Sitrep for Sept. 20-23, 2024 (as of 9:30 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

In the Kupiansk direction, Russian forces advanced towards the Oskil River from the village of Pishchane, moving toward the village of Kruhliakivka. Initially, they were advancing towards the villages of Kolesnykivka and Hlushkivka but likely encountered strong resistance from the defending Ukrainian forces and shifted the direction of their offensive southward toward Kruhliakivka.

The most dramatic change in the frontline has happened in the Vuhledar direction, where Russian forces have made significant progress in recent days, advancing on Vuhledar from two sides. It is worth noting that on the western flank, they are advancing from the village of Prechystivka, and on the eastern flank, from the village of Vodiane, aiming to cut off the supply route from the village of Bohoiavlenka. This would greatly complicate the supply lines of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in Vuhledar. The Ukrainian project DeepState attributes the difficulties in this area to the cancellation of the rotation of the 72nd Separate Mechanized Brigade of the AFU and the failure of the 58th Separate Mechanized Brigade to hold back Russian forces near Prechystivka in early September.

Since the distance between Russian-held positions and the remaining supply routes to Vuhledar is about 10 km [6 mi], Russian forces can effectively fire on this entire area. There is a high likelihood that the AFU will have to abandon Vuhledar before the muddy season begins.

In the Toretsk direction, Russian forces have straightened the frontline by occupying the "bulge" to the east of the villages of Niu-York and Nelipivka.

In the southern part of the Pokrovsk direction (the Kurakhovo direction in some sources) the situation for Ukrainian forces is deteriorating. In recent days, the RuAF has advanced from the village of Memryk to the west and cut off the road connecting the town of Selydove with the village of Tsukuryne. This advance has complicated the supply of Ukrainian troops in the town of Hirnyk and the village of Kurakhivka. It is reasonable to expect that Russian forces will gradually occupy the "bulge" to the west of the village of Nevelske.

The RuAF are also advancing west of Krasnohorivka: they bypassed the village of Hostre from the south and captured the village of Heorhiivka. These actions have further complicated the supply of Hirnyk and Kurakhivka.

Attacking in the direction of Hirnyk, Russian forces are actively hitting it with artillery and glide bombs. They are destroying residential buildings, thereby preparing the area for urban warfare, which is likely to begin in the near future.

At the same time, the AFU have also achieved some success. In the Chasiv-Yar direction, Ukrainian forces have managed to recapture some positions near the village of Zaliznianske, northeast of the town of Chasiv Yar.

Additionally, in the Kursk region, the AFU advanced northeast from the village of Malaya Loknya, straightening the frontline in this area.

In the course of the Russian counteroffensive in the Kursk direction, we have seen many videos featuring BMD airborne infantry fighting vehicles—armored vehicles used by Russian Airborne Troops units. These are tracked vehicles with guns and lightweight armor, specifically designed to be airdropped from transport aircraft. We believe that the concept of such BMDs is outdated: in a war between peer adversaries, air defenses would prevent them from being dropped with parachutes, and in combat operations against a lightly armed enemy, there is no need for airdrops. Since the thin armor of BMDs is easily penetrated, their use negatively affects the survivability of Russian paratroopers. In our opinion, the Russian command should consider re-equipping paratroopers with BMP infantry fighting vehicles instead of BMDs. The fact that the use of BMDs continues not only due to a shortage of other equipment but also due to the high inertia of the army's top leadership is confirmed by the ongoing production of the BMD-4M at the Kurgan Machine-Building Plant, alongside the BMP-3.

Additionally, we note that Russian forces have yet to achieve significant success in the Kursk direction.

It can be assumed that for the Ukrainian commanders, countering the Russian offensive has a higher priority than holding positions in other directions—Ukraine will try to maintain a bridgehead in the Kursk region until future negotiations.

Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated that as part of the work on the victory plan, Ukraine has already prepared three points to hold “talks in any format” with Russia, adding that “there will be more meetings, both offline and online,” and the plan will be ready in early November. Later, representatives from the Ukrainian president’s office clarified that by “offline meetings,” he meant meetings with intermediary countries, not direct talks with Russia.

Maria Zakharova, the spokeswoman for the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has announced that Russian representatives will not participate in the upcoming “peace summit.” However, she also emphasized that Russia remains open to a politico-diplomatic resolution to the crisis and is prepared to consider serious proposals that take into account the realities “on the ground.”

Meanwhile, Reuters sources—including a European diplomat, a European intelligence official and a US official—claim that Iran has not delivered the launchers for the Fath-360 ballistic missiles it sent to Russia, despite earlier reports from Western outlets suggesting otherwise two weeks ago. This development raises some questions. First, it is possible that the Russian military has found the launchers unsuitable for Ukrainian terrain, as they are mounted on civilian two-wheel drive Mercedes trucks. Another theory is that Russia already has chassis ready for the missiles, based on all-terrain KAMAZ, BAZ or Ural trucks, which could explain why Iran did not provide its own launchers. A further hypothesis suggests that Iran has supplied the missiles but withheld the launchers, possibly using them as a bargaining chip in future negotiations at the United Nations General Assembly. However, it remains unclear how Iran would manage to resolve this issue with Russia if it were to reach a compromise with the West, making this last theory less plausible.

On Sept 21, a parade marking the anniversary of the beginning of the Iran-Iraq War in Teheran showcased a Shahed-136B loitering munition with an alleged range of 4,000 km [2485 mi], which is significantly higher than that of the currently available versions. It is not known whether this new version will be supplied to Russia but arguably, it is not going to make much difference, since the current one is capable of reaching targets over the entire territory of Ukraine.

Western Assistance

Volodimir Zelenskyy has arrived in the United States for meetings which were mentioned in our previous sitrep.

The US is preparing a new $375 million military aid package to Ukraine. Among other items it is expected to include Joint Standoff Weapon gliding bombs with a range of about 100 km [62 mi] which are launched from F-16 fighters. These bombs can be equipped with cluster, fragmentation or penetrating warheads, and overall, function similarly to an extended-range JDAM. At the moment it is not clear if their use inside Russia will be restricted, though even if it is not, they cannot be seen as a substitute to the long-range Storm Shadow/SCALP EG or ATACMS missiles which have a range of up to 300 km [186 mi].

Ukrainian and Russian Strikes

The last week has shown that, according to Russian officials, the most effective Ukrainian weapon at the moment is drone debris.

On the night of Sept. 21, a drone attack by the AFU caused a fire at the 719th Southern Military District base in the village of Kamenny, Tikhoretsk district, Krasnodar region. A year ago, US authorities reported that warehouses near Tikhoretsk were being expanded to store ammunition from North Korea. The General Staff of the AFU claims that at the time of the strike, there was a trainload on the base that had delivered at least 2,000 tons of ammunition, including North-Korea-supplied.

Also on the night of Sept. 21, a drone attack by the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) resulted in a large fire breaking out at the 23rd Arsenal of the Main Missile and Artillery Directorate of the Russian MoD in the Toropets district of the Tver region. The site is just south of the town of Toropets and the 107th Arsenal, which was attacked on Sept. 18. Col. Ants Kiviselg, head of the Estonian Defense Forces Intelligence Center, stated that approximately 30,000 tons of ammunition were destroyed in the strike on the Toropets ammunition depot, equating to about 750,000 shells. The RuAF, on average, expend up to 10,000 shells per day, meaning that the strike destroyed nearly a three-month supply. We find these calculations somewhat imprecise, as 30,000 tons represents the entire capacity of the base, but it is unknown whether it was fully stocked or if the ammunition stored was actively used in the current war. Nevertheless, we agree that the destruction of these storage sites will impact the supply chain of Russian forces and the situation on the frontline, as logistics routes will need to be adjusted.

Also, on Sept. 21 in the village of Molkin in the Krasnodar region, a former Wagner Group base caught fire. After Prigozhin's death and the disbanding of the group, the base returned under the control of the Russian Ministry of Defense and was likely being used in the interests of the "African Corps." It is unclear what caused the fire, and we have not seen any reports of UAVs. The pro-Russian Telegram channel Trinadtsatyy [the 13th] of “DPR” serviceman Egor Guzenko suggests that sabotage was the cause of the fire.

More and more authors of research projects are getting tired of volunteer work, experiencing burnout and ceasing their activities. Last year, the analytical community lost the Oryx and Calibre Obscura projects. Last week, two researchers involved in counting military vehicles at Russian storage bases announced they were discontinuing their work. Jompy stated that he will complete his already planned research in 2024, but will not continue the project next year as the hobby no longer brings him joy. Analyst Ben @bentanmy wrote in his latest thread about artillery systems that this is likely his last thread on the war, and that its outcome depends solely on the willingness of partner countries to help Ukraine at least maintain the current dynamics.

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