Sitrep for Oct. 18-21, 2024 (as of 9:00 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

One of the two most dynamic areas of the frontline in recent days has been the Ukrainian pocket west of the village of Nevelske in the Kurakhove direction: Russian forces have made significant advances, approaching the town of Hirnyk and the village of Kurakhivka, and have captured the village of Zhelanne Druhe. We believe they might capture Kurakhivka and part of Hirnyk by the end of the week, as urban fighting is already underway on the northern outskirts of the town. Holding the pocket would be quite a dangerous scenario for the Armed Forces of Ukraine, therefore Ukrainian troops are likely to retreat from the area in the near future, as they did in Vuhledar. As no videos showing a large number of captured or killed Ukrainian soldiers were published, the AFU must have managed to retreat from the town without major losses.

Another active section of the frontline is the Kursk direction, where Russian counter-offensive actions continue east of the village of Snagost. It is worth noting that, after the start of the second wave of the counteroffensive, fighting continued near ​​the villages of Olgovka and Novoivanovka without major advances. Both sides claimed the enemy was on the backfoot: on the salient in Olgovka for the AFU, and for the Russian Armed Forces—slightly to the south, on the salient between Olgovka and the village of Lyubimovka. As a result of the retreat of Ukrainian forces from Olgovka, the encirclement of this part of the group was avoided, and Russian forces liberated this village having advanced slightly near Lyubimovka.

Now they are trying to advance towards Novoivanovka and further towards the village of Malaya Loknya, as evidenced by footage of combat showing the destruction of Russian BTR armored personnel carriers. Apparently, the RuAF now intend to cut off and clear out the part of the Ukrainian bridgehead north of these villages.

More and more often, military summaries mention weather conditions, which, according to pro-Russian Telegram channels, hinder the offense more than the defense. The real muddy season has not yet begun; however, it could lead to a slowdown in combat operations if it is more pronounced than in the spring of this year.

Unexpectedly for us and some of our Western colleagues, reports of the deployment of North Korean soldiers to Russia have been confirmed (a timeline of events was published by Meduza [international Russian-language online media outlet]). This conclusion is based on two videos showing hundreds of soldiers of Asian appearance in Russian uniforms, where Korean speech can be heard.

Experts assert that the dialect spoken is North Korean. South Korean intelligence officially reported the deployment of 1,500 special forces to Russia — as far as we know, this is their first official press release concerning the cooperation between Russia and North Korea on the war in Ukraine. According to intelligence reports, up to 12,000 North Korean troops are expected to be sent to Russia. Furthermore, for the first time since 1990, vessels from the Russian Pacific Fleet entered North Korean waters, apparently to transport North Korean soldiers to the city of Vladivostok. In satellite images published by South Korean intelligence, what is claimed to be a formation of North Korean soldiers can be seen at a training range in the city of Ussuriysk. While the images do not allow for the soldiers' affiliations to be confirmed, the presence of North Korean forces is corroborated by the aforementioned videos. Additionally, footage has been released showing Kim Jong-un overseeing the preparation of a special operations unit getting ready to deploy to Russia on Sept. 11 and Oct. 2.

It is worth noting that while the North Korean special forces cannot be considered truly elite, their training, endurance and motivation are clearly superior not only to the regular North Korean infantry but also to Russian assault troops. We still believe that the potential decision to send North Korean soldiers to fight in the Kursk region is a political mistake—it would look like an admission by Putin of his inability to defend his own country’s territory with Russia's own armed forces.

Pro-Russian Telegram channels are discussing the proficiency of North Korean military personnel in operating unmanned systems and are questioning their ability to handle modern equipment, such as FPV drones.

A key question arising amid reports of 12,000 DPRK soldiers making their way to Russian soil—a force roughly equivalent to a RuAF motorized rifle division—is how they will take part in combat. If deployed as an expeditionary corps, coordination would be handled through a field command staffed by North Korean generals, meaning few translators would likely be needed. However, if these 12,000 troops are divided into smaller units and sent across different sectors of the front, integrating them with Russian commanders and fellow soldiers would present a far greater challenge.

Reports indicate that DPRK troops have been issued Russian small arms, but it remains unclear what type of armored vehicle they will use. If North Korean armored vehicles are employed, their transport from the Far East could take at least a month, based on past instances of military equipment being moved by rail across Russia in 2021. If Russian vehicles are provided instead, DPRK forces would need to familiarize themselves with RuAF APCs or IFVs first, which could prove unpopular among Russian soldiers, who are already facing an acute shortage of armored vehicles on some parts of the frontline. Furthermore, it remains unclear whether enough military vehicles can be assembled to equip an entire division.

It is also conceivable that North Korean soldiers could be used as assault infantry without armored support, essentially as “cannon fodder.” The DPRK armed forces boast over a million troops, including some 200,000 special forces soldiers. However, if only 12,000 soldiers are deployed to Russia, as is being reported, and they do not engage in combat before November (in the Kursk region, according to Ukrainian sources), they are unlikely to significantly alter the situation on the frontline. While their presence could play a role in certain sectors of the front, it is unlikely to lead to major breakthroughs.

In the context of the current war, deploying 12,000 soldiers is unlikely to provide the RuAF with a significant advantage on the battlefield. The benefits of this decision, in our opinion, are outweighed by the negative consequences. In particular, it is unclear how South Korea will react, as it has so far refrained from sending lethal military aid to Ukraine, only participating in circular supply chains. Some experts believe that North Korea’s primary motivation for sending troops to Russia is to provide its soldiers with real combat experience. However, if these troops are sent on "meat-grinder" assaults, few may return, making the idea of gaining combat experience irrelevant. North Korea has previously sent smaller groups of its military pilots and instructors to participate in various armed conflicts:

• North Vietnam (during the Vietnam War);
• 25 pilots to Syria in 1967 (during the Six-Day War);
• 30 pilots to Syria and Egypt in 1973 (during the Yom Kippur War);
• 40 pilots and 75 instructors in 1975-1976 trained Syrian pilots and participated in some combat operations against Israel;
• Special Forces trained the Syrian regular army in guerrilla warfare tactics in the 1980s;
• In 2016, two paramilitary groups from the DPRK reportedly participated in the Syrian civil war on the side of Syrian government forces, but this was not confirmed.

Among other things, the South Korean intelligence statement mentions that DPRK officers have been present in Russia for some time helping with the use of ballistic missiles, as previously reported.

Researcher Jompy observed that the 22nd Tank Reserve Base began to withdraw BRDM-2 amphibious armored scout cars from storage. By the end of April 2024, Russia still had a large stockpile of these vehicles, but for some unknown reason they were hardly ever recovered and never brought to the frontline. Now that stocks of other IFVs or APCs have been depleted, the recovery of BRDM-2s is likely to begin, confirming the Russian army's equipment shortage.

Ukrainian and Russian Strikes

On Oct. 19, the Russian Aerospace Forces launched a strike on the central part of the city of Zaporizhzhia with three air bombs injuring 10 individuals, including two children. There were no signs either of military vehicles or military facilities in the photos of the affected areas. This suggests that it was a hit on a residential area, which constitutes a war crime.

Overnight into Oct. 19, Ukrainian UAVs attacked the Kremniy EL plant in the city of Bryansk. Over 90% of the plant’s output is used for the defense industry, e.g. microelectronics for the Pantsir-S1 Pantsir-S1 surface-to-air missile and anti-aircraft artillery system as well as 9K720 Iskander mobile short-range ballistic missile system. Photos of the aftermath of the attack show some damage to the buildings, though the size of a UAV warhead is clearly not sufficient to inflict serious enough damage to halt production.

In the early hours of Oct. 20, Ukrainian drones attacked the Sverdlov Plant in Dzerzhinsk, Nizhny Novgorod region, which produces explosives and reportedly loads air-dropped and artillery munitions with them. It was reported that four firefighters sustained shrapnel wounds — whether this occurred during a second drone strike or from the detonation of ammunition stored at the plant remains unknown.

Conscription, Mobilization and Contract Military Service

In September 2024, we reported the story of volunteer fighters Dmitry "Goodwin" Lysakovsky and Sergey "Ernest" Gritsay, who were punished for criticizing their commander by being reclassified from drone operators to assault troops and sent into a "meat assault," from which they did not return. Now, Gritsay's widow is being denied presidential and insurance compensation on the dubious grounds that the certificate from his military unit does not state the cause of his death, only indicating that he was killed during military service and that his death was related to the performance of his duties.

Meanwhile, the widow of a serviceman killed in the Kursk region is being denied compensation on the grounds that this region is not part of the "special military operation" zone. A similar case previously occurred in the city of Yekaterinburg. Later, the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection of the Ryazan region confirmed that such payments are currently impossible and stated that they are already preparing changes to regional regulations to begin providing compensation to the families of military personnel who were killed in the Kursk region.

The Vyorstka media outlet analyzed statistics from the Judicial Department of the Supreme Court of Russia and found that in the first half of 2024, 427 Russians were convicted for evading regular conscription, and one person was convicted for evading alternative civilian service. None of them were sentenced to actual imprisonment: three received suspended sentences, one was released from punishment, and one was acquitted. Ninety-nine percent of those convicted under these articles were fined, with only five receiving fines exceeding 100,000 rubles [$1,030]. It is worth noting that the data for 2023 followed a similar pattern, which is why we continue to recommend avoiding regular conscription by any means: receiving a fine or, in rare cases, a suspended sentence is far better than becoming disabled or being killed in the war.

Artyom Tamoyan, an IT developer living in the Netherlands, discovered that the large number of convictions related to the Freedom of Russia Legion appears to be the result of entrapment, likely orchestrated by Russian intelligence services. The programmer has discovered that law enforcement officers are creating multiple clone websites mimicking the Legion’s official site. These sites redirect those interested in joining the unit to fake Telegram bots. This tactic allows law enforcement to capture conversations between unsuspecting users and individuals posing as Legion representatives, which is later used to prosecute them under charges of participating in a terrorist organization. So far, Tamoyan has identified around two dozen fake sites and reported them to providers and local registrars. Since phishing (creating websites that resemble popular ones to trick users into sharing personal data) is banned worldwide, most of these sites were blocked fairly quickly. Although similar sites will likely continue to appear, it will take time before they rank among the top search results on Yandex.