.
The village of Russkoye Porechnoye, located in the northern part of the Ukrainian bridgehead, has remained contested, effectively on the frontline, since nearly the beginning of the AFU's Kursk operation. Unlike Sudzha, the village has neither been occupied nor located in the AFU’s rear. Even now, after counterattacks by the RuAF, it remains outside Russian control and is still classified as a "gray zone."
Reports indicate that after entering this village, Russian soldiers discovered the bodies of seven civilians in the basements of houses. Judging by the level of decomposition (warning: graphic content without censorship), it appears the bodies had been there for several months. Because of this, determining the cause of death and the age of the deceased is almost impossible without an autopsy. One soldier, for instance, noted the presence of hematomas, though these are more likely marks from post-mortem lividity. It is also plausible that the bodies were damaged by animals. At this stage, claims of execution remain unsubstantiated.
The soldiers who discovered the bodies reported that some of them had their hands bound; however, this detail is not corroborated by the video footage. In contrast, video evidence from Bucha clearly showed the deceased with their hands tied behind their backs.
Although Russkoye Porechnoye was not occupied by the AFU, pro-Russian Telegram channels and officials have blamed Ukrainian soldiers for the deaths of the people found in the village. The Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation has opened a criminal case on charges of committing a terrorist act.
We have repeatedly emphasized that the Russian side has not adequately addressed the evacuation of civilians from combat zones, often leaving them to flee on their own. The lack of humanitarian corridors has been a persistent issue. Residents of settlements located close to the frontline face the greatest danger, as they are constantly subjected to various forms of attack, including carpet bombing.
In some cases, UAV operators may have mistaken civilians for soldiers in disguise, as incidents of military personnel wearing civilian clothing were repeatedly documented during the Kursk operation. Civilians hiding in basements could have also been mistakenly attacked by military forces (from either side), as mopping-up operations in captured positions pose the risk of encountering hostile forces in any shelter. Furthermore, civilians seeking shelter in basements risk dying from cold, starvation, dehydration or injuries. Evacuating the wounded from forward positions is extremely difficult, leaving civilians with little to no access to medical care after an attack.
Given these factors, the precise circumstances surrounding the deaths of the civilians remain unclear, making it difficult to favor one version of events over another.
Journalists from Deutsche Welle interviewed Oleksiy Dmitrashkovskyi, a representative of the military commandant's office of the occupied part of the Kursk region. Dmitrashkovskyi reported that approximately 2,000 civilians remain in the area, mostly children and the elderly. Since the onset of combat operations in August 2024, at least 36 civilians have been killed and another 100 have been injured. In total, 112 people have died for various reasons, 40 of whom succumbed to cardiovascular diseases. These figures are not final, as combat operations in the Kursk region are ongoing, and the bodies of killed residents may still be discovered in destroyed homes.
This situation once again highlights the urgent need for authorities to not only assist civilians in leaving combat zones and nearby areas but also enforce mandatory evacuations. Many civilians underestimate the dangers and hope to survive the fighting and attacks by hiding in basements.
During combat in populated areas where civilians are present, armed forces must comply with the requirements of international humanitarian law, wear military uniforms with insignia and use clearly marked military vehicles. The use of civilian vehicles by military personnel endangers civilians by making it difficult for drone operators to identify the enemy.
A video has been published showing two Russian soldiers walking along a dirt road through a field, leaning on crutches or sticks. In recent months, we have often heard complaints from Russian soldiers about being sent to the frontline without adequate medical treatment. However, this is the first time such soldiers have been seen in forward positions, where they are vulnerable to being filmed or attacked by drones. Previously, reports only mentioned injured soldiers or those on crutches stationed in the near rear.
New evidence has emerged of Russian forces using old BTR-50 armored personnel carriers on the frontline. The last confirmed use of these vehicles in active combat was in May 2024.
Meanwhile, a large column of Russian military equipment, sufficient to equip a battalion tactical group, was spotted in Mali. The photos and videos show more than 130 pieces of equipment, including:
- seven T-72B3M tanks;
- 50 armored wheeled vehicles;
- seven BTR-82A APCs;
- five BMP-3 IFVs;
- about 60 wheeled vehicles;
- eight or nine Gazelle vehicles;
- pickup trucks, including armored Toyota Land Cruiser J70;
- several D-30 122mm towed howitzers;
- two river patrol boats.
The Russian military vehicles appear to be operated by local residents. Investigative efforts by the Frontelligence Insight team and researcher Casusbelli have shed light on how this equipment reached the West African nation. Transporting such heavy machinery via air is logistically challenging, given the considerable distance from both Russia and its military bases in Syria. Additionally, air traffic analysts would likely have detected the movements if they had occurred. Intriguingly, some of the vehicles bear "oversized cargo" markings, which are typically used for transport on Russian railways. Sources confirmed sightings of the military equipment crossing the Mali-Guinea border. Visual intelligence documenting these movements was captured near Mali’s capital, Bamako. Since Guinea has access to the Atlantic Ocean, researchers speculate that the vehicles have arrived by sea. Maritime transport data revealed that two Russian ships, the Adler and Siyanie Severa, departed Murmansk in early December 2024 and later docked in a Guinean port.
At the time of the cargo’s departure from Murmansk, the Assad regime in Syria had not yet collapsed, ruling out any direct connection to the region. These developments have sparked outrage among segments of Russia’s pro-military audience, who are dismayed by the sight of modern military technology in Africa while outdated and scarce equipment is being used on the frontlines in Ukraine. Whether the vehicles in Mali will be employed by local armed forces or the Russian MoD’s Africa Corps remains unclear.
A series of disturbing videos have emerged on various Telegram channels, showing Russian soldiers from the 155th Guards Naval Infantry Brigade of the Pacific Fleet displaying severed human heads. While initial footage raised questions about its authenticity, subsequent videos left little doubt about the gruesome events. It is worth noting that this same brigade was implicated in a similar incident in the Belgorod region last year. Speculation abounds that members of the brigade may be financially profiting from these videos, producing them for consumers of extreme gore content.
On Jan. 14, the Senate held hearings to confirm Pete Hegseth as the US Secretary of Defense. After the nominee’s opening speech, senators were given seven minutes each to ask him questions. The role of the Pentagon chief is of particular importance because he, alongside Donald Trump, will influence US policy regarding Russia and Ukraine. His decisions will have an impact on military operations, global security and international armed conflicts. It is expected that the Defense Secretary will be confirmed on Jan. 22 or 23, soon after Trump’s inauguration. Although the hearings were not final, all indications suggest that Hegseth will be confirmed.
It is worth noting that during Trump’s previous term, many of his cabinet ministers and other appointees quickly lost the President’s trust and were dismissed from their positions. It is also noteworthy that Hegseth has had combat experience. He served in the National Guard, although never in high-ranking positions. The largest unit under his command did not exceed 150 or 200 people, which is the size of a company. He retired as a captain and was later promoted to major. It is quite common for a US Defense Secretary to have had combat experience, which stands in contrast to the typical practice in Russia.
Perhaps the most pressing questions during the hearings were asked by Illinois Senator Tammy Duckworth, a Democrat. She aimed to demonstrate that Hegseth lacked the necessary qualifications for the position of Defense Secretary. Like Hegseth, Duckworth served in the National Guard, including in Iraq, and retired in 2014 with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel after 22 years of service—10 years longer than Hegseth. Since Hegseth stated in his opening speech that one of his main priorities as Secretary of Defense would be to combat the "communist Chinese threat" in the Indo-Pacific region, Duckworth asked him to name the countries that are part of ASEAN, or at least their total number. However, Hegseth evaded the question, mentioning only US allies outside ASEAN in the region: South Korea, Japan and the AUKUS alliance with Australia. Hegseth's inability to name the key countries over which China and the US are competing for influence shows that he lacks the knowledge needed for the position of Pentagon chief.
Additionally, Duckworth asked Hegseth to name the three types of major national security agreements personally signed by the Secretary of Defense. He hesitantly replied, "Perhaps you mean NATO." This was incorrect, as the US Secretary of Defense is central to three key types of agreements: the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) and arms trade cooperation agreements.
Regarding the war in Ukraine, Hegseth stated in his opening speech that the United States would conclude wars in such a way as to free up resources and focus on more serious threats. From these words, it can be inferred that the US will be less concerned about Ukraine’s fate and more about the significant financial cost of the war.
On Jan. 17, during a visit to Russia, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian signed a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement with Vladimir Putin. Broadly speaking, the agreement resembles a similar treaty signed by Russian authorities with North Korea in June 2024 but differs in the absence of mutual defense obligations. This is likely due to the fact that North Korea possesses nuclear weapons, minimizing the threat of an attack against it. Meanwhile, Iran does not have a nuclear arsenal, and the risks of armed conflict against the country are currently quite high. Putin is clearly unwilling to engage in yet another military conflict but seeks to demonstrate that Russia is not isolated, that its ties with other countries are strengthening, and that it has major strategic partners. The new agreement is fundamentally similar to the treaty signed in 2001 and may be intended to show that Trump cannot drive a wedge between Russia and Iran. Additionally, Putin could use this agreement to pressure Israel and, through it, the US administration, by threatening, for instance, to supply modern weapons to Iran, such as Sukhoi Su-35 fighter jets, if certain demands are not met. We certainly do not expect to see Iranian troops on the Ukrainian frontlines.
Advanced third-generation AN/PSQ-42 Enhanced Night Vision Goggle-Binoculars, developed for the US Army by L3Harris, have been spotted in use by Ukrainian special forces. The device combines the image intensification technology found in traditional night vision goggles with thermal imaging capabilities integrated into a single unit. The goggles were adopted by the US Army in 2019 and were first used in combat during the evacuation from Afghanistan in August 2021.
A video has surfaced showing two military police officers from military unit 55115 in the city of Kyzyl in Russia's constituent republic of Tyva beating soldiers with batons and torturing them with electricity. Before the beating, the men had been in the hospital but were ordered back to forward positions without proper recovery. The soldiers protested, which led to the beatings. While violence against Russian soldiers is not uncommon, this case attracted national attention. Aleksandr Kots, a pro-Russian Komsomolskaya Pravda correspondent and a member of the Human Rights Council under the President of Russia, reported that a military police officer was arrested and a criminal case was initiated against him. However, we are confident that even if the perpetrator in this case is punished, it will not affect the overall situation of violence in the Russian army.
The Institute for the Study of War claims that since the North Korean military began engaging in large-scale combat operations in December 2024, their losses have averaged about 92 personnel per day. The Institute suggests that, therefore, all North Korean troops in the Kursk region will be eliminated within three months. We disagree with this assessment: even if the initial data is accurate, war is a non-linear process and such extrapolation is not applicable.
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