Sitrep for Oct. 21-23, 2024 (as of 8 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

A significant change in recent days has been the advance of the Russian Armed Forces in the Kupiansk direction, near the village of Kruhliakivka, where they have reached the banks of the Oskil River.

This has allowed them to split the Ukrainian bridgehead on its left bank into two parts. To the north of Kruhliakivka, a pocket has formed east of Kupiansk, which is the primary objective in this direction. The remaining portion of the bridgehead in the area of the village of Borova, south of Kruhliakivka, is much larger than the aforementioned pocket.

In the Pokrovsk direction, Russian forces continue their advance on the town Selydove from the direction of the village of Mykhailivka, as well as to the west of the village of Tsukuryne, near the village of Novodmytrivka. This salient is relatively small and urban fighting in Selydove could begin soon.

In the Kurakhove direction, the RuAF are rapidly occupying the pocket east of the town of Hirnyk and the village of Kurakhivka: they have advanced towards the village of Zoryane and fully occupied the village of Maksymilianivka in the southern part of the pocket, moving towards the town of Kurakhove. It remains unclear if Ukrainian troops are still partially encircled there.

Reports of heavy rains and muddy terrain suggest that the muddy season has already begun in some directions. This is confirmed by footage captured on the ground and by a drone. If the muddy season worsens, combat operations will likely slow down in the near future.

Western Assistance

The European Parliament has approved a loan to Ukraine of €35 billion [$37,7 billion], which will be repaid using the profits generated by Russian frozen assets in the EU. This loan is part of a larger macro-financial assistance package of €45 billion [$50 billion], which the G7 countries took a long time to negotiate. It is worth noting that Ukraine will have the autonomy to decide how to spend these funds. Furthermore, the credit cooperation mechanism will grant Ukraine direct access to the profits from frozen Russian assets in Europe, which can be used, for example, to repay loans issued by European allies or other G7 countries, as well as for the purchase of ammunition and weapons.

The UK has announced a loan to Ukraine of £2.26 billion [$2.92B], which will also be covered by income from frozen Russian assets. Discussions on the possibility of assisting Ukraine using this income have been ongoing for quite some time, and significant results are only now coming to fruition.

France will transfer 12 additional Caesar self-propelled howitzers to Ukraine, also funded by frozen Russian assets.

An unannounced visit by US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin to Ukraine took place, during which he announced a new $400 million US military aid package. It will include:

Ammunition for HIMARS MLRS;
155mm and 105mm artillery ammunition;
60mm, 81mm, and 120mm mortar systems and rounds;
Tube-launched, Optically tracked, Wire-guided (TOW) missiles;
Javelin and AT-4 anti-armor systems;
M113 armored personnel carriers;
Satellite communication equipment;
Small arms and ammunition;
Grenades and training equipment;
Demolitions equipment and munitions;
Equipment to protect critical national infrastructure;
Spare parts, ancillary equipment, services, training and transportation.

This package continues a positive trend in aid, as it is significantly larger than the usual $150-200 million packages. This was made possible by the need to distribute the budget before the end of the fiscal year and to spend the funds allocated under the PDA before the end of President Biden's term.

Volodymyr Zelenskyy said in another video address to the nation that the US has also allocated $800 million to fund the development of drones in Ukraine.

Re:Russia has published an article on Russia’s “shadow fleet,” a term used to describe decommissioned oil tankers acquired by Moscow to circumvent sanctions and continue trading oil. According to a report by the Kyiv School of Economics, the fleet increased its volume of transported oil and petroleum products by 70% over the past year. Despite sanctions, only around 70 tankers have been subject to restrictions, while estimates place the total number of vessels in the shadow fleet between 700 and over 1,000. The report also reveals that sanctions can often be circumvented simply by re-registering tankers under a new name and flag.

Enforcement is further complicated by the fact that many of the tankers, in addition to illegally transporting Russian oil, are also involved in legal trade. According to a Bloomberg investigation, most of the tankers that have resumed operations were sanctioned by the UK, while almost all vessels sanctioned by the US remain inactive.

Despite these loopholes, sanctions are still yielding some results. Russian oil continues to sell at a significant discount, as buyers hedge against possible penalties, resulting in Russian oil revenues standing at least 10% lower than they otherwise would be.

According to Financial Times sources, Turkish customs have restricted exports of US military products to Russia after receiving a warning from the United States about possible consequences. The list of goods banned for export to Russia includes various electronics: microchips, remote control systems, processors and memory cards used in missiles and drones, as well as machinery and other equipment. Earlier, we reported on the imposition of sanctions on Chinese banks working with Russian companies, causing them to limit their interaction with clients from Russia.

Ukrainian and Russian Strikes

In the early hours of Oct. 19, the Kremniy El plant in Bryansk was attacked by drones of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

On Oct. 21, a message appeared on the company’s website stating that the attack had disrupted the power supply to the plant, interrupted the technological production chains, and therefore the plant was ceasing production.

The CyberBoroshno project studied satellite images of the plant from Oct. 20, paying special attention to the electrical substation, and concluded that it had not been affected, and the damage to the roof of the workshop was minor.

Therefore, they consider the message about the plant's shutdown to be disinformation. The Polkovnyk Henshtabu [Colonel of the General Staff] Telegram channel agrees with them, believing that with this message, plant representatives are trying to prevent repeated Ukrainian drone attacks.

On the morning of Oct. 21, Russian forces launched a missile strike on a residential area in the city of Zaporizhzhia. As a result of the attack, two people were killed and 15 others were injured. Later, reports emerged stating that one of the victims subsequently died in hospital, and the number of injured increased to 20 people. Apartment buildings, a dormitory, and a kindergarten were damaged.

Ukrainian intelligence has reported the murder of Russian Aerospace Forces officer Dmitry Golenkov, who served as chief of staff of a heavy bomber squadron based in the village of Shaikovka in the Kaluga region. The Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense published photographs of a man with a broken head, reportedly, in the village of Suponevo in the Bryansk region. It should be noted that the face is not clearly visible in the pictures, making it difficult to confirm the identity of the person. The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) has revealed that Golenkov and five other Russian soldiers were involved in the missile strike on a residential building in Dnipro on Jan. 14, 2023, which killed more than 40 people. Journalists from Vazhnyye Istorii [IStories, independent Russian investigative media outlet] tried to talk to the airmen at the time. Golenkov refused to answer questions, but did not deny that he was serving in the 52nd Heavy Bomber Aviation Regiment, adding that Ukraine was a region of Russia.

(The Investigative Committee for the Bryansk region effectively denies Golenkov's murder, and a relative told the Vot Tak [Like This] media outlet that they had recently spoken with him.)

Conscription, Mobilization and Contract Military Service

In the previous sitrep, we reported that relatives of soldiers killed in the Kursk region are being denied compensation because this region is not part of the "special military operation" zone. Similarly, soldiers serving in the Kursk region do not receive the combat pay that is paid to those fighting in Ukraine. On Oct. 21, a photo of an air-dropped bomb appeared followed by a complaint about the non-payment of the “combat pay” to the crew (later, the Telegram channel that posted the photo published a post describing the consequences of the publication and hoping that, although it had not yet affected the situation with payments, this will still happen in the future). We expect that more messages like this will appear over time.

Gaziz Zinnatov, a soldier serving statutory military service, was buried in the village of Askarovo, Abzelilovsky district, Russia's constituent Republic of Bashkortostan. He was killed in the Kursk region on Aug. 15. Based on the fact that the Ukrainian operation in the Kursk region began on Aug. 6, it can be concluded that Zinnatov was already stationed in the area at the beginning of the operation, rather than sent later to repel the attack. Despite authorities' promises not to send conscripts to the war, combat operations are affecting Russian border regions, and conscripts are being killed. By the end of August, Mediazona and BBC News Russian’s verified list of losses included 172 conscripts. We are not seeing efforts to remove conscripts from combat zones—on the contrary, State Duma member from the Zabaykalsky region Andrey Gurulyov stated that it is normal to use conscripts on the frontline.

Oleg Kozhemyako, the governor of the Primorsky region, has proposed that the children of soldiers killed in Ukraine should be given apartments in order to instill patriotism in them. We doubt that an apartment can replace a father for an orphan, and this proposed method of "instilling" patriotism is perplexing.