Sitrep for Aug. 26-28, 2024 (as of 8 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

The situation for the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the Pokrovsk direction is becoming increasingly dangerous. Although we anticipated that the town of Novohrodivka would be captured in the coming days, the pace of the Russian forces' advance has exceeded our expectations, not only failing to slow down as it approached the town but even accelerating. Initially, DeepState noted that the Russian Armed Forces had pushed through the town, with fighting continuing on the northern outskirts. However, Ukrainian journalist Yurii Butusov has since confirmed that Novohrodivka has fallen, with the fighting lasting only three days.

Additionally, Russian forces have made significant advances south of the recently captured village of Ptyche, moving towards the villages of Kalynove and Memryk (in both villages, soldiers from the 114th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade of the RuAF raised Soviet flags). As a result, the village of Karlivka is now in a precarious position: by moving southeast from Memryk, Russian forces could cut off the road, depriving Ukrainian troops in Karlivka of supply routes and avenues for retreat. In our opinion, the AFU should consider withdrawing from this village.

In addition, Russian forces are advancing towards the village of Mykhailivka, west of Kalynove—the contested area is now close to the town of Selydove. According to Butusov, Russian forces have approached the town and fighting for its control is expected to begin soon.

We have also noted changes in the Toretsk direction. Earlier, we reported about the beginning of fighting on the outskirts of the town of Toretsk, and now, the RuAF have managed to partially capture it.

All this suggests that the offensive in the Kursk region not only failed to prompt the redeployment of some Russian forces from Donetsk but also exacerbated the shortage of AFU personnel in the region. In our opinion, this is the only factor that could have led to such a rapid retreat of Ukrainian troops from their defensive positions. Specifically, it seems that the forces available in the Pokrovsk direction are insufficient to establish a full defensive line; they have so far only been able to retreat in an organized manner. If the Ukrainian command does not take measures to stabilize the situation, Russian forces could be on the outskirts of Pokrovsk within a few weeks, as opposed to months as we previously believed. We also believe that for the AFU "emergency" brigades, such as the 3rd Assault Brigade, it would be more logical not to conduct a counteroffensive in the Lyman direction but instead to be sent to the Donetsk region.

To better understand the situation, it is also useful to compare the sizes of the recently captured towns: Sudzha had a population of about 5,000, while Novohrodivka had over 16,000 residents in 2004. The important factor here is not the population size itself (as civilians began evacuating from Novohrodivka when the frontline approached), but rather the number of permanent structures that could be converted into fortifications and firing positions. Novohrodivka has significantly more such buildings than Sudzha, meaning that its defense could have been much more effective with a sufficient number of soldiers.

It is worth noting that while the capture of Pokrovsk will complicate the AFU’s logistics on certain parts of the frontline, it will not lead to the swift capture of the entire Donetsk region, let alone Ukraine’s defeat.

On Aug. 27, several pro-Russian Telegram channels, along with Vyacheslav Gladkov [governor of the Belgorod region], reported an attempted border breach in the Belgorod region near the villages of Zhuravlyovka and Nekhoteyevka. Satellite images tracking fires from NASA’s Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) confirmed that fighting occurred in this area.

However, claims of a breach by 200 or more Ukrainian soldiers and several infantry fighting vehicles seem unrealistic. It is hard to imagine that over a hundred soldiers would go on a raid on foot with only a few armored vehicles for cover. It is much more plausible that the breach was actually carried out by a few infantry fighting vehicles with a small number of troops, likely a sabotage and reconnaissance group. In the current circumstances, it is impossible for the AFU to open a new front or carry out a new large-scale breakthrough in the Kursk region.

Commander-in-Chief of the AFU, General Oleksandr Syrskyi, confirmed at the Ukraine 2024 Forum that one of the goals of the Kursk operation was an attempt to divert some Russian units from other directions, primarily from the Pokrovsk and Kurakhove (the latter is an extension of the Marinka direction) directions.

According to him, about 30 thousand Russian soldiers have been transferred to the Kursk direction so far. This number may include not only servicemen withdrawn from the Donetsk region, but also conscripts transferred from other Russian regions, as well as combat units from the Kharkiv, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions, as well as from Crimea. We cannot independently estimate the size of the Russian contingent in the Kursk region, but we assume Syrskyi's numbers to be approximately correct.

The frontline in the Kursk direction remains relatively stable. According to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Russian forces have already built a fifth pontoon crossing over the Seym River. We expect the AFU will continue to strike the pontoons as the RuAF tries to restore them as quickly as possible.

We previously reported on the formation of a motorized rifle regiment within the Russian Aerospace Forces. Now, it has become known that some soldiers from the Strategic Missile Forces of the Russian Federation (RVSN) have joined motorized rifle units and are fighting in the Kursk region. A pro-Russian Telegram channel posted a message thanking for the drones provided by one of these infantrymen. This once again highlights the growing personnel shortage within the RuAF. The successful offensive in the Pokrovsk direction, as always, comes at the cost of significant losses that need to be replenished. Additionally, Russia needs to form reserves for a counteroffensive in the Kursk region and to defend its territory in case of new Ukrainian attacks.

Michael Kofman, along with some other experts, believes that the personnel situation for the Ukrainian side will gradually improve, as the soldiers mobilized after the tightening of laws in May will soon complete their training and will be able to strengthen the AFU on the frontline.

Last week, we reported on the Arbat Battalion, part of the Wild Division of Donbas, which allegedly liberated the village of Nechaev, although there was no information about its capture or that it was ever contested.

Now, the same battalion has claimed the liberation of the neighboring village of Nizhnyaya Parovaya. As far as we know, it too was never captured. Both settlements were a contested zone, but were not under Ukrainian control. If the Arbat Battalion entered the village, which may have once been visited by AFU advance units, it does not mean that the RuAF has liberated it.

Defense Express speculates that when Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced that Ukraine had “tested its first domestically produced ballistic missile,” he was referring to the Sapsan short-range ballistic missile system, previously known as Hrim-2. However, the authors note that it remains unclear whether the missiles and system as a whole are ready for mass production, as, back in June 2023, they were reportedly still far from completing their testing and refinement phase.

In May 2023, Sergey Aksyonov, the Russian-appointed head of Crimea, claimed that Russian air defenses had intercepted Hrim-2 ballistic missiles over the peninsula. One of his advisers even posted a photo of a crater, allegedly caused by the Ukrainian-made missile. We cannot independently verify or refute this claim. While the long-range versions of the ATACMS tactical ballistic missile had not yet been delivered to Ukraine at the time, the intercepted munitions could have also been modified S-200 missiles.

Since the Hrim-2 is domestically produced in Ukraine, it is not subject to restrictions on strikes against targets on Russian soil. However, if any Western components were used in its construction, the country of origin could still impose limitations on its use—similar to how the US has imposed restrictions on the deployment of Storm Shadow missiles, a topic we have previously covered.

On the issue of countering Russian reconnaissance drones guiding strikes against critical targets deep inside Ukrainian territory, Zelenskyy noted that using Patriot missiles against these drones was impractical due to their high cost. Scarce Patriot missiles are typically reserved for more significant threats, such as Kh-47M2 Kinzhal hypersonic missiles and 3M-54 Kalibr cruise missiles, while UAVs are primarily shot down by drones or F-16 fighter jets instead.

A pro-Russian Telegram channel released an intercepted video showing a Ukrainian FPV drone ramming a Russian reconnaissance UAV.

The Vyorstka media outlet reported that the number of people willing to sign a contract with Russia’s Ministry of Defense in Moscow has doubled following the AFU attack in the Kursk region. According to daily statistics from the one-stop contract military service recruitment facility, in the week leading up to the invasion of the Kursk region, from July 29 to Aug. 4, an average of 97 people signed contracts per day. The following week, this number increased to 126, then to 180, and last week, it reached 213. According to a source in the Moscow mayor’s office, half of those coming to the recruitment facility were motivated by the Ukrainian forces' invasion of the Kursk region.

It appears to us that the Russian authorities are trying to downplay the seriousness of the situation in the Kursk region, as the topic of the offensive is not a priority on national TV channels. Therefore, we find it doubtful that such a "minor" event could motivate a large number of people to sign contracts. It is worth noting that on July 23, Moscow Mayor Sergey Sobyanin increased the sign-up bonus in Moscow to 1.9 million rubles [$20,800]—most likely, it is this factor that led to the increase in the number of people willing to go to fight in Ukraine. We attribute the fact that it did not happen instantaneously, but gradually, to the time it takes for people from Russian regions who want to sign contracts in Moscow to prepare, say goodbye to their families, buy tickets and travel to the capital.

On Aug. 26, Russia launched one of its most massive attacks on Ukraine. According to the AFU, 102 missiles and 99 UAVs were shot down. It is unclear whether this attack was timed to coincide with Ukraine's Independence Day on Aug. 24. For a long time, we have observed a pattern where the RuAF accumulate missiles and drones and then conduct large-scale attacks over several days. Russia’s Ministry of Defense stated that the targets were energy infrastructure facilities in the Kyiv, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Khmelnytskyi, Dnipropetrovsk, Poltava, Mykolaiv, Kirovohrad, and Odesa regions, claiming that all targets were hit. Attacks on energy infrastructure are considered war crimes, as they provide no significant military advantage and primarily harm civilians. Besides substations, such as in the Vinnytsia region, energy-generating facilities were targeted. At least one missile hit the dam of the Kyiv Hydroelectric Power Plant, with video footage from the scene suggesting it struck the machine room. The extent of the damage is still unknown. Experts say the dam itself is too massive to be damaged by cruise missiles. The purpose of such strikes is to disable the power plant and deprive residents of electricity in the Kyiv region.

In our previous sitrep, we reported on the strike on a hotel in the city of Kramatorsk, Donetsk region, on the night of Aug. 25, which resulted in the death of a Reuters security advisor and injuries to two journalists. On the night of Aug. 27, Russian forces launched a missile strike on a hotel in the city of Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk region, killing four people and injuring five others.

Also, on Aug. 27, photos were published showing the wreckage of a rare Russian Kartograf [Mapmaker] UAV shot down near Kryvyi Rih. The drone is equipped with 12-lens cameras and is designed for reconnaissance and mapping.

The oil depot in Proletarsk, Rostov region, attacked by drones on the night of Aug. 18, continues to burn. Satellite images from Aug. 26 show two fire sources, with the second possibly resulting from the Aug. 23 strike.