Sitrep for Aug. 2-5, 2024 (as of 9 a.m. UTC+3)
Frontline Situation Update
Russian forces continue to advance in the Pokrovsk direction, primarily along the railway near the villages of Zhelanne and Serhiivka. Additionally, they are attacking Zhelanne from the east, likely aiming to encircle it.
According to a map published by researchers, the main Ukrainian fortifications, constructed near the town of Novohrodivka and the villages of Mykolaivka and Ivanivka, have not yet been reached by the Russian Armed Forces. We anticipate that Russian progress will slow as they approach these fortifications. However, as mentioned earlier, it is crucial not only to build defensive structures properly but also to have a sufficient number of trained soldiers to defend them. After capturing Zhelanne, Russian forces will likely straighten the frontline to the north of the village and then proceed south along the Vovcha River.
Russia’s Ministry of Defense reported the capture of the village of Novoselivka Persha. This is corroborated by DeepState maps, which indicate the presence of Russian forces near the village of Mezhove, south of Novoselivka Persha.
In the Toretsk direction, fighting is taking place near the town of Zalizne and the settlement of Pivdenne. Russian troops are continuing their counterattacks from the north of Zalizne and from the south from the village of Niu-York towards the settlement of Nelepivka, aiming to encircle and capture the territory to its east and advance towards the town of Toretsk.
According to available data, Zalizne is almost completely captured. There are two spoil tips near the town—such heights play an important role in battles because they offer a good view of Toretsk. However, since spoil tips are dumps of waste rock formed as a result of mining, they are usually almost completely devoid of vegetation. Thus, soldiers occupying them find themselves susceptible to enemy artillery and drone attacks. Therefore, it is unclear whether Russian forces will be able to exploit these spoil tips after capturing them.
Ukrainian sources report ongoing attempts by the RuAF to cross the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas Canal to enter the main part of Chasiv Yar. Although they previously managed to enter a residential neighborhood, they have not yet been able to gain a foothold there.
Western Assistance
On Aug. 4, Ukrainian Air Force Day, Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced the arrival of the first ten F-16 fighter aircraft from Denmark, confirming information provided by sources familiar with the subject. Two fighter jets are visible on the airfield behind the president, but they have no markings or inscriptions indicating their affiliation with the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
Judging by the lack of M61 Vulcan cannons above the wing as well as the old friend-or-foe antennas, these are decommissioned US Air Force ADF F-16s, handed over as trainer aircraft for technicians or decoys for possible Russian strikes. The video also showed combat-ready aircraft with the appropriate inscriptions and Vulcan cannons visible above their wings. It is worth noting that the jets are equipped with the Israeli-developed Pylon Integrated Dispensing System Plus, a missile attack warning system that detects enemy missiles aimed at the aircraft, allowing the aircraft to evade attacks. Reports indicate that the pylons also have built-in countermeasures.
Together with the fighter aircraft, Ukraine received AIM-120 AMRAAM missiles. In this regard, various speakers, including Commander-in-Chief of the AFU, General Oleksandr Syrskyi, once again raised the topic of potential F-16 interceptions of Russian aircraft.
The latest version of these missiles, the D3, can fly up to 160-180 kilometers [100-110 mi]; however, to our knowledge, it is not available for export. This underscores once more that assumptions about the potential missions Ukrainian F-16 jets could accomplish should not be based on the modern weaponry available to Western countries. Reports indicate that the AFU will receive AIM-120 AMRAAM C8 missiles, probably by October; however, even their range is barely sufficient to intercept Russian aircraft armed with FABs with UMPKs. Similarly, flying close enough to the frontline to intercept them is likely to prove risky. In the footage provided by Zelenskyy, the aircraft shown are equipped with AIM-120B missiles, which are only used in training, as well as AIM-9X Sidewinders, a short-range missile most useful against drones and cruise missiles in the current aerial context.
According to an article by The Economist, more advanced onboard radar systems for F-16 fighter aircraft are expected to arrive in Ukraine in the fall (and by the end of the year, an additional 10 fighter jets—CIT).
An article by The War Zone points out that Ukrainian pilots first need to gain more experience before attempting to intercept Russian aircraft, which aligns with our assessment of the situation. A significant advantage of F-16 fighter jets over Ukrainian Soviet-era aircraft is their improved compatibility with Western weaponry such as GBU-39, AGM-88 HARM or JDAM.
It remains unclear whether the Ukrainian Air Force will be able to integrate its F-16 jets with Swedish ACS 890 AEW&C aircraft and ground-based air defense systems. Likewise, it is still unclear whether the necessary Link 16 system, a military tactical data link network mostly used by NATO members, will be provided and whether Ukrainian specialists will find a workaround to ensure the exchange of data between different systems in its absence.
Rybar, a prominent pro-Russian Telegram channel/analyst suggested that fighter jets could be stationed not only at airfields in the western part of Ukraine but also in neighboring Romania and Moldova, with Ukrainian airfields being used as staging areas. However, we doubt that Western countries would allow this to happen.
Ukrainian and Russian Strikes
In the early hours of Aug. 3, a drone strike hit the Morozovsk airfield in the Rostov region, with powerful explosions heard on eyewitness video. Satellite images confirm the destruction of an ammunition storage facility. According to the Dos’ye Shpiona [Spy Dossier] Telegram channel, the strike also destroyed a Su-34 fighter jet and an aviation weapons depot, damaged the flight control center, and caused minor damage to the airfield's engineering equipment.
On the night of Aug. 3, the Atlas oil depot north of the town of Kamensk-Shakhtinsky in the Rostov region was also attacked. Reports indicate that this facility is part of the Russian State Reserve, serving as a storage site for strategic reserves of petroleum products. In August 2020, it hosted joint exercises by the Ministry of Defense and the State Reserve.
On Aug. 4, a massive fire broke out at an oil depot in the town of Azov, Rostov region, with local residents reporting that it was preceded by a raid of Ukrainian drones.
On Aug. 2, an ATACMS tactical ballistic missile attack was reportedly carried out on an S-400 air defense position near Sevastopol, however, there has been no confirmation of the destruction of any vehicles.
On Aug. 3, a strike on the territory of the ship repair plant in the city damaged the Russian Rostov-on-Don submarine (it was damaged in a strike on Sept. 13 and, as reported, was launched on July 17 after completing dock repairs). The General Staff of the AFU claimed that it was sunk. However, the Crimean Wind Telegram channel asserts that it did not sink and only sustained damage.
On Aug. 4, in the city of Luhansk, several explosions occurred, the details of which are not entirely clear yet. Various sources report hits on the buildings of the Luhansk Higher Military Aviation School of Navigators and the Donets plant. According to the head of the "LPR" Leonid Pasechnik, 12 missiles were fired, of which 4 were shot down, with the rest hitting residential houses and storage facilities with fuel tanks.
Ukrainian UAV strikes on civilian targets within Russian territory continue. On the night of Aug. 3, two aircraft-type drones hit a high-rise residential building in Oryol. According to Governor Andrey Klychkov, one person was injured. We believe this was a case of accidental targeting, likely due to the route programming not accounting for the high-rise building in its path, as drones typically fly at low altitudes to avoid air defenses.
On Aug. 4, a quadcopter in Shebekino, Belgorod region, flew into a broken window of a residential building and exploded. According to Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov, a woman was killed. Based on our experience, this behavior does not seem to be the result of electronic warfare; it appears to be a deliberate attack, constituting a war crime. Unfortunately, this is not the first such incident—both sides systematically use such indiscriminate attack tactics, effectively amounting to terror against the civilian population. We remind you that updates on attacks on civilian infrastructure can be found on our Telegram channel.
Conscription, Mobilization and Contract Military Service
In our previous summary, we reported that we had adjusted our estimate of the recruitment rate of volunteer fighters into the Russian Army. In 2023, it was 30,000 people per month, while in the first quarter of 2024, it dropped to around 26,000. Of this number, approximately 21,000 were volunteer fighters (contract soldiers of the MoD), as opposed to conscripts, convicts or mercenaries from volunteer units. However, there remains a shortage of personnel, as confirmed by the story of sailor Oleg Sosedov, who served on the Admiral Kuznetsov aircraft carrier of the Northern Fleet but was later recruited to be deployed in Ukraine. According to his fellow soldiers, he was killed in the Kharkiv region during an assault. This is not the only such case—the Vault 8 pro-Russian Telegram channel reports the recruitment of qualified specialists from various branches, including the Aerospace Forces, Strategic Rocket Forces, Navy, Railway Troops and others, into assault groups as infantry. We agree with this channel that this undermines the combat readiness of the entire army and navy.
On Aug. 3, a mass SMS campaign from the number 117 began in Russia, offering to sign a contract with the Ministry of Defense and receive "immediately from 800,000 rubles [$9,350]." This amount includes a 400,000-ruble federal sign-up bonus [$4,680], with regions recommended to provide at least 400,000 rubles [$4,680]. Telegram channels had previously reported plans for such a large-scale recruitment campaign for new contract soldiers.
It has emerged that in two different regions young men who had been exempt from military service on health grounds signed a contract and ended up on the frontline after some girls “made arrangements” with the draft office, possibly in return for a reward. According to his mother, after Konstantin Drepin from the city of Vladimir was turned down by two draft offices he was conscripted and sent to the front by a third one and was soon killed.
According to Vitaliy Zubkov’s sister, he was also exempt on health grounds but as a result of arrangements between his girlfriend and a military unit, on June 17 he signed a contract. His family have not heard from him since July 3 and they do not know if he is still alive.
On July 27, Pavel Kushnir, a musician and anti-war activist died in the Birobidzhan pre-trial detention center in the Far East. He was arrested in May 2024 and criminal proceedings were initiated because the videos he had posted on his YouTube channel allegedly incited terrorism. The channel had five subscribers. Pavel’s friends have started a fundraiser to transport his body to his hometown of Tambov. Pavel Kushnir is the eleventh political prisoner who has died in custody for their anti-war activities.
