Sitrep for Sept. 2-4, 2024 (as of 6 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

The situation has changed in recent days in Chasiv Yar, located north of the Pokrovsk direction and west of the town of Bakhmut. Russian assault groups have crossed the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas Canal and appear to have gained a foothold in the residential neighborhood in the eastern part of the town, specifically in the Oktyabrskyi district.

In the southern part of the Donetsk region, the situation has escalated in the Vuhledar direction. It seems that Russian forces intend to advance on Vuhledar from two sides. In the east, they are attacking the village of Vodiane, while to the west, they have already captured the village of Prechystivka. For the Armed Forces of Ukraine, supplying the town via the remaining road through the village of Bohoiavlenka has become extremely difficult.

With the intensification of the Vuhledar direction, the issue of rotating Ukrainian units has been raised once again in Ukrainian society. As stated by Ukrainian politician Maryana Bezuhla, the 72nd AFU Brigade is currently withdrawing from Vuhledar, which she warns could lead to catastrophic consequences on this section of the frontline. Her statement has drawn criticism from other Ukrainian commentators. It is worth noting that earlier speculations suggested that Russian advances in the Toretsk direction were related to AFU rotations. We also believe that the Russian Armed Forces indeed try to exploit such situations, intensifying pressure whenever they observe Ukrainian units withdrawing for rotation.

As always, the Russian advance is accompanied by massive shelling and strikes, and Vuhledar will soon be completely reduced to ruins.

In the Pokrovsk direction, the advance toward Pokrovsk has yet to resume. According to Ukrainian military observer Kostiantyn Mashovets and military analyst Tatarigami, this is because the RuAF are securing the flanks of this offensive. Had they continued moving toward Pokrovsk, the Ocheretyne salient would have been dangerously overstretched. Attacks on the town are likely to resume after some time.

It was anticipated that the Kursk operation might lead to the lifting of some restrictions on the use of long-range Western weaponry on Russian soil. Ukraine recently submitted a corresponding request to the United States along with a list of desired targets. However, when journalists asked President Biden about this, he categorically stated, "I made it clear what we support and don’t support."

Reuters, citing sources, reported that one of the upcoming military aid packages for Ukraine could include AGM-158 JASSM cruise missiles with a range of over 300 km [186 mi], which can be launched by F-16 fighter aircraft. However, no specifics about potential targets were provided, leading us to believe that further easing of restrictions is unlikely in the near future.

According to experts from the US portal War Zone, JASSM missiles have a notable advantage in penetrating air defenses compared to other missiles. They are less visible to ground surveillance radars, can maintain their trajectory and are guided by the imaging infrared terminal guidance system even in a dense electronic warfare environment. Most importantly for Ukraine, the US has a large stockpile of JASSM missiles—reportedly around 2,000. In comparison, the UK had only a few hundred Storm Shadow missiles before transferring them to Ukraine. Although JASSM production was halted in 2021, it is set to resume, with total stockpiles expected to reach 12,000 units.

Ukrainian and Russian Strikes

On Sept. 3, Russian forces launched ballistic missile strikes on the city of Poltava, located west of Kharkiv. The target was a military academy where, according to Ukrainian military expert Serhii "Flash" Beskrestnov, recently mobilized signallers were being trained. Due to the short flight time of 9K720 Iskander missiles, the personnel did not have time to reach cover. Contrary to rumors, there were no underage cadets, elite professionals or foreign specialists at the site. Since all military personnel, even those not involved in combat, are considered combatants under the Geneva Conventions, their training site is a legitimate military target. The only exceptions are military medics and chaplains. It is worth noting that cadets of higher military academies are considered military personnel and therefore combatants as early as age 17.

As of the morning of Sept. 4, according to the State Emergency Service of Ukraine, the death toll had risen to 53, with 298 injured.

This is not the first such strike on gatherings of Ukrainian military personnel. The highest number of strikes occurred in 2022, with the deadliest resulting in the deaths of 87 Ukrainian servicemen. The State Bureau of Investigation of Ukraine has opened a criminal case over the negligence of Ukrainian military personnel.

On the evening of Sept. 3, a strike also hit a university in the city of Sumy. Footage of the aftermath shows that a security guard was injured.

In the early hours of Sept. 4, Russian missiles struck residential buildings near the railway station in the city of Lviv. At present, it is known that seven people were killed and 53 injured.

A video has emerged allegedly showing Russian soldiers stationed in an acting school in the town of Kurchatov, Kursk region. The footage depicts soldiers relaxing in one classroom while a teacher conducts a lesson in the adjacent room. If verified, this represents a serious breach of the laws and customs of war.

Territorial defense units deployed in the Kursk region, frightened by rumors of Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance group raids, fired at Akhmat special forces driving along the Kursk-Lgov highway, wounding two soldiers. It is notable that almost most reports referring to this incident describe the Akhmat special forces as signalers. There were also previous reports of two signalers being captured.

A video has emerged from the Zaporizhzhia axis showing a Ukrainian drone burning down forest lines by dropping an incendiary mixture, reportedly thermite. While the exact term used by Ukrainian troops for such drones is unknown, Internet users have dubbed them "Dracarys." The video reveals that a small amount of ammunition detonates in one spot after the fire starts, suggesting that these drones could be highly effective in burning out positions in tree lines. Russian soldiers have frequently reported attacks by Ukrainian drones dropping Molotov cocktails on their positions, leading to the destruction of camps, supplies and military equipment, and resulting in casualties. It is also worth noting that Russian troops previously used 9M22S incendiary rockets for BM-21 Grad MLRS both in forest areas, where Ukrainian troops could potentially be located, and in populated areas, where their use is prohibited.

Photos have surfaced showing a Russian BTR-82A armored personnel carrier completely covered in rubber belts and improvised slat armor.

It is worth noting that most of the modifications to Russian armored vehicles that we have observed are related to protection and camouflage, including explosive reactive armor blocks, roof screens (cope cages) and rubber-fabric screens. Technical improvements, however, are present in missiles such as jamming-resistant antenna systems, dipole reflectors and other components of active protection.

There have been reports that the Russian Air Force has begun using air-dropped bombs equipped with an upgraded Universal Gliding and Correction Module [UMPK] with a strike range of up to 85 km [53 mi]. We cannot confirm this information yet, as measuring the distance requires geolocation data for both the bomb's release point and its impact site.

There are renewed claims that Iran plans to supply Russia with ballistic missiles. This information currently comes from European officials and we have no further confirmations.

Ukrainian military expert Serhii "Flash" Beskrestnov notes that Russian forces have changed their tactics for using Shahed-136 (Geran-2) loitering munitions. These drones now operate at altitudes exceeding 2 km [1.25 mi], often reaching 4 to 5 km [2.5-3 mi]. This altitude allows them to bypass mobile fire teams, which are unable to target objects at such heights. Just before striking, the drone descends sharply, giving the mobile fire teams a chance to shoot it down. A mobile mobile fire team typically consists of pickup trucks equipped with a 12.7mm, 14.5mm or 23mm machine gun or anti-aircraft gun. The effective engagement altitude of such weapons is 1 to 2 km [0.6-1.2 mi], depending on the caliber. While Shaheds at higher altitudes should theoretically be more visible on radar and easier to target with air defense systems, the high cost and scarcity of missiles for these systems make such usage impractical against UAVs. Consequently, various helicopters are already being used against drones, and it is likely that F-16 fighters will soon be used to intercept them.

Russian soldiers returning from Ukraine are increasingly implicated in violent crimes. Vladimir Aleksandrov has been detained on suspicion of murdering 11-year-old Anastasia Yakina in Nizhny Tagil. Anastasia went for a walk on Aug. 30 and did not return. Four days later, her body was found in the basement of her apartment building. On Sept. 3, Aleksandrov, who had recently returned from the war, was detained on suspicion of the murder. According to the Vot Tak media outlet, Aleksandrov has five previous convictions, including a 2020 conviction for rape and sexual assault, as reported by E1.ru. After murdering Yakina, Aleksandrov left for Moscow, intending to return to the frontline due to higher payments for signing a contract in the capital.

Ex-convict Artur Kurshev was arrested in the Leningrad region on Sept. 2 after returning from the war. On Aug. 28, he killed a woman because she called him a fool. According to Kurshev, the victim allegedly tried to flirt with him, but he refused her, saying that he had a girlfriend. She then called him a fool, for which he stabbed her in the stomach. The woman died on the spot. In April 2023, Kurshev was sentenced to nine years in prison for murder. A few weeks after the sentence, he signed a contract with the Ministry of Defense and joined a Storm unit. Six months later, he returned from the frontline.

It is worth noting that Russian veterans with PTSD do not receive any rehabilitation, and the problem of high levels of violence, which existed even before the war, will only get worse as all these soldiers and ex-convicts return from the war.

During his visit to the city of Kyzyl in Russia's constituent republic of Tyva, Putin held a "Talking About Important Things" lesson for school children [a compulsory lesson held every Monday in schools across the country], during which he allowed for the possibility of peaceful negotiations with Ukraine. As a precondition for such negotiations, he mentioned the withdrawal of the AFU from the territory of the Kursk region. Previously, he had named the withdrawal of the AFU beyond the borders of the annexed regions of Ukraine as a preliminary condition for the start of negotiations, and after the invasion of the Kursk region, he declared such negotiations impossible.

Recently, we have received many questions about the possibility of decisive fighting in the coming weeks and months. We believe it is incorrect to speak of "decisive fighting," as we do not anticipate a clear outcome that would determine a winner. However, we can anticipate climactic battles in the following sense: Russian forces are likely to launch new attacks in the Pokrovsk and Vuhledar directions and attempt to realign the frontline. This will require significant resources and lead to substantial losses. Thus, the shortage of personnel and equipment in the Russian Army will continue to grow. Meanwhile, following the intensification of mobilization in Ukraine in May 2024, the pace of draft has significantly increased and the shortage of military personnel is gradually being addressed. We do not consider large-scale counteroffensive operations possible, as we do not see the Western allies planning major military aid deliveries next year. Based on the above, we expect the coming weeks and months to be climactic in the sense that Russian forces will likely advance and occupy some territory before the onset of the muddy season. Afterward, the front is expected to stabilize, with fighting shifting to a positional phase, likely for many months as neither side will have the strength to conduct large-scale offensive operations.

It is worth noting that in June Switzerland hosted the first Summit on Peace in Ukraine. The summit announced that preparations for a second round were already underway. Russian representatives are also expected to take part and this will signal an end to the war. This suggests that both parties may be gradually moving toward a temporary freeze of the war, similar to the Minsk agreements, possibly as early as next year. It is worth noting that Ukraine is being pushed into this direction by several factors, including uncertainty over continued military aid and economic challenges, especially problems in its energy sector, which has suffered huge damage from Russian attacks.

Mediazona, an independent Russian media outlet, is celebrating its 10th anniversary. Since the start of the war, they have been experiencing great financial difficulties and recently even announced a crowdfunding campaign, fearing that their journalists may not be able to continue their vital work into 2025. We hold Mediazona in great esteem and consider their work to be of great importance. Therefore, we urge you to support them by signing up for regular donations.