dispatches
July 19

Sitrep for July 17-19, 2024 (as of 9 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

Despite the hot weather and combat operations somewhat slowing down, active fighting continues on the Donetsk axis, especially near Chasiv Yar. Two weeks ago, Russian forces fully captured the Kanal neighborhood. However, their further progress in this area has been hindered by the need to cross the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas Canal. As a result, the Russian Armed Forces are currently strengthening their flanks in this section of the front. DeepState reports that Russian troops have captured the village of Kalynivka, north of Chasiv Yar, although some researchers still consider it a contested area. It is worth noting that it was a contested area as recently as the end of May, when a Russian MT-LB multi-purpose armored vehicle managed to cross the canal, which turns into underground pipes near Kalynivka.

Additionally, the AFU still face a shortage of air defense systems and missiles in this area. Soldiers of the 24th Separate Mechanized Brigade of the AFU have once again filmed a Russian Sukhoi Su-25 Grach (Frogfoot) attack aircraft flying at low altitudes over Chasiv Yar deploying thermal trap flares. At such a range, these aircraft could be shot down with MANPADS, which are regularly included in military aid packages to Ukraine. We have previously reported on this problem, and it is surprising that it has not yet been resolved.

In the Toretsk direction, Russian forces have advanced into the town of Zalizne near Toretsk. Additionally, they have made progress in the villages of Novoselivka Persha and Prohres, located north of Novoselivka Persha. After capturing these locations, further progress will be limited by the Vovcha River. South of Novoselivka Persha, Russian forces have advanced towards the village of Karlivka.

When discussing RuAF losses, we usually refer to the loss of military vehicles, which can be analyzed through footage coming from the frontline. However, assessing personnel losses is generally more difficult. The Dos’ye Shpiona (Spy Dossier) Telegram channel published a list of 194 soldiers from the 109th Separate Rifle Regiment who are missing in action (excluding those killed or wounded) over three weeks of active fighting in the Toretsk direction. The formation of a rifle regiment, rather than a motorized rifle regiment, once again indicates a shortage of armored vehicles in the Russian Army. Independent researchers were able to partially confirm this list by studying social media platforms with information about missing soldiers. It is worth noting that when analyzing data on personnel losses, accounting for the number of MIAs is usually difficult. These soldiers are most likely dead, however, their obituaries are not published, and they are not entered into the National Probate Registry until officially declared dead.

Ukrainian and Russian Strikes

Combat operations in Zalizne are accompanied by strikes. As a result of one such strike on July 17, a civilian was injured.

On July 18, Russian forces struck the village of Hrodivka in the Pokrovskyi district of the Donetsk region, resulting in the death of three women.

In the Belgorod region, according to Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov, a Ukrainian drone attack on a car near the hamlet of Tserkovny killed a married couple. One possible explanation—though not a justification—for this trend is the use of civilian vehicles by Russian soldiers.

Complaints have emerged from families of mobilized soldiers about military police seizing vehicles donated or bought by relatives and civilian volunteers for mobilized personnel. This follows a longstanding order to confiscate civilian vehicles not registered with military units. It is worth noting that this order was motivated more by bureaucratic red tape than by a desire to save civilian lives and reduce collateral damage.

In our previous sitrep, we reported that the General Staff of the AFU had acknowledged the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from the left bank of the Dnipro River. The investigative website Slidstvo.Info has released an extensive report on the Ukrainian operation in the village of Krynky. According to police data, since the beginning of the operation in October 2023, 262 soldiers have been killed and another 788 have gone missing—most of whom are also presumed dead, with their bodies never recovered. Additionally, logistical challenges have hindered the timely evacuation of wounded soldiers, which has likely contributed to the aforementioned tally as providing aid within an hour of injury significantly increases the chances of survival and optimal recovery.

There is now considerable debate about whether the efforts made and losses incurred were justified in light of the outcome of the operation. The Ukrainian Parliament’s National Security Committee has signaled it intends to review the effectiveness of the operation. DeepState project analysts consider the operation a failure due to the fact that the bridgehead was maintained but never reinforced. Conversely, Denys, codenamed "Raccoon," a commander of an airborne assault company of the 35th Brigade of the AFU, which has fought and continues to operate on the Dnipro, argues that the defense and expansion on the bridgehead in Krynky were necessary to prevent the RuAF from attempting a landing operation on the right bank of the river.

There is at present no consensus within our team on whether this operation was successful. Some analysts believe the operation was pointless from the start, while others argue it was initially justified but should have been concluded once the RuAF began its intensive bombing campaign, gradually razing Krynky to the ground at the end of last year.

On the night of July 18, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) attempted to attack coast guard bases on Lake Donuzlav in western Crimea with unmanned aerial vehicles and unmanned surface vessels. Video recordings show something exploding far on the horizon. The Ministry of Defense of Russia and the pro-Russian Telegram channel Voevoda veshchayet [Voevoda broadcasts], associated with the Russian Air and Space Force, also released videos, purportedly showing the destruction of vessels from helicopters over the Black Sea. The full consequences of this combined attack remain unclear.

The Economist has published an article about the shortage of military vehicles in the Russian Army and Russia's capabilities to produce new tanks. We agree with the article's general premise that the RuAF are facing equipment shortages but strongly disagree with the assertion that Russia will only be able to produce up to 28 new T-90M tanks in 2024. Based on our assessment, Russia produces between 20 and 30 T-90M tanks per month. We regularly receive video recordings of convoys of military vehicles, and on one such occasion, we counted 23 T-90M tanks. Additionally, UralVagonZavod [Russian state-owned machine-building company] sometimes publishes reports on tank shipments. In March and May, for example, approximately 10 tanks were shown in the photos, and we assume that not all machines shipped were depicted in these images. Claims about the modernization of significant numbers of old T-90s also do not align with reality: the Oryx project's counts have recorded the loss of 40 T-90As, 10 T-90Cs and 100 T-90M tanks. This indicates that stockpiles of old T-90 tanks at storage bases were depleted early in the invasion, and now more and more newly produced tanks are being lost.

About two weeks ago, Volodymyr Zelenskyy mentioned that 14 newly formed AFU brigades currently lack the requisite equipment, including weapons and vehicles. It has now been revealed that France plans to train and equip 2,100 Ukrainian servicemen—roughly the size of an assault brigade—by the end of 2024. This military aid package will include 18 Caesar self-propelled howitzers, 24 AMX-10 RC armored fighting vehicles and 128 VAB (Véhicule de l'Avant Blindé) armored personnel carriers, which constitutes approximately the set of military vehicles required for a brigade.

Conscription, Mobilization and Contract Military Service

A Samara region resident who went to fight in Ukraine has been in captivity for over a year. His daughter, who is being raised by her grandmother because her mother has been deprived of parental rights, does not receive the state support she is entitled to because of her father's status. Social payments for the child have been halted, and the POW’s military salary has also been cut off. The grandmother is being denied re-registration and resumption of child support payments due to the lack of a power of attorney from the prisoner of war. This is not the first case known to us of Russian soldiers being deprived of due payments after their capture. We believe that such measures are systematically applied as punishment for surrendering.

In December 2023, 19-year-old dual Russian-Ukrainian citizen Danil Efimov traveled to Turkey for vacation. During a conversation with border guards in Volgograd Airport, his devices were confiscated and he was forced to unlock them. In a banking application, the guards discovered a transfer of 13,000 rubles [$150] to the Ukrainian Serhiy Prytula Charity Foundation. The next day, Efimov was sentenced to 13 days of administrative detention. After serving this time, he was detained again and given another 10 days for hooliganism in the city center. On Jan. 15, he was arrested on suspicion of treason. In early July 2024, the Rostov Regional Court sentenced Efimov to 12 years in a maximum security penal colony and an additional year of restricted liberty.

On July 18, the First Western District Military Court in Saint Petersburg sentenced artist Anastasia Dyudyaeva and her husband Aleksandr Dotsenko to 3.5 and 3 years in a penal colony, respectively. Investigators claim the couple disseminated napkins with Ukrainian-language anti-war messages and calls for the execution of Vladimir Putin on the shelves of a local supermarket. One of the napkins allegedly contained the words "Putin to the gallows." According to their lawyers, the prosecution did not provide any evidence that the napkins were actually distributed by the defendants.

On July 18, an Air India Boeing aircraft en route from Delhi to San Francisco made an emergency landing in Krasnoyarsk. If a person arrested in absentia in Russia was on that flight, they could have been detained after the emergency landing. We urge expatriates who are or may be facing criminal prosecution in Russia to carefully consider their flight routes and ensure that they do not cross Russian territory.