Sitrep for July 24-26, 2024 (as of 9 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

The Russian Armed Forces continue expanding the Ocheretyne salient and are advancing towards the town of Myrnohrad. According to Ukrainian military observer Yurii Butusov, a critical situation has developed for the Armed Forces of Ukraine in this area.

From the captured village of Prohres, Russian forces are moving towards the villages of Vesele, Ivanivka and Vovche, and are also making progress in the villages of Novoselivka Persha and Lozuvatske.

According to DeepState, Ukrainian soldiers from the 31st Separate Mechanized Brigade were encircled between Prohres and Lozuvatske a few days ago but have since managed to break through and rejoin their main forces.

Earlier, it was expected that after capturing Prohres and Vovche, the RuAF would not be able to quickly cross the Vovcha River and would focus on mopping up the territory further east. However, they have already crossed the river via the railway tracks, trying to advance as much as possible while the opportunity exists. DeepState emphasizes that this progress was made possible due to the significant numerical superiority of the RuAF. For instance, videos show large Russian platoons of 40 to 60 soldiers crossing the frontline and moving along the railway. This is the kind of superiority that General Oleksandr Syrskyi, Commander-in-Chief of the AFU, referred to in an interview with The Guardian.

The RuAF’s advantage in military equipment is also evident in a video by the 79th Air Assault Brigade of the AFU, filmed near the village of Novomykhailivka in the direction of the town of Kostiantynivka in the southern Donetsk region. The video shows a Russian attack involving 11 tanks, 45 armored combat vehicles, 12 motorcycles, one BMPT Terminator tank support fighting vehicle and 200 assault troops. The attack was repelled, partially thanks to minefields and drone strikes. As a result, six tanks, seven armored vehicles and all 12 motorcycles were destroyed, once again demonstrating the unsuitability of motorcycles for frontal assaults. It is worth noting that OSINT analyst Def Mon previously calculated that, on this section of the frontline, the RuAF have lost 74 tanks and 150 armored fighting vehicles since the beginning of the year.

Both sides are currently struggling with military personnel and equipment shortages. Although Russia is experiencing a decrease in the influx of new contract soldiers, the RuAF have a smaller shortage of personnel compared to the AFU. As to the situation with military equipment, it can be described as follows: while the AFU contend with insufficient supplies from Western allies, the RuAF face a growing shortage of armored vehicles as their stockpiles are being depleted. Clear evidence of this is the continued fielding of T-54/55 tanks in combat operations. In addition, if not for the equipment shortage, the T-62M tank would not have become one of the main tanks of the Russian Army along with the new T-90M, and BRDMs, which had long been out of service before the start of the war, would not have been delivered from storage bases back to the frontline, and assaults on motorcycles would not have become commonplace.

Although current Russian assaults are often compared to the "meat assaults" conducted by the Wagner Group, this analogy is not entirely accurate. Despite some complaints, soldiers only carrying rifles are not as frequently sent to storm enemy positions. Instead, assaults are often supported by armored vehicles, aircraft or artillery. Similarly, Wagner Group assault troops did not always engage in "meat assaults" either; they were periodically supported by artillery as well.

From a military standpoint, the current RuAF tactics do not appear effective—successful advancement generally requires a concentration of forces rather than dispersion.

Some sources report that Russian forces are planning an attack from the town of Polohy towards Huliaipole. Theoretically, this is plausible, as Russian units have indeed been stationed in this section of the frontline for a long time without conducting offensive actions. In such a case, as in other similar situations, only minor advancements can be achieved at the cost of significant losses. The motivation for such an attack might be the desire to deliver results by the general in charge of this direction. Additionally, it seems that this approach aligns with General Valery Gerasimov’s tactics: when facing resistance in one active direction (as is currently the case in the Kharkiv area), to shift focus to another section of the frontline. However, this tactic often results in the dispersion of forces and the unjustifiable expenditure of equipment and personnel.

Nevertheless, by the end of the year, when Ukraine will have trained and equipped new brigades, large-scale breakthroughs of the frontline will become impossible in our view. If Russian authorities perceive the situation as potentially dangerous, they may choose to counter it with a second wave of mobilization. Rifle units emerging from a new draft would then be deployed in defensive roles, as was done in the Kharkiv region in the fall of 2022.

Photos have emerged of a Russian D-30 howitzer outfitted with an improvised cope cage and Kontakt-1 explosive reactive armor blocks. It is worth noting that reactive armor should normally be installed on proper armored plates, and in the absence of adequate support—such as when mounted on UAZ Bukhanka vans or trucks—it may cause more harm than good.

A Russian unmanned ground vehicle was also spotted donning slat armor. Tracked UGVs lack any visible armor plating and are likely to be damaged even by UAV debris.

In the Kharkiv direction, Russian forces primarily use 122mm caliber artillery, which affects their rate of progress—the smaller the caliber, the shorter the weapon’s range. We have also observed that the Group of Troops "North" has received long-range M-46 towed field guns from storage depots. The 130mm projectiles used by these guns were widely sold to other countries in the 1990s and now have to be imported from North Korea and Iran.

Ukrainian and Russian Strikes

In the Kaluga region, a Russian Mil Mi-28N attack helicopter crashed, resulting in the death of the crew. According to the Kremlin-aligned news outlet Mash, the helicopter was returning from a combat mission intercepting Ukrainian UAVs on the border with the Bryansk region. While we have previously reported on calls to adopt the AFU practice of using small aircraft to intercept drones, examples of using helicopters for this purpose have been rare. The exact cause of the Mil Mi-28N crash is still unknown, although the MoD quickly attributed it to a technical malfunction. We find it highly unlikely that the helicopter was shot down by a Ukrainian drone and we do not rule out other possibilities, such as the helicopter getting entangled in power lines. As stated by pro-Russian milblogger Kirill Fyodorov, the helicopter’s crew had been among the most effective in repelling raids by the "Russian Volunteer Corps," though only a few Russian helicopters were involved in these operations.

Once again, the Russian MoD has effectively admitted to committing war crimes. On July 25, a video was released showing a double-tap strike with an Iskander-M missile equipped with a cluster munition warhead against rescue crews at the Kharkiv Armored Vehicle Plant.

Our previous sitrep already recounted a Russian MoD report of a strike against an alleged "temporary deployment point for foreign mercenaries and instructors" in the town of Derhachi in the Kharkiv region. The July 25 report included a new video showing the same type of missile used against what is again claimed to be a "temporary deployment point for foreign mercenaries and instructors." In fact, the building targeted housed the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD), an organization specializing in mine-clearing operations in Ukraine. Although there were no casualties, the building was badly damaged and the Foundation’s staff vehicles were destroyed.

Western Assistance

Spain has announced that it will supply Ukraine with a MIM-23 HAWK surface-to-air missile system by September. The AFU are already actively using such systems.

The Netherlands and Denmark will transfer 14 Leopard 2A4 tanks, restored by the German automotive and arms manufacturer Rheinmetall, to Ukraine by the end of summer.

The UNIAN Ukrainian news portal reported that Poland provided Ukraine with a new military aid package, including a significant amount of ammunition and 10 MiG-29 fighter aircraft. Unfortunately, the translation was incorrect. The 45th military aid package, which includes ammunition, is currently being implemented, while the 10 MiG-29 aircraft are still being prepared for transfer. This transfer is scheduled to occur within six months after the arrival of F-16 fighter aircraft, which will replace the MiG-29s.

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz stated that to prevent the deployment of US long-range missiles in Germany, Russia must first cease its war against Ukraine. We are convinced that such an attempt to blackmail Putin will not be successful.

Conscription, Mobilization and Contract Military Service

At least two Russian regions, the city of Moscow and the Leningrad region, have changed their approach to recruiting contract soldiers, according to the Mozhem Ob'yasnit [We Can Explain] Telegram channel. Advertisements now highlight the potential annual earnings for a soldier, rather than focusing on one-time sign-up bonuses. In Moscow, these earnings amount to 5.2 million rubles [$60,900] and in the Leningrad region, just over 4 million [$46,450]. However, the advertisements fail to mention that surviving on the frontline for an entire year is highly unlikely for a soldier.

It is worth noting that all contracts signed with the Russian MoD are open-ended. There are rare examples of civilian contracts with a limited duration, typically concluded with volunteer units, including Cossacks, the "Union of Volunteer Fighters of Donbas" and other formations. However, individuals who enter into such agreements are classified as civilian workers assisting the "special military operation," rather than military personnel. Consequently, they are not eligible for any federal payments or compensations.

A new recruitment tactic, invented in Tolyatti, Samara region, has been reported by the Idite Lesom! [Flee through the woods/Get lost you all] Telegram channel. In addition to recruiting convicts in penal colonies and accused individuals at the pre-trial stage, the draft office has begun contacting local residents with suspended sentences by phone, offering them contracts in exchange for expunging their criminal records.