Sitrep for Oct. 23-25, 2024 (as of 11 a.m. UTC+3)
Frontline Situation Update
In the Pokrovsk direction, the Russian Armed Forces have made significant progress in recent days, occupying a salient near the town of Selydove. They have launched attacks from multiple directions: south from the village of Tsukuryne, north through the village of Marynivka and east through the village of Mykhailivka. Currently, they have nearly straightened the frontline in this area. Additionally, Russian forces have released footage showing a flag being raised in the center of Selydove. Although such videos do not provide definitive proof of control, the DeepState map already marks the entire eastern part of the town as under RuAF control. Therefore, we expect the town to be fully captured within the next week. Furthermore, reports indicate that Russian forces have approached the village of Vyshneve, a key point along one of the supply routes to Selydove. This advance leaves the Armed Forces of Ukraine with only one accessible road heading northwest from the town, which is also now under fire. This suggests that Ukrainian forces have either already withdrawn from the rest of Selydove or will do so soon.
In the Kurakhove direction, intense fighting has continued within the pocket near the town of Hirnyk and the village of Kurakhivka. Urban fighting is ongoing in Hirnyk, and to the west, Russian forces have advanced into the village of Izmailivka, cutting off one of the roads leading to the town. Additionally, Russian troops continue advancing toward the town of Kurakhove from the village of Maksymilianivka. If they manage to capture the Hirnyk–Kurakhivka pocket quickly, they could potentially bypass the Kurakhove Reservoir, move behind Ukrainian lines, and launch an attack on the town of Kurakhove from the west. However, we are uncertain whether the RuAF will be able to advance that far in a short amount of time, especially with the muddy season worsening terrain conditions. A recent video—though its exact location is unknown—shows a Russian trench flooded with rainwater.
On Oct. 24, Vladimir Putin commented on the situation in the Kursk region at the BRICS summit, stating that about 2,000 Ukrainian soldiers were encircled there. However, judging by available data, there are currently no such areas in the Kursk direction. The situation near the village of Kremyanoye most closely resembles what was described; however, we doubt that so many soldiers could be deployed there. We regularly observe such salients along the frontline, though troops typically try to retreat in time if the situation becomes threatening. At the same time, soldiers of the 36th Separate Marine Brigade of the AFU recently found themselves encircled at their positions in the village of Lyubimovka. According to their own accounts, they had to call down artillery and mortar fire on their position. Although the building they occupied caught fire, they were able to leave it, evacuate wounded soldiers and regroup with their fellow soldiers. Notably, there were only nine soldiers involved in this case—not two thousand, nor even a few hundred.
In addition, during the summit, Putin claimed that Ukrainian losses in the Kursk region had reached 26 thousand people, likely including both dead and wounded. We consider this figure unrealistic and note that both sides tend to overestimate enemy losses. According to our estimates, 10,000 to 15,000 Ukrainian soldiers are taking part in the Kursk operation, with actual losses significantly lower.
Kyrylo Budanov, Chief of the Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine, stated to The War Zone on Oct. 22 that the first units of North Korean soldiers were expected to reach Russia’s Kursk region by the following day. On Oct. 24, Ukrainian military intelligence confirmed their arrival, though no photo or video evidence has emerged so far. It is possible that officers were sent first to plan upcoming operations. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy later stated that North Korean soldiers are expected to be deployed on the battlefield between Oct. 27 and 28.
A video has surfaced, allegedly showing North Korean officers strolling through Red Square. However, we do not consider this as evidence of any broader deployment, as small numbers of military personnel from various countries frequently visit Moscow for military cooperation or training.
John Kirby, the US National Security Council Coordinator for Strategic Communications, has stated that the United States has information regarding 3,000 North Korean military personnel arriving in Russia. The same was earlier confirmed by South Korea. Allegedly, the North Korean soldiers arrived in Vladivostok by sea and headed for training to various military bases in eastern Russia. US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin has also indicated that the US has evidence of North Korean military presence in Russia, although their specific role remains unknown.
From a military perspective, the deployment of such an insignificant military contingent is likely more beneficial for North Korea than for Russia, since it will hardly have a noticeable impact on the frontline situation. However, theoretically speaking, it might provide North Korean soldiers with valuable experience in full-scale warfare, where a wide range of weaponry is employed to fight US weapons—assuming these soldiers are not killed in "cannon fodder" infantry assaults.
South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol has announced that his government may reconsider its stance against directly supplying lethal aid to Ukraine, a decision contingent on the level of involvement of North Korean forces. It is worth noting that, in addition to domestically produced armored vehicles, South Korea’s arsenals include US-made M113 APCs, as well as Russian-made T-80U tanks, BMP-3 IFVs and Metis ATGMs—all of which could be operated by the AFU with minimal additional training.
Western Assistance
A new group of Ukrainian pilots has completed its basic flight training course in the United Kingdom. The next phase will likely involve lessons on advanced training aircraft, followed by instruction on F-16 fighter jets.
Reports indicate that France will begin delivering its Mirage 2000-5F fighter jets to Ukraine, with a first batch of three set to arrive in early 2025. The Mirages will be configured to carry SCALP-EG long-range cruise missiles and AASM Hammer air-launched missiles, along with advanced MICA air-to-air missiles. Similarly to F-16s, these jets are expected to be used primarily to counter Russian cruise missiles and drones, as sending inexperienced pilots directly to the frontlines to face the Russian Air Forces could prove too hazardous.
A week ago, we reported on conscript soldiers from the 90th Tank Division stationed in the Chelyabinsk region, each of whom received 305,000 rubles [$3,160] for signing contracts with the Ministry of Defense—contracts they had not actually signed. Similarly, seven conscripts from the 232nd Rocket Artillery Brigade in the Kurgan region each received 405,000 rubles [$4,200] in their accounts from the Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social Services of the Republic of Tatarstan for allegedly signing contracts with the MoD. According to the conscripts, they are not allowed to leave their unit to go to the bank and decline the transfer. "The commanders do not acknowledge they made a transfer, or that it happened as a result of an error or a glitch," one conscript complained, adding, "They will deploy us to Rostov and then to the frontline." As we anticipated, it is difficult for conscripts in such situations to follow human rights activists' advice to take leave and decline the transfer. We provided further details on similar cases in the previous mobilization summary released in collaboration with volunteers.
