dispatches
September 13

Sitrep for Sept. 11-13, 2024 (as of 8 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

In the Pokrovsk direction, the Russian Armed Forces continue advancing in the village of Hrodivka and towards the village of Lysivka, northwest of Novohrodivka. The RuAF have also made progress west of the village of Nevelske, occupying the village of Lisivka, east of the town of Ukrainsk. It appears that the Armed Forces of Ukraine are gradually withdrawing from the pocket that has formed. After this, the AFU will likely concentrate near the town of Hirnyk, with a population of about 12,000, and the village of Kurakhivka. They may also establish defensive positions near the villages of Zhelanne Pershe and Zhelanne Druhe.

According to Ukrainian military observer Kostiantyn Mashovets, the Russian military leadership has transferred additional forces from the 1st Army Corps, recently merged into the 51st Combined Arms Army, to the southern flank of the Ocheretyne salient, intensifying pressure on this sector of the front. Mashovets sees the potential Russian breakthrough west of the village of Memryk as the most significant and troubling development for the AFU. This maneuver allows Russian forces to bypass the town of Selydove from the south, which they have been unsuccessfully attacking head-on for some time, further complicating the defense of the town. The capture of Selydove is crucial for Russia’s future advances, as it is positioned on the flank of a potential salient toward Pokrovsk. Mashovets notes that AFU positions forming a line along the villages of Shevchenko, Chunyshyne, Dachenske and Novyi Trud hinder further Russian progress towards Pokrovsk. If Russian forces are able to swiftly capture Hirnyk, it would significantly weaken Ukrainian defenses and enable the RuAF to advance west and northwest from Hirnyk toward Selydove.

In the Kupiansk direction, Russian forces have made slight advances around the village of Pishchane, moving toward the Oskil River, including in the direction of the village of Kolesnykivka. In their attempts to advance near the villages of Novoselivske and Kolomyichikha, Russian forces are aiming to widen the flanks of the salient near Pishchane to prevent it from being potentially cut off by Ukrainian forces.

Russian forces continue their counteroffensive in the Kursk direction. Following posts from pro-Russian Telegram channels about the capture of several settlements, the Russian Ministry of Defense officially confirmed that the villages of Apanasovka, Byakhovo, Vishnevka, Viktorovka, Vnezapnoye, Gordeyevka, Krasnooktyabrskoye, Obukhovka, Snagost and 10-Y Oktyabr had been retaken. The analytical group Black Bird Group published a map of Russian advances in the Kursk region, with red areas marking territories claimed by pro-Russian sources and orange indicating confirmed advances by the RuAF. The situation remains fluid, with positions potentially switching between the two sides within short periods, especially due to Ukrainian counterattacks.

At present, most sources agree that Russian forces have now advanced from the village of Korenevo to the village of Snagost. Based on video footage of fighting on the southern outskirts of Snagost, it can be assumed that the village has indeed been retaken. There are also reports confirming ongoing combat in Krasnooktyabrskoye and Vishnevka, although it remains unclear whether Russian troops have traveled to these locations from Korenevo or by crossing the Seym River.

Currently available information does not allow us to definitively determine whether these movements represent the first steps of a full-scale counteroffensive or simply a probing of Ukrainian defensive lines. As we noted in our previous sitrep, Russian commanders have been massing troops in the Kursk region for several weeks. Assuming the units we have observed were deployed in their entirety, we estimate the total strength of the contingent transferred to the Kursk region to be 30,000 to 35,000 troops. The fact that the RuAF have started counterattacking likely suggests that the Russian command believes it has achieved the necessary numerical advantage to push Ukrainian forces out of the area. Even if these combat operations are merely designed to probe the frontline, they essentially serve as reconnaissance-in-force, likely to be followed by the main phase of the counteroffensive. If not, Ukrainian forces will have the opportunity to shore up any weaknesses identified in the wake of these attacks. It seems likely that Russian commanders have delayed launching their counterattack as long as politically feasible, forcing the Ukrainian military to deplete its reserves, However, with the US elections and potential negotiations fast approaching, the presence of enemy forces on Russian soil is becoming an increasingly pressing issue.

On Sept. 11, a Russian Sukhoi Su-30SM aircraft was lost over the Black Sea. Ukraine's Main Directorate of Intelligence claimed it was shot down by MANPADS, though the video only shows the fighter flying at low altitude, with no visible interception. The pro-Russian Telegram channel Fighterbomber, associated with the Russian Air and Space Force, confirmed the loss of the aircraft. The causes of the crash and the fate of the crew remain unknown.

The video of the Sukhoi Su-30SM shows the interface of the drone recording the scene, which visually resembles that of a Bayraktar drone. The use of such drones over the Black Sea seems logical and relatively safe, as Russian air defenses are less active over the sea compared to near the frontline, and Russian aircraft flying at high altitudes risk being targeted by Ukrainian Patriot SAM systems.

This week, there has been significant discussion about the possibility of lifting restrictions on Ukraine's use of Western precision weapons against targets on Russian territory. It is worth noting that, as of now, the US prohibits the use of not only ATACMS tactical ballistic missiles but also British Storm Shadow and French SCALP-EG missiles, as they contain American components. While obtaining such permission would not be a decisive factor in the war—since, aside from nuclear weapons, there is no "superweapon" that can radically alter its course—it could nonetheless provide significant assistance to Ukraine. It is also worth noting that the partial lifting of restrictions on strikes against Russian targets on May 31, 2024, almost completely spared the city of Kharkiv from S-300 missile attacks.

Although the RuAF have withdrawn most of their aircraft from ATACMS missile range, there are still important targets within their range that would have a significant impact if destroyed. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty researchers examined satellite images of Russian airfields within approximately 300 km [186 mi] of the frontline and found that most of these airfields are currently missing aircraft. For instance, a photo of the Millerovo military airfield from Aug. 20 shows Sukhoi Su-25 attack aircraft and a helicopter; however, we do not know whether they are present in more recent images, whether those are operational or if they are being used as spare parts donors. In addition to airfields, ATACMS missiles can target bridges, which are impossible to significantly damage by drone, large ammunition storage facilities, fuel depots and headquarters—including field headquarters of regiments, brigades, corps, divisions and armies as well as S-300/S-400 air defense system positions, which can all be destroyed with the powerful long-range missiles’ warheads. It is worth noting that since ballistic missiles have a short flight time and are difficult to intercept, we are confident that Russian forces have moved air defense systems to the frontline to protect headquarters and other important facilities, which means that the chances of detecting and targeting them are increasing. Furthermore, the RuAF are currently short of air defense systems. According to the Japanese AS-22 analytical team, most air defense systems have been withdrawn from central and eastern Russia to areas bordering Ukraine and the frontline.

The Millerovo military airfield, Aug. 20.

Putin stated that if Ukraine is granted the permission to use Western weapons against targets on Russian soil, it would signify the direct involvement of NATO, the US and European nations in the war. This claim comes despite the fact that ATACMS missiles are actively used against Crimea, which Putin considers Russian territory.

On the morning of Sept. 11, restrictions on the use of the airspace over the Murmansk region were imposed due to a Ukrainian drone attack. Two UAVs were shot down 7 kilometers [4 mi] from the Olenya airfield, near the town of Olenegorsk. The Kremlin-aligned news outlet Mash claimed that the drones were launched from Finland and that two Swedish reconnaissance aircraft helped coordinate their strike mission. The Finnish Defense Forces denied reports of drones being launched from their territory. We believe the drones were launched from Ukraine, and the claim of Swedish reconnaissance aircraft’s involvement is unfounded. The presence of such planes near Russian borders, gathering data during the war, is entirely natural. In fact, they are not needed to guide UAVs in an attack on a stationary target: the coordinates of airfields are well-known and pre-programmed into drones. Additionally, drones attacking targets in other Russian regions are not accompanied by any aircraft.

In the afternoon of Sept. 11, half an hour after the airspace restrictions in the Murmansk region were lifted, a light aircraft was fired upon—likely mistaken for a drone.

On Sept. 12, during an attack on the village of Viroliubivka in the Donetsk region, three staff members of the International Committee of the Red Cross were killed and two others were injured. The strike hit the site of a planned humanitarian aid distribution, despite all the vehicles being clearly marked with the Red Cross emblem. The attack was presumably launched by Russian forces. We consider this version to be plausible since Viroliubivka is located about 10 kilometers [6 mi] away from the frontline, west of the town of Chasiv Yar, which regularly comes under Russian artillery fire.

A video from the Kupiansk direction has emerged, which Russian propagandists might try to represent as a Russian prisoner of war being executed by Ukrainians. In the video, a Russian soldier commits perfidy by feigning an intent to surrender while concealing a grenade, intending either to throw it at the Ukrainian soldiers or blowing himself up along with them. A drone operator appears to notice the grenade and alerts the approaching AFU soldiers, who then stop and retreat. After the Russian soldier rises to activate the grenade, the Ukrainian soldiers shoot him, causing the grenade to explode. In this case, the Russian POW committed a war crime by using deceitful tactics, while the Ukrainian soldiers are not in breach of International Humanitarian Law, as they responded to a situation involving an active combatant rather than an official surrender.