Sitrep for Sept. 16-20, 2024 (as of 9:30 a.m. UTC+3)
Frontline Situation Update
In the Kursk direction, over the past few days, Russian forces have made slight progress in the Korenevsky district, moving from the village of Snagost toward the village of Lyubimovka, near the village of Obukhovka. Although this was reported earlier, there had been no convincing confirmation of this advancement until now. The breach of the Russian-Ukrainian border near the village of Vesyoloye has not yet impacted the Russian counter-offensive. Nonetheless, Russian forces have not achieved significant success.
Two weeks ago, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated that Russia had transferred 60,000 troops to the Kursk region. In his latest statement, he mentioned 40,000 Russian soldiers being “diverted” to the Kursk direction. We are still unable to confirm or deny these claims, but we estimate that there are at least 30,000 troops, and it is possible that the number may indeed be closer to 40,000.
A video has surfaced (reportedly filmed in the Glushkovsky district in early September) showing a Ukrainian mine-clearing vehicle — either a UR-77 Meteorit or its Western equivalent — deploying an explosive charge to detonate mines, clearing a path through the minefield.
Additionally, at the 29-second mark, the detonation of a mine appears to be triggered by the combat breacher vehicle. These events likely preceded the breach of the line of concrete pyramids mentioned in the previous sitrep and confirm that the main issue with Russian fortifications was the lack of a sufficient number of prepared soldiers to man them.
Politico has reported, citing anonymous senior Ukrainian military officials, that the idea for an offensive in the Kursk region was proposed by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy as early as the beginning of 2024. At the time, the plan faced stiff opposition from General Valerii Zaluzhnyi, then Commander-in-Chief of the AFU, and Emil Ishkulov, commander of the 80th Air Assault Brigade.
Zaluzhnyi expressed concern over the absence of a clear strategy for the next steps following the establishment of a foothold on Russian territory, and reportedly never received a satisfactory response from Zelenskyy. Meanwhile, Ishkulov feared the offensive could result in heavy losses for his brigade (as we previously reported, soldiers from the 80th Brigade were captured in the Kursk region). His dismissal from his position last July caused a significant stir in Ukrainian society.
Politico also mentioned that the AFU was forced to redeploy some units that had already entered Russian territory when the RuAF escalated their offensive in the Pokrovsk direction to counter the Ukrainian foray into the Kursk region.
In conclusion, it appears that political objectives took precedence over military strategy in the planning of the Kursk operation. We continue to believe that postponing the offensive until mid-September could have reduced Ukrainian casualties while preserving the potential political gains.
In the Kupiansk direction, the frontline has remained virtually unchanged, but the RuAF has approached the villages of Kolesnykivka and Hlushkivka near the Oskil River. Although a rather dangerous salient has formed, the AFU will only be able to cut it if they have sufficient reserves: equipped units and the required amount of ammunition.
In the Toretsk direction, Russian forces have advanced slightly on the outskirts of Toretsk, but this has not had an impact on the overall situation.
In the Pokrovsk direction, the RuAF has completely captured the village of Hrodivka and continues to gradually advance. In the southern part of the direction, on the salient west of the village of Nevelske, Russian forces advanced west of the village of Memryk and south of the village of Halytsynivka, gradually occupying the resulting "bulge."
In addition, the RuAF have also made progress near the village of Klishchiivka in the Chasiv-Yar direction.
Thus, over the past week, there have been no significant changes in the frontline, the reason for this is still unclear.
Ukrainian and Russian Strikes
On the night of Sept. 18, Ukrainian drones struck the 107th Arsenal of the Main Missile and Artillery Directorate of the Russian MoD in the town of Toropets, Tver region (470 km [292 mi] from the frontline).
According to Governor Igor Rudenya, a fire started "as a result of UAV debris falling during the interception of the attack by air defense forces." The explosions were so powerful that they were detected by seismic sensors, and the smoke plume resulting from the fire was visible from space.
Satellite images taken before the full-scale invasion show that some of the ammunition was stored in the open air.
Unprotected ammunition boxes can ignite even from the impact of a UAV with a small warhead and easily trigger a large-scale fire, which can lead to the detonation of ammunition even in well-built reinforced concrete shelters. The Skhemy [Schemes] project (part of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty) published satellite images showing that almost all buildings appear destroyed, with researchers estimating that between 50 to 75% of the buildings were destroyed according to one estimate, and between 70 to 90% according to another.
The loss of such a large quantity of ammunition is a serious blow to the Russian Army, which may affect the intensity of combat operations for a short period. According to various reports, the warehouse might have contained S-300 missiles, 9K720 Iskander ballistic missiles and BM-21 Grad rockets. According to the Russian Ministry of Health, 13 people were sent to a hospital, with no fatalities reported.
On Sept. 19, Russian forces launched an airstrike on a geriatric care home in the city of Sumy killing one and injuring 14 people. The Sumy region has featured in our sitreps on shelling nearly every day. Lifting restrictions on the use of Western weapons inside Russia might reduce the frequency of attacks on Ukrainian cities and protect civilians.
Western Assistance
The EU has allocated € 400 million [$447 m] for the development of the Ukrainian defense industry using the revenue generated by frozen Russian assets. Reportedly, this method of funding has already financed the production of 22S2 Bohdana 155mm wheeled self-propelled howitzers, which we covered in our previous sitrep.
Many European countries are vying for income from the Russian assets to provide military aid to Ukraine without spending their own resources. There is a danger that some countries might promise military aid with this money in mind and as a result, will not be able to fulfill their promise.
Next week, Zelenskyy will visit the United States, where he will speak at a session of the UN General Assembly and meet with President Joe Biden, as well as presidential candidates Donald Trump and Kamala Harris. We assume that after Zelenskyy’s meeting with the President, the US administration may announce the lifting of restrictions on the use of non-American long-range precision weapons against Russian territory. However, it is also likely that the first use of missiles will occur before an official announcement is made.
Photographs have surfaced, reportedly taken either in the village of Novohrodivka in the Donetsk region or in the Kursk region. They depict a Ukrainian POW, brutally murdered—the photos show a sword stabbed into his chest.
His status as a POW is indicated by the remnants of tape, typically used to bind prisoners, visible on his hands. In one of the photographs, which appears doctored, a shadow remains visible. There is also no weapon near the body, and the body itself lacks a bulletproof vest, helmet or other protective gear (when soldiers from one side capture an enemy soldier, the latter is typically required to not only lay down their weapons but also remove their helmet and body armor).