Sitrep for August 7-9, 2024 (as of 9 a.m. UTC+3) 

Frontline Situation Update

There have been no significant changes in recent days in the main sectors of the frontline within Ukrainian territory:

• In the Kharkiv region, fighting continues in the town of Vovchansk and near the village of Hlyboke;
• In Chasiv Yar, the Russian Armed Forces have still not managed to establish a foothold beyond the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas Canal, despite persistent efforts;
• On the Ocheretyne salient, Russian troops have captured the village of Serhiivka and are advancing along the railway, gradually expanding the breach;
• In the Toretsk direction, Ukrainian forces have managed to slightly push back Russian troops in an area of the village of Niu-York.

Thus, the situation in the Kursk region has not yet significantly affected the most active parts of the frontline.

Ukrainian Offensive in the Kursk Region

Almost all information about the situation comes from the Russian side, as Ukraine remains in a state of radio silence. Mykhailo Podolyak, Advisor to the Head of the Office of the President of Ukraine, and President Volodymyr Zelenskyy have been extremely cautious in their statements about the situation in the Kursk region, using vague language. Ukrainian research projects, including DeepState, are withholding data on the current positions of Ukrainian forces in the Kursk region to avoid exposing them to additional risk.

At this point, we can confidently say that Ukrainian troops are in the town of Sudzha, which is likely fully captured, as supported by reports of fighting in the village of Martynovka, northeast of Sudzha. Near the village of Bondarevka, east of Sudzha, Russian soldiers found Western-supplied rations. However, some analysts, relying solely on visually confirmed information, conservatively estimate that the Armed Forces of Ukraine control only part of the town.

Reports indicate that the AFU have approached another municipal district administrative center, the village of Korenevo, and are advancing along the highway from Sudzha towards Kursk.

On the third day of the offensive, the rapid advance of Ukrainian forces slowed down both due to the diminishing surprise effect and the need to consolidate their positions in already captured territory. According to the pro-Russian Voyenkor Kotenok Telegram channel, this involves setting up minefields and building fortifications.

Initially, Ukrainian troops advancing in the Kursk region encountered resistance from units of the Federal Security Service (FSB) Border Service and a border protection group of troops. The Russian Ministry of Defense reported transferring some units of the Group of Troops "North," which had been fighting in the Kharkiv region, to the Kursk region. Tractor trucks with this group’s tactical marking—a diamond with a cross—were spotted on the Kursk-Sudzha highway, transporting T-62M tanks.

At the moment, there are no confirmed reports of Russian units, equipment or personnel being transferred from the active combat zones in the Donetsk region to Russian territory. The only exception being the 3rd Battalion of the 1st Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade, better known as "Pyatnashka." A small column of military vehicles belonging to this unit was sent to defend the Kursk region, although they have not been seen on the frontline for some time, with their last known position being near Chasiv Yar.

In order to dislodge Ukrainian forces from Russian territory, a greater deployment of ground forces is required, supported not only by the air force but also by long-range artillery. Based on the fighting in the Kharkiv region, the Group of Troops "North" has Soviet D-30 122mm howitzers and M-46 130mm cannons. However, we still have not seen Russian artillery in action in the Kursk region so far.

Pro-Russian war correspondent Yury Kotenok reported that while conscripts were defending the border, Akhmat special forces were stationed deep in the rear. On the other hand, the VChK-OGPU Telegram channel claimed that Akhmat fighters had been involved in combat in the Kursk region but later "dispersed." Akhmat special forces commander Apti Alaudinov stated that his fighters had been manning their positions at the border; however, Ukrainian forces bypassed their strongpoints.

Since Russian authorities consider the Federation’s border regions to lie outside the "special military operation" zone, they continue to send conscripts there to perform their statutory military service and, in particular, to guard the federal border. As a result, conscripts were among the first to face the Ukrainian advance and, in turn, to suffer losses and be forced to surrender. Meanwhile, Anastasia Kashevarova and other pro-Russian propagandists praised the heroism of the captured border guards and conscripts. Based on the available data, we estimate that dozens of Russian soldiers or more have been taken prisoner, while virtually no reliable data exists on the number of military personnel killed or wounded in action.

A video taken northwest of Sudzha shows bodies and an assault rifle. The person holding the camera can be heard talking about "assault rifles and soldiers" lying on the ground. Presumably, he has recorded the aftermath of the attack on a white UAZ Bukhanka van.

In the early hours of Aug. 9, local residents captured footage of a burning column of Russian armored vehicles in the village of Oktyabrskoe, Rylsky district, Kursk region. Video released later in the day confirmed the column was struck.

A Ukrainian Telegram channel posted a video showing AFU Mil Mi-8 helicopters reportedly flying over the Kursk region.

Several AFU brigades are involved in the offensive in the Kursk region, including units from the 22nd and 82nd brigades. These units are extensively using Western-supplied military equipment. In addition to the previously mentioned Stryker APCs, a Marder 1A3 IFV (one of which was struck by a Lancet drone) and a Cougar MRAP have also been spotted across the border. Thus far, Western allies appear largely unconcerned about Ukraine using the equipment they provided in this operation.

Markus Faber, Chairman of the Bundestag Defense Committee, stated that he sees no issue with Ukraine using German-made weapons on Russian territory, noting that once they are handed over, military vehicles, including Leopard tanks, become Ukrainian property. Furthermore, he added that with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the territories of both countries are now considered combat zones.

At a press conference on Aug. 8, Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh confirmed that the US continues to oppose Ukraine’s use of Western-made long-range missiles against targets on Russian territory. However, she emphasized that the US supports Ukraine's efforts to protect its borders and does not view the situation in the Kursk region as an escalation.

It is already evident that the offensive in the Kursk region has considerably boosted the morale of Ukrainian society, both the military and Ukraine’s supporters. According to The Telegraph, the AFU managed to capture more territory in this two-day offensive than during the entire summer counteroffensive of 2023.

Ukraine’s counterintelligence has performed exceptionally well in this instance, particularly by misleading the Russian side. It is likely that the AFU command managed to amass forces close to the Russian border under the guise of concerns about a potential RuAF attack against the Sumy region.

Thus, the AFU demonstrated their strength and exposed Russia’s inability to counter the incursion and defend its declared red lines. The reaction of Russian authorities suggests that the US and other Western countries should not fear potential escalation if they lift restrictions on the use of the weapons they supply.

The main goal of the offensive in the Kursk region is currently believed to be diverting some Russian forces to this new front, thereby easing pressure on Ukrainian defenses elsewhere. However, the units of the Group of Troops "Center," advancing on the Donetsk axis, have not yet been redeployed, and there has been no significant slowdown in the Russian advance. Nevertheless, this is the most obvious and achievable objective of the operation. While previous raids on Russian territory did not yield such results, they were much smaller in scale.

Some sources speculate that the possible goal of the offensive is the capture of the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant. We consider this unachievable, primarily because the plant is located far enough from the Russia-Ukraine border that organizing supply lines over such a distance would only be possible by significantly expanding the area of penetration. This is not only impractical but may also be unrealistic, as the AFU likely lacks the resources for such large-scale maneuvers. Even in the hypothetical event of a capture of the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant, it is hard to imagine Ukraine using nuclear safety as leverage against Russia. At the same time, the consequences of simply disconnecting the plant from the grid would not have a significant impact on Russia’s military posture.

The capture of the more distant city of Kursk seems even less attainable.

The seizure of the Sudzha gas metering station is unlikely to be the main objective of this offensive, despite it controlling the only gas pipeline still supplying Europe.

In order to cut off the supply route of Russian forces in the Kharkiv region, it is necessary to hold the surrounding territory for a considerable period of time—we are not sure if this is feasible.

In addition to all that has been mentioned, there is now widespread discussion about using the captured territory to strengthen Ukraine’s negotiating position. The weakness of this hypothesis is that, in our opinion, negotiations cannot begin before the US presidential election in November. Holding this territory for more than three months will be an extremely difficult task for Ukraine.

Various research groups have released analyses of the situation, including the Black Bird Group, the Frontelligence Insight team founded by Ukrainian military analyst Tatarigami, and Rob Lee, Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute.

Bloomberg sources report that Russian generals warned General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the RuAF, about the accumulation of Ukrainian armored vehicles in the Sumy region and the AFU's intent to invade the Kursk region. However, Gerasimov ignored these warnings and redirected some units from that area to another sector of the frontline. Similar reports were published by the VChK-OGPU and Rybar Telegram channels. An indirect confirmation of the absence of some key units in the Kursk region could be the lack of recorded Russian artillery activity for three days, with the air force and 9K720 Iskander missiles being used as countermeasures against the Ukrainian offensive.

There have been numerous reports of civilian casualties and injuries, but in the absence of hard evidence, we cannot definitively hold Ukrainian forces responsible. One of the most prominent incidents occurred on Aug. 8, when local residents were traveling from Kursk to Sudzha, possibly to retrieve something from their home. Along the way, they encountered several abandoned and presumably shelled civilian cars and anti-tank mines lying on the road.

At one intersection, they came under fire, but the driver managed to turn around and escape. The video also captured a dump truck, which we discussed in our previous sitrep—the person holding the camera reports that the truck belongs to a local road repair and construction management company. At the end of the recording, they slow down near two soldiers standing on the road and shout that "there is bombing" (apparently, indicating that they were shot at from the direction they came from). Some commentators believe that the men recognized these soldiers as Russian soldiers, but the recording does not show unequivocal signs of this: the red spot on the soldier’s sleeve seems too large for a patch or ribbon. It should be noted that the AFU and the RuAF often use uniforms with the same "multicam" pattern, and without special patches and colored ribbons, even experts cannot unequivocally assert to which of the warring sides a particular soldier belongs. Therefore, it should be taken into account that eyewitnesses recounting any event could have been mistaken about the affiliation of its participants. The men were not injured, and later they published a video of the aftermath of the attack on their vehicle. The fate of the drivers and passengers of the abandoned cars captured on video is unknown, but we assume that some of them belonged to Russian soldiers—cases of their use of unmarked civilian cars have been repeatedly documented.

On Aug. 6, an ambulance crew was dispatched to the Sudzhansky district to assist wounded people. Reports indicate that around 10 p.m., the vehicle was struck by a loitering munition: the paramedic and driver were killed, while the doctor suffered multiple injuries and is currently hospitalized. At present, we lack objective data to confirm whether the ambulance was indeed the intended target of the strike, or if something nearby was the aim, as well as whether it was a Ukrainian or Russian drone. It is worth noting that on our channel tracking attacks on civilian infrastructure, we regularly document attacks on civilian vehicles, including those operated by emergency services, carried out by both sides.

Vladimir Putin has promised to pay 10,000 rubles [$120] to residents of the Kursk region who have left their homes. It is worth noting that even before the war, Russian authorities often lacked funds for citizens' needs, such as road repairs and social infrastructure. However, now even the poorest regions are finding resources for sign-up bonuses of hundreds of thousands of rubles for those concluding contracts with the Ministry of Defense.

Ukrainian and Russian Strikes

In the early hours of Aug. 3, Ukrainian drones struck the Morozovsk airfield in the Rostov region, destroying an ammunition storage facility and at least one Su-34 fighter jet.
On the morning of Aug. 9, a similar attack occurred on a military airfield in the Lipetsk region. Eyewitness videos captured drones flying overhead, with one recording showing powerful explosions and secondary detonations. Additionally, a fire near the Lipetsk military airfield was detected by NASA's Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) satellite imagery (and satellite images of the aftermath that emerged by the evening of Aug. 9 show extensive destruction).

Also, on Aug. 9, four drones struck a residential building in Shebekino, Belgorod region. According to preliminary reports, there were no casualties.

Putin has signed a law that considers online streaming of a crime as an aggravating circumstance. While the law is aimed at curbing "trash streams," it likely also makes online discreditation of the Russian Army a more serious crime than offline discreditation.