Sitrep for Aug. 30-Sept. 2, 2024 (as of 8 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

The advance of Russian forces in the Pokrovsk direction appears to have somewhat slowed. This may be due to the need to pull in reserves and possibly a decision to intensify offensives on other fronts. Nevertheless, in recent days, Russian troops have made some progress on the southern flank of the Ocheretyne salient, moving south from the already occupied village of Memryk, capturing the small village of Dolynivka, and approaching the village of Halytsynivka, which is now in a precarious position.

Ukrainian forces to the west of the village of Nevelske are at risk of being encircled. It would be advisable for them to withdraw from the area before Russian forces cut off their supply and retreat routes. The Russian Armed Forces appear to be preparing an advance towards the villages of Zhelanne Pershe, Zhelanne Druhe and Kurakhivka, with the aim of straightening the frontline between Halytsynivka and Krasnohorivka. The distance between these two points is about 8 km [5 mi], and the surface area of the territory that could end up encircled west of Nevelske is around 80 square kilometers [30 sq. mi].

There are rumors that Ukrainian forces are leaving this dangerous sector, although these reports remain unconfirmed. Looking ahead, a defensive line could be established either around Kurakhivka (although this village may face an attack from two directions) or closer to the town of Kurakhove.

The New Voice of Ukraine published an interview with Oleksandr Solonko, a serviceman from the 411th Battalion of Unmanned Aircraft Systems of the AFU, who has been fighting in the Pokrovsk direction for several months, including in the battle for the village of Ocheretyne. He recalled that the Russian offensive on the southern flank, directly towards the town of Pokrovsk, began after the capture of the village of Novooleksandrivka on the northern flank in June 2024. During those battles, the Russian forces suffered significant losses in armored vehicles and temporarily halted their advance, refraining from moving towards the village of Vozdvyzhenka and further towards the Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka highway.

Additionally, Solonko pointed out that in this direction, the RuAF have an overwhelming advantage in terms of equipment, ammunition, and personnel—a level of superiority they have not enjoyed in any other direction, including Bakhmut. It is likely that after their initial successes, the Russian command committed all available reserves to this area.

Recently appearing videos filmed by Russian soldiers from newly captured positions show substantial concrete fortifications and dug-in containers. The fact that such fortifications were captured in a matter of days once again confirms there is an insufficient number of AFU personnel manning defensive positions in this sector of the front.

In recent days, there has also been an increase in fighting in the Vuhledar direction: the RuAF stormed the Pivdennodonbaska 1 coal mine on the outskirts of Vuhledar. However, as of now, the AFU defenses are holding up, with only minor advances by Russian forces.

Over the past year, it has become clear that the Russian command is employing the following tactics: Russian troops try to advance along various sections of the frontline and, if they manage to push through Ukrainian defenses anywhere along the frontline, they increase the pressure on that spot, developing the offensive until they are forced to stop, after which they begin to “feel out” the frontline again.

The Ukrainian Center for Defense Strategies [security think tank] stated that Russian troops in the Pokrovsk direction have a 4:1 advantage over the AFU in both personnel and the supply of drones and ammunition. According to the center’s analysts, the Russian Army could reach the outskirts of Pokrovsk by mid-September if the offensive continues at the current pace. However, this offensive is very costly for the RuAF and they will not be able to maintain this pace for a long time. The battle for Pokrovsk may become the culmination of the Russian offensive this year, after which the frontline will begin to stabilize.

Michael Kofman has mentioned something similar: while the AFU’s numbers are increasing due to intensified mobilization, the RuAF suffers heavy losses in the absence of mobilization and insufficient numbers of volunteer fighters. As we previously noted, volunteers and journalists from Mediazona [independent Russian media outlet] and BBC News Russian cannot keep up with the incoming obituaries, and the situation has stayed the same since then.

We believe that since the situation is evolving dynamically, the current slowdown may soon be followed by offensive actions toward Pokrovsk once Russian reinforcements arrive. In our view, stabilization on this section of the frontline is indeed possible by fall, but it would be unwise to assume that a large-scale Ukrainian counteroffensive will follow. For that to happen, in addition to replenishing personnel, the AFU would need to accumulate a sufficient amount of equipment and ammunition. However, Western allies have recently been supplying military aid in insufficient quantities. At this point, there is no reason to believe that the situation will improve at the beginning of 2025. After the Russian Army exhausts its offensive potential, the frontline is likely to come to a standstill.

There is also reported progress by Russian forces in the Kupiansk direction near the village of Pishchane, towards the Oskil River. Russian troops are still attempting to reach the bank of the Oskil River to disrupt the supply lines of Ukrainian forces on its eastern bank. The distance from their current positions to the bank is approximately 5–6 km [3-4 mi].

After reaching the riverside, they will likely try to “straighten” the frontline from Pishchane to the village of Lozova, advancing not only from Pishchane but also from the village of Stelmakhivka.

In the Kursk direction, the frontline remains stable. Russian forces have failed to dislodge the AFU from the village of Borki in the eastern part of the salient. Ukrainian forces are trying to gain a foothold in the area.

Russian forces keep building pontoon crossings across the Seym River in the Glushkovsky district of the Kursk region, while Ukrainian forces continue to destroy them. Videos have been published showing kamikaze drones targeting a Russian column of PMP pontoon park trucks standing on the river bank, as well as destroyed vehicles as a result of previous attacks.

The Black Bird Group has concluded that advancement in the Pokrovsk direction is much more important for Russia than the Ukrainian offensive in the Kursk region, where the RuAF are only trying to stabilize the situation. In our opinion, if the AFU command had postponed the Kursk operation, as we wrote in our previous sitrep, then, most likely, it would have been possible to avoid a breakthrough in the Donetsk region. At the same time, the Ukrainian Army could have used the element of surprise with the same success. The most effective tactic for Russian generals, in our view, would be to withdraw troops from the Glushkovsky district, build defenses along the river and seek to inflict as much damage on the enemy as possible with various strikes, while simultaneously conducting their offensive operation on enemy territory.

Ukrainian and Russian Strikes

On Aug. 30, Russian forces launched several strikes on five Kharkiv districts using FAB-500 air bombs equipped with Universal Gliding and Correction Modules (UMPK). Reports indicate that the strikes resulted in six people killed, including a 14-year-old girl, and 98 injured, including 22 minors. One of the bombs hit a 12-story residential building, destroying several floors and igniting a fire.

In retaliation, on the evening of Aug. 30, Belgorod came under MLRS fire, leaving five people dead and another 46 injured, including seven children.

Some commentators have speculated that Ukrainian air defenses may have been responsible for the Russian bombs falling on residential neighborhoods in Kharkiv, or that damage in Belgorod was caused by Pantsir-S1 missiles, rather than Ukrainian MLRS. However, we believe these claims are unfounded and argue that both attacks amount to war crimes, aimed at inflicting maximum damage on civilian infrastructure. In Kharkiv, the targets of the strikes were residential areas, and we find it highly unlikely that the UMPK-equipped FAB-500 bombs could have been successfully intercepted. In the case of Belgorod, the use of indiscriminate weapons in civilian areas is equally unacceptable.

On the night of Sept. 1, Russia experienced one of its largest UAV attacks since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The Russian MoD reported the destruction and interception of 158 fixed-wing UAVs across 15 regions.

Eleven UAVs were downed in Moscow. One hit a freestanding engineering building in Kapotnya, causing a fire. Another hit an oil refinery, causing a fire that was quickly extinguished.

Five drones attacked the Tver region, hitting the Konakovo Power Station and a gas storage facility a few kilometers away. We are not aware of any blackouts caused by the attack. According to eyewitnesses, the drone made several circles over the power plant before hitting it. As far as we know, such drones are not controlled by an operator but fly according to predetermined coordinates. Therefore, it is possible that the drone was not flying circles around the plant looking for the best angle to strike, but was simply following a preprogrammed flight path toward the gas storage facility.

Vazhnyye Istorii [IStories, an independent Russian investigative media outlet] analyzed NASA's Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) satellite imagery of fires and found several other suspected attack sites in other regions.

On the afternoon of Sept. 1, Kharkiv was attacked with S-300 and 9K720 Iskander mobile short-range ballistic missiles. There were 47 casualties and damage to residential buildings, a post office, shops, a sports complex and the Target shopping center.

About two weeks ago, a video was released in which the owners of this Kharkiv shopping center complained that fighters from the 3rd Assault Brigade of the AFU had occupied the premises of the shopping center and were using it for military purposes (we believe that they may have stored food or uniforms there). On this basis, Russian propagandists claim that the shopping center was a legitimate target. If one side in a military conflict strikes a military target, it has an obligation to minimize harm to civilians. In this case, it was a daytime strike on a weekend, no attempt was made to avoid civilian casualties.

On the same day, Sept. 1, the city of Belgorod came under a retaliatory attack, possibly again with MLRS. Eleven people, including two children, were reportedly injured and damage was caused to residential buildings and vehicles.

Overnight into Sept. 2, Kyiv also came under attack. More than ten cruise missiles and about ten ballistic missiles were reportedly shot down. Fragments fell in four districts of Kyiv, setting fire to vehicles and damaging non-residential buildings. By morning, two people were reported injured, one of them being admitted to hospital.

On Aug. 31, Russian forces announced having struck with Iskander missiles what they claimed to be an AFU convoy south of the city of Sumy. It later transpired that in fact it was a convoy of grain carriers in which one driver was killed and another four injured.

Western Assistance

The issue of servicing F-16 fighters has recently become a topic of wide debate. It was previously assumed that certain tasks requiring high qualification would be carried out by civilian engineers, possibly from Lockheed Martin. However, it has transpired that the American administration is not prepared to send them to Ukraine, since they might come under a Russian attack and even be killed, thus the expectation is that the servicing of fighters might be undertaken by coalition partners in Europe. The Netherlands has already announced its readiness to fund the work of civilian engineers.

It is unknown how many F-16 fighter aircraft have already been delivered to Ukraine. In July, it was reported that six units would be delivered in 2024, with 12 pilots undergoing training. Later, The Economist reported that 10 units had arrived. Recent articles in The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal again mention six aircraft.

The Netherlands announced that they would deliver 28 BvS10 Viking tracked all-terrain vehicles to Ukraine. According to the country's defense minister, the Dutch Naval Infantry unit has already trained Ukrainian soldiers to operate these vehicles.

A 2S1 Gvozdika 122mm self-propelled howitzer in a green livery characteristic of the Bulgarian Armed Forces was spotted in a photograph from the frontline. The delivery of these howitzers was reported in March 2024, but the number of howitzers transferred is unknown.

Germany has announced a new military aid package supplied to Ukraine. It includes:

1 IRIS-T SLS;
26 Vector reconnaissance drones;
1 Bergepanzer 2 armored recovery vehicle;
6 high mobility engineer excavators;
14,000 rounds of 155mm ammunition;
10 unmanned surface vessels;
55,000 first aid kits.

If the package includes non-precision projectiles, the 14,000 rounds would last only a few days. This small military aid package will have little to no impact on the frontline.