Sitrep for July 29-31, 2024 (as of 9 a.m. UTC+3)
Frontline Situation Update
In the southern part of the Donetsk region, Russian mechanized assaults near the village of Novomykhailivka have continued in recent days. However, there have been no significant advances comparable to those achieved in the Ocheretyne salient, as the Armed Forces of Ukraine have successfully repelled these attacks, destroying many enemy vehicles.
According to Ukrainian sources, there are more Russian soldiers but fewer armored vehicles concentrated in the Ocheretyne salient than in the southern part of the Donetsk region. The Russian Armed Forces have made some progress near the village of Tymofiivka, west of the village of Lozovatske, straightening the frontline by capturing a portion of territory north of the village of Prohres. Russian forces are also continuing to advance along the railway towards the villages of Vesele, Zhelanne and Serhiivka.
In the Toretsk direction, Russian forces have advanced near the villages of Pivnichne and Zalizne, aiming to occupy the multi-story buildings located there. Toretsk itself is under constant airstrikes and artillery shelling as Russian forces prepare for the upcoming battle for the town. They are preemptively destroying multi-story buildings that could be used as fortifications and firing points. This tactic allows the RuAF to capture settlements by first demolishing all structures that could be used as defensive positions.
However, while reports have emerged that Russian soldiers reached the outskirts of Toretsk, these have not yet been confirmed. It is likely not a significant advance but rather the penetration of a group beyond enemy positions, similar to previous occurrences. While the RuAF continue to advance and attempt to gain a foothold in settlements surrounding Toretsk, the main advances are observed on the Ocheretyne salient.
A video has been published showing a Russian attack by an infantry column, geolocated between the villages of Prohres and Ocheretyne. About 30 people are seen walking along forest lines towards Ukrainian positions. Upon the arrival of a Ukrainian FPV drone, they scatter into the forest, which is subsequently shelled by artillery using both high-explosive fragmentation and cluster munitions. This video demonstrates the numerical superiority of the RuAF and highlights the difference in the striking capabilities of drones and artillery. If the column had been first hit by a 155mm high-explosive fragmentation shell (or a cluster munition), significantly more casualties could have been inflicted within a radius of about 20 meters. Thus, drones, due to their substantially smaller warheads, still cannot fully replace artillery. Comparable damage could theoretically be achieved by a swarm of attack drones; however, such tactics are not yet being employed in practice.
Ukrainian Telegram channels have released footage showing a six-wheeled armored combat vehicle in the Shebekinsky district of the Belgorod region, later identified as a North Korean Bulsae-4 M-2018 NLOS ATGM. We have little doubt that the vehicle in the video has indeed six wheels, with a body shape and wheel configuration identical to the DPRK ATGM, rather than the eight-wheel configuration typically found in the RuAF. It is worth noting that while North Korea APCs are not named Bulsae-4, they do share the same six-wheel chassis, provisionally referred to as the M2010. Some analysts, including military expert Yuri Lyamin, have suggested that it could be a 6x6 APC with slat armor. However, we believe that it is more likely that North Korea delivered ATGMs rather than APCs, given that the RuAF are experiencing a shortage of the former and have still plenty of the latter in reserve depots. Additionally, to our knowledge, neither South Korea nor Western intelligence services have reported any deliveries of APCs or AGTMs from North Korea, unlike missiles and artillery shells.
In light of this discovery, some Telegram-channels have recalled an unusual video published earlier this year showing the destruction of a Ukrainian AS-90 self-propelled howitzer, suggesting it could have been struck by a Bulsae-4 AGTM.
Ukrainian and Russian Strikes
Russian soldiers published a video on the Severnyy Veter [Northern Wind] Telegram channel purportedly showing the destruction of ground surveillance radars. However, the video feed from the reconnaissance drone actually depicts a typical airport weather radar, entirely unrelated to combat operations.
On the Kherson axis, the AFU struck a RuAF command post with a rarely used US-made JDAM-ER precision guided bomb.
On July 29 and 30, Ukrainian FPV drones attacked streetcars twice in occupied Horlivka, Donetsk region. Both hits targeted the front of the trains and do not appear to be accidental. On July 29, the strike wounded a streetcar driver, and on July 30, a streetcar driver was killed, two female passengers and a young female passenger on a nearby bus were also injured as a result of the attack.
Pro-Russian war blogger Kirill Fyodorov has posted a thermal vision video of a ZALA Lancet loitering munition strike on a Sukhoi Su-25 Grach (Frogfoot) attack aircraft of the Ukrainian Air Force at the Dovhyntseve airfield near Kryvyi Rih. Judging by the video of the resulting fire, a real aircraft was hit, rather than a mock-up. With the ongoing strikes on Ukrainian airfields, the issue of F-16 fighter aircraft deployment and protection is becoming increasingly pressing.
The Wall Street Journal published an article detailing the types of modern weapons the US has promised to supply to Ukraine for the F-16 fighter aircraft transferred by Western allies. The article also outlines possible deployment scenarios for these aircraft. The AFU plan to fly these aircraft along the Russia-Ukraine border and strike Russian soil. However, American officials consider this option unrealistic due to the significant threat posed by Russian air defenses. We agree with this assessment; however, we find the American officials’ suggestion to use the F-16 for close air support missions unwise, given the presence of Russian short and medium-range air defenses on the frontline. A more optimal suggestion from European officials is to use the aircraft for air defense, to push back the Russian Air Force, which is launching bombs with Universal Gliding and Correction Modules (UMPK kits), away from the frontline. However, this too is currently risky given the technical capabilities of both sides’ radars. To effectively counter Russian aircraft, the Ukrainian Air Force needs to be equipped with more powerful radar systems. Therefore, the best use of the F-16 fighter aircraft this year would be flying within Ukrainian territory, intercepting cruise missiles and UAVs and gaining operational experience. More complex missions should be undertaken later.
The Kyiv Post, citing sources within Ukrainian intelligence services, published a photo showing Tuareg rebels in Mali with a Ukrainian flag, purportedly taken immediately after a fight with Wagner Group mercenaries. Additionally, during a TV marathon broadcast, Andrii Yusov, a representative of the Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine, stated that Ukrainian intelligence had provided the Tuaregs with certain information that enabled them to ambush Wagner Group members. However, many researchers noted that the photo appeared to be edited. We also observed that the Ukrainian flag in the image had a noticeably different tone and contrast compared to the rest of the photo and was hanging unrealistically, deviating from the vertical. Later, a video featuring the same individuals as in the photo with the flag was discovered. It was filmed by a UK-based Tuareg during a visit to a northern rebel group and was originally published back on June 10. The edited photo by the Kyiv Post not only included the Ukrainian flag but also featured a European-looking individual, presumably posing as a Main Intelligence Directorate officer. While we still do not know if Ukrainian intelligence was involved in the attack on the Wagner Group in Mali, it is clear that the photo in question is a fake.
On July 30, our team published a report on factory upgrades for T-72B3 tanks. The Uralvagonzavod plant has modified the T-72B3 tank several times since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Some of these modifications are visually noticeable, allowing us to distinguish the T-72B3M Model 2023 (Obr. 2023) from an unknown variant seen on a trainload, which we called the T-72B3M Model 2024 (Obr. 2024). This distinction is helpful for tracking the pace of tank modernization. The T-72B3M Model 2023 includes additional explosive reactive armor on the tank’s rear instead of protective screens, a standard cope cage and a Sosna-U multi-channel stabilized sight on the turret. Tanks produced from the summer of 2024 onward, the T-72B3M Model 2024, are now easily identified by a new distinctive element—rubber-fabric screens designed to protect the rear of the turret and the engine and transmission compartment.
On July 26, former Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, Dmitry Bulgakov, who was responsible for logistical support, was arrested in connection with a corruption case. Last week, searches were conducted in his apartment and country house, where investigators discovered a collection of awards and paintings depicting Russian military officials as generals of the 18th and 19th centuries or revolutionary figures. Some of these paintings were reminiscent of a meme we posted in February. On Telegram, it was noted that in one of the revolutionary-style paintings, most of the depicted heroes had been removed from their positions or even imprisoned—drawing a parallel with "the Commissar Vanishes."
Governor of the Stavropol region Vladimir Vladimirov has instructed the preparation of a law that, starting from Aug. 1, will increase the one-time regional sign-up bonus for those who sign a contract with the Ministry of Defense by seven and a half times: from 200,000 rubles [$2,320] to 1.5 million rubles [$17,400]. This follows an earlier increase in February 2024, when the payment was raised from 100,000 rubles [$1,160] to 200,000 rubles [$2,320].
Authorities continue to conduct raids to identify and enlist former migrants who have recently acquired Russian citizenship. RIA Novosti [Russian state-owned news agency], citing data from the Federal Bailiff Service, reports that in the first half of the year, 39,500 migrants were expelled from Russia. Last week, a video appeared in which a representative of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Dolgoprudny stated that the head of the Main Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the region had tasked the police with "lightening the Moscow region so that it does not darken with foreign citizens."
The Kremlin-aligned news outlet Mash reports empty shelves in "Pyaterochka" supermarkets in several regions, including Yaroslavl, Ivanovo, Kostroma and Vladimir. The X5 Group, Russia’s largest food retailer, attributes the shortage to a "seasonal labor shortage" at a Yaroslavl distribution center. However, it is likely that the shortage is also related to an increase in police anti-migrant raids.
The New York Times, citing its sources, reports that after the new law on mobilization in Ukraine came into force the AFU have been drafting about 30,000 men a month.
On the morning of August 1, Vazhnyye Istorii, or IStories, an independent Russian investigative media outlet, will publish our joint investigation on the rate of volunteer fighter recruitment into the Russian Army.
On July 31, at 6 p.m. Moscow time, we have hosted another livestream to answer your questions.