Sitrep for Oct. 25-28, 2024 (as of 8:30 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

In the Pokrovsk direction, the Russian Armed Forces have made significant advances in Selydove over recent days. Most of the town is now under Russian control, with the remaining areas likely to be captured soon. Fighting began less than a week ago, which is a relatively rapid pace given that the pre-war population of the Selydove agglomeration was nearly 50,000, with over 23,000 residing in the town itself. Additionally, the RuAF are engaged in fighting for the village of Vyshneve and are attempting to advance southwest from there toward Novodmytrivka and Novooleksiivka.

In the Kurakhove direction, Russian forces have occupied the town of Hirnyk and are close to capturing the pocket to the east, including the village of Kurakhivka, where fighting has already begun. This has created two smaller pockets: one between Kurakhivka and Zoriane and another between Oleksandropil and Hostre, with all these villages likely to be captured soon. A video showing a Russian flag photo op in Oleksandropil suggests that the village is no longer under Ukrainian control and is likely contested.

Fighting has intensified in the Vuhledar direction. In recent days, Russian forces have advanced 7 km [4.35 mi] to the north, northwest and west of Vuhledar, partially capturing the villages of Shakhtarske, Novoukrainka and Bohoiavlenka. This section of the frontline was held by the Ukrainian Territorial Defense Forces, while key Armed Forces of Ukraine mechanized brigades were redeployed to other sectors of the front, weakening the overall defense. Notably, Russian tactics focus on targeting the least defended sections of the frontline. Consequently, when the AFU send reinforcements to areas under pressure, sometimes even "emergency" brigades, the Russian advance slows, prompting them to probe Ukrainian defenses in other locations. In this case, as in most others, it would be inaccurate to describe the situation as a breakthrough of Ukrainian defenses or a collapse of the frontline, as these imply progress made without significant enemy resistance. The RuAF advance in the Vuhledar direction should be seen as a tactical success, not an operational one. We believe it is likely that the AFU command will redeploy reserves to the south of the Donetsk region, which would likely slow further RuAF advances.

Finnish analysts from the Black Bird Group have published a map marking Ukrainian fortifications, though it is worth noting that the frontline on this map is somewhat outdated. According to the map, the next Ukrainian defensive line is located just beyond the villages of Shakhtarske, Novoukrainka and Bohoiavlenka. With a sufficient number of Ukrainian soldiers deployed there, this line should slow the Russian advance in this direction.

Separately, it is worth noting that the muddy season has not yet begun across the entire frontline.

After US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and National Security Council Coordinator for Strategic Communications John Kirby officially confirmed that the US has evidence of North Korean military presence in Russia, the New York Times, citing Ukrainian and American sources, reported they had arrived in the Kursk region. According to the newspaper's sources, their numbers are expected to reach 5,000 by Oct. 28.

Open-source data analysts monitoring air traffic have detected shuttle flights operating between Khabarovsk or Vladivostok, and Volgograd or Rostov-on-Don. In the case of Rostov-on-Don, it is evident that these flights involve troop transfers, as the airport is closed to civilian flights. Similar information has also been transmitted to us by a confidential source.

The Main Directorate of Intelligence of Ukraine (GUR) released a recording of an intercepted conversation among Russian soldiers that mentions North Korean troops. In the recording, they discuss an incident in which military police stopped a KAMAZ truck with civilian plates, driven by a soldier lacking a combat order. The conversation indicates that the driver was transporting North Koreans to support some "IFV crews," which the GUR believes refers to the 810th Guards Naval Infantry Brigade. The GUR post also claims that the KAMAZ truck was stopped while carrying these DPRK soldiers.

All this evidence leaves no doubt that DPRK troops have indeed been deployed in the Kursk region, rather than merely stationed in the Russian Far East. Earlier, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated that the first clashes involving these troops are expected in the coming days. However, we have no evidence of additional armored vehicles being transferred to the Kursk region by rail or convoy, which may suggest plans to send North Korean infantry into "meat assaults."

South Korea claims that North Korean soldiers sent to Russia are being disguised as Russian soldiers from eastern regions such as Buryatia or Sakha (Yakutia), and are issued  false documents. We believe this would allow Russian propaganda to deny or downplay the involvement of foreign soldiers in the war.

There have also been reports of North Korean pilots being sent to Russia, although this remains unconfirmed. (We have previously covered cases of DPRK pilots deployed to various conflict zones). We do not see any pilot shortages within the Russian Aerospace Forces. However, if North Korea has indeed sent its pilots, possibly for training, they would not require to be retrained to fly Russian aircraft, as the DPRK Air Force already operates Mikoyan MiG-29 and Sukhoi Su-25 aircraft.

Following the release of a video showing injured civilians being rescued from a vehicle that had allegedly been fired upon by Russian soldiers, the Prosecutor’s Office of Ukraine has launched an investigation into Russian soldiers killing civilians in the town of Selydove. The video quality does not allow for a clear view of bullet holes in the vehicle or to determine who fired and from which side However, the very fact that civilians were injured supports the version suggesting gunfire was involved. It remains unclear whether the vehicle was deliberately targeted or simply caught in crossfire.

Incidents like this may occur when civilians attempt to evacuate from a combat zone on their own, unaware that they are driving past military positions when they receive orders to halt. It is worth noting that in the early days of the Ukrainian incursion in the Kursk region, a video emerged showing a civilian vehicle heading toward the town of Sudzha in an area of active combat, and coming under fire at a junction. In such situations, soldiers on either side may assume the vehicle is carrying an enemy sabotage and reconnaissance group, and if it does not stop after a warning shot, they open fire to neutralize it.

To avoid such incidents, the concept of humanitarian corridors was developed, wherein the parties to the conflict agree that during a particular period of time and along designated routes, civilians may safely leave the zone of hostilities.

The Russian state-owned news agency RIA Novosti has published drone footage purportedly showing an AFU strike on civilians heading towards the Russian-controlled portion of the town of Chasiv Yar. In the video, one civilian can be seen carrying a large white flag. As the group approaches an intersection with concrete structures on both sides of the road, artillery or mortar rounds begin to fall nearby, prompting them to take cover along the shoulder of the road. The video then cuts to a now empty road, followed by a FPV drone strike on a concrete structure, wherefrom a person in military uniform emerges at the end of the clip. Both RIA Novosti and the TASS news agency claim that the AFU strikes killed at least six Chasiv Yar residents attempting to leave the combat zone and evacuate toward Russian-controlled territory. However, the footage does not provide direct evidence of civilian fatalities. The video was geolocated in Chasiv Yar at an intersection leading to the Kanal neighborhood, which has long been under Russian control.

Ukrainian interceptor drones continue targeting Russian reconnaissance UAVs near the frontline. One recent video shows at least two Ukrainian interceptor drones pursuing a Russian UAV, with the footage showing one drone hitting its target as the other films the scene.

Additionally, Ukrainian military expert Serhii "Flash" Beskrestnov released a video showing a Russian reconnaissance UAV attempting to evade an incoming interceptor drone. According to Beskrestnov, the evasive maneuvers are performed automatically by an algorithm powered by computer vision and artificial intelligence. In late September, "rear-view cameras" intended to detect approaching enemy UAVs were first spotted on Russian reconnaissance drones.

A video has emerged from a Russian training ground, showing a row of armored vehicles, including a T-34-85 tank. This has led some commentators to conclude that these tanks may soon appear on the frontline, possibly in service with North Korean soldiers. However, we believe this line-up, featuring just one unit of each model, resembles more of an exhibition display than an operational fleet. Moreover, Russia has very few T-34-85 tanks remaining in working condition. It is worth noting that in 2019, Russia acquired 30 operational tanks from Laos, primarily for use in Victory Day parades and historical film productions. The oldest tank model used by Russia on the frontline is the T-54. According to the Oryx project, only 13 T-54/T-55 tanks have been visually confirmed as lost to date, while the total number of tanks lost by Russia since the onset of the war in 2022 has recently surpassed 3,500 units.

On Oct. 26, a Russian Mil Mi-28N Havoc attack helicopter crashed in the Kerch Strait, resulting in the death of both pilots. According to pro-Russian Telegram channels, the loss of control was caused by equipment failure. We agree that the likelihood of external influence is negligible, as the nearest Ukrainian positions are more than 250 km [155 mi] away. Although Ukrainian unmanned surface vessels armed with R-73 air-to-air missiles were spotted in May 2024, there has been no evidence of their successful use, and the Ukrainian side has not claimed responsibility for the helicopter crash.

Armin Papperger, Director of the German automotive and arms manufacturer Rheinmetall, reported that the company is building four weapons factories in Ukraine. The first factory has already been launched and is expected to produce its first batch of 10 Lynx infantry fighting vehicles by the end of the year. Papperger estimated the Ukrainian army's need for armored vehicles at 3,000 units; however, a decision on the production of subsequent batches has not yet been made, as it remains unclear who will finance them.

The owner of Readovka [Russian pro-war online news outlet] has flipped over an ATV in the Smolensk region, sustaining serious injuries and currently remains in a coma.

For ATV enthusiasts, we recommend wearing not only a helmet but also using motorcycle neck protection, as it significantly increases survival chances in case of a rollover.

Last week, Ukrainian drones launched several attacks on alcohol distilleries in Russia. In particular, in the early hours of Oct. 28, a plant in the town of Novokhopyorsk, Voronezh region was targeted, with eyewitness videos capturing the resulting fire. We believe that such strikes do not impact the overall course of the war.

A mixture of ethanol and diethyl ether is used to produce smokeless powder. However, even during World War I, methods were developed to regenerate this mixture in a closed cycle, meaning that the consumption of ethanol for gunpowder on a national scale is negligible. Consequently, destroying half of the alcohol distilleries in the country would not significantly impact gunpowder production.

Ethanol has also not been used in the production of ethylene glycol for decades. With the development of the gas-chemical industry in the mid-20th century, it became possible to produce ethylene glycol directly from ethylene, which is much cheaper.

Similarly, the use of ethanol in Soviet aviation technology was discontinued several decades ago.

Journalists from The Washington Post have analyzed satellite images of the secret 48th Central Research Institute of the Russian Ministry of Defense in the town of Sergiyev Posad-6, Moscow region. They concluded that extensive construction of new buildings, including high-security biological laboratories designed to work on the most dangerous pathogens, has been underway there for the past two years.

We do not believe that this construction is related to the development of weapons of mass destruction for use in the war. Instead, it is likely that Russian officials are concerned about the potential use of biological weapons against Russia and are working on defenses against such threats.

In 2021, CIT co-founder Ruslan Leviev, commissioned by The Insider for an investigation into the poisoning of Alexei Navalny, filmed sites connected to the development of Novichok and biological weapons. He discovered that one of the buildings of interest, located in Mytishchi, Moscow region, was built from scratch in about a year. This indicates that Russia’s leadership had an interest in such developments and was willing to invest significant resources in them even before the war.

Although tear gas is technically classified as a chemical weapon under the Chemical Weapons Convention, which prohibits its use in warfare, we have decided to refer to its use on the frontline as the application of "riot control weapons" since, for the general public, the term "chemical weapons" is more closely associated with substances like chlorine, chloropicrin or sarin.