Sitrep for July 15-17, 2024 (as of 9 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

Russian forces have advanced in the village of Novoselivka Persha, which was recently semi-encircled. The Russian Armed Forces are advancing from the north and the east, with fighting already taking place within the village. A video has surfaced showing a Russian soldier capturing two Ukrainian servicemen.

Additionally, Russian forces are advancing towards the village of Yasnobrodivka.

It appears that offensive actions have slowed due to the intense heat. In the absence of sufficient armored vehicles, the weather significantly impacts soldiers who must move on foot in full gear. This situation is exacerbated by supply issues, with the RuAF experiencing acute water shortages in some areas. Stanislav "Osman" Bunyatov, a soldier of the 24th Separate Assault Battalion of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, stated on the Hovoryat Snaiper [They Say Sniper] Telegram channel that drones are continuously delivering water and other essential supplies to AFU positions.

The AFU General Staff has finally acknowledged the recent AFU withdrawal from the left bank of the Dnipro River, reporting that fighting has shifted from Krynky to the mouth of the Dnipro. The reports indicate that holding the line was pointless due to the "extensive destruction of buildings and shelters." This was also reported by Hovoryat Snaiper. It is worth noting that three weeks ago, the independent researcher Naalsio concluded his tally of military equipment losses in the village of Krynky.

Due to the hot weather, forest fires near populated areas in Crimea have intensified. Although occupation authorities claim that firefighting units of the Ministry of Emergency Situations are handling the situation, no firefighters are visible in the available videos. There is likely a personnel shortage, and the leadership is hesitant to use firefighting aircraft, fearing that Ukrainian forces might mistake Ministry of Emergency Situations helicopters for military aircraft.

The Russian Ministry of Defense released a video showing 9K720 Iskander mobile short-range missiles striking the Hydroport airfield in the city of Odesa, resulting in a large fire. Reports indicate that the target of the strike were hangars housing Yak-52 piston aerobatic aircraft, which the AFU have adapted for intercepting Russian reconnaissance drones. One video from the scene shows an Orlan reconnaissance drone releasing a parachute after being shot down. While opinions on the effectiveness of using Yak-52s for such purposes vary, recent events suggest they have been effective: on July 14, the Ukrainian Air Force reported shooting down three Orlan reconnaissance drones and one Zala drone on the Donetsk axis; on July 15, three Orlans and one Zala; and on July 16, four Orlans, two Zalas, one Supercam and one reconnaissance drone of an unknown type.

Ruslan Pukhov, Director of the Russian Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, (well-known for his bmpd LiveJournal blog), suggested that the Russian Army adopt a practice similar to that of the AFU regarding the use of small aircraft for countering drones.

Russia possesses several types of aircraft suitable for this purpose. These include not only the light-engine Yak-52, which can be equipped with the necessary weapons, but also jet combat training aircraft like the L-39 and Yak-130, as well as helicopters, which have already been observed intercepting drones.

Ukrainian and Russian Strikes

On July 12, Ukrainian forces struck air defense batteries near the city of Mariupol. At the time, there was no evidence of the strike, however, an obituary recently appeared for Captain Aleksandr Nosaev, the commander of an S-300VM SAM system multi-channel missile guidance station, who was killed on July 12 as a result of the missile attack.

On July 16, another strike on air defense batteries was reportedly carried out using ATACMS tactical ballistic missiles with cluster munition warheads. Due to the poor quality of the video, we do not share the CyberBoroshno project’s confidence that S-300V SAM system positions were also hit. There is currently no information available regarding the consequences of the strike.

Earlier, we reported on a study revealing a significant reduction in air defense batteries in the eastern part of Russia. It has now become apparent that a similar reduction in air defense systems also occurred in the northwestern part of the country. Despite regular mentions by Russian authorities of the NATO threat, air defense capabilities have weakened particularly near the land border with NATO countries.

Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, we have been advocating for the evacuation of residents from the border areas of the Belgorod, Kursk and Bryansk regions, as these territories are subjected to constant attacks, making it dangerous to stay there. Starting from July 23, Belgorod regional authorities have restricted entry to 14 settlements in the region. Only adult men in personal body armor facilities, in an armored vehicle with jamming devices, and accompanied by military personnel and municipal representatives will be allowed entry. It is important to note that this still does not mean that other residents will be evacuated from the danger zone and that alternative housing will be provided in another region and compensations will be paid. This measure will only complicate life in other border areas and essentially force local residents to relocate independently.

Furthermore, the list does not include any cities or towns—not even Shebekino, which is subjected to attacks on an almost daily basis, often resulting in civilian casualties.

Last week, we reported that Spain had restored 10 Leopard 2A4 tanks and would soon send them to Ukraine. It is now confirmed that the transportation has begun. The tanks will arrive in Poland by next weekend, where they will be handed over to the AFU.

A video has been published showing the Azov Brigade mopping up RuAF positions. Russian officials and propagandists are attempting to present this as the murder of a prisoner of war. In reality, the footage depicts a typical trench battle: Ukrainian soldiers slowly advance through Russian trenches under the cover of darkness, discover a Russian soldier, shoot him and later finish him off. There were no attempts by the Russian soldier to surrender: he did not raise his hands nor indicate he wanted to surrender. He was simply sitting, possibly due to concussion or shock, or mistaking the Ukrainians for his fellow soldiers in the dark (in response to Ukrainian fire, he shouted: “Friendly!” presumably not recognizing the enemy). It is worth noting that in such close-combat situations, it is necessary to react instantly to the appearance of the enemy, as there is no time to ask if they want to surrender.

Pro-Russian war correspondent Filatov claims that the video was staged, suggesting that the Russian soldier had been captured earlier and that a staged video was later filmed. This statement likely stems from his understanding that the video in question does not depict a violation of international humanitarian law, as the soldier did not visibly surrender. For a combatant to fall under the protection of international humanitarian law, two conditions must be met: first, the soldier must be completely under the enemy’s control; second, they must clearly express the desire to surrender, such as by raising their hands. Without meeting the second condition, the soldier remains a combatant, regardless of whether he is visibly armed or not.

Some commentators argue that the Russian soldier should not have been killed as he was visibly wounded. It is prohibited to kill wounded soldiers when it is absolutely clear that they pose no threat to the other party, such as when they are lying unconscious with a severe injury. In this case, however, the Russian soldier only had a small scratch on his forehead, and there is no reason to believe he could not have suddenly thrown a grenade or produced an assault rifle.

We do not believe that a war crime was committed in this instance. However, we find that the dissemination of close-quarters combat videos with significant gore and bloodshed is unhelpful and only feeds the appetite of some viewers who crave gruesome and brutal content. This, in turn, can provoke others to commit genuine war crimes on the battlefield.

Conscription, Mobilization and Contract Military Service

Last week, we reported on a video address by mobilized soldiers declaring that they would not tolerate provocations and would defend their "women, not the government." Pro-Russian Telegram channels published a response video in which soldiers from the 79th Motorized Rifle Regiment allegedly "send greetings to all provocateurs who try to demotivate them by organizing rallies and recording video addresses calling for demobilization." The Mobilizatsiya.Novosti [Mobilization.News] Telegram channel noted that this video had been dubbed. The original video, published on a small Telegram channel, shows military personnel thanking volunteers for their support.

As we expected, the practice of paying rewards to those who "recruit" someone willing to sign a contract with the Ministry of Defense is spreading across Russian regions. Recently, Yaroslavl regional authorities announced a reward of 100,000 rubles [$1,130] for voluntary "recruiters."

Yevgeny Shishanov, an adult orphan from Barnaul, won a court case against Altai region officials before the war, for failing to provide him with housing, but the decision was never enforced. The regional housing authority told him that the only way to get the housing he was legally entitled to was to join the "special military operation."  Without informing his pregnant wife, Shishanov signed a contract with the Defense Ministry and was killed less than five months later. Three months after his death, Shishanov's widow and children were taken off the waiting list for housing.

The Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) no longer publishes detailed data on the number of deaths and mortality from external causes, notes demographer Alexey Rakhsa. This category includes deaths not related to illnesses, such as traffic accidents, suicides and combat-related deaths. Vazhnyye Istorii [IStories, independent Russian investigative media outlet] have recently published an article assessing Russia's losses in the war for 2022-2023, calculating excess mortality among men aged 20 to 49 based on Rosstat data.

According to The Bell, over 650,000 people have left Russia since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine and have not returned. Journalists obtained these figures by contacting statistics and migration agencies in around 70 countries to which Russians have relocated. The largest number of Russians moved to Armenia—110,000 people as of March 2023.

On July 17 at 6:00 p.m. Moscow time, we have hosted another livestream to answer your questions and introduce a new team member. With his military background, he is well-equipped to answer your questions about the Russian Army.

We would also like to recommend following the Twitter account of our mobilization summary editor. There, he reviews data not included in our sitreps, such as analyses of military equipment.