Sitrep for Aug. 28-30, 2024 (as of 7:30 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

In the Kursk region, Russian forces have retaken the village of Korenevo, which was previously captured by Ukrainian forces, according to DeepState.

Various sources, including pro-Russian Telegram channels and US intelligence, indicate that the Armed Forces of Ukraine are constructing defensive structures on the occupied territory in the Kursk region, suggesting that Ukraine intends to hold this area for an extended period. However, the frontline has seen little significant change in recent days.

OSINT analyst Def Mon compared combat zones from Aug. 19 to Aug. 29, and according to his map, the frontline has remained nearly unchanged over this 10-day period. The advances toward the village of Kulbaki or any potential withdrawal from Korenevo have not significantly impacted the overall situation on the ground.

The Ukrainian CyberBoroshnо project published satellite images of the village of Karyzh, showing a partially destroyed bridge over the Seym River. It remains unclear whether the remaining section of the road is still passable, even for light vehicles. Additionally, the images show a flooded pontoon crossing near the bridge. While the project's analysts suggest that the pontoon was sunk by drone strikes, we believe that it would be difficult for drones to flood it so evenly across its entire span. Instead, this might be a deliberate attempt at camouflage.

Mayor Aleksey Klemеshov of the town of Lgov announced that Ukrainian forces struck the railway tracks at the Lgov-Kievsky station and shared a photograph of the damaged tracks. Based on our experience analyzing the aftermath of railway strikes and sabotage, we believe that the damage in the photograph from Lgov more closely resembles the result of an explosive device planted under the rail rather than a direct strike.

Authorities in the Kursk region have closed the road from Rylsk to Kursk for civilian transport due to the threat of strikes and FPV drones. Additionally, entry into Kurchatov has been restricted—only residents and those with special passes are allowed, though an evacuation of civilians is not currently planned. We consider this a reasonable measure, as we do not currently see a significant threat to Kurchatov.

Despite ongoing reports about conscripts being deployed to the Kursk region, we still cannot confirm whether this practice has become more widespread. Authorities have begun to conceal such information. For instance, a post on the VKontakte social network about conscripts from the 217th Regiment of the 98th Guards Airborne Division, stationed in Ivanovo, being sent to the combat zone was deleted. The reason given was a direct objection to the information in the post by "experts and competent organizations."

In the previous sitrep, we mentioned that the Russian Armed Forces in the Pokrovsk direction had passed through the village of Novohrodivka; however, it appears that it has not yet been fully captured.

After taking the villages of Memryk and Kalynove, Russian forces approached the village of Lisivka, where a line of fortifications is located, and the town of Selydove, which had a pre-war population of nearly 24,000. A photo was published showing Russian troops raising a flag on the administrative building of the Kotliarevska mine east of Selydove. However, the raising of a flag in a settlement does not indicate its capture, as there have been instances where flags were dropped from drones in areas where enemy troops had not yet entered.

In honor of Ukraine's Independence Day and Constitution Day, Ukrainian soldiers even raised Ukrainian flags, reportedly over some Russian border settlements.

Similarly, Russian soldiers entered the village of Synkivka in the Kupiansk direction and raised a flag there. Despite this, the village remains under Ukrainian control, which did not stop Russian media from claiming that Synkivka had been captured.

The Kursk operation and its impact on the Pokrovsk direction have been widely discussed recently. Some Ukrainian sources claim that the critical situation in the Pokrovsk direction is not due to the offensive in the Kursk region, but rather to factors such as Ukrainian soldier fatigue, inadequate defenses, command errors and the incompetence of certain unit commanders. We disagree with this assessment and believe that if the AFU had fresh, well-prepared reserves in the Pokrovsk direction, the RuAF would not have advanced so quickly. Furthermore, it is incorrect to compare the Pokrovsk and Kursk directions and assert that the AFU’s rapid advance in the first days of the operation was due to well-rested troops. The speed of their advance was much more influenced by the element of surprise and weak defenses—it is worth noting that the Russia-Ukraine border was guarded only by conscripts and Federal Security Service (FSB) border guards. However, the fact that Russian forces have been unable to dislodge the AFU from their territory for an extended period suggests that the AFU’s reserves used in the Kursk operation were well-prepared and less fatigued than the units in the Donetsk region.

When journalists asked Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy whether the pace of the Russian advance in the Pokrovsk direction had changed due to the Kursk operation, he stated that this was not the case and that the speed of the RuAF remained roughly the same. However, many analysts and researchers disagree with this assessment. In particular, Def Mon constructed a graph of the changing pace of the Russian troops' advance based on DeepState data and found that since the beginning of the Kursk operation, the pace of the Russian advance in the Pokrovsk direction, when measured in square kilometers gained, has almost doubled. Analysts from the Black Bird Group have reported similar findings.

Since the start of the Kursk operation, Russia has managed to capture 145 square kilometers [55 sq. mi] in the Pokrovsk direction and an additional 65 square kilometers [25 sq. mi] on other parts of the frontline in the Donetsk region. This is significantly smaller than the more than 1,000 square kilometers [385 sq. mi] gained by the AFU in the Kursk region. For Ukraine, however, Russia’s advance means that several more towns could now be wiped off the map. From the perspective of residents of the Pokrovsk district of the Donetsk region, the potential strategic gains achieved by securing a foothold on Russian soil pale in comparison to the dangers posed by the rapid advance of enemy forces in their region.

Pro-Russian propagandist Yury Podolyaka has expressed skepticism about the speed of Russia’s advance, going as far as suggesting that Ukraine may by luring the RuAF into a trap. We find these claims to be laughable, as it is highly unlikely that the Ukrainian command would willingly surrender such well-fortified positions just to bait the enemy. However, this raises the broader question of whether Ukraine risks losing the entire war by retreating from its defensive positions in the Donbas. In our view, losing parts of the Donetsk region is unlikely to lead to such an outcome. The capture of Pokrovsk or Kostiantynivka will not decisively change the course of the war.

We believe that while the decision to launch the Kursk operation was fundamentally sound, it may have been premature. Considered in isolation, the operation is undoubtedly a success. The offensive has boosted the morale of Ukrainian soldiers and the public at large, demonstrating that the AFU remains combat-ready and capable of taking the fight to Russian soil. It has also shown that Putin’s so-called red lines do not exist, and fears of nuclear escalation were evidently overstated. However, in our assessment, the timing of the operation was suboptimal for the Ukrainian Army. With Ukraine actively expanding its troop numbers and Russia merely replenishing its losses, it might have been more prudent to delay the offensive. For example, launching the incursion in mid-September and halting the advance two to three weeks before the onset of the muddy season, would have allowed Ukraine to transition more smoothly to a defensive posture in the Kursk region.

For a defensive war, it is necessary to prepare infantry units in advance, rather than motorized forces. This preparation does not require waiting for supplies, as training soldiers in defensive operations can begin immediately after mobilization. This training needs only a minimal amount of equipment, including infantry weapons, anti-tank systems, a limited amount of artillery, drones, and basic logistics and evacuation equipment.

Training infantry takes two to three months. By accelerating mobilization in May, the AFU could have new units ready by August, which could then be rotated to the most challenging sectors of the front, such as Pokrovsk and Toretsk. To achieve this, a new infantry battalion would be introduced into a brigade fighting in a given direction, while one motorized rifle battalion would be withdrawn for personnel replacement and joint combat training exercises, a process that takes about a month. If we assume that 5,000 soldiers are enough to maintain a foothold in the Kursk region, it would be necessary to rotate 10 battalions across various sections of the frontline. Starting these actions in August would allow for the preparation of 10 battalions by mid-September.

With these 10 battalions, a local offensive operation—excluding plans to advance towards the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant—could be carried out, reaching designated positions approximately 20 km [12 mi] from the Russia-Ukraine border within a week. This approach would prevent overburdening supply lines and ensure that artillery can be positioned either from Ukrainian territory or with minimal entry into Russian territory. If the tactical situation allows for it and reserves are available, the zone of control could be expanded on the flanks. If not, the operation could be halted to establish a secure foothold. This would yield positive effects with minimal losses: it would boost morale, demonstrate that the Ukrainian Army remains combat-ready and show that there are no red lines.

The muddy season is expected to begin around October. By that time, additional rifle battalions that started training in the summer would be ready. Deploying these battalions to the Kursk region, with each covering approximately 2 km [1.2 mi] of the frontline, would allow for the establishment of a reliable defensive line and facilitate the rotation of units that began the offensive. The size of the foothold should be calculated to ensure it can be effectively held.

If the initial invasion group had not dispersed in different directions in the early days but had instead advanced directly towards the Seym River and established defenses along the river, the situation might be different now. We expected that after the bridges were blown up and the combat zone was isolated, the AFU would quickly occupy the Glushkovsky district. However, this did not occur, likely due to a lack of forces. In our view, after capturing the town of Sudzha, the AFU should have turned west and reached the Seym River south of Korenevo. Then, they should have started deploying prepared infantry battalions and taking defensive positions along the captured lines, while motorized infantry units continued advancing westward through the Glushkovsky district. The bridges should have also been destroyed in the same manner, but without pushing eastward toward the Belgorod region to avoid direct engagements and minimize losses.

At the moment, it is unclear whether the AFU have infantry units adequately trained for holding defensive positions. In early July, President Zelensky reported that 14 brigades had been formed, but there was insufficient equipment to arm them. If some of these brigades are now fully prepared, they could potentially be used for defensive operations.

Thus, in our opinion, had the operation been conducted in mid-September instead, it would have still retained the element of surprise, as the Russian command would likely have assumed that Ukrainian forces were planning to repel an alleged impending attack on the Sumy region. Additionally, it would have allowed for the rotation of forces in the Pokrovsk and Toretsk directions and the establishment of more effective defenses in those areas.

On Aug. 26, a Ukrainian F-16 fighter aircraft was lost while repelling a massive Russian air attack. The AFU reported that contact with the aircraft was lost as it was approaching a target and it was later discovered that the aircraft had crashed and the pilot had died. An obituary for the deceased Oleksii "Moonfish" Mes was published by the Ukrainian Air Force. Mes was known for his interviews with Western media and his advocacy for the delivery of F-16 fighter aircraft to Ukraine, alongside pilot Andrii "Juice" Pilshchikov, who was killed on Aug. 25, 2023, in a collision involving two L-39 military training aircraft.

According to the Voice of America, the causes of the crash are considered to be a technical malfunction, pilot error or friendly fire from a Ukrainian air defense system.

In early August, The Economist reported that ten F-16 aircraft had already been delivered to Ukraine, suggesting that the lost aircraft could be replaced relatively quickly. However, the death of a pilot, whose training requires significant time and effort, represents a considerable loss for Ukraine.

A video was published on Aug. 28, allegedly showing the crash of a Russian Su-25 aircraft. The footage shows two Su-25 aircraft flying at different altitudes, with one flying very close to the ground and releasing decoy flares. In our opinion, the video quality does not provide enough evidence to definitively confirm that the aircraft crashed. We have not yet seen any reports confirming the pilot's death.

On the night of Aug. 28, Ukrainian UAVs attacked the Atlas oil depot in the Kamensky district of the Rostov region. Initial satellite images showed two burning tanks, and additional explosions were reported later that evening. At the moment, there are no updates on whether the fire has been extinguished or how many tanks are still burning.

The intensity of the fire at the Proletarsk oil depot, which began after the attack on the night of Aug. 18, has significantly decreased, but the fire itself is still ongoing.

The Russian MoD has repeatedly stated that their attacks target Ukrainian energy facilities. According to Ihor Syrota, CEO of Ukrhydroenergo, every hydroelectric power station in Ukraine has been attacked by Russian forces. He also highlighted that since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, more than 130 missile strikes have been carried out on generating capacities, resulting in a loss of about 40% of the generation capacity at Ukrainian hydropower plants and over 80% at thermal power stations.

Andrii Yermak, Head of the Ukrainian Presidential Office, published a letter from the Ukrainian IAEA mission. According to the document, the Russian attack on Aug. 26 affected the operation of Ukrainian nuclear power plants, causing three reactors at the Rivne Nuclear Power Plant and one reactor at the South Ukraine Nuclear Power Plant to go offline.

Ukrainian military expert Serhii "Flash" Beskrestnov, citing Ukrainian military personnel, reported sightings of unexplained green light beams in the sky. According to the description, these lights are visible only at night, move slowly, and have been seen either following vehicles or illuminating defensive positions. It was later discovered that the lights come from Russian Zala UAVs equipped with thermal cameras and a targeting system capable of giving fire directions to air strikes and 2K25 Krasnopol laser-guided artillery shells.

Ukrainian Telegram channels published a photo from the Kursk region, showing a Russian Argument-3 electronic warfare system covered with an anti-drone net. Since the net is metallic, it could function as a Faraday cage, potentially reducing the effectiveness of this "jammer."

"Information booths" aimed at promoting contract military service have recently appeared in the Moscow metro, including at the Slavyansky Bulvar station and some others. The need for such measures is not entirely clear to us, especially considering reports that the number of recruits willing to sign contracts with the MoD in Moscow has doubled following the AFU attack on the Kursk region.

According to the VChK-OGPU Telegram channel, citing employees of the Moscow police department, police officers in the capital have been promised a bonus of up to 50,000 rubles [$550] for each person persuaded to sign a contract with the MoD. It was previously reported that police officers in the regions were promised a bonus of 10,000 rubles [$110] for each detainee who signs a contract with the MoD. While the police officers surveyed expressed skepticism about the new initiative—citing a lack of known cases where such bonuses have been received—they acknowledged that such an amount could serve as a significant incentive for rank-and-file officers when engaging with the public.