dispatches
August 12

Sitrep for Aug. 9-12, 2024 (as of 8 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

On the main part of the frontline, Russian forces continue to advance:

  • In the Kupiansk direction, near the villages of Pishchane and Stelmakhivka (south of Pishchane), where recent fighting had yielded little progress, the situation has now shifted somewhat in Russia's favor;
  • In the Pokrovsk direction, Russian forces have made slight progress near the village of Ivanivka (north of the village of Vesele) and around the village of Zhelanne, aiming to widen the flanks of the salient and straighten the frontline;
  • In the Toretsk direction, Russian forces have made significant progress east of the villages of Niu-York and Nelipivka, forming a salient near the village of Pivnichne toward the town of Toretsk. According to some reports, Russian forces have already reached the outskirts of the town.

We anticipate that, similar to the situation in the Pokrovsk direction during the fighting for the village of Hrodivka, combat operations will likely slow down as forces approach Toretsk. While it may not make strategic sense for the Armed Forces of Ukraine to hold smaller villages, they will likely put up a stronger defense to retain control of larger population centers.

We do not believe the current changes along the frontline are a direct result of events in the Kursk region. Troop movements take time and cannot impact the frontline so quickly. Over the past few days, we have not observed any redeployment of units from the Group of Troops “Center,” which is engaged in combat in the Donetsk region.

In the Kharkiv direction, there have been no significant changes yet; however, the situation for the AFU could improve soon, especially in the town of Vovchansk, as units from the Group of Troops "North" are being redeployed to the Kursk region.

Ukrainian Offensive in the Kursk Region

In the Kursk direction, a new phase of the offensive has begun. During the first two days, Ukrainian forces, capitalizing on the element of surprise, executed rapid maneuvers, crossing the border at several points. They swiftly occupied Russian territory, advancing toward the town of Sudzha and the village of Korenevo. At this stage, we estimate that the Ukrainian grouping numbered no more than a thousand troops.

Subsequently, the AFU began to introduce additional forces into Russian territory. We now estimate that the Ukrainian group located in the Kursk region and the border areas of the Sumy region comprises several thousand soldiers, though the number is likely still significantly less than 10 thousand. This force size is currently adequate given that the estimated length of the frontline in this area is slightly under 50 km [31 mi]. If the operation involved significantly larger forces—between 10,000 and 15,000 troops or more—this would have noticeably impacted the situation. The troop density would be much higher, allowing the AFU to sustain the offensive in multiple directions and leading to a corresponding increase in the intensity of the fighting.

In the War on the Rocks podcast, Michael Kofman stated that the AFU does not have additional reserves available for a new advance in the Kursk region, such as toward the town of Lgov. Both new units and those withdrawn from the frontline for rotation are currently involved in the offensive. Kofman draws his conclusions on personal meetings with Ukrainian military personnel and analysis of on-the-ground information, which provide him with a clearer understanding of the current situation within the Ukrainian Army.

Reports of Ukrainian forces entering new settlements often involve areas adjacent to those already captured. The AFU are consolidating their positions, which indicates a shift from an active advance to a more positional approach. Thus, the culminating point of the Ukrainian offensive has passed, and now the AFU are establishing a foothold, similar to the one in the village of Krynky on the left bank of the Dnipro River. This new hotbed of tension will draw off some Russian reserves. Depending on how much loss the Ukrainian command is prepared to accept and what forces the Russian command deploys, this bridgehead could hold out for several weeks or more.

According to Ukrainian military observer Kostiantyn Mashovets, the RuAF are forming a new group of troops to counter the Ukrainian incursion. This new force is being built around units from the Group of Troops “North,” with additional units pulled from other directions of the front. Mashovets reports that troops numbering in the several thousands, equivalent to roughly a dozen battalions, have already been deployed to the Kupiansk direction.

These developments suggest that a continued rapid advance is highly unlikely, and the capture of, for example, the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant is now out of the question. The land seized by the AFU is bordered by contested areas where Ukrainian forces are present but do not have full control. Likewise, Russian forces cannot safely operate within these areas. These areas are characterized by fluctuating levels of control and the presence of Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups. Further Ukrainian raids do not constitute a broadening advance and have no impact on the frontline. Incursions of this nature can be observed north of Korenevo, in the Belovsky district, on the Kinburn Spit in the Kherson region and even in Crimea.

At the same time, there is no consensus among experts about the extent of Ukrainian control over the town of Sudzha. While it is likely that part of the town is under AFU control, other areas are only sparsely populated by Ukrainian troops. On Aug. 10, videos emerged showing the targeting of Ukrainian positions in the northeastern part of Sudzha; however, these alone do not confirm that the AFU fully control the town. Meanwhile, some pro-Russian channels claim that the eastern part of Sudzha is still under RuAF control.

This video showing the evacuation of a damaged VAB armored personnel carrier is a good indication that the AFU control a particular area.

On the other hand, statements from Russian authorities about civilian evacuations do not necessarily mean an imminent AFU advance towards a said district. Nevertheless, raids are always a possibility, which makes the specified territory clearly dangerous for civilians. Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, we have always argued that border districts should be evacuated.

Although it was easy at first to get the impression that “the AFU would capture the nuclear power station” or that “the RuAF would quickly drive them out,” it has become clear that neither side is poised for a quick victory on this axis. For instance, pro-government bloggers agree that current Russian forces are insufficient to stabilize the situation, let alone defeat the advancing AFU units.

These discussions seem to have led the Russian Aerospace Forces helicopter pilot with the call sign "Voevoda" to announce his intention to join the fighting in the Kursk region, instead of a planned leave, claiming later that he came to an agreement with a certain unit.

The last few days were rich in fake messages and psychological operations. Case in point: a photo of an AFU soldier standing next to a sign with the Ukrainian spelling of Kursk. A distance of “10” [6 mi] is shown in this photoshopped version, whereas in reality, the sign indicates 108 km [67 mi]. Such images are designed to sow panic among local residents and those closely monitoring the events in the Kursk region.

On Aug. 10, the Dva Mayora [Two Majors] pro-Russian Telegram channel posted panicked messages about a new large-scale breakthrough of an entire column of Ukrainian armored vehicles, which allegedly had already advanced several dozen kilometers in the direction of Belaya. According to the VChK-OGPU Telegram channel, there was no large-scale breakthrough, and what caused such an emphatic reaction were two trucks with artillery guns. In addition, on the night of Aug. 11, a pro-Russian war blogger published a video from Belaya, where he did not find any Ukrainian soldiers

Nikolay Volobuyev, the head of the Belovsky district, later announced that a Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance group had crossed the border, but by Aug. 11, the situation had already stabilized, though it remained critical.

A video was published on Aug. 10 showing AFU soldiers with the flag of the 252nd Territorial Defense Battalion (presumably a newly formed unit) near a municipal building in the village of Poroz in the Grayvoronsky district of the Belgorod region (approximately 2.5 km [1,55 mi] from the border with Ukraine). Such raids are usually part of psychological warfare.

AFP published photographs of Ukrainian armored vehicles allegedly crossing the Russian border in the Sumy region. It is worth noting that the photos show not only MT-LB multi-purpose armored vehicles and armored personnel carriers, but also Pion self-propelled guns (with a firing range, depending on the projectile, of up to 47 km [30 mi]). Artillery is important both for holding positions and for advancing, including on the flanks.

On Aug. 10, a report was published that another Russian Kamov Ka-52 (Hokum B) attack helicopter was lost: according to a preliminary version, it was shot down by a man-portable air defense system, the crew was killed.

The Russian side continues to publish evidence of aircraft or loitering munitions in action, but for unclear reasons we have not yet seen any footage of close combat. At the same time, the Russian Ministry of Defense published a video of T-62M tanks Model 2022 (Obr. 2022) reportedly holding certain firing positions in particularly dangerous areas of the Kursk region. The date and location of this footage are unknown to us.

Over the weekend, the Russian Ministry of Defense released several old videos, falsely claiming them to be recent. These include:

  • A Mil Mi-28N attack helicopter supposedly flying over the Kursk region, which was actually filmed over the Luhansk and Donetsk regions;
  • A Sukhoi Su-25 Grach (Frogfoot) attack aircraft allegedly operating over the Kursk region, but in reality, the footage was from the Donetsk region;
  • A Sukhoi Su-34 Fullback fighter-bomber purportedly dropping a FAB-3000 air-dropped bomb on Ukrainian reserves in the border areas of the Sumy region, which was actually footage from July documenting the first official use of this bomb.

This habit of presenting archive footage as current has been observed since 2015. It is possible that employees of the Department of Information and Mass Communications of the Russian Ministry of Defense are wary of accidentally revealing classified information that is not intended for public release. As a result, when they need to quickly create a post for a Telegram channel, they often resort to using old recordings or, in some instances, videos from the Internet. For example, during the war in Syria, there were cases where video game footage was posted under the headline "Russian aircraft working against ISIS."

Pro-Russian Telegram channels report that aerial reconnaissance and strike UAV units are being redeployed from the Zaporizhzhia region to the Kursk region. There has not been any significant advancement by either side on this axis for a long time, and we do not consider such a withdrawal from this section of the frontline to be particularly detrimental to Russia.

John Kirby, the National Security Council Coordinator for Strategic Communications, commented on the use of Western weapons on Russian territory, saying that the Ukrainians were using American weapons in areas that had already been agreed upon for cross-border strikes. According to him, the ultimate goal is to help Ukraine defend itself.

Thus, the AFU are still not permitted to use long-range weapons against Russian territory. However, in recent weeks, we have seen several successful strikes by Ukrainian drones on ammunition depots and airfields in Lipetsk, Voronezh and the Rostov region.

Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov published a video reportedly showing servicemen from the Akhmat-Chechnya Regiment allegedly destroying a Ukrainian supply convoy. The video shows fighters from the unit near a Roshel Senator armored vehicle with a damaged hood, as well as visible ammunition and the bodies of Ukrainian soldiers. Notably, there is no fire or smoke and the blood appears coagulated. This has led to speculation that the unit may have stumbled upon a previously destroyed vehicle and recorded the video next to it—a tactic similar to what Akhmat fighters did in Mariupol.

However, some parts of the Akhmat units did engage with Ukrainian forces and were captured (it is worth noting that there are several Akhmat units with the same name).

Ukrainian and Russian Strikes

Dmytro Pletenchuk, spokesman for the Ukrainian Navy, reported a strike on a Russian gas platform in the Black Sea. According to him, the platform housed various relay stations and jammers and a few hours before the strike, equipment and military personnel were brought there—no civilians were present. The video recording of the strike does not show a missile or drone in flight, suggesting that unmanned surface vessels may have been used.

According to the AFU, on the night of Aug. 11, Russia attacked Ukraine with four North Korean KN-23 missiles and 57 Shahed drones. President Zelenskyy reported that a missile strike on a private house in the Brovarskyi district of the Kyiv region resulted in the deaths of two people—a 35-year-old man and his 4-year-old son—and injured three others. Earlier, the State Emergency Service of Ukraine reported that debris from an intercepted missile had fallen on the house.

The Russian MoD claims that on the morning of Aug. 11, four Tochka-U missiles and 14 UAVs were shot down over the Kursk region. Aleksey Smirnov, acting Governor of the Kursk region, reported that 15 people were injured when missile debris fell on an apartment building in Kursk. Witnesses have published videos of air defense system operations over the Kursk region.

On Aug. 9, the Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense once again carried out a raid on the Kinburn Spit in the Kherson region. The video shows the Ukrainian flag being placed on a monument to Suvorov and a drone strike on a small structure resembling a shed. Additionally, there have been claims that six units of Russian military equipment were destroyed and 30 soldiers were killed; however, no evidence has been provided. This raid is not the first on the Kinburn Spit, and their purpose remains unclear.

The Russian side claims that the operation was unsuccessful for the Ukrainians. The approaching boats were met with gunfire and anti-tank guided missile fire. Video footage showing the bodies of killed Ukrainian soldiers has also been released.

The Atesh partisan movement in Crimea reports that air defense around the Crimean bridge has been reinforced, publishing photos showing barges now positioned in two rows around the bridge.

On Aug. 11, a fire broke out at a cooling tower of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. According to President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, the fire was started by Russian forces, while the Russian TASS news agency claims it was caused by a Ukrainian drone strike. In any case, the nuclear plant is currently not in danger.

Western Assistance

Lithuania has announced a new military aid package for Ukraine to be delivered in August. It will include:

  • Four M113 armored personnel carriers;
  • Short range air defense systems and missiles;
  • Counter-UAV systems and drone jamming equipment;
  • All-terrain vehicles with spare parts;
  • Various loaders and trailers;
  • Rifles, ammunition and smoke charges.

It is worth noting that this is not a particularly large aid package; a similar amount of equipment could have been "spent" during the operation in the Kursk region.