Sitrep for Sept. 13-16, 2024 (as of 9:30 a.m. UTC+3)
Frontline Situation Update
In the Pokrovsk direction, Russian forces continue pushing the Armed Forces of Ukraine from the salient between the village of Nevelske and the Vovcha River. In recent days, Russian forces have captured the village of Halytsynivka. The Russian Ministry of Defense also claimed to have taken the village of Zhelanne Pershe, though this remains unverified—DeepState has marked it as contested. Russian forces are also advancing toward the villages of Hostre and Oleksandropil, located south of the village of Kurakhivka. West of Halytsynivka and the previously captured Lisivka, the AFU are gradually retreating from the town of Ukrainsk, as anticipated by OSINT analyst Def Mon, who showed a few days ago that the town was close to being encircled.
In the Toretsk direction, where the AFU had broken the blockade of the phenol plant in the village of Niu-York in early September, the RuAF have now captured the facility, straightening the frontline.
In the Vuhledar direction, Russian forces have made some progress near the village of Vodiane and are pushing from there towards Vuhledar.
In the Kursk region, where the Russian counteroffensive began on Sept. 11, the RuAF have not yet managed to make a large-scale breakthrough, while Ukrainian troops are holding back the onslaught. In addition, in recent days, the AFU have crossed the Russia-Ukraine border and captured the village of Vesyoloye in the Glushkovsky district, which was confirmed by both Ukrainian and Russian sources. A video has emerged showing a Ukrainian engineering vehicle clearing a path through defensive obstacles at the border, pushing aside concrete pyramids. It is worth noting that fortifications are only effective when protected by trained units. In this case, there were no signs of even a minefield, although AFU sappers could have cleared a passage for military vehicles in advance. A CNN article about the Kursk operation, citing a Ukrainian EOD operator, reports about the clearing of paths through RuAF minefields and the installation of mines, conducted during the consolidation of AFU positions in captured territories.
Russian forces are attacking Ukrainian positions on the western edge of the bridgehead, advancing from the village of Snagost toward the village of Lyubimovka. They may either be moving from the village of Korenevo or transferring part of their forces across the Seym River near the village of Krasnooktyabrskoye. At the same time, Ukrainian forces in Vesyoloye can distract part of the Russian forces involved in the counteroffensive, shelling them with artillery and even attacking their flank.
According to DeepState, over the past few days, the AFU have advanced north of the village of Olgovka, capturing the villages of Vetreno and Durovka, and entered the village of Zhuravli. While no visual evidence has surfaced yet, there is indirect confirmation from pro-Russian blogger Anatoly Radov, who showed footage of fighting involving Russian marines in a tree line near the village of Aleksandrovka, located north of Vetreno.
Ukrainian and Russian Strikes
On Sept. 15, Russian forces struck the city of Kharkiv, heavily damaging a multi-story residential building. Reports indicate that a woman was killed and 42 other people were injured.
On the morning of Sept. 16, Belgorod was attacked, apparently with MLRS rockets, judging by the sound. As of this sitrep, it is known that eight people were injured, one of them seriously. Private residences, a gas pipeline and more than 15 cars were also damaged.
We have repeatedly emphasized that attacking populated areas with indiscriminate weapons constitutes a war crime. Recently, tit-for-tat strikes have escalated: increasingly, a strike on Kharkiv is followed by a retaliatory strike on Belgorod. However, the ultimate responsibility for all civilian casualties lies with the Russian leadership, which initiated the war in Ukraine.
Western Assistance
US President Joe Biden met with UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer to discuss various topics, including the potential lifting of restrictions on Ukraine's use of Western high-precision weapons against military targets on Russian territory. When asked about the outcome of the discussion, Starmer gave a vague answer, only confirming that the issue had indeed been raised. Some Western journalists reported that they received information from US officials, under the condition of anonymity, stating that a public announcement on this matter would only follow after the first use of high-precision weapons on internationally recognized Russian territory. It can now be assumed that a fundamental decision regarding the use of Storm Shadow missiles has already been made. However, there is currently no reason to believe that the US will lift restrictions on the use of ATACMS tactical ballistic missiles for strikes on Russian soil.
A debate has erupted within the military-analytical community over whether Ukraine needs Western intelligence data for target acquisition. Some believe that the AFU require Western intelligence to strike military facilities on Russian territory, while others, including us, believe that even open source data already provides ample opportunities to identify relevant targets. Ukraine has access to satellite data; in 2022, the Serhiy Prytula Foundation purchased a radar satellite and gained access to data from other ICEYE satellites. Ukraine also has access to intercepted phone calls and messages from Russian soldiers. Moreover, Ukrainian intelligence likely even has a larger spy network within Russia than Western countries. We believe that this combination of resources is sufficient to create a long list of targets for high-precision strikes at distances just over 250 km [155 mi] from Ukraine’s border. Our opponents in the debate cite the shortage of Storm Shadow and SCALP-EG missiles, arguing that this makes it particularly important to select targets carefully.
Dmitry Medvedev, Deputy Chairman of Russia’s Security Council, commented on the possible lifting of restrictions on Ukraine’s use of Western high-precision weapons against targets on Russian soil. He stated that there are already formal prerequisites for Russia to use nuclear weapons due to the AFU’s offensive in the Kursk region, but emphasized that "Russia is showing patience."
In July, Denmark placed an order with Ukrainian manufacturers for the production of 18 Bohdana 155mm self-propelled howitzers for the AFU. Reports indicate that these artillery vehicles have already been delivered. This move not only bolsters Ukraine’s artillery capabilities, but it also supports its defense industry. However, it is important to note that establishing military production facilities on Ukrainian soil is inherently risky. Furthermore, constructing underground factories is prohibitively expensive, and relocating all military production below ground is simply not feasible.
It has also emerged that the Netherlands will be unable to deliver a promised Patriot SAM system to Ukraine, and will instead be sending only certain components: three launchers and ground surveillance radars. This shortfall is reportedly due to one of Ukraine’s allies backing out of a previous agreement. To complete the system an engagement control radar, an antenna mast group and power generators will still be required. Additionally, analyst Colby Badhwar points out that Western defense contractors have not sufficiently ramped up their production of air defense systems, while officials report that SAM missile stockpiles are nearing depletion.
Naval warfare OSINT analyst H.I. Sutton has published a satellite image of Novorossiysk Bay, noting the withdrawal of all military ships from the port—something he attributes to growing concerns over possible Ukrainian precision strikes using Western missiles. While this explanation seems plausible, it is also possible that the missing ships are participating in Russia’s "Ocean-2024" military exercises. Although these exercises never mentioned the Sea of Azov or the Black Sea as training grounds, they did include the Mediterranean. The Ukrainian General Staff recently stated that Russia had sharply increased the number of military vessels in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, with the latter likely explaining the ship’s withdrawal from Novorossiysk Bay. While many of these ships are capable of launching Kalibr cruise missiles, this does not necessarily indicate an imminent large-scale missile attack, as Russia is reportedly facing a shortage of Kalibr missiles, whose production takes a considerable amount of time.
On Sept. 13, several pro-Russian Telegram channels published the farewell messages from volunteer fighters Sergey "Ernest" Gritsay and Dmitry "Goodwin" Lysakovsky. "Goodwin" had previously served as the commander of a UAV reconnaissance unit, while "Ernest" was a drone operator. Lysakovsky accused Igor "Zloy" Puzik, the commander of the 87th Separate Rifle Regiment, of failing to use intelligence gathered by drones, sending soldiers into frontal assaults, stealing humanitarian aid and enabling drug trafficking. Allegedly, to get rid of unwanted subordinates, Puzik decided to disband the UAV unit and reassign the operators to assault troop units. "Goodwin" and "Ernest" were sent on a "meat assault" from which they did not return.
Regular readers of our mobilization summaries know that such cases in the RuAF are not uncommon, as commanders often undervalue specialists and do not tolerate criticism from them. However, the publication of the video has brought this incident widespread attention. As a result, Russia’s Minister of Defense Andrey Belousov has instructed the Federal Security Service (FSB) military counterintelligence department to address the situation that led to the servicemen’s deaths "as soon as possible."
On Sept. 15, a shooting occurred near a golf club in Florida owned by Donald Trump. The FBI is investigating the incident as a foiled assassination attempt on the presidential candidate. The suspect, Ryan Wesley Routh, drove up to the club's fence in West Palm Beach and inserted the barrel of an assault rifle through the fence. He was spotted by a Secret Service agent who opened fire. Routh was not injured and attempted to flee but was detained in a neighboring district. On social media, Routh wrote that he had voted for Trump in 2016 but later became disillusioned with him. In recent years, he criticized Trump and supported the Democrats and Ukraine. He also claimed to have visited Kyiv after the war began and tried to recruit foreigners for the AFU on Facebook.
It is worth noting that PTSD can develop not only in those directly involved in traumatic events but also in those who witness them. We encourage readers to prioritize their mental health and take steps to protect themselves from secondary trauma.