Sitrep for Sept. 26-27, 2024 (as of 9:30 a.m. UTC+3)
Frontline Situation Update
Russian troops have advanced a little further in the Vuhledar direction from the village of Prechystivka, with the distance between the captured positions to the east and west of the town of Vuhledar now approximately 6 km [3.73 mi]. This suggests that it is time for the Armed Forces of Ukraine to organize rearguard combat actions to withdraw the main group of forces, which risks being completely surrounded.
A video showing the use of thermite incendiary munitions targeting Vuhledar is being circulated on social networks. Judging by the footage, those are BM-21 Grad MLRS 9M22S rockets and not white phosphorus projectiles, despite the unfounded accusations that periodically appear. However, this is actually an archive video from August 2023. We have not seen the Russian Armed Forces use these munitions since then, likely due to their stocks running low.
The AFU, however, continue to use their Dracarys drones with incendiary mixtures. Their effectiveness has been confirmed by numerous reports.
In the northern Pokrovsk direction, Russian forces have made some progress near the villages of Krasnyi Yar and Krutyi Yar, as well as near the town of Mykolaivka. The Russian Ministry of Defense also reported on the capture of the town of Ukrainsk and the village of Lisivka. The capture of the latter has been known for a long time, as well as the fact that the AFU might have left Ukrainsk. It is possible that the Russian MoD sometimes reports on the capture of settlements in advance or after the fact, so that it can claim the "liberation" of new territory every day. There are no noticeable changes on other sections of the frontline.
Footage has emerged showing Ukraine deploying a "mothership drone," a UAV, typically fixed-wing, carrying several smaller FPV drones equipped with explosives. This approach allows loitering munitions to be launched from a closer distance to their targets than would be possible from the ground. The primary limitation of FPV drones is their relatively weak batteries; however, using a mothership drone helps mitigate this issue to some extent. Similar technology is reportedly already in use by Russian forces.
Western Assistance
It has been revealed that the latest US military aid package, which we discussed in our last sitrep, will include an additional Patriot missile defense battery. The system in question will be pulled from storage in the US and will require to be refurbished before deployment. Modern air defense systems are generally in short supply, with the exception of the older MIM-23 Hawk SAM systems.
In addition, the US has announced plans to train another 18 Ukrainian pilots on F-16 jets, starting in 2025. Earlier reports indicated a shortage of available training slots. This cohort of 18 cadets suggests the Ukrainian Air Force will be able to operate an additional nine aircraft.
In addition, the latest $375 million aid package under the PDA program includes at least 150 M1117 armored vehicles, to be supplied directly from US Army stockpiles.
The Times quoted UK Secretary of State for Defense John Healey stating that Ukraine is unable to provide enough personnel for training. We believe that he may have been referring to the size of the AFU before the recent tightening of mobilization, and it is possible that the situation has changed somewhat since then. Additionally, the article cites data from a new report by the UK National Audit Office, which reveals that British military stocks have been heavily depleted. As a result, the UK government had to reduce its support to Ukraine in mid-2023, as further supplies could pose risks to the combat readiness of the British Army.
However, the UK government has promised to send an additional 4 AS90 self-propelled howitzers to Ukraine. It is worth noting that Prime Minister Keir Starmer previously stated that within the first 100 days of his tenure, his country would send 12 such SPHs to Ukraine, 10 of which have already been delivered to the AFU.
The German government announced a €400 million [$446 million] increase in military aid to Ukraine for 2024. This funding will be used to purchase:
In addition, the Bundestag announced €170 million [$190 million] for the restoration of energy infrastructure, which has been severely damaged, and another €50 million [$56 million] for the treatment of wounded Ukrainian soldiers.
The United States has put forward a declaration of support for Ukraine, which has been joined by 30 countries (including the G7 nations). This declaration could potentially form the basis for a plan similar to the Marshall Plan. It includes a commitment to provide financial assistance to Ukraine to improve its macroeconomic situation, as well as necessary equipment supplies. It explicitly states that Russia must compensate for the damage caused to Ukraine. Until that happens, frozen Russian assets will not be "unfrozen." Notably, Belgium, where a significant portion of these assets is located, has not joined the declaration.
We interpret this as a form of response to Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s peace plan: although allied countries cannot promise Ukraine the necessary volume of military assistance, they are at least putting forward a plan for the country’s post-war recovery.
The aforementioned victory plan that Zelenskyy plans to present to Biden and representatives of both parties has not yet been published, but based on press reports, it can be assumed that it focuses on increasing arms supplies to Ukraine, lifting restrictions on strikes on Russian territory, supporting Ukraine's economy, and certain diplomatic measures—all aimed at Ukraine's victory and forcing Russia into peace. Thus, the plan suggests a continuation of the current strategy—"more money and weapons" for Ukraine to win. In our view, this is difficult to implement, as in 2025, allies may not be able to maintain the same level of support as in 2024 (for example, the UK has stated that its reserves are depleted, and Germany has cited a lack of budgetary funds). It can be assumed that during meetings with U.S. administration officials, Zelenskyy is simultaneously discussing a possible "Plan B."
It should be noted that the plan to fight until victory does not align with the Kursk bridgehead operation, as it consumes a significant amount of resources. In such a plan, establishing the Kursk bridgehead would make sense only at the very final stage, after the liberation of Donetsk, Luhansk, Mariupol, Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and other key cities. In a scenario where only a small part of the occupied territory remained, seizing a piece of the enemy’s territory could accelerate their capitulation. Nevertheless, holding the Kursk bridgehead might be useful as leverage in future negotiations, especially if a more realistic plan that involves freezing the conflict is pursued.
Both sides understand that a ceasefire would be temporary and unreliable, with its main purpose being to allow both sides to rest, recruit and train personnel, and accumulate weapons, before resuming fighting with renewed force. During this time, either side may use any explosions or sabotage as a pretext to accuse the other of violating the agreements and reigniting combat operations. We assume that during the "ceasefire," in addition to rebuilding the army and economy, Ukraine and its allies may shift focus to a sanctions and economic war against Russia, attempting to make holding onto occupied territories very costly for Putin's regime.
For the analytical community, it will be important during the "ceasefire" to monitor how the Russian Army is building up resources, what new technologies are being implemented, and how and where resources are being redistributed. Having a cold and clear assessment will allow for a balanced understanding of the evolving situation.
On Sept. 26, Zelenskyy met with US presidential candidate Kamala Harris. She assured him of her support, saying, "I will do everything to ensure Ukraine wins this war." In our view, this is an important statement because it emphasizes victory, not just the defense of the country’s independence. It suggests a commitment to further military aid and consistent political pressure on Putin.
A meeting between Zelenskyy and US presidential candidate Donald Trump is scheduled for Sept. 27, even though it was nearly canceled. Perhaps after this meeting, we will finally learn what Trump's plan to end the war entails.
Conscription, Mobilization and Contract Military Service
Norwegian authorities have denied political asylum to Russian citizen Pavel Suetin from Severomorsk, Murmansk region, who fled to Norway on Sept. 22, 2022. Although this happened the day after Putin announced the start of mobilization, the reason for his departure was a home visit by people in military and police uniforms, to whom he did not open the door. After fleeing, he requested asylum in the city of Vadsø. His application was under review for two years and was denied based on Putin's statements about the end of mobilization. It is worth noting that only the mobilization campaign itself has concluded, and we cannot rule out its resumption. Norwegian immigration officials appear to misunderstand the situation in Russia and are mistaken in claiming that it is safe for him to return to the country.
In the last two to three months, the number of people in Saratov willing to fight in Ukraine has increased tenfold. According to Vitaly Fedorov, an officer at the military service recruitment facility, the main motivation of citizens is to defend the Motherland. However, we believe that this increase is related to the fact that at the end of July, Governor of the Saratov region Roman Busargin increased the sign-up bonus for a contract with the Ministry of Defense tenfold—from 50,000 [$540] to 500,000 rubles [$5,400]. This amount will be paid to those who sign a contract by Dec. 31, 2024. In our opinion, those who wished to sign contracts for ideological reasons had already done so much earlier, in 2022-2023.
It has become known that a female ex-convict from an assault unit was killed in the war with Ukraine. This is the first known case of a woman who signed a contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense in a penal colony being killed. Elena Pimonenkova, 37, was killed at the end of August in the Belgorod region. According to her sister, she signed her contract in May 2024 at a women’s penal colony in the Tosnensky district of the Leningrad region. The New York Times reported in June 2024 on recruitment efforts in women’s penal colonies in this region specifically. As reported, in this penal colony, 60 women expressed a desire to go to the war, of whom 10 were selected—"they were selected based on their criminal records and psychological profiles." Among them was Elena, who had six convictions for assaulting a man with a knife, robbery, theft, property damage, death threats, intentional infliction of minor bodily harm and car theft. She was sentenced to probation five times, and before the end of her sixth term—a custodial one—she had one year remaining.
