Sitrep for July 19-22, 2024 (as of 9 a.m. UTC+3)
Frontline Situation Update
The Russian Armed Forces have not yet managed to make significant progress in the village of Novoselivka Persha, in the Ocheretyne direction, where they supposedly have the objective to push the Armed Forces of Ukraine beyond the Vovcha River. However, to the north, as noted by DeepState, the village of Prohres has already been completely captured.
To the south of the Ocheretyne direction, fighting for the town of Krasnohorivka continues. Pro-Russian war correspondent Semyon Pegov a.k.a. WarGonzo reported advances in the central part of the town at the beginning of June, yet it has still not been fully captured. This has even led to a debate between pro-Russian war correspondents Alexander Sladkov and Andrey Filatov. In response to Sladkov's report on the progress of the 5th Special Forces Brigade and the 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade of the RuAF, Filatov hinted that the situation "on the ground" is not as optimistic as in the reports.
In this war, capturing a settlement means maintaining physical control of an area at street level, preventing the enemy from entering even under fire. However, some settlements are positioned on the frontline and are subject to constant strikes by the opposing side. "Contested areas" are struck by both sides, with neither able to have full physical control of the territory.
Ukrainian and Russian Strikes
On July 21, the Ministry of Defense of Russia released a video of a new 9K720 Iskander short-range ballistic missile strike on a train convoy of the AFU. As is always the case in such instances, significant enemy losses are claimed: 240 soldiers killed and 60 military vehicles destroyed. The video shows three trains; however, the quality of the recording does not allow us to understand what they were carrying, and we doubt that 60 pieces of military vehicles could fit on the claimed two convoys of 20 flatcars each. An Iskander strike near the trains is clearly incapable of completely destroying both convoys and everything around them. Although the MoD claimed the strike was on the town of Barvinkove in the "DPR," the town actually is located in the Izium district of the Kharkiv region, where we geolocated the video.
On July 20, Ukrainian drones struck the Millerovo military airfield in the Rostov region, resulting in a large fire, as seen in eyewitness videos. Governor Vasily Golubev initially stated that all the drones had been intercepted; however, emergency services were dispatched to the site, evidently to extinguish the fire at the airfield. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty published satellite images showing scorched fuel tanks and a burned hangar, the contents of which are currently unknown. There were no reports of damaged aircraft.
Unfortunately, Ukraine still lacks the more powerful and EW-resistant high-precision Western missiles to strike targets that would be within range on Russian soil, such as the Millerovo airfield. During a recent meeting, Volodymyr Zelenskyy tried to persuade new UK PM Keir Starmer to allow Ukraine to use British missiles on Russian territory. However, UK Defense Secretary John Healey later stated that Britain had not imposed any restrictions, likely hinting at the position of the Biden Administration.
Both ATACMS and Storm Shadow missiles could inflict significantly greater damage to Russian military vehicles and infrastructure than Ukraine drones.
The Daily Mail has published a column by the former UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson who recently met with Donald Trump. According to Johnson, Trump’s behavior immediately after the assassination attempt has demonstrated the former President’s great courage and resilience. Johnson is also convinced that if Trump wins the election, he will end the war in Ukraine within 24 hours, forcing Putin "to pull back at least to the pre-invasion boundaries of 2022" and allowing him to claim victory, denazification and demilitarization of Ukraine. Crimea will remain under Russian occupation while Ukraine’s EU and NATO membership will be guaranteed.
It is worth noting that Putin has repeatedly demanded that Ukraine give up attempts to join NATO. Also, in order to force Putin to retreat to the 2022 border the US will have to significantly increase their support of the AFU, for there seems to be no other way of achieving that.
In his interview to the BBC, Volodymyr Zelenskyy has already commented on this "peace plan" by saying that Ukraine will never agree to it. However, he acknowledged that no one would agree to a war that would last another ten years.
Pro-Russian blogger and Russian Aerospace Forces helicopter pilot Aleksey Voevoda published a video in which a Kamov Ka-52 (Hokum B) attack helicopter was nearly hit by a rocket fired from a Russian MLRS attacking a ground target. This incident was possible because there is no coordination between aviation and artillery in the Russian Army. He also mentioned (1, 2) that there has already been an incident where a Russian BM-27 Uragan MLRS shot down a Russian helicopter, resulting in the crew’s death. Additionally, at least two Kamov Ka-52 (Hokum B) helicopters, one Mil Mi-28N attack helicopter, and one Ka-29 helicopter have been shot down by a Pantsir-S1 surface-to-air missile and anti-aircraft artillery system. We have encountered a similar incident before: at the end of last year, a RuAF Sukhoi Su-25 Grach (Frogfoot) attack aircraft flew near a Russian BM-21 Grad MLRS just as it began firing.
On April 15, a week after being sent to the front and less than a month after turning 18, Yaroslav Lipavskiy from Tyumen was killed in combat. He is currently the youngest Russian soldier to have been killed in the war with Ukraine. According to Lipavskiy’s mother, he signed a contract instead of undergoing statutory military service to help his family and earn money because his girlfriend was pregnant. However, it is possible that Lipavskiy did this to avoid criminal prosecution. On the website of the Leninsky District Court of Tyumen, there is a criminal case record listing Yaroslav Vladimirovich Lipavskiy as accused of causing grievous bodily harm in a group conspiracy (Article 111 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation), which carries a penalty of up to 12 years in prison.
Our team also works to influence Russian society and soldiers, aiming to dissuade them from participating in the war. However, it is becoming increasingly difficult to distribute our content. Yevgeny "BadComedian" Bazhenov reported that the VKontakte social network has started blocking YouTube links, disguising it as technical errors.
The Russian Ministry of Defense released a video featuring a BMP-3 commander with the nickname "Dobry" who talks about his equipment, uniform and combat missions. He also mentions that due to the heat, the command is providing additional water and good food, ensuring that the soldiers lack nothing. In reality, many Russian units continue to experience supply issues, including shortages of essential items like water. Some units try to solve these problems by using soldiers of lower status called "caravan men" or "camels"—ex-convicts or disgraced soldiers. They are forced to carry ammunition, water and food to the frontline on foot, often without weapons, rendering them easy targets for drones and effectively expendable.
On April 23, Russian Deputy Defense Minister Timur Ivanov was detained on suspicion of bribery. On July 20, Ivanov's lawyers requested a change in his pre-trial detention, citing his awards and commendations, including state honors, and his participation in combat operations. The court refused to release Ivanov from custody. Pro-Russian Telegram channels expressed outrage, as Ivanov, of course, did not participate in any combat operations.
Members of Storm-Z units are attempting to obtain combat veteran IDs, but draft offices are denying their requests. According to the law, former convicts are considered a special contingent aiding in the execution of tasks within the "special military operation," rather than military personnel, and therefore cannot claim combat veteran status.
Russian propaganda is outraged by a post on Ukrainian channels documenting an FPV drone strike on a Russian fire truck in the occupied part of the Donetsk region (the rescuers were unharmed). However, they do not seem to be outraged by a Russian drone strike on a Ukrainian combine harvester in the Sumy region, which resulted in the death of the harvester operator and injuries to his assistant. Neither the fire truck nor the harvester can be mistaken for military vehicles, and it is unclear why drone operators chose them as targets.
On July 18, a unit of the National Guard of Ukraine fighting on the eastern front released a video showing the destruction of vehicles with a Javelin ATGM, something we have not seen on the frontline for several months. However, they are in high demand due to the saturation of the frontline with electronic warfare systems.
Independent analyst Colby Badhwar, in a column on the effectiveness of EW for the independent Russian investigative outlet The Insider, writes that Russian jammers are not omnipotent. Despite the AFU having to abandon certain types of precision weapons, such as Excalibur artillery shells and GLSDB munitions, others—GMLRS, JDAM, SDB—remain quite effective. This is due to both the specifics of their application and regular software updates that enhance resistance to EW.