Sitrep for Aug. 23-26, 2024 (as of 9 a.m. UTC+3) 

Frontline Situation Update

In the Pokrovsk direction, Russian forces have expanded their control south of the village of Mykolaivka, towards the village of Mykhailivka, and advanced into the village of Novohrodivka.

Meanwhile, in the Toretsk direction, they have extended their control in the town of Zalizne as urban fighting continues on the outskirts of the town of Toretsk.

Researchers from Black Bird Group have studied satellite images and mapped Ukrainian fortifications in the Pokrovsk direction. According to this map, after the capture of Novohrodivka, Russian forces will face the last line of defense before the town of Pokrovsk. Once the village of Hrodivka is captured, the road to the town of Myrnohrad will be nearly open for them. We expected that the Russian advance would slow down as they approached Hrodivka, due to visible fortifications near the village of Vesele. However, Russian forces quickly overcame this defensive line and have now approached Hrodivka and the village of Krasnyi Yar. They have also breached the defensive line before Novohrodivka, where urban fighting has begun. This raises concerns that Novohrodivka could be captured in the coming days. It is possible that the Armed Forces of Ukraine were unable to fully defend these fortification lines due to a shortage of personnel. This is the very scenario we feared when we expressed skepticism about the Kursk operation: we believe that it is dangerous to open a new front with such a lack of manpower.

According to The Economist, Ukrainian commanders cite various reasons for the rapid pace of the Russian advance in the Donetsk region. Among these reasons, in addition to the shortage of personnel, is a deficit of artillery ammunition. Despite expectations of an improved situation following renewed supplies, at least some commanders report that the RuAF are still using ten times more shells than the AFU. We do not rule out the possibility that this may be an exaggeration.

The article also claims that the already difficult situation for Ukraine on this front is being exacerbated by the Russian tactic of attacking with small infantry groups — they are harder for drone operators to track and target, and these small assault groups are not significant enough targets for the use of precision weapons or air-dropped bombs. Meanwhile, the Russian Armed Forces are using glide bombs and new types of jamming devices, which further complicate Ukraine's defense.

Colonel Pavlo Fedosenko told the publication that many soldiers have been at forward positions without rotation for extended periods — sometimes for 30-40 days. According to one fighter, in some cases, it can stretch to two months. Another problem, according to Fedosenko, lies in the "idiotic" orders, which further demoralize the troops.

An article by Associated Press includes accounts from some Ukrainian commanders about the extremely poor training of mobilized soldiers. Under these conditions, they have had to plan operations involving infantry with no shooting skills or basic knowledge of topography. As a result, some recruits did not trust the combat plans and abandoned prepared positions, with one soldier from the 110th Brigade describing cases of retreat after coming under light artillery fire. Frustrated by the quality of new conscripts, some units began conducting their own recruitment campaigns to independently select higher quality personnel.

The combination of these factors could indeed have led to a faster advance of Russian forces in the Pokrovsk direction, despite the presence of significant fortifications.

Meanwhile, in recent days, there have been reports of the redeployment of some Russian forces from the Donetsk region to the Kursk region: specifically, mobilized soldiers from the now-disbanded 1443rd Regiment, who are now serving in the 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade (fighting in the Donetsk region).

Additionally, Putin was informed that the 11th Air Assault Brigade, also present in the Donetsk region, is now operating in the Kursk direction; however, it is worth noting that the redeployment of some units does not mean that the entire brigade is now in the Kursk direction.

Furthermore, it has become known that conscripts from the 98th Guards Airborne Division, stationed in Ivanovo and Kostroma, are being sent to serve in the Kursk region. Reportedly, the soldiers have recently taken their oath and will soon be deployed to the border areas.

Russia and Ukraine have completed a 115-for-115 prisoner of war exchange: 115 conscripts captured in the Kursk region have returned to Russia, while 115 prisoners of war have returned to Ukraine, including naval servicemen, 3 border guards, and 82 defenders of the city of Mariupol, among them 50 defenders of the Azovstal Steel Factory.

In the Kursk direction, the situation remains relatively stable, with the frontline virtually unchanged over the past few days. There have been minor advances by Ukrainian forces in the eastern and western parts of the salient; however, the AFU has apparently not yet managed to consolidate their hold on newly gained positions. In particular, combat is now ongoing to the east of the town of Sudzha near the village of Russkaya Konopelka, where a clash involving a Ukrainian Kozak armored vehicle and a Russian BMP IFV recently took place, as well as to the southeast near the village of Cherkasskaya Konopelka.

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty has published satellite images of the bridge across the Seym River in the village of Karyzh, the condition of which was previously unknown. The new image shows that the bridge is significantly damaged, although it is impossible to say for sure that it has become impassable for any vehicle. There is also a pontoon crossing built near the bridge. It looks like it is slightly submerged—an old Soviet tactic that allows part of the pontoon sections to be hidden from the enemy. Although Ukrainian drones’ operators might now find it difficult to detect and strike the crossing, it is still clearly visible in satellite images.

A video has emerged showing looted stores in the village of Glushkovo, including a hunting store and a Beeline mobile phone outlet. We have previously reported on a similar incident involving an Akhmat Regiment serviceman, while later, more videos appeared showing Russian soldiers plundering a warehouse of the Wildberries marketplace in the village of Zvannoye. We do not yet know whether Russian authorities will investigate these crimes.

The Financial Times published an article detailing the preparation and early stages of the Ukrainian military operation in the Kursk region of Russia. The preparation began in early summer under strict secrecy. Most Ukrainian soldiers were not informed about the operation until the day of the attack. Information leaks in the past and the possible desire of Western allies to influence the actions of the AFU explain such a high level of secrecy. A cover story was also made to justify the concentration of Ukrainian troops near the Russian border, both to their own military and to Western officials. Ukrainian officials stated that Russia was building up forces across the border from the Sumy region in preparation of an attack.

In late July and early August, the AFU began concentrating forces in the border area of the Sumy region. The military hid their equipment and camped in surrounding forests. Some moved into abandoned cottages. Many soldiers dressed in civilian clothing and drove ordinary cars.

On the first day of the attack, the AFU used heavy artillery and air support to provide cover and suppress early Russian attempts to respond — a type of combined arms maneuver that the Ukrainians had practiced during training exercises. Electronic warfare units jammed radios and mobile phone service, making it impossible for the Russians to communicate. However, Ukrainian units also lost the ability to coordinate in real-time, as Elon Musk had disabled the use of StarLink terminals on Russian territory. Ukrainian troops were totally dependent on their instincts and the trust that all units were following the plan.

In order to advance, Ukrainian forces had to clear paths through Russian minefields using UR-77 mine-clearing vehicles, which launch explosive-filled cables, resembling fire hoses, across minefields. The resulting explosions trigger the destruction of nearby mines by sympathetic detonation.

Russian conscripts and border guards, caught off guard by the sudden assault, were forced to flee from their positions near the border. The report notes that Ukrainian forces pursued the escaping troops cautiously, aiming not to overextend the nascent salient and risk being cut off from the rest of their forces.

By the fourth day of the offensive, the Russian Air Force began deploying air-dropped bombs equipped with Universal Gliding and Correction Modules (UMPK), inflicting heavy losses on Ukrainian troops.

Regarding the issue of military personnel disguising themselves in civilian clothing, it is important to note that Russian forces frequently strike civilian vehicles, residential buildings and non-combatants. While it cannot be ruled out that some of the targets were indeed soldiers in disguise, violations on one side do not justify indiscriminate attacks by the other. Though it remains unclear how widespread this practice is among Ukrainian forces, it should be noted that Russian troops have reportedly made extensive use of civilian vehicles to evade detection by drones.

Russian propaganda has shared a new video from the village of Korenevo in the Kursk region, which shows the bodies of civilians allegedly killed by Ukrainian soldiers. As we explained in one of our previous reports, it is completely unclear how these people died—we do not see any signs that clearly indicate extrajudicial executions.

In any war, there are situations when civilians end up getting killed by soldiers for various reasons. Soldiers may assume that civilians will point enemy artillery at them, or they may be following orders to hold a position and not let anyone through. It is worth noting that on Aug. 8, a video was published showing a civilian car that came under small arms fire on the way from Martynovka towards Sudzha. In this situation, the driver’s behavior was dangerous: he was driving towards an active combat zone and trying to drive past a checkpoint without signaling in any way that he is a civilian who accidentally ended up in the wrong place. On Aug. 10, commenting on this video, a pro-Russian Telegram channel posted recommendations for civilians on how to behave near the combat zone, indicating that soldiers on both sides may react this way when facing a car trying to break through a checkpoint.

The Pioner Zapasa [Reserve Pioneer] pro-Russian Telegram channel published a photo of a Russian Mil Mi-8 helicopter that made a hard landing in the Kursk region. Judging by the image, the aircraft is essentially destroyed. Serhii Sternenko, a Ukrainian far-right social activist and YouTuber, suggests that an FPV drone had hit the Mi-8; a video likely showing the incident was published on Aug. 9. While we consider this a strong possibility, we cannot definitively confirm it at this time.

Russia’s Ministry of Emergency Situations released a video claiming that Ukrainian forces buried the warhead of a Tochka-U missile near an infrastructure facility in the Kursk region. The footage shows the excavation of a rather deep pit (with no infrastructure facility visible nearby) and the supposed extraction of prefabricated fragments and missile debris from the Tochka-U. The video then claims that the warhead was removed, taken to a firing range, and detonated. How both the warhead and prefabricated fragments were extracted from a single pit remains unclear to us. We believe this video was created for propaganda purposes to depict how Ukrainians allegedly tried to destroy a critical infrastructure object in the Kursk region.

On Aug. 25, the Donbass.Realii media outlet released a video report about the Saint Barbara 19th Missile Brigade of the AFU, which is armed with Tochka-U tactical missile systems, apparently using older Tochka missiles according to the photos. This indicates that Ukraine still has such missiles in its arsenal. The Russian Ministry of Defense regularly claims to have intercepted Tochka-U missiles, but rarely shows the debris, depriving independent researchers of the opportunity to verify these claims.

On July 23, the pro-Russian Telegram channel Voyenny Osvedomitel [Military Informant] discussed the recent appearance in a report by the MoD of 122-mm D-30 howitzers of an early modification, stating that it was a sensible decision given their large numbers in army warehouses. They contrasted this with the return to service of 1938-model M-30 howitzers of the same caliber, which they considered a questionable decision.

Just a month later, on Aug. 24, a video made by Russian soldiers somewhere on the frontline emerged. It showed their firing position, equipped with exactly such an M-30 howitzer (which can be distinguished from the structurally similar D-1, for example, by the absence of a muzzle brake), which had been put out of action by numerous Ukrainian drones. This video once again confirms the shortage of equipment, particularly artillery, in the Russian Army.

Petro Andryushchenko, Advisor to the Ukrainian mayor of Mariupol, reported that Russia is already using the new railway in Mariupol for transporting fuel—tanks heading towards Rostov-on-Don were recorded. This indicates that at least part of the railway from Rostov-on-Don to Donetsk, Mariupol and Berdiansk is already operational. Whether the section between Mariupol and Berdiansk, which would allow fuel to be brought into Crimea, has been restored is unknown.

According to the Crimean Wind Telegram channel, after the Conro Trader ferry sank on Aug. 22, the crossing through the Kerch Strait is not functioning, as the other two ferries were damaged earlier. Meanwhile, fuel is not being delivered to Crimea by rail via the Crimean Bridge, as the structures have been weakened after an explosion on the bridge, and also due to the fear of missile strikes on fuel trains. The channel's authors suggest that Crimea may soon experience fuel shortages.

Ukrainian and Russian Strikes

On Aug. 24, Ukrainian drones attacked an ammunition storage facility in the Ostrogozhsky district of the Voronezh region. Satellite images from Aug. 24 show a large-scale fire, and images from Aug. 25 reveal the remnants of several structures. Mark Krutov, editor of the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty news service, suggested that in addition to the storage facility, the site also housed a Russian military base. There were photos taken in the area, posted on July 23, 2023. Historical satellite images show the base was present before the full-scale invasion but had since been significantly expanded.

On the night of Aug. 25, Russian forces hit a hotel in the city of Kramatorsk, Donetsk region, where Reuters journalists were staying. The attack killed the news agency’s security advisor and injured six other people, including two journalists. Among the injured were US and UK citizens.

On Aug. 25, the co-founder and CEO of the Telegram messenger app Pavel Durov was detained in France. The charges against him remain unclear. It is worth noting that given its convenience, Telegram is the main messaging app for Russian soldiers, and news of Durov's arrest has caused panic in pro-Russian Telegram channels. It is also likely that the Ukrainian side uses Telegram to some extent. At this point, there is no reason to believe that Durov's arrest will grant Western intelligence services access to encrypted communications of Russian soldiers.