Sitrep for Aug. 12-14, 2024 (as of 9 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

In the Pokrovsk direction, Russian forces have made significant advances, capturing the villages of Ivanivka, Lysychne and Svyrydonivka, and have now reached the outskirts of the village of Hrodivka. This suggests that fighting for this larger settlement, which is close to the town of Pokrovsk, will likely begin soon.

In the Toretsk direction, Russian forces have also made some progress in the area between the village of Niu-York and the town of Zalizne. Footage has been released showing urban combat on the outskirts of the town of Toretsk, where Ukrainian troops are moving between five-story buildings, including with armored vehicles, and storming them.

In the Kupiansk direction, Russian forces have made slight progress near the village of Pishchane. Their objective in this area is to reach the Oskil River, aiming to disrupt the supply lines of Ukrainian troops stationed on its eastern bank.

In the Kursk direction, Ukrainian forces are moving freely on armored vehicles through the central and northern parts of the town of Sudzha, as confirmed by video footage. This suggests that the Armed Forces of Ukraine have practically full control of the town. Commander-in-Chief of the AFU, General Oleksandr Syrskyi, announced that the AFU had completely mopped up the town.

Ukrainian forces attempted to advance southeast from Sudzha along the road toward the village of Belaya; however, a column of 7 to 8 BTR-4 and M113 armored personnel carriers was ambushed near the village of Giri. A video was published showing a BTR-4E APC being fired upon by a Russian armored vehicle. Overall, the AFU lost 6 to 8 BTR-4 APCs but they largely avoided casualties among their personnel.

Throughout the Ukrainian offensive in the Kursk region, videos have emerged of captured Russian soldiers, including conscripts. Evidence of some Akhmat unit fighters ending up in captivity, after soldiers of the 225th Separate Assault Battalion of the AFU published a photo of their IDs. However, the presence of these documents in the AFU's possession does not necessarily mean their holders have been captured; some may have been killed, lost their IDs or left them behind in destroyed vehicles. Although a misspelling of the word “certificate” can be spotted in a photo, it is unlikely to be a fake. Russian civil servants are known to make errors even in important documents like passports. Apti Alaudinov, commander of the Akhmat special forces, has confirmed the capture of five soldiers from the Akhmat-Chechnya unit. Also, on Aug. 13, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced that the AFU had taken hundreds of prisoners of war.

Meanwhile, on Aug. 12, the Russian side also released videos of captured soldiers, reportedly from the 80th Air Assault Brigade of the AFU. This indicates that as Ukrainian forces advance from captured territory in various directions, they may encounter Russian patrols or face resistance at the Russian defensive line. Therefore, it would be prudent for the AFU to focus on reinforcing their positions for subsequent defense.

Ukrainian forces have already significantly expanded the territory they control along the Russia-Ukraine border. They are present in the village of Plekhovo, south of Sudzha, and according to Bild journalist Julian Röpcke, possibly even further east.

Additionally, they have likely been present in the village of Gordeyevka, south of the village of Korenevo, since Aug. 10. However, the salient toward Korenevo poses a risk for the AFU: as with many such advances, the salient needs to be widened to prevent forward positions from being encircled. For example, Ukrainian forces might advance toward the village of Snagost. The Russian Ministry of Defense has already reported fighting in this area, indicating that it is contested at the moment. The pro-Russian Telegram channel Dva Mayora [Two Majors] also reported the presence of the AFU in this village.

In addition, on Aug. 12, combat activities were reported along the Russia-Ukraine border in the Belgorod region. Russian forces repelled breakthrough attempts through the automobile checkpoint near the village of Kolotilovka, as well as at the Bezymeno border checkpoint near the village of Kozinka and the town of Grayvoron.

In our opinion, these forays, occurring far from the Kursk region, are intended to distract Russian forces from the AFU ongoing military operation in the region. There is a possibility that such incursions could spread to the Bryansk region, which we consider less fortified than the Belgorod region. Moreover, it is easier for the Russian Army to bring additional forces to the Belgorod region, as it became a significant logistical hub even before the full-scale invasion began. It is also worth noting that Sudzha is an important railway junction connecting central Russia with the southern regions. Therefore, if the AFU take control of the railway lines, Russian troops will have to significantly change the supply route to the Belgorod region.

We still do not expect a significant advance of the AFU toward the towns of Rylsk, Lgov and especially Kurchatov. However, our conservative estimate may not fully reflect the real expansion of the salient near Korenevo, which, according to some sources, the AFU is trying to envelop. Thus, pro-Russian propagandist Yury Podolyaka has claimed that the Ukrainian Army has captured the village of Olgovka. Meanwhile, Ukrainian forces may continue to advance along the border, and sabotage and reconnaissance groups may conduct raids far beyond the controlled territory.

Recently, an article by retired Australian General Mick Ryan describing the AFU's offensive in the Kursk region (which he also published on Twitter) has been widely discussed. According to him, this is a multiphase operation that involves creating the conditions for an invasion. The initial phases of the operation included intelligence collection, force preparation, deception (which we saw earlier), operational security, logistics and other aspects. The next phase is the breakthrough phase, which took place in the early days of the invasion, followed by the exploitation phase—expanding the captured territory and securing it. Different forces and support elements are deployed depending on the stage.

At present, the AFU is attempting to consolidate its gains, strengthening the newly formed bridgehead and making efforts to expand it, for example, by advancing toward Korenevo or Giri (in the direction of Belaya). However, this expansion has its limits, which means there is a final point of success development: it depends on the depth of the breakthrough (as we have mentioned, it is extremely challenging to organize logistics for a group in Kurchatov, located 60 km from the border), the forces the enemy has deployed to repel the attack (we are not yet certain of the exact steps taken by the Russian command), as well as the strategic objectives of the operation.

Ryan presented three possible scenarios for the further development of this operation and assessed the potential risks and consequences.

The Option 1 scenario is to consolidate on the terrain the AFU have seized so far and then defend it until the nearest negotiations take place. Ryan assesses this scenario as the riskiest because the line of Ukrainian dispositions features multiple small salients, which would be easily cut off and destroyed if the AFU cannot expand the flanks of these salients and "smooth out" the frontline, reducing its length. Maintaining such a large territory is fraught with losing a large number of forces, equipment, as well as electronic warfare and air defense assets. According to him, Ukraine cannot afford this, and in case of failure, it would also lose the very positive strategic messaging that has been generated by the AFU’s surprise attack into Russia.

The result in this case would be to create a significant risk to Russian sovereignty and critical assets, and constitute a draw for Russian forces from Ukraine. It might also provide Ukraine some leverage if forced into negotiations in the near future. If Ryan is referring to negotiations if Trump wins the election, then maintaining the bridgehead would be necessary at least until November, and possibly until January, when he would assume office.

The second option is to prepare fortifications and retreat to them while reducing the occupied territory. This is a medium risk option, with a decreased risk of Option 1. Withdrawal into pre-designated terrain that is easier to defend, requires a smaller quantity of troops to defend, and is able to be supported by artillery, air defense, logistics and other functions more effectively. This approach would also ensure that more troops could be reallocated after the operation to other activities, be they defending in the Donetsk region or subsequent cross-border attacks into Russia. By doing so, Ukraine can maximize the political and strategic benefits of the offensive while reducing the risks of losing the combat force. It would still require large numbers of combat and support troops to defend the seized Russian territory, and would demand a major engineer effort to build minefields and other obstacles, trench lines and deep bunkers and logistic storage locations. The objective for this option would be to pose a risk to Russian sovereignty, comprise an ongoing draw for Russian forces from Ukraine, and to give Ukraine some leverage if forced into negotiations in the near future. Humiliation of Putin and his army could also be a significant factor. The risks of this opportunity might be worth the potential gains.

The third option is to withdraw from the Kursk region back to the internationally recognized border between Russia and Ukraine. This would allow Ukraine to maximize the political and strategic benefits of the operation on Russian territory while preserving a large body of experienced combat troops that might be employed on subsequent offensive operations in 2024 and 2025. By choosing this option, the Ukrainians would send a signal to the Russians that they are capable of invading and causing damage but are not seeking to occupy Russian territory. Although the mere fact of a Ukrainian incursion might allow Putin to strengthen his rhetoric about the “NATO threat,” it would also make him appear weak, as he would be unable to “punish” the enemy for conducting an operation in the Kursk region. The result of this scenario would be Putin's humiliation on the one hand, and the preservation of Ukrainian forces on the other. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s supporters would receive a message that the country can go on the offensive without risking the destruction of its ground forces involved in the operation. Given the preservation of Ukrainian forces under this option, it will probably be the one that gives Zelenskyy the best domestic political boost and improvement in Ukrainian morale.

We do not entirely agree with the assessment of the political consequences of this operation within Russia. In the event of a rapid AFU withdrawal from the Kursk region, Russian propaganda is likely to downplay the situation, portraying it as a minor incident involving sabotage and reconnaissance group raids, rather than anything significant.

The option that the Ukrainian government will choose will be influenced by a number of factors: changes in Russian military tactics in Ukraine (including the Donbas), Russia's reaction to the events in Kursk, domestic and international political considerations and the resources required to continue the operation itself.

Bloomberg, citing its sources, has reported that Russian authorities may launch a new wave of mobilization before the end of 2024. However, we have repeatedly said that we do not anticipate such a move this year unless a critical event occurs on the frontline. While the Ukrainian offensive in the Kursk region is undoubtedly a significant development in the war, we do not consider it a critical event. At present, no frontline section occupied by Russian troops has fallen; the AFU have advanced into areas with minimal enemy presence. Therefore, we believe that the recent developments do not substantially increase the likelihood of a new wave of mobilization.

Indeed, we see that events on internationally recognized Russian territory tend to attract more attention. For example, attacks on Donetsk are often underreported outside the region, whereas a strike on Belgorod becomes a major news story in federal media.

Similarly, the establishment of a Ukrainian foothold, not in the occupied village of Krynky, but on Russian territory, is a more significant political event that undoubtedly requires a response from the Russian authorities. It is now necessary to create reserves within Russia, both to repel the current offensive in the Kursk region and to prepare for possible future offensives in the Bryansk, Belgorod or Voronezh regions. Since the current recruitment of volunteer fighters does not even cover ongoing losses, one possible solution could be to slow down the offensive in the Donetsk region and redirect some of the recruits not to reinforce units suffering losses but to a reserve group of troops within Russian territory. Another option might be to decide not to withdraw forces from the Donbas and to deal with the AFU in the Kursk region using the forces of the Rosgvardia [the Russian National Guard] and Akhmat. The Russian authorities might also further increase the regional sign-up bonuses; however, we doubt this will have a noticeable impact on the recruitment rates of volunteer fighters. In such a situation, a new wave of mobilization may seem like a logical step, but it should be noted that politically, this is an extremely delicate issue—the reaction to the first wave scared the Kremlin so much that it was quickly curtailed.

However, it is worth noting further developments regarding another “taboo” topic—the use of conscripts in the war. In the first days of the AFU offensive, many Russian conscripts were captured by the AFU, yet Russian federal media has avoided mentioning this issue and has minimized commentary on the situation in the Kursk region. At the same time, State Duma member from the Zabaykalsky region Andrey Gurulyov has asserted that there is nothing unusual about deploying conscripts to the frontline. The Vyorstka media outlet reports that conscripts who were able to evacuate from the border during the AFU breakthrough are being pressured to sign contracts and return back to the frontline.

Governor of the Kharkiv region Oleh Syniehubov has reported that after the opening of the frontline in the Kursk direction the number of air strikes on the Kharkiv region has significantly decreased. Previously, the region experienced between 30 and 60 strikes per day, but this number has now dropped to fewer than 10. It is also worth noting that the reduction in strikes could be attributed to the recent destruction of several ammunition depots, such as those in Morozovsk and the Lipetsk region.

It is reported that on Aug. 12, North Korean KN-23 missiles were used in a strike on the Bohodukhiv district of the Kharkiv region. These missiles can be identified by their distinctive features.

The German government has tasked automotive and arms manufacturer Rheinmetall to prepare 14 Leopard 2A4 tanks and Buffel infantry mobility vehicles for delivery to Czechia. In exchange, Czechia will send modernized T-72 tanks, likely upgraded by the Excalibur Army company, to Ukraine.

This time, our weekly livestream will take place on Thursday, Aug. 15 at 4 p.m. Moscow time. Feel free to submit your questions.