Sitrep for Aug. 21-23, 2024 (as of 9 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

In the Kharkiv region, the 3rd Assault Brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine has launched an offensive in the Lyman direction near the village of Novovodiane located north of the village of Makiivka.

In the Donetsk region, the Russian Armed Forces are advancing through areas that were once densely populated, with numerous small settlements. This concentration of villages explains why Russian troops have been able to capture two or three locations each day, despite their limited size and strategic importance. In the days following the last sitrep, Russian forces have captured the villages of Komyshivka, Ptyche and Mezhove in the southern part of the Pokrovsk direction. Russian forces are advancing towards the town of Pokrovsk at the cost of heavy losses.

Combat operations continue on the outskirts of the town of Chasiv Yar. A video has surfaced showing three Russian assault troops crossing the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas Canal and capturing several Ukrainian soldiers who were sheltering in a basement. Despite ongoing clashes, the frontline in this area has remained largely unchanged in recent weeks.

In the Kursk direction, Ukrainian forces have taken control of the village of Korenevo, according to DeepState; however, we have not yet seen visual confirmation of this.

Ukrainian forces have expanded their area of control in the Glushkovsky district of the Kursk region, with combat now taking place near the villages of 10-Y Oktyabr and Komarovka, as confirmed by geolocated video footage. The distance from the Ukraine-Russia border to the Seym River is approximately 10 to 15 km [6 to 9 mi]. The AFU could potentially seize the Glushkovsky district by advancing not only from east to west but also from the state border to the Seym River. However, no attempts have been made to advance from Ukrainian territory so far, likely due to the lack of additional forces in the Sumy region. It is worth noting that according to military analyst Michael Kofman, the AFU have deployed all available reserves in the Kursk region. For this reason, we do not currently expect a similar Ukrainian offensive in other border regions of Russia.

Contrary to our expectations, a UAZ-39094 crewcab pickup truck managed to cross the significantly damaged bridge in the village of Zvannoye. To achieve this, a wooden board was placed on the edge of the destroyed section of the bridge. While this makeshift solution allows for car traffic, it remains quite risky and is unlikely to support the passage of larger trucks or military vehicles.

There is still no confirmation of the destruction of the bridge in the village of Karyzh. A video published by Ukraine's Air Force Commander Mykola Oleshchuk shows strikes on a different bridge and a pontoon crossing over the Seym River.

As the RuAF capture various settlements, they nearly raze them to the ground, as ground operations are typically accompanied by airstrikes. Even without airstrikes, most buildings are destroyed during combat. However, we have not yet observed the active use of the Russian Air Force in the Kursk region.

The Wild Division of Donbas within the RuAF, which includes units like Sarmat, Pyatnashka [1st Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade] and Arbat, announced that they occupied the village of Nechayev (which had a population of six people in 2010). As proof, the soldiers took photos against the backdrop of ruins and a burning house. What makes this situation unusual is that there were no prior reports of the capture or even any fighting for Nechayev.

During the fighting for the village of Russkaya Konopelka, another friendly fire incident was recorded: a Ukrainian Kozak armored personnel carrier engaged in a firefight with Russian BMP-2 and BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles. The BMP-2, marked with the tactical sign "V," first fired at the Kozak. As the Kozak retreated, the BMP-3 opened fire, but its projectiles also hit houses near the Ukrainian armored vehicle and ultimately struck the Russian BMP-2. Later, the UNIAN news agency suggested that the BMP-2 was actually Ukrainian, and its crew, after escaping the vehicle, was later struck by drones. However, we disagree with this and believe that the video does not support such a conclusion, as the footage showing Ukrainian soldiers in the yard of a residential building (after an edited cut) was likely not filmed near the site of this firefight.

We have seen evidence that some Russian forces have been transferred from Crimea to the Kursk direction. A column of trucks marked with the insignia of the 56th Russian Air Assault Regiment (based in Feodosia), transporting personnel, was spotted in the Voronezh region en route to Kursk.

In addition, there are reports that parts of the 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade have been transferred from the Donetsk region to the Kursk direction, though we have not yet seen evidence to confirm this. The Russian military leadership has not withdrawn its main forces from the frontline, and we doubt that this will happen, as they have the option to redeploy units from sectors where the frontline has remained static for a long time, such as Zaporizhzhia or Kherson. It is possible that some forces were transferred from the Lyman direction, where the AFU recently began offensive operations. Despite the positive political effect of the offensive in the Kursk region, we have not yet seen the achievement of significant military goals.

A column of Russian armored vehicles was spotted in the Bryansk region, driving on a service road along the border and firing towards the Bachivsk Ukrainian border checkpoint. Additional details are not available at this time. Coinciding with the release of the video showing the column, Governor of the Bryansk region Alexander Bogomaz announced that a Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance group had been repelled in the Klimovsky district. However, the Klimovsky district is located quite far from where the video was recorded.

According to independent researcher Naalsio, during the Kursk operation from Aug. 15 to 20, the AFU lost 14 pieces of equipment: four infantry fighting vehicles, five armored personnel carriers, one destroyed 5P73 launcher (for S-125-2D Pechora-2D), two engineering vehicles, one ground surveillance radar and another military vehicle. During the same period, the RuAF lost 13 pieces of equipment: thee captured and two destroyed tanks, two destroyed BTR-82AT armored personnel carriers, one captured 2A29 MT-12 Rapira gun, one destroyed Kamov Ka-52 (Hokum B) attack helicopter and four additional captured and destroyed vehicles. Despite the AFU's initial heavy losses at the beginning of their offensive, equipment losses on both sides have now nearly equalized, which we attribute to the stabilization of the frontline. The loss ratio may shift again if the RuAF attempts to mop up the Ukrainian bridgehead in the Kursk region.

Ukrainian and Russian Strikes

On Aug. 22, Ukrainian drones struck the Marinovka air base in the Kalachyovsky district of the Volgograd region. This air base is home to Sukhoi Su-24 and Su-34 bombers, which are actively used by Russia in the war. Videos recorded by local residents capture fires and secondary detonations—likely missiles and air-dropped bombs. Satellite images of the aftermath show destroyed hangars and other structures. Some commentators suggest that aircraft debris might be visible, but the image quality is insufficient to confirm this. Ground-level photos of the aftermath show aircraft in some damaged hangars, but it is unclear if any aircraft were present in the destroyed shelters.

In recent weeks, Russian air bases in border regions have faced a series of successful Ukrainian attacks, including strikes on the Morozovsk air base and an airfield in the Lipetsk region. We believe that the sharp reduction in airstrikes targeting the Kharkiv region is likely tied not only to the AFU’s offensive in the Kursk region but also to successful Ukrainian strikes on Russian aerial munitions depots.

On Aug. 21, a Ukrainian drone, built from a modified light aircraft, traveled nearly 1,800 km [1,120 mi] to reach the Murmansk region, where it was shot down by Russian air defenses. Its potential target may have been the Olenya air base, home to Tupolev Tu-95 and Tu-160 strategic bombers, which have been frequently used to launch cruise missiles, such as the Kh-101, against Ukraine.

Meanwhile, the fire at the Proletarsk oil depot in the Rostov region, attacked by Ukrainian drones on the night of Aug. 18, has not yet been extinguished. Satellite images show the fire spreading, with some fuel tanks completely consumed by the flames, while others appear to have been successfully extinguished. Reports indicate that 49 firefighters were injured.

According to local residents, the depot was hit again by Ukrainian UAVs early on Aug. 23.

On Aug. 22, Ukrainian forces struck a ferry carrying 30 fuel tankers in the port of Kavkaz in the Kerch Strait. The pro-Kremlin Telegram channel Shot claims the attack was carried out using a Neptune cruise missile, while the Kremlin-aligned outlet Mash reports that a Storm Shadow cruise missile was likely used. Veniamin Kondratyev, Governor of the Krasnodar region, stated that 17 people were rescued from the ferry, while the fate of two crew members remains unknown.

The Kyiv Independent media outlet published an article discussing the political consequences of the Kursk offensive. Given the current situation, Putin can no longer use the excuse of "taking into account the facts on the ground": with a Ukrainian bridgehead in the Kursk region, it is no longer feasible to freeze the conflict along the current frontline. We believe that Putin cannot afford to leave Ukrainian forces on internationally recognized Russian territory for an extended period. Therefore, we expect that within a few months, Russian forces will receive orders to mop up this bridgehead and will commit substantial resources to this mission, regardless of personnel losses.

The Wall Street Journal reported that several months before the Ukrainian invasion of the Kursk region, Colonel General Aleksandr Lapin disbanded the interagency council responsible for security in the Kursk region, which was supposed to coordinate the efforts of the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Federal Security Service (FSB) and the regional administration. According to the Wall Street Journal, Lapin thereby "created a gap" in border defenses which contributed to the success of the Ukrainian operation.

We doubt that the existence of such a council would have significantly impacted the defense of the region. While non-MoD security agencies can assist the military with intelligence, Bloomberg sources indicate that Russian generals had already warned General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the RuAF, about the AFU's preparations for an invasion of the Kursk region. However, Gerasimov did not take these warnings seriously.

Two drone videos from the Kursk region have been published, showing bodies lying on a road. The bodies appear to be wearing civilian clothes, and Russian propaganda is attempting to convince viewers that Ukrainian soldiers are executing local civilians. However, these videos do not clearly indicate the circumstances under which these people died: they could have been shot, caught in crossfire, or struck by mortar fire, artillery or drones. Therefore, it is impossible to definitively conclude that the presence of civilian bodies is evidence of extrajudicial executions, unlike the situation in Bucha, where victims had their hands tied behind their backs.

The Verkhovna Rada [Ukrainian Parliament] has ratified the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, but with a reservation: Ukraine will not recognize the ICC’s jurisdiction over war crimes committed by its citizens for the next seven years. While any country can ratify a treaty with reservations, the key factor is how other countries react. For example, the EU, which considers ICC membership a condition for European integration, may not accept this reservation.

A suspicious project called Safe Haven has appeared on Telegram, promising soldiers help with fleeing Russia and six months of free housing in Turkey or Serbia. Such luxurious conditions are unusual even for the largest and most established deserter assistance programs, making contact with this project potentially dangerous.

Grigory Sverdlin, the leader of Idite Lesom! [Flee through the woods/Get lost you all] project, has reported a significant increase in contacts from the parents of conscripts being sent to the Kursk and Belgorod regions. Sverdlin advises these parents to reach out to human rights activists and file complaints with the Military Prosecutor's Office, as this may help prevent the deployment of conscripts to the border. It is unclear whether the number of conscripts being sent to the border has increased or if the surge in messages from parents reflects a growing awareness of the dangers associated with serving on the border.

We remind you that the fall regular conscription campaign begins on Oct. 1. We advise avoiding it by all means possible and reaching out to verified projects that assist deserters and refuseniks, such as Idite Lesom!, Kovcheg and the Movement of Conscientious Objectors.