Sitrep for Oct. 2-4, 2024 (as of 10 a.m. UTC+3)
Frontline Situation Update
The key development of the week was the capture of Vuhledar in the Donetsk region. Going forward, Ukraine’s defensive line will likely run near the village of Bohoiavlenka. To seize it, the Russian Armed Forces will probably try to advance on the village of Novoukrainka to cut off one of the supply routes leading to Bohoiavlenka from the west, which runs north of Novoukrainka.
Russian forces also continue to attack north of Vuhledar, advancing towards the village of Katerynivka and further to the villages of Yelyzavetivka, Hannivka, and Uspenivka. Thus, we expect them to move north from Vuhledar towards the village of Dalnie, while continuing to push towards Kurakhove from the east, approaching from the village of Maksymilyanivka. It is likely that they will first try to seize the pocket west of the village of Pobeda and then begin a direct assault on Kurakhove from the east and south.
Interestingly, although Vuhledar was effectively captured a few days ago, Russia's Ministry of Defense officially reported its capture only on Oct. 3. However, on Oct. 2, the ministry hurried to declare the capture of the village of Verkhnokamianske in the Siversk direction in the Donetsk region, and Russia’s Minister of Defense Andrey Belousov sent a congratulatory telegram to the command of the 6th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade of the RuAF, which is operating in this area. There is currently no objective evidence of the capture of Verkhnokamianske, and DeepState does not even consider it contested. It is worth noting that to the east is the long-occupied village of Verkhniokamianka in the Luhansk region, which has a similar-sounding name. Pro-Russian milblogger Kirill Fyodorov claimed that military personnel from this direction denied the capture of Verkhnokamianske.
In the southern part of the Pokrovsk direction, the situation in the village of Tsukuryne has become even more threatening for Ukrainian forces. The settlement is already completely a contested area and we expect it to be captured in the coming days.
It is also noteworthy that Russian forces have still not fully captured the pocket to the west of the village of Nevelske: the town of Hirnyk and the village of Kurakhivka remain uncaptured. We believe that only after capturing this territory will the RuAF proceed to storm Selydove and will probably also try to encircle it advancing from the villages of Marynivka, Mykhailivka and Tsukuryne.
A small advance by Russian troops has also been noted in the north of the Kharkiv region in the Kupiansk direction. They are now even closer to the Oskil River in the area of the villages of Kruhliakivka and Kolisnykivka. It is worth noting that Kruhliakivka was home to one of the three crossings over the Oskil River, which has long been destroyed as a result of combat operations.
In addition, the RuAF have already reached the center of the town of Toretsk, where fighting is now ongoing.
On Oct. 2, the Ukrainian DeepState project reported that Russian forces were able to advance in the western part of the Ukrainian bridgehead in the Kursk region and liberate the village of Obukhovka southeast of the village of Snagost.
We believe the primary objective of this bridgehead is political and is intended to demonstrate Ukraine’s allies that the AFU is capable of conducting combat operations on enemy territory, despite the opponent’s overwhelming advantage in resources and existing limitations on the use of some Western-supplied weapons. Therefore, the size of the bridgehead is of secondary importance; as long as it exists, it is achieving its goals. Under these conditions, there is no need for the AFU to advance any further. In fact, they may even pull back to more advantageous positions in certain areas, as the mere existence of the bridgehead strengthens Ukraine’s position in potential future negotiations.
On the other hand, one reason Ukrainian forces have not withdrawn from the Kursk could be the potential damage to Ukraine’s foreign policy image, particularly given the lack of recent battlefield successes. Some members of our team also suggest that internal political considerations could be at play: a withdrawal at this stage of the campaign might raise questions within Ukrainian society about why so many resources were expended on an ultimately unfruitful endeavor.
In our previous sitrep, we shared photos of a destroyed Bradley IFV in the Kursk region, typically associated with Ukraine’s 47th Mechanized Brigade. We noted at the time that these vehicles could have been transferred to one of Ukraine’s newly formed brigades. However, on Oct. 2, a video surfaced showing captured Ukrainian soldiers, reportedly from the 47th Mechanized Brigade, which definitively confirms the brigade’s involvement in the fighting in the Kursk direction.
The independent researcher Naalsio has returned from a break and published an assessment of losses in the Kursk region from Sept. 9 to Oct. 1: the RuAF lost at least 51 pieces of equipment (seven tanks, 29 infantry fighting vehicles, two armored personnel carriers, one howitzer, one self-propelled howitzer, three air defense systems and other equipment), while the Armed Forces of Ukraine lost a minimum of 78 pieces (eight tanks, 28 infantry fighting vehicles, 29 armored personnel carriers, five SPHs, one howitzer and other vehicles). The total losses for the RuAF since the beginning of the operation in the Kursk region amount to 134 units, and for the AFU—202 units. Thus, the AFU continues to lose more equipment and of greater value in the Kursk direction.
Farida Rustamova's project published an article based on conversations with high-ranking Russian officials who regularly communicate with Putin. According to them, after the start of the operation in the Kursk region, Putin began to consider negotiations impossible. In other words, the hope that Putin would be more inclined to compromise after the invasion did not materialize. However, the question arises as to how accurately these officials understand Putin's position.
Western Assistance
Belgium plans to deliver three Caesar self-propelled howitzers to Ukraine, for a total cost of €12 million. In 2024, Western allies planned to supply Ukraine with 72 Caesar SPHs, three of which funded by Belgium.
Ukraine’s Ambassador in the Czech Republic claims that the AFU have received only one third of the 500,000 artillery shells promised by the end of the year as part of the Czech initiative. It is worth noting that at the end of June the Czech publication iRozhlas reported that 50,000 shells had already been delivered to Ukraine and the purchase of another 500,000 had been funded. These were to be delivered in batches of several tens of thousands per month until the end of the year.
On Oct. 1, former Prime Minister of the Netherlands Mark Rutte became the new NATO Secretary General. On Oct. 3, he met with Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Kyiv to discuss further support for Ukraine.
Ukrainian and Russian Strikes
Overnight into Oct. 3, Ukrainian UAVs attacked the Borisoglebsk airfield in the Voronezh region where part of the Russian Air Force employed in the war in Ukraine is based. However, according to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, no noticeable damage was caused to the hangars, equipment or runway. Satellite images show only a few patches of scorched grass.
On Oct. 3, Ukrainian UAVs struck a target in the town of Kurchatov, Kursk region. Russian propagandists claim that it was an attempted attack on the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant. In fact, the attack seems to have targeted an ammunition depot in Kurchatov, which is about 5 km [3 mi] away from the nuclear plant, with eyewitness videos clearly capturing the sound of a secondary detonation.
