Sitrep for Oct. 16-18, 2024 (as of 10:30 a.m. UTC+3)
Frontline Situation Update
The Russian Armed Forces continue employing the same tactics seen in most of their assaults on relatively large settlements. They typically encircle a settlement from two sides, followed by a frontal attack designed to force the Armed Forces of Ukraine into a quicker retreat.
This is exactly how Russian forces are currently advancing on the town of Selydove in the Pokrovsk direction. They are trying to envelop the town from the north and south and will attempt to cut off the AFU’s supply lines near the village of Vyshneve. While this maneuver will complicate Ukrainian positions in the town, it is unlikely to lead to a quick retreat. Fighting for Selydove could continue for a prolonged period.
Similarly, in the Kurakhove direction, the RuAF are advancing toward the town of Hirnyk and the village of Kurakhivka, which is a logical continuation of their offensive on the salient west of the village of Nevelske. On its southern flank, they have partially captured the village of Maksymilyanivka and occupied the village of Ostrivske, while on the northern flank, they are advancing south of the village of Tsukuryne, near the village of Izmailivka.
In the Chasiv Yar direction, Russian forces have advanced mainly around the village of Kalynivka, north of Chasiv Yar, over the past few weeks, where the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas Canal goes into underground pipes. In Kalynivka and slightly to its south, the RuAF have crossed the canal and started entering the Oktiabrskyi neighborhood in the east of the town not only with isolated storm infantry groups but also with armored vehicle columns, as seen in geolocated footage. Another video of a Russian attack was geolocated south of Chasiv Yar, indicating that here too, Russian forces are attempting to advance from two sides.
In the Kursk region, the situation remains unstable and the frontline is shifting, with some settlements, such as the village of Zelyony Shlyakh, changing hands. According to the independent researcher Naalsio, confirmed losses of military equipment by Russian forces in the Kursk direction for the period Oct. 7-15 exceeded those of Ukraine for the first time. The RuAF lost at least 26 military vehicles this week, including three tanks, 11 infantry fighting vehicles, three armored personnel carriers, one MLRS and eight transport vehicles. The AFU lost at least 20 units during this period, including three tanks, eight IFVs, seven APCs, one howitzer and one engineering vehicle. Previously, according to Naalsio, Ukraine's confirmed losses in the Kursk region always exceeded Russia's. It is worth noting that these estimates are not up-to-date, since visual data on losses is not always available promptly, which means it is unknown when exactly the ratio of military equipment losses inverted.
Recently, reports of rain in the Donetsk and Kursk regions have begun to appear. So far, we have not seen confirmation of the start of the muddy season, photos or videos of soggy soil and stuck vehicles, but we expect an imminent slowdown in combat operations. It should be noted that the muddy season will affect both sides, since the defenders also need to bring in supplies and evacuate the wounded.
Western Assistance
The Wall Street Journal published an article reporting that the United States is refocusing its training of Ukrainian F-16 pilots on younger cadets rather than experienced airmen who have already flown other aircraft. Such a decision could extend by many months the timeline for when Kyiv will have a full squadron of F-16 fighter aircraft, comprising 20 aircraft and 40 pilots. One possible reason cited is the lack of experienced Ukrainian pilots with the prerequisite English-language skills who can be sent to training away from the battlefield for about six months. In addition, eight cadets who have been learning basic piloting skills on the Alpha Jet trainer in France for the past year are reported to have begun training on the F-16 in Romania last month. Another eight experienced fighter pilots are completing their F-16 training in Arizona, USA, and will arrive in Ukraine in early 2025. A number of cadets are also undergoing basic pilot training in France and the UK, and may include those who will become Mirage 2000-5F pilots.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has presented his victory plan to the Verkhovna Rada, which he had previously discussed with allies in Washington.
Below are comments on the parts of the plan relevant to our area of expertise.
Zelenskyy argues that Ukraine’s non-aligned status makes it an appealing target for Putin, while a formal invitation to join NATO would symbolize Russia’s geopolitical defeat.
Although some have interpreted this as a call to admit Ukraine into the alliance immediately, even before the war ends, it appears that Zelenskyy is referring to a commitment to NATO membership after the war, with all necessary preparatory steps being completed in advance.
This part of the plan includes extending the war on Russian territory—such as the ongoing Kursk operation—and potentially conducting similar operations in other Russian regions. The goal is to prevent the creation of buffer zones on Ukrainian soil, a strategy reminiscent of Putin's own rhetoric regarding operations in the Kharkiv region.
Key components of this defense strategy include:
- Strengthening the AFU and destroying Russia’s offensive capabilities on Ukrainian territory;
- Partner support to equip reserve brigades and enhance air defenses;
- Expanding operations using Ukrainian missiles and drones and investing in their production;
- Lifting restrictions on the use of weapons and providing long-range missiles.
It is important to note that restrictions on weapons use are typically lifted in response to Russian actions, rather than at Ukraine’s request. For example, the transfer of ATACMS tactical ballistic missiles occurred in response to Russia's use of North Korean KN-23 missiles, and the partial lifting of the ban on using Western weapons against Russian territory followed the start of Russia’s offensive in the Kharkiv region in May 2024.
In this part, Volodymyr Zelenskyy talks about deploying a comprehensive non-nuclear strategic deterrence package on Ukrainian territory, sufficient to safeguard Ukraine from any military threat from Russia. This is intended to compel Russia to join an honest diplomatic process for a just conclusion to the war, or to face the guaranteed inability to continue its aggressive war, as Ukraine would use this deterrence package against specific military targets. The list of weapons and targets on Russian territory is contained in a secret annex to the plan, available “only to certain partners” of Ukraine.
Here he focuses on Ukraine’s economy and natural resources.
This part deals with post-war experience exchange to strengthen NATO’s defense capabilities and ensure Europe’s security.
We have repeatedly stated that the AFU’s military experience significantly surpasses that of Ukraine’s allied armies. This aspect of the plan is already being studied and will be actively implemented after the war ends.
Minister of Defense of the Netherlands Ruben Brekelmans stated that the Netherlands has approved the use of the F-16 fighter aircraft supplied to Ukraine for self-defense, which could include strikes on military facilities in Russia. Denmark had previously issued a similar statement. It is likely that this statement is a kind of response to Zelenskyy’s victory plan. We believe such strikes will only be possible with US approval.
Meanwhile, Swedish Minister for Defense PĂĄl Jonson expressed his support for Ukraine's victory plan and its accession to NATO.
During a conversation with US presidential candidate Donald Trump, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy invoked the Budapest Memorandum, stating that for Ukraine to guarantee its security, it would either need to possess nuclear weapons or be part of a military alliance, with NATO being the only effective option. However, Zelenskyy later clarified, during a press conference at NATO headquarters, that Ukraine does not plan to reacquire nuclear weapons. It is worth noting that developing nuclear arms is a lengthy and costly process, fraught with diplomatic and political risks, and a Ukraine currently at war will not be in a position to invest in this kind of technology in the coming years.
US President Joe Biden has arrived in Berlin for a working visit, where he is expected to meet with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, French President Emmanuel Macron and British Prime Minister Keir Starmer.
The Netherlands has allocated €271 million [$294 million] for the production of artillery ammunition destined for Ukraine in Czechia in 2025. The exact quantity of rounds to be supplied remains unknown, as the price per round has yet to be determined. Additionally, the Netherlands has ordered six DITA self-propelled howitzers from Czechia. It was earlier reported that nine of these howitzers were delivered to Ukraine in the summer of 2023, though we have not seen evidence of their deployment.
The US announced a new $425 million military aid package, which will include:
- Additional munitions for National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS):
- RIM-7 missiles and support for air defense;
- Stinger anti-aircraft missiles;
- Ammunition for High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS);
- Air-to-ground munitions (possibly JSOW glide bombs);
- 155mm and 105mm artillery ammunition;
- Tube-launched, Optically tracked, Wire-guided (TOW) missiles;
- Javelin and AT-4 anti-armor systems;
- High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs);
- Small arms and ammunition;
- Grenades, thermal cameras and training equipment;
- Demolitions equipment and munitions;
- Spare parts, ancillary equipment, services, training and transportation.
In recent days, discussions continued about the potential involvement of North Korean soldiers on Russia's side. According to the New York Times, U.S. intelligence and military officials are skeptical of Ukrainian intelligence claims about a significant number of North Korean mercenaries participating in the war, though they have no doubts about the presence of engineers helping launch KN-23 missiles. (After the sitrep was recorded, a video from Primorye showed soldiers speaking Korean and South Korean intelligence reported the arrival of North Korean special forces in Russia.)
Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustam Umerov claimed that Norway will continue to support the AFU and will provide Ukraine with six more F-16s in the near future.
Canada has announced a new military aid package to Ukraine worth CAD 64.8 million [$47 million], which will include small arms, ammunition and protective gear.
Ukraine will soon receive 49 Abrams M1A1 tanks from Australia. These tanks were previously slated for decommissioning.
US State Department spokesman Matthew Miller said that previously, various Chinese companies produced and supplied weapon components to Russia.
Now, however, it has been noticed that finished drones are now being delivered for the war in Ukraine. In this regard, the US imposed sanctions on Chinese drone producers. We are talking about the Garpiya [Harpy] drones, which are similar in appearance and close in technical characteristics to the Shahed drones, weigh less than 300 kg [661 lbs], and have a flight range of up to 1,500 km [932 mi].
Conscription, Mobilization and Contract Military Service
In the Samara region, authorities have doubled the reward for those who "attract" individuals willing to sign a contract with the Ministry of Defense, increasing it from 15,000 rubles [$155] to 30,000 rubles [$310]. It is worth noting that in some other regions, similar payments can reach up to 100,000 rubles [$1,030]. Additionally, in a number of regions, police officers are awarded bonuses for "recruiting" individuals for the war.
We see indirect evidence that the MoD is currently recruiting 30,000 people per month. The successful replenishment of existing units' losses and the sustained intensity of the Russian army's offensive actions over the past few months confirm these significant recruitment efforts. In the summer, we and some other analysts believed that the MoD's personnel situation would gradually deteriorate by the fall and that Ukraine's advantage would increase. However, in reality, we observe the opposite situation: Russia is, at the least, not slowing down the pace of its offensive. Another sign of the successful recruitment is the formation of new units, primarily in the Leningrad Military District, the 44th Army Corps and several new divisions. We cannot accurately assess the number of contracts signed monthly, but we are confident that the recruitment rate is relatively high.
In Russia’s constituent republic of Tatarstan, a new method of enlisting conscripts into contract military service has been devised: 10 conscripts from the 90th Tank Division in the Chelyabinsk region received 305,000 rubles [$3,150] each from the Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social Services of the Republic of Tatarstan for signing contracts with the MoD, which they never actually signed. The Central Military District, which includes the 90th Tank Division, explained the incident as a "technical glitch" and stated that the conscripts' status remained unchanged. Human rights activists from the organization Shkola Prizyvnika [Conscript School] explain that unsuspecting soldiers are being registered as contract soldiers and receiving monetary payments. If the servicemen accept the money, do not refuse it, and do not report the mistake, they will be considered to have signed a contract. They could be immediately deployed to a combat zone, and by the time they realize it, there would be no way to reverse the situation. Shkola Prizyvnika advises that instead of transferring the money back themselves, soldiers should go to a bank and file a claim for an erroneous payment, so the bank can return the funds. However, they acknowledge that this might be difficult for conscripts in military units, and publicizing such cases could be helpful for those caught in this situation.
Former Wagner Group mercenary Mikhail T., previously convicted of murder, fatally assaulted a female resident of the city of Novosibirsk on Oct. 1, recording the incident on video. After the assault, he carried the unconscious woman outside. The victim was hospitalized in critical condition and died a week later. The deceased woman's son reported that, according to the investigator, the mercenary signed a new contract with the MoD and will soon be sent from the pre-trial detention center to the front.
The Nasiliu.net [No to Violence] non-profit organization has announced an urgent fundraising campaign for emergency shelter, psychological and legal support for women suffering from domestic violence. We encourage you to support this important project.
