Sitrep for July 22-24, 2024 (as of 9 a.m. UTC+3)
Frontline Situation Update
The Russian Armed Forces have reportedly advanced in the Kharkiv region, specifically in the Kupiansk direction, where they entered the village of Synkivka. However, according to pro-Russian war correspondent Yury Kotenok, the center of the village remains under the control of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. It is worth noting that fighting in this area has been ongoing since February, when a possible offensive on Kupiansk was first discussed. At that time, it was already evident that launching the offensive would be impossible without sufficient forces to capture Synkivka.
South of Synkivka, Russian forces have captured the village of Pishchane. Their next objective is to advance on the village of Kolesnykivka, aiming to break through the area east of the Oskil River and disrupt Ukrainian supply lines on that side of the river.
Recently, Russian aircraft have continued to operate in close proximity to the frontline, despite new military aid packages that included man-portable air defense systems. On July 23, a video emerged showing Ukrainian forces using a MANPAD to shoot down one of the two Sukhoi Su-25 Grach (Frogfoot) attack aircraft of the Russian Aerospace Forces flying in the Toretsk direction. Another video shows that the aircraft crashed and exploded near the village of Troitske, south of Niu-York. The pilot managed to eject and was evacuated to the rear.
Additionally, in the Toretsk direction, Russian forces are expanding the salient near Niu-York and have made some progress near Zalizne and Pivdenne.
Russian propagandist Vladimir Solovyev released a report on the 116th Special Forces Brigade of Rosgvardia [the Russian National Guard] fighting near Vovchansk in the Kharkiv direction. The report showed a new 2023 T-72B3M tank, with slat armor installed over the turret, manufactured at UralVagonZavod [Russian state-owned machine-building company]. Factory-installed slat armor can be visually distinguished from makeshift versions, which may help identify new tanks from modified ones. Previously, we were skeptical about the idea of Rosgvardia receiving heavy armored vehicles because we did not expect such units to be sent to forward positions. However, judging by the markings, this brigade has been subordinated to the Group of Troops "North" under the command of Colonel General Aleksandr Lapin.
It is worth noting that our mobilization summary editor posts videos of trainloads carrying Russian tanks on his Twitter account. These videos often reappear on Telegram channels, such as those of Andriy Tarasenko, a Kharkiv-based historian specializing in military vehicles and the author of btvt.info, and pro-Kremlin milblogger Kirill Fyodorov, who sometimes present old videos as new ones.
A video has emerged showing a Minsk motorcycle equipped with a UDSh smoke canister. These canisters, visually resembling anti-tank mines with a green-colored disk in the middle, are used to deploy a smoke screen to hide from drones. In the case of tanks, a smoke screen completely envelops the vehicle, making it difficult for the enemy to target it with artillery. However, in the case of motorcycles moving at higher speeds, the smoke would likely make them more noticeable to enemy drones.
Ukrainian and Russian Strikes
Photos have appeared showing the aftermath of a Russian 9K720 Iskander mobile short-range ballistic missile strike on a Ukrainian train convoy in the town of Barvinkove on July 21. The photos depict several burned trucks and railcars, a railcar riddled with shrapnel, RPG grenades laid out on a railway platform and other munitions. The scale of the destruction does not match the Russian MoD’s claims of having destroyed two trains allegedly carrying 60 armored vehicles, along with more than 200 soldiers nearby. Even though the Ukrainian side is better at controlling leaks of sensitive information about the consequences of Russian strikes on military facilities, information still tends to leak out. However, in this case, no data on significant losses and damages from this strike has emerged so far.
On July 23, the Russian MoD claimed to have launched an Iskander strike on a temporary deployment point for foreign mercenaries and instructors in the town of Derhachi in the Kharkiv region. However, Serhii Bolvinov, head of the regional police investigative department, released footage showing a school building with no signs of military use, such as sandbags in window frames. The photos also show no traces of military personnel or vehicles. Although the Russian MoD reported that 50 instructors were killed in this strike, there is no confirmation of any military casualties.
It is worth noting that prior to the strike, Russian federal media circulated a video featuring a retired Spanish Army Colonel named Pedro Baños. In the video, Baños claimed that during a strike on the city of Odesa (date unspecified), 18 British Special Air Service soldiers and members of the French Armed Forces were killed, with another 25 British soldiers reported injured.
On June 13, correspondents from the NTV TV channel came under attack in the occupied city of Horlivka, Donetsk region. Cameraman Valery Kozhin was killed and correspondent Aleksey Ivliev lost his arm. During the attack, they were interviewing Major Timur Khuziev, the chief artillery officer of the 85th Motorized Rifle Brigade, who was also killed.
On July 22, a large-scale raid by Ukrainian drones targeted the Morozovsk military airfield in the Rostov region. According to sources from the Astra Telegram channel, two servicemen were injured in the attack. However, the extent of the damage to military equipment at the base remains unknown.
On July 22, Belgorod region governor Vyacheslav Gladkov reported that during an attack by the AFU on the village of Nikolskoye, two children sustained shrapnel injuries. Given the size of the crater observed, it seems unlikely that weapons used by Ukrainian forces, such as UAVs or HIMARS MLRS rockets, would have caused such extensive damage. We suspect that a Russian glide bomb may have been responsible for the crater in the village.
During an attack on the night of July 23, Ukrainian drones successfully struck a railway ferry in the Russian port of Kavkaz near the Kerch Strait in the Krasnodar region. According to the AFU General Staff, the ferry was being used to transport military equipment. Governor Veniamin Kondratyev reported one fatality and several injuries among the crew and port staff. If the ferry was indeed used for military purposes, as suggested, the collateral damage appears proportional to the impact on military infrastructure. Consequently, this strike does not constitute a war crime.
In response to Ukraine's blocking of the transit of Lukoil oil through its territory via the Druzhba pipeline, Hungary has begun to blackmail Ukraine. Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó declared that Hungary would not approve the allocation of €6.5 billion [$7.05 billion] from the European Peace Facility for weapons for the AFU until Ukraine allows the transit of Russian oil.
A Toyota Land Cruiser SUV exploded in Moscow with Andrey Torgashov, deputy chief of a Moscow region-based unit that is part of the Russian military’s satellite communications center (related to the Strategic Rocket Forces), and his wife inside. According to the Interior Ministry, an explosive device detonated and both of his feet were blown off in the blast. While it has not yet been confirmed that the assassination attempt was related to the war in Ukraine, we believe that Torgashov would be a desirable target for Ukrainian intelligence. However, it was later revealed that the victim of the explosion was a namesake of the aforementioned Torgashov, born the same year, who also serves in the RuAF, but is a PSYOP officer of the Main Directorate of the General Staff.
Conscription, Mobilization and Contract Military Service
Moscow authorities have increased the sign-up bonus for new recruits to 1.9 million rubles [$21,700]. Thus, combined with the federal payment of 195,000 rubles [$2,230], a "volunteer fighter" who signs a contract with the MoD can receive more than 2 million rubles [$22,800] at a time. In addition, the "Moscow" allowance of 50,000 rubles [$570] remains in place. The website of the Moscow mayor notes that in total, a serviceman will receive more than 5.2 million rubles [$59,400] in the first year after signing a contract. In contrast, in Chukotka, the region with the highest average salary, it would take more than 2.5 years to earn this amount, while in the poorest regions, it would take between 11 and 12 years.
In addition, on July 11, the sign-up bonus in the Moscow region was raised to 1.7 million rubles [$19,400]. This sharp increase in regional payments is likely to influence neighboring regions, thus an increase in payments in other central Russian regions can be expected soon.
47-year-old Armenian citizen Hayk Harutyunyan had an argument with a man who turned out to be a prosecutor in the city of Yakutsk. Harutyunyan was taken to the police station, charged with insulting a government official (Article 319 of the Russian Criminal Code) and released on recognizance. Unaware that the maximum penalty for this offense was community service, he was persuaded to sign a contract with the MoD by a recruiter who promised to clear his criminal record in exchange for a year's service on the Russia-Ukraine border at a salary of 200,000 rubles [$2,280] per month. Harutyunyan signed a contract, only to learn later from an ASTRA correspondent that the contract was in fact open-ended. He served on the border in the Belgorod region for five months, receiving a salary of 31,000 rubles [$350]. Recently, his commanders caught him drinking alcohol with fellow soldiers, put him in a pit and decided to send him on an assault mission. Harutyunyan recorded a video appeal to Margarita Simonyan [Russian propagandist, editor-in-chief of the RT international news television network] and "Armenian brothers," asking them to help him get out of this situation.
The Kyiv International Institute of Sociology has published a study examining the views of Ukrainian citizens living in government-controlled territories on the continuation of active combat and the acceptability of territorial concessions to end the war. Approximately 1,000 people were surveyed from May 16 to 22 as part of an ongoing tracking poll conducted since May 2022. Respondents were asked which of the following two statements describing potential compromises for achieving peace with Russia they agreed with more:
- "To achieve peace as soon as possible and preserve its independence, Ukraine may give up some of its territories."
- "Under no circumstances should Ukraine give up any territory, even if it means the war will last longer and Ukraine’s independence could come under threat."
Researchers clarified that the first option does not specify which territories are being referred to and does not assert that they would be permanently annexed by Russia. The aim was to gauge the general willingness of Ukrainians to discuss territorial control as a parameter in peace negotiations.
Results remained relatively stable from May 2022 to May 2023, with around 8-10% of respondents willing to make territorial concessions and an overwhelming majority of 82-87% opposed to making any concessions. However, since May 2023, there has been a gradual increase in the proportion of Ukrainians willing to consider territorial concessions. The number had risen to 19% by the end of 2023, 26% by February 2024 and 32% by May 2024. It is worth pointing out that Russian forces launched an offensive in the Kharkiv region in May 2024, and the AFU was confronted with an unstable flow of military aid from Western partners. Nonetheless, a majority of Ukrainians, 55%, continue to oppose any territorial concessions to this day.
From June 20 to 25, 2024, just over 2,000 people were surveyed using a different formulation. Respondents were offered one of three hypothetical peace agreement packages and asked how ready they were to support it. The packages were as follows:
1. Russia retains control over all currently occupied territories.
Ukraine agrees not to join NATO.
Ukraine becomes a member of the European Union and receives the necessary funding from the West for reconstruction.
2. Although Ukraine does not officially recognize this, Russia maintains control over the occupied territories of the Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Donetsk, Luhansk regions and Crimea.
Ukraine becomes a NATO member and has genuine security guarantees.
Ukraine becomes an EU member and receives the necessary funding from the West for reconstruction.
3. Although Ukraine does not officially recognize this, Russia maintains control over the occupied territories of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions and Crimea.
Ukraine regains full control over the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions.
Ukraine becomes a NATO member and has genuine security guarantees.
Ukraine becomes an EU member and receives the necessary funding from the West for reconstruction.
With the first package, which is the most challenging for Ukraine, 8% of respondents are ready to agree easily, 30% find it hard but acceptable and 54% categorically disagree. With the third, which is the most favorable package, 20% fully agree, 37% consider it acceptable and 33% categorically disagree.
These results indicate that while Ukrainians are open to discussing various parameters for peace agreements, they strongly reject the idea of "peace at any cost," with ensuring future security being the most critical issue for them. Previous surveys have shown that Ukrainians are skeptical about the bilateral security agreements signed by Volodymyr Zelenskyy and view NATO membership as a reliable guarantee against future invasions.
It is worth noting that public opinion by the end of this year will likely be significantly influenced by the situation with heating and electricity, which will depend on the intensity of Russian missile strikes, assistance from European countries, weather and other factors.
The Guardian has published an interview with General Oleksandr Syrskyi, Commander-in-Chief of the AFU, where he describes the situation as highly challenging. According to Syrskyi, the RuAF outnumber the Ukrainian Army in all types of weapons, military equipment (by two to three times) and ammunition. It is worth noting that the interview comes out amid numerous trips by President Zelenskyy and the signing of security guarantee agreements with other countries.
It can be surmised that we are approaching a situation of "non-victory" —a scenario where certain agreements might lead to a temporary ceasefire, with Russia failing to reach the administrative borders of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions and Ukraine not reclaiming its territories. Despite the approval of a $61 billion military aid package by the US in late April, we have yet to see large deliveries of infantry fighting vehicles or armored personnel carriers necessary for offensive operations. Furthermore, there does not seem to have been discussions about a similarly large package for the following year.
It is unclear how realistically the Russian leadership assesses its capabilities, or if it is willing to make concessions, such as dropping demands to limit the size of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. We are uncertain whether Putin and the military command grasp that the territories currently seized by the RuAF in Ukraine likely represent the maximum that the Russian Army can capture and hold. The RuAF is gradually running out of equipment, and next year this shortage will become a major issue. Even if Russia drafts several hundred thousand more people in a second wave of mobilization, addressing growing manpower problems, the MoD will lack sufficient tanks, artillery and air defense systems to arm them.