Sitrep for Oct. 14-16, 2024 (as of 10 a.m. UTC+3)
Frontline Situation Update
In the Pokrovsk direction, Russian forces have advanced north of the village of Tsukuryne and launched an assault on the town of Selydove from two sides, including from the south via the village of Marynivka. As a result, Tsukuryne is now effectively semi-encircled.
In the Kurakhove direction, fighting continues. The Russian Armed Forces are creating a "pocket" around the town of Hirnyk and the village of Kurakhivka after securing control of Ostrivske.
In the Kupiansk direction, Russian forces are steadily approaching the Oskil River and plan to advance on Kupiansk from the south, via the villages of Hlushkivka and Kolisnykivka, and from the northeast, through Synkivka. Although this offensive may take time, it is becoming increasingly dangerous for civilians to remain in the area due to frequent shelling. In response, Ukrainian authorities have announced a mandatory evacuation from Kupiansk and several other settlements in the Kharkiv region. According to the Governor of Kharkiv region Oleh Syniehubov, it is becoming impossible to provide heating, electricity or humanitarian aid in the region.
In the Kursk region, active combat is ongoing, though the frontline has remained largely unchanged over the past few days. Conflicting reports make it difficult to confirm whether Ukrainian forces are still present in the village of Olgovka. It is also possible that the salient near Olgovka and Kremyanoye has already been reclaimed by Russian troops. The areas near the villages Novoivanovka, Leonidovo and Zelyony Shlyakh appear to be changing hands periodically.
We would like to separately highlight the issue of concrete pyramid obstacles on public roads near the frontline, from the direction of Rylsk and Kursk. Because these obstacles were not marked, cars driving at high speeds due to the danger of drones started crashing into them at night. After an outcry in the pro-war community, reflective road signs were placed on some of the pyramids. Several Telegram channels even suggested that the concrete pyramids had been moved by Ukrainian saboteurs. A fake video appeared online, showing a Ukrainian Baba-Yaga heavy drone, carrying one of these pyramids, followed by an even more absurd video of the same drone dragging an F-16 fighter aircraft. This version does not hold up to scrutiny, given the weight of the pyramids, which is hundreds of kilograms [pounds], or even more than a ton [2,200 lbs]. Only Russian soldiers could have set up such obstacles.
One reason why civilians remain so close to the frontline is a poorly executed evacuation. However, there are also civilians on the territory captured by the Armed Forces of Ukraine; for example, people were not evacuated from Sudzha. In response to requests from the relatives of Sudzha residents, both Russian and Ukrainian authorities accused each other of refusing to cooperate in evacuating civilians. Another problem on territory controlled by the RuAF is that local residents, forced to leave their homes, are concerned about the safety of their remaining property. Some people who fled the combat zone have returned to their homes after hearing numerous reports of looting by Russian soldiers.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, citing information from the Main Intelligence Directorate [GUR], claimed that "with reports of North Korean boots on the ground, in fact, Pyongyang has actually entered the war against Ukraine." Recently, there has been growing speculation about the possible involvement of DPRK soldiers in the war on the side of the Russian Federation, especially after the signing of an agreement on a "comprehensive strategic partnership" between the two countries. In addition, the reported deaths of six North Korean officers near Donetsk, who were allegedly providing technical support for DPRK-made weapons, has been viewed by some as confirmation of North Korean military personnel being dispatched to Russia.
Even more surprising is the assumption made by Ukrainian journalists, based on information from sources in Ukraine’s GUR, that North Korean soldiers undergoing training in Russia will allegedly be sent to the Kursk region under the guise of Buryats. In our opinion, such a move would only highlight the RuAF’s inability to eliminate the Kursk bridgehead and defend its own territory. Therefore, if such a scenario is to be considered at all, it would be more logical to assume that North Korean soldiers would be sent to the occupied territories, as it was reported, in particular, by the Washington Post. So far, however, there has been no evidence of DPRK infantry serving within the Russian army.
Renowned Korean expert Andrey Lankov, a professor at Kunming University in Seoul, also considers it unlikely that North Korean infantry will be sent to fight in Ukraine.
Bruno Kahl, President of Germany's Federal Intelligence Service, said at a public hearing in the Bundestag that Russia is carrying out the largest restructuring of its armed forces since 2008. This includes reorganizing military districts and significantly increasing the number of its ground forces. He added that Russia is concentrating its forces in the western direction, along NATO's eastern borders, and, according to German foreign intelligence, the RuAF will be ready for a conflict with NATO by 2030.
Indeed, we see that the Western Military District has been divided into the Moscow Military District, which is responsible for the war in Ukraine, and the Leningrad Military District, likely aimed at "neutralizing potential threats from NATO member states." It is worth noting that while new formations are being created and their personnel numbers are growing, these units are currently fighting in Ukraine or in the Kursk region and do not pose an immediate threat to NATO countries. For Russia to create such a threat, it would need to freeze the war with Ukraine and spend several years restoring its combat capabilities, producing equipment, weapons and ammunition. Nonetheless, we agree that European countries should increase their defense capabilities, as the war in Ukraine has shown they are not prepared for large-scale wars, and has already partially depleted their stockpiles.
Western Assistance
Doug Bush, Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, stated that by the end of 2024, the US will reach a production rate of about 55,000 artillery shells per month, rather than the previously expected 70,000 to 80,000. It was earlier reported that the 55,000-per-month rate would be achieved by the end of summer, with plans to exceed this goal by the new year. By the end of the year, new shell manufacturing plants are expected to open in the US. The current shortfall may be attributed to unforeseeable fluctuations, and by early 2025, we might again see the schedule being exceeded. It is also worth noting that for now, artillery gunpowder is purchased from Canada and TNT from unnamed allies. However, within four years, in addition to increasing production and procurement, plans are in place to begin producing gunpowder and TNT in Virginia, as the Army’s procurement department works on diversifying its production capabilities.
In February 2024, President Emmanuel Macron and President Volodymyr Zelenskyy signed an agreement under which France committed to providing €3 billion [$3.16B] in military aid to Ukraine over the course of the year. However, due to budgetary constraints and forthcoming spending cuts, the full amount will not be delivered, with the total value of the aid package now expected to be slightly over €2 billion [$2.18B].
It is worth noting that Germany had also previously reported a budget deficit and indicated it was looking for alternative sources of funding for Ukraine, including frozen Russian assets. Similarly, the National Audit Office of the United Kingdom published a report highlighting the depletion of military stockpiles, which poses a threat to the army’s combat readiness. The potential reduction in military support from Ukraine’s allies in 2025 could prevent Kyiv from maintaining its current pace of combat operations, potentially leading to a freeze in the conflict. A pause in the war may align with Putin’s interests, as Russia’s defense industry is struggling to keep up with the demands of the war, and the Russian army would likely benefit from a temporary respite.
The Netherlands has announced a new military aid package for Ukraine. It will include:
- 79 YPR-765 armored personnel carriers;
- 2 Patriot SAM system launchers;
- 25 cranes, 21 trucks and 20 excavators;
- 36 small boats.
Journalists from Mediazona [independent Russian media outlet] have noticed that Moscow courts have stopped providing the legal grounds for arrests on their websites. Since Sept. 30, case files regarding the imposition or extension of preventive measures (such as pre-trial detention or house arrest) no longer specify the charges, and this information has also begun to disappear from older files. As a result, journalists and human rights activists will no longer be able to track new defendants facing politically motivated charges.
On Oct. 15, political prisoner Aleksey Moskalyov was released. Law enforcement officers first took notice of Moskalyov in April 2022 after his daughter Masha drew an anti-war picture during class. At the end of 2022, a criminal case was initiated against Moskalyov for "discrediting the Armed Forces" due to his social media posts. He was sentenced to two years in a penal colony, although the sentence was later reduced to one year and ten months. In an interview following his release, Moskalyov emphasized the vital role letters play in supporting political prisoners. If you do not know how to send a letter or what to write, several projects provide detailed instructions.
