Sitrep for July 31-Aug. 2, 2024 (as of 10 a.m. UTC+3)
On Aug. 1 in Ankara, the largest prisoner exchange since the Cold War occurred between Russia and several Western countries. Russian authorities released 13 political prisoners and three hostages from Western countries. According to the Federal Security Service (FSB), eight convicted murderers and spies, as well as two minors, returned to Russia.
Despite this joyful event, it is important to remember that a large number of political prisoners are still held in Russian pre-trial detention centers and penal colonies. More information about them can be found in the relevant section of the Mediazona [independent Russian media outlet] website and in the following Associated Press article. According to the OVD-Info independent human rights project, 2,702 people are being persecuted for political reasons, with 1,372 currently deprived of their freedom, 10 having died before being released and another 100 experiencing health problems in detention. The exchange involved just over 1% of all convicted political prisoners.
We encourage our readers to write letters to political prisoners. Instructions and advice can be found on RosUznik, a volunteer project that helps ensure letters comply with all official requirements; OVD-Info, which also hosts letter-writing evenings for people to write to political prisoners; and Mediazona.
Frontline Situation Update
Russian assaults in the Ocheretyne-Pokrovsk direction are continuing. In recent days, the Russian Armed Forces have captured the village of Vesele and advanced towards the villages of Hrodivka and Ivanivka, while also slightly widening the salient near the villages of Zhelanne and Serhiivka. Satellite images show that these all are very small settlements, with the exception of Hrodivka. Therefore, we anticipate that Russian forces will likely slow the pace of their advance as they approach Hrodivka.
In the Toretsk direction, Russian forces have also advanced in the village of Niu-York, near ​​the town of Zalizne and the village of Pivdenne. The village of Nelipivka is located between Zalizne and Niu-York, and it is likely that the RuAF will advance towards Nelipivka after capturing Niu-York. However, Ukrainian troops are counterattacking and even taking Russian soldiers prisoner. The territory around Niu-York and Zalizne will probably be abandoned by the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the future to prevent some of their troops from being encircled.
Although we hoped that Russian forces would struggle to cross the Vovcha River and that the AFU would be able to build a defensive line, the RuAF managed to advance along the railway. According to Ukrainian military observer Kostiantyn Mashovets, this was possible mainly due to the Russian advantage in aircraft and artillery. He believes that Russia's main goal in this direction is to advance as much as possible towards the Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka highway, namely in the direction of Pokrovsk, Myrnohrad and Malynivka, since a bypass road passes through these settlements. The capture of Myrnohrad, for example, will lead to the highway being cut, which will complicate the supply of the AFU in the Toretsk direction. This is precisely what Mashovets considers to be the main task of the RuAF in the near future, since it is impossible to maintain equally intensive combat operations in both the Pokrovsk and Toretsk directions incurring such heavy losses.
Russian sources claim that the RuAF have once again used underground passages to penetrate the main part of Chasiv Yar beyond the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas Canal, where they attacked the Novyi neighborhood. However, the claim that the raid was launched through pipes running under the canal does not seem very credible. Furthermore, a video has appeared showing Russian soldiers crossing the canal on a bridge, trying to advance towards the Novyi neighborhood and coming under attack by Ukrainian UAVs.
According to a source of the VChK-OGPU Telegram channel, on July 28, a Russian special forces group was ambushed in a forest in the Chernihiv region and suffered significant losses. This is confirmed by photographs published by Ukrainian journalist Yurii Butusov, which show the bodies of five saboteurs in gear similar to that worn by the Leshie sabotage and reconnaissance group in reference photos.
Western Assistance
In his interview with Le Monde, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said that it is currently impossible to send newly formed brigades, created during the mobilization, to the frontline because they lack weapons. He had previously mentioned similar problems in the brigades formed after the tightening of mobilization laws in Ukraine. The inability to send new brigades to the frontline also means that the AFU will continue to experience a shortage of personnel on the battlefield. Zelenskyy also said that Russia should take part in the next peace summit, which could take place in November.
One of the key news stories of the past week has been the arrival of the first batch of F-16 fighter jets in Ukraine, first reported by Bloomberg citing its sources, as well as by Gabrielius Landsbergis, Foreign Minister of Lithuania. However, pictures purportedly showing an F-16 above the city of Lviv cannot be considered reliable evidence. According to some reports, two photos of the jet were made as a prank back in 2022. The authenticity of a photo previously published by the Dumskaya Telegram channel is also questionable, as it only shows the sky as the background. Mykhailo Podolyak, Advisor to the Head of Office of the President of Ukraine, has stated that Ukraine will not officially confirm the arrival of the fighter jets. Meanwhile, Karine Jean-Pierre, the White House Press Secretary, flatly refused to answer questions regarding the F-16s.
Six fighter jets were expected to arrive in the near future, making the above news plausible even without reliable confirmation. It is doubtful that these aircraft will be seen taking part in combat close to the frontline; rather, they will likely be tasked with intercepting Russian cruise missiles.
In the near future, Ukraine will receive a financial tranche of $3.9 billion from the United States, according to the country's Ministry of Finance. This will be the first financial aid from the US in 2024. The funds are essential for the Ukrainian budget to pay salaries to teachers, employees of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine and state agencies. Additionally, the money will provide payments to internally displaced persons, low-income families and people with disabilities.
Ukrainian and Russian Strikes
On July 31, a Mil Mi-8 helicopter of Rosgvardia [the Russian National Guard] was destroyed near Donetsk. Initially, Russian helicopter pilot and war blogger Aleksey Voyevoda wrote that the helicopter was shot down by a Ukrainian drone, a version first disseminated by Forbes. However, later that same day, he retracted his statement, clarifying that the aircraft was downed by a HIMARS rocket strike while on the ground. It is reported that the Mi-8 was involved in evacuating wounded soldiers, a fact later confirmed by obituaries. The number of casualties from this strike remains unclear.
Generally, as we have often stated, strikes on evacuation groups constitute war crimes. However, while it is easy to see that soldiers are carrying wounded comrades-in-arms in the case of infantry, it is unknown whether the Ukrainian side had the ability to visually identify this aircraft as a medical evacuation helicopter in this instance.
A video has surfaced showing Venezuelan police officers receiving instructions on how to suppress protesters. One of the instructing officers appears to have an arm patch resembling the insignia of the Wagner Group, leading some commentators to conclude that the mercenary organization is assisting local law enforcement in dispersing protests in Venezuela. However, the quality of the video is insufficient to reliably determine what the individual in question looks like and if the emblem on their uniform is indeed that of the Wagner Group. Skull patches are used by numerous military, police and other law enforcement units worldwide. Even within the Wagner Group, there was a separate skull patch for the informal ISIS Hunters units, allegedly composed of Syrian citizens operating independently in Syria. Furthermore, even if it is a Wagner Group insignia, it does not necessarily mean that the individual wearing it is a member of the group.
Wearing patches from allied forces is quite common. For instance, during the Syrian Civil War, where Russian Special Operations Forces cooperated with various pro-Assad groups, some Russian soldiers were seen wearing uniforms with Hezbollah patches. There has been no credible evidence of Wagner Group presence in Venezuela. While individual security consultants or private military companies from Russia have been seen in the country, none of them were linked to Wagner Group structures.
Conscription, Mobilization and Contract Military Service
Vladimir Putin signed a decree increasing the sign-up bonus for concluding a contract with the Ministry of Defense to participate in the war from 195,000 rubles [$2,260] to 400,000 rubles [$4,640] as of Aug.1. Additionally, the decree recommends that regional heads set a payment from the regional budget at least at the same level—400,000 rubles [$4,640]. Thus, the minimum reward for going to war should now be 800,000 rubles [$9,280].
There is also information that from Aug. 1, mobile operators will start sending messages from the 117 number urging people to sign contracts with the MoD to participate in the war. This also confirms that the number of recruited volunteer fighters is insufficient.
On Aug. 1, Vazhnyye Istorii [IStories, independent Russian investigative media outlet] published a study on the pace of recruitment of volunteer fighters into the Russian Army, to which our team contributed. As previously reported, from Sept. 22, 2022, to Aug. 1, 2024, individuals signing contracts with the MoD received a sign-up bonus of 195,000 rubles [$2,270]. According to information on federal budget expenditures, about 426,000 Russians received this payment from the fall of 2022 to April 2024. Using this information, as well as reports on regional budget expenditures, which include various indirect indications of the number of volunteer fighters, we concluded that officials' claims about the number of recruits are inflated by at least 15%. All the data suggest that the regions are failing to meet their recruitment targets.
In a recent conversation with Michael Kofman, we have reached a consensus on the scale of recruitment for the war in past and current years. Our discrepancies in estimating the number of recruited soldiers stemmed from the fact that we considered only volunteer fighters who directly signed contracts with the Ministry of Defense. In contrast, Western experts, who claim that the MoD recruited 30,000 people monthly in 2023 and 20,000 to 25,000 in the current year, include all categories of individuals going to war: volunteer fighters (contract soldiers of the MoD), conscripts who were coerced into signing contracts, mercenaries from various volunteer units and ex-convicts. We believe it is important to specifically address the number of volunteer fighters who voluntarily signed contracts at draft offices, as this figure reflects the level of support for the war within Russian society.
Additionally, after analyzing data on payments from federal and regional budgets and engaging in lengthy discussions with colleagues from Meduza [international Russian-language online media outlet], Mediazona [independent Russian media outlet], Vazhnyye Istorii [IStories, independent Russian investigative media outlet] and Western experts, we concluded that our previous calculations were somewhat mistaken, underestimating the number of volunteer fighters by about 5,000 people per month. Thus, in 2023, the influx of new recruits across all categories was approximately 30,000 people per month. In 2024, the recruitment rate of contract volunteers exceeds 20,000 per month, and when including conscripts and volunteer unit mercenaries, it reaches up to 25,000 people per month.
However, numerous indicators suggest that Russian authorities consider the current recruitment pace insufficient. This is evidenced by increased federal payments, a continued rise in regional sign-up bonuses and intensified advertising for contract military service. The shortage of personnel has resulted in limited achievements on the frontline. The only minor area where Russian forces have managed to advance is the Ocheretyne-Pokrovsk direction, with significantly less success in the Toretsk direction, and the offensive from Novomykhailivka to Kostiantynivka has largely failed, despite the deployment of a large number of armored vehicles.
If the New York Times' information is accurate, stating that the AFU is recruiting 30,000 people per month following the enactment of a new mobilization law, then Ukraine's recruitment rate currently surpasses Russia's. However, this does not imply that Ukraine will quickly amass the necessary forces to launch offensive operations this year. There are no current promises or discussions about supplying Ukraine with large-scale weapons packages for the coming year. The existing plans, including European expenditures and ammunition production, are likely to only sustain the current pace of combat rather than accelerate it.
Yury Dud released an interview with Artemy Lebedev, Russian designer and propagandist. We believe it is unwise to completely ignore propagandists' statements, as analyzing their rhetoric can help build effective counter-arguments when engaging with those who hold a pro-war stance. A prime example of this is the Na Zzzzzapadnom fronte bez peremen [All quiet on the Wezzzzztern Front] Telegram channel, created by journalist and blogger Ivan Filippov, which examines propagandists' reactions to various events. In this regard, discussing Lebedev's performances is particularly useful, as he is one of the few pro-Russian speakers who conveys information calmly, logically and without vivid emotional coloring, giving him significant influence over his audience.
A key point from the interview worth analyzing is Lebedev's question about why Dud uses the term "full-scale invasion," which he claims is a pro-Ukrainian propagandistic cliché. It is worth noting that combat operations from 2014 to 2022 differ significantly in intensity from those occurring since 2022. The term "full-scale invasion" reflects a fundamentally different level of state involvement and conflict intensity. From 2014 to 2022, the conflict was a locally limited, low-intensity engagement. However, from 2022 onwards, it has escalated into a high-intensity war involving a comprehensive range of weapons, including artillery, tanks, aviation, missiles and naval forces.
Dud also asked Lebedev to comment on the discrepancy between his desire for the capture of Odesa—an objective that would require combat operations—and his wish to avoid having his adult sons participate in the war, implying that he wants to achieve his goals at the expense of other people's children. Lebedev argues that professional soldiers, including mobilized soldiers with military specialties, should participate in the war. However, this statement is inaccurate. A specific military specialty is typically assigned to individuals who have graduated from a military academy, completed statutory military service or received military training alongside their higher education degree. Nevertheless, everyone else is also assigned a military specialty upon receiving a military ID—specifically, military specialty 999/998 000, which indicates the absence of any military specialty. Since the beginning of mobilization, many individuals drafted into the army lacked statutory military service experience, military education or any specialized skills, and thus cannot be considered professional soldiers.