Sitrep for Sept. 6-9, 2024 (as of 7:30 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

In the Vuhledar direction, Russian forces have captured the village of Vodiane, located northeast of the town of Vuhledar. This has resulted in Vuhledar being partially encircled, with the village of Prechystivka to the west having been captured earlier. Ukrainian forces in Vuhledar now have access to supply routes only via rural roads leading to the village of Bohoiavlenka. It is likely that the Armed Forces of Ukraine will have to abandon the town soon to avoid the risk of being fully encircled. Holding Vuhledar has already been challenging due to its prolonged exposure to airstrikes and artillery shelling, which have left the town nearly destroyed. It is worth noting that fighting in the Vuhledar direction began as early as November 2022, and at the end of January 2023, the Russian Armed Forces launched a renewed offensive, suffering significant losses among their naval infantry units.

In the Pokrovsk direction, Russian forces have made slight progress in the village of Hrodivka and in the area between the Vovcha River and the now-occupied village of Nevelske. It appears that the RuAF aim to push the AFU out of the pocket that has formed in this area, covering approximately 100 square kilometers [38 square mi]. Should they be able to, the RuAF might even try to encircle part of the Ukrainian forces there. Military analysts Def Mon and Rob Lee believe that the AFU is already withdrawing from this "bulge" without having made an official announcement.

Ukrainian military observer Kostiantyn Mashovets believes (and we share his opinion) that Russian forces have shifted their focus to the southern part of the Pokrovsk direction, rather than halting their advance on the town of Pokrovsk. According to Mashovets, the AFU command is unable to prevent their progress west of the village of Nevelske, and no order has been given for Ukrainian forces to withdraw from the Nevelske salient to the Hirnyk-Kurakhivka line. Since Russian forces are already on the western bank of the Vovcha River, Mashovets believes it will be impossible to hold the lines between the villages of Zhelanne Pershe and Zhelanne Druhe.

On Sept. 7, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy reported that the situation in the Pokrovsk direction had improved over the past few days, though it was too early to call it fully stabilized. Moreover, there has been no recent confirmation of his earlier statement about the redeployment of significant forces to the Kursk region, as no noticeable increase in fighting has been observed there. So far, only low-intensity positional fighting has been reported. Deploying large forces merely to position them near the frontline without launching counterattacks seems pointless to us.

In the Kursk direction, the AFU continue to strike pontoon crossings over the Seym River. A video has emerged showing strikes with air-launched munitions, suggesting that the crossings submerged in water were not camouflaged but ended up underwater due to the strikes. Earlier, due to incomplete data, we made incorrect conclusions about the reasons for the flooding of the pontoon sections.

It is worth noting that constructing new pontoon crossings would be relatively simple for Russia, and we do not expect that regular strikes against these crossings will lead to a shortage of components.

One of the most significant developments in recent days has been the reported delivery of ballistic missiles from Iran to Russia. On Sept. 6, The Wall Street Journal reported that American and European officials had confirmed the shipment of ballistic missiles from Iran to Russia—no longer warning of Tehran’s intentions, but stating that the transfer had already taken place. On Sept. 7, Bloomberg also reported on the delivery, while The Times specified that Iran had supplied Russia with over 200 Fath-360 ballistic missiles. These missiles have a range of approximately 120 kilometers [75 mi], with a warhead of around 150 kilograms [330 lbs]. The speed of ballistic missiles is significantly higher than that of cruise missiles, making them much harder to intercept, although systems like the Patriot SAM system are capable of doing so. While reports indicate that the US and the EU are already working on sanctions in response to Tehran’s actions, we remain skeptical about their effectiveness. Russia and Iran are already among the most sanctioned countries in the world, yet this has not slowed their military production, nor has it led to economic collapse. It remains unclear what additional steps western countries can take in response to these missile deliveries.

While Iran has denied shipping missiles to Moscow, we believe that the increased use of Iskander ballistic missiles by Russian forces could indirectly suggest that an agreement on missile deliveries has already been reached. Still, we have yet to see direct evidence of their deployment on the front.

Western Assistance

President Zelenskyy personally addressed the meeting at the Ramstein air base, once again urging allies to lift restrictions on the use of high-precision Western weapons against targets on Russian territory. He also noted that simply lifting the restrictions is not enough; Ukraine needs more of these weapons, as supplies of ATACMS tactical ballistic missiles, Storm Shadow and SCALP-EG missiles have dwindled. This is likely due to Western stockpiles gradually running out, with cruise missile production yet to resume in several European countries. Additionally, the limited number of these missiles might be one of the reasons why their use against targets on Russian soil deemed secondary by Western allies remains restricted to this day.

Journalists asked US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin about the American response to Zelenskyy’s request to lift restrictions on the use of Western weapons against targets in Russia. Austin replied that US policy had not changed and added that such permission is meaningless since Russia has moved its aircraft and other critical assets beyond the range of ATACMS missiles. When asked why the US does not allow strikes on strategic targets from Zelenskyy’s proposed list, he mentioned that Ukraine could use its own UAVs for that purpose. However, we believe that drones cannot replace missiles due to their significantly smaller warheads and longer flight times.

On Sept. 10, the 79th session of the United Nations General Assembly will open, with both Zelenskyy and Biden scheduled to speak. We believe that if the Biden administration does not lift the restrictions after this event, it is unlikely they will be lifted before the next administration takes office.

On Sept 6, Andriy Melnyk, Ukraine’s current Ambassador to Brazil and former Ambassador to Germany, stated in his interview with Berliner Zeitung that Ukraine would not oppose Germany acting as an intermediary in potential negotiations with Russia, noting that Ukrainians trust the Germans. According to Melnyk, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz could use Germany’s diplomatic channels to gauge whether dialogue with Putin would be worthwhile.

On Sept. 8, in an interview to ZDF TV, Chancellor Scholz emphasized that the war in Ukraine should be stopped as soon as possible, and that Russia should also take part in the next Summit on Peace in Ukraine. It is worth noting that Ukraine’s former Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba expressed a similar view during the first Peace Summit on June 15 and 16. However, it is unlikely that any progress toward negotiations will be made before the US presidential elections, as its outcome will heavily influence the positions of the involved parties.

Sept. 30 marks the end of the US fiscal year, and to avoid "losing" the funds, the Biden administration is negotiating with Congress to urgently allocate $6 billion for military assistance under the Presidential Drawdown Authority program. This program enables the immediate transfer of aid from US military stockpiles rather than placing production orders. According to Reuters, the US State Department hopes to extend the deadline for using these funds by passing a short-term emergency spending bill. It remains unclear why, despite agreeing on $61 billion in funding, deliveries have been slow this year. Some analysts suggest this delay is due to Pentagon rules requiring the US military to maintain a certain level of readiness, which cannot be compromised. Others believe it may be linked to bottlenecks in manufacturing.

Meanwhile, the US has announced a new military aid package worth $250 million for Ukraine, which will include:

• RIM-7 Sea Sparrow surface-to-air missiles and support for air defenses;
• Ammunition for HIMARS MLRS;
• 155mm and 105mm artillery ammunition;
• TOW anti-tank missiles and Stinger anti-aircraft missiles;
• Javelin and AT-4 anti-armor systems;
• Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, M113 armored personnel carriers and MRAP Vehicles;
• Small arms ammunition and grenades;
• Patrol boats;
• Maritime training equipment;
• Demolitions equipment and munitions;
• Spare parts, ancillary equipment, services, training and transportation.

Additionally, following the latest Ramstein format meeting, military aid packages have been announced by other allies of Ukraine:

• The Netherlands will supply spare parts for F-16 fighter aircraft, air-to-air missiles, generators and light vehicles;
• Canada will donate more than 80,000 CRV7 rocket motors for unguided aircraft rockets, 970 C6 general purpose machine guns (GPMG) (Canadian version of the FN MAG), along with 29 decommissioned chassis from 29 M113s and 64 Coyote LAVs;
• Spain will supply a MIM-23 HAWK surface-to-air missile system battery;
• The United Kingdom will supply 650 Martlet lightweight multirole missiles.

Portugal has completed the transfer of six Kamov Ka-32 helicopters to Ukraine, which had been promised back in 2022. It is reported that Ukrainian forces will handle their repairs. Although these are civilian helicopters primarily used by rescue services, they could potentially be adapted for logistics or drone interception by mounting a machine gun.

During the night of Sept. 7, in the Ostrogozhsky district of the Voronezh region, an UAV crashed, causing a fire that spread to explosive materials, according to Governor Aleksandr Gusev. Andriy Kovalenko, Head of Ukraine's National Security and Defense Council’s Center for Countering Disinformation, claims that North Korean-made missiles were stored at the ammunition facility; however, we have no confirmation of this.

In recent months, we have repeatedly explained why we are skeptical about using motorcycles on the frontline instead of APCs and IFVs. Specifically, motorcycles lack armor protection and can be severely damaged by bullets or anti-personnel mines. A recently surfaced video shows a motorcycle hitting a small anti-personnel landmine, the PFM-1 "Butterfly" (aka "Petal"). This type of mine typically does not kill a person who steps on it but can cause the loss of a foot. In this case, it disabled the vehicle.

Pro-Russian bloggers have shared their experiences of how different military officials have treated them. Pro-Russian war correspondent Alexander Sladkov reported that the team of the former Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu often criticized pro-war bloggers for their harsh stances and demanded they stop posting, in particular, about supply issues. According to Sladkov, the Chief Military Prosecutor’s Office opened a criminal case against him for discrediting the RuAF, but he avoided punishment only after an intervention by Oleg Dobrodeev, Head of the All-Russia State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company, and the Presidential Administration. Following Shoigu's removal from office, many members of his team came under investigation. Under the current Minister of Defense Andrey Belousov, pro-Russian war bloggers can finally "breathe a sigh of relief." Sladkov claims that the current MoD leadership is doing everything possible "to ensure the success of the army, headquarters, rear, and combat units."

The pro-Russian Telegram channel Fighterbomber, associated with the Russian Air and Space Force, also reported that a criminal case had been opened against its author.

"DPR" serviceman Egor Guzenko, the author of the pro-Russian Telegram channel Trinadtsatyy [The 13th], recorded a video criticizing the government. In the video, he called Putin and other Kremlin officials traitors and accused them of causing the deaths of Russian soldiers. His team later deleted the post, fearing possible prosecution for "discrediting the RuAF."