Sitrep for July 12-15, 2024 (as of 9 a.m. UTC+3)
Frontline Situation Update
Pro-Russian sources report that in the Kharkiv region, near the village of Hlyboke, the situation for the Russian Armed Forces continues to deteriorate. Previously, we noted that the Armed Forces of Ukraine had advanced and entered the village from the north. Despite the difficult situation and supply issues, Russian forces have not yet withdrawn from Hlyboke. The pro-Russian Telegram channel, The Diary of a Paratrooper, reported that FPV drones are destroying all the vehicles used for supply and ammunition delivery, and are hindering the evacuation of wounded soldiers. Ukrainian sources confirm this account by releasing footage showing the formation of "roads of death." Although it is too early to speak of a significant change in the situation, it is clear that Russian forces can no longer conduct offensive operations in the Kharkiv region and are finding it increasingly difficult to hold captured territory.
The pro-Russian Telegram channel Voyenny Osvedomitel [Military Informant] published a video showing Ukrainian Baba-Yaga drones being shot down with an AK-12 assault rifle equipped with a thermal sight. A soldier from the 83rd Guards Air Assault Brigade managed to shoot down two drones this way. Similar incidents were previously reported: a few days ago on this brigade's Telegram channel and in January on the Telegram channel of the Pskov paratroopers.
On the Zaporizhzhia (South Donetsk) axis, Russian forces successfully captured the village of Urozhaine.
According to a video of the assault, enemy positions and all buildings were initially destroyed by artillery, including cluster munitions. Then armored personnel carriers and assault troops on motorcycles entered Urozhaine. In our opinion, calling this a successful motorcycle assault is incorrect because, after such bombardment, capturing the settlement could have been even done on foot. It is also worth noting that the motorcycles approached via roads, which facilitated the operation; however, smooth roads do not always lead directly to enemy positions.
OSINT analyst Def Mon analyzed verified data on Russian losses during the assault on Urozhaine, estimating that the RuAF lost at least 50 pieces of equipment.
In the Toretsk direction, Russian forces have focused on strengthening their flanks around the village of Niu-York and advanced towards the village of Oleksandropil to the west of the salient.
Def Mon has also calculated that during the fighting for the village of Novomykhailivka on the Donetsk axis, the RuAF have lost at least 74 tanks and 150 armored fighting vehicles since the beginning of the year. This amount is comparable to losing one tank and one motorized rifle regiment.
Such losses are currently occurring along the entire frontline between Donetsk and Vuhledar, encompassing the entire southern part of the Donetsk axis, and are not limited to battles for particularly significant settlements.
As we have mentioned before, this tactic could have been more effective had the RuAF concentrated their efforts in one or two directions. Currently, fighting with significant losses of military vehicles is occurring simultaneously in all directions, leading to an increasing shortage of vehicles.
Jakub Janovsky, an Oryx project volunteer, provided his estimates of Russian vehicle losses since the beginning of the year, which include 611 tanks, 300 MT-LB multi-purpose armored vehicles, over 500 BMP infantry fighting vehicles, 191 BTR armored personnel carriers and 48 BMD airborne infantry fighting vehicles. These enormous losses explain the high rates of some types of vehicles being withdrawn from storage. According to previously discussed estimates, the RuAF have enough tanks and armored vehicles for at least another year; however, by the end of 2025, the shortage could become critical, and Russia may need to consider purchasing military vehicles from allies as early as next year.
On May 8, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine passed a bill on the mobilization of convicts. Unlike in Russia, where coercive methods are used, Ukrainian convicts are selected more carefully. According to Ukrainian Minister of Justice Denys Maliuska, out of over 5,000 contract applications, 2,872 were selected, with 368 convicts rejected due to medical reasons.
Additionally, a video depicting battles near the village of Novoselivka Persha on the Ocheretyne salient has emerged. The video shows ex-convicts from the Shkval [Squall] Battalion of the 47th Separate Mechanized Rifle Brigade of the AFU participating in the attack using Bradley IFVs. Previously, this village was semi-encircled.
It appears that ex-convicts underwent training for no more than two months. We believe they are unlikely to have fully mastered how to operate IFVs in such a short period, suggesting the battalion likely includes both ex-convicts and regular military personnel.
Ukrainian soldiers have repeatedly shared complaints about the command of the 59th Mechanized Brigade. According to their reports, brigade commander Bohdan Shevchuk allegedly continues deploying untrained recruits, including ex-convicts, into battle despite significant losses. In addition, he reportedly sent high-ranked intelligence officers to the frontline, resulting in additional casualties. We believe that such orders stem from both the incompetence of certain commanders and the pressing shortage of personnel. It is worth noting that after the start of mobilization in Russia, some mobilized soldiers found themselves on the frontline a week or two after being drafted.
Previously, the RuAF progress in the Toretsk direction was associated with Ukrainian rotations; however, we are unable to assess the objectivity of the complaints mentioned above or the extent of such issues throughout Ukrainian forces.
Ukrainian and Russian Strikes
On July 13, Russian forces launched two consecutive strikes (a double tap) using Iskander-M ballistic missiles, hitting the railway station in the village of Budy in the Kharkiv region. According to the Russian Ministry of Defense, the strikes targeted a train carrying equipment and ammunition, including three Marder 1A3 infantry fighting vehicles, resulting in the deaths of up to 120 AFU soldiers. We can confidently identify only trucks in the above photos and we believe it to be highly unlikely for such a large concentration of Ukrainian soldiers to have been present in that area.
Reportedly, the second strike resulted in several casualties, including the head of the Kharkiv regional department of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine, a patrol police sergeant, and 25 others injured, including two children. An ambulance was also struck during the attack. It is worth noting that a double tap is a war crime.
Last week, it was reported that Belarus's Alyaksandr Lukashenka once again spoke of the "Ukrainian threat" and ordered the deployment of troops to the Ukraine-Belarus border. As expected, he soon announced that the threat had been neutralized and ordered the troops to withdraw. This caused a significant uproar in pro-Russian Telegram channels, where authors called Lukashenka a traitor, accused him of being a sellout and expressed displeasure that this allowed Ukraine to redeploy troops to the Donetsk and Kharkiv axes.
Separately, there were at least two incidents in the past week involving Russian UAVs, specifically the Shahed-136 (Geran-2) loitering munition, entering Belarus from Ukraine. One UAV later returned to Ukrainian territory, while the other disappeared from radars deep within Belarusian territory. The reasons for these deviations are unclear, but it is possible that Ukrainian electronic warfare caused the UAVs to stray off course.
Western Assistance
In our previous sitrep, we mentioned that the new British Prime Minister Keir Starmer stated that the AFU could use British weapons against targets on Russian territory; however, the British Ministry of Defense later refuted his statement. It has become known that for the UK to authorize Ukraine to use Storm Shadow missiles against Russian territory, it must obtain the consent of France and another unnamed NATO ally. France had previously stated that it did not object to its weapons being used on Russian soil. We believe the unnamed ally to be the US, and, as we recall, the Biden administration never granted such permission. Even after the Russian missile strike on the Okhmatdyt children’s hospital, President Biden's National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan stated that the US position had not changed. Experts suggest that the issue of using any Western weapons against military targets on Russian soil is decided by the US administration.
Given that American officials justified the ban on such use by citing fears of escalation, the US decision to deploy long-range missiles, including hypersonic ones, in Germany in the coming years seems unexpected. Putin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov stated that if the US deploys long-range missiles in Europe, Russia has the sufficient potential for deterrence, but it would have to target its missiles at European capitals.
In our view, the deployment of long-range American missiles in Germany will not impact the current war in Ukraine in any way, but could increase the risk of an accidental nuclear war. Since the Cold War, missile experts have agreed that when one side possesses weapons capable of rapidly reaching and destroying the leadership of the opposing side, before a counter-strike decision can be made, the risk of an accidental nuclear war sharply increases. This is because once missile attack warning systems detect a threat, there is no opportunity to verify the information. There were numerous instances during the Cold War when warning systems gave false alarms, perhaps the most famous of which occurred in 1983. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty was signed between the USSR and the USA in 1987 to reduce the threat of an accidental nuclear war. Since 2007, Russia and the USA have repeatedly accused each other of violating the treaty, and in 2019, the Trump administration withdrew from the treaty, claiming Russia had developed and deployed a missile for the Iskander system with a range in excess of 500 km [310 mi], without ever providing evidence of its existence. We believe that this missile never existed, as we would have observed it in action in the current war.
In our opinion, the correct course of action would not be to deploy nuclear weapons in Germany, but rather to provide Ukraine with German Taurus missiles, or to lift restrictions on the use of Storm Shadow missiles and other munitions on Russian territory—or ideally, both.
Czech President Petr Pavel announced that Ukraine had received 50,000 artillery shells in June as part of the Czech initiative, and will receive similar amounts in July and August. From September until the end of the year, the AFU are slated to receive between 80,000 and 100,000 shells every month. This is in line with previously announced contracts for the delivery of a total of 500,000 shells.
Some time ago, we quoted Ukrainian researchers who compiled videos showing Russian soldiers committing suicide after sustaining severe injuries or to avoid capture. According to pro-Russian propagandist Anastasia Kashevarova, such incidents are classified as suicides rather than combat losses, disqualifying the deceased's relatives from receiving any benefits. Additionally, these soldiers are reportedly denied funeral rites in churches, as suicide is considered a grave sin in Orthodoxy. Kashevarova cites paragraph 23 of the RuAF's Internal Service Charter, which obliges soldiers to offer decisive resistance to the enemy and avoid capture during combat.
On July 15, the spring regular conscription campaign in Russia concluded. Unlike previous years, there were no widespread roundups. However, cases of deceit and violence forcing conscripts to sign contracts have been frequent. For instance, on June 23, Ilya Shelomentsev from Ust-Ilimsk in the Irkutsk region, along with 20 other conscripts, was taken to Novocherkassk in the Rostov region for military service. By July 2, he had signed a transfer report to another unit and a contract to serve "until the end of the special military operation." According to Shelomentsev's mother, unbearable conditions and physical violence were used to coerce conscripts into signing contracts, with promises of better conditions and a salary of 40,000 rubles [$460].
We strongly recommend avoiding statutory military service by all means. As the flow of volunteer fighters diminishes and RuAF personnel shortage worsens, conscripts will increasingly be forced through violent methods to sign contracts with the MoD for deployment to the frontline.