Sitrep for Aug. 19-21, 2024 (as of 9 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

Russian forces continue to advance in the Pokrovsk direction. In recent days, they captured the village of Zhuravka, located south of Hrodivka, and advanced close to Krasnyi Yar. They have also approached the town of Novohrodivka and made some progress in the village of Zavitne, where they raised a Russian flag. However, fighting in Zavitne continues and the village is not yet fully under Russian control.

In the Toretsk direction, Russian forces have widened their area of control in the village of Pivnichne and entered the neighboring village of Druzhba. Fighting also continues on the outskirts of Toretsk.

The Russian Ministry of Defense announced the capture of the village of Niu-York, to which they refer by its former Soviet name, Novhorodske, used between 1951 and 2021. Russian sources have published a video showing a Russian flag on a building in the village. Meanwhile, TASS, the Russian state-owned news agency, citing "DPR" authorities, reports that there still is a bulge of AFU resistance at the phenol plant. According to the latest DeepState map, this area is marked as contested, indicating that fighting in Niu-York continues. We reported that the village was almost fully captured as early as Aug 7.

Russian forces have also raised a flag on a spoil tip south of the town of Zalizne, a vantage point overlooking the road leading to the village of Nelipivka. The RuAF’s ability to fire on targets using the road will compromise the AFU’s supply lines, potentially forcing them to abandon the village. This would enable Russian forces to launch an attack on Toretsk from the south as well.

At the moment, advances are only being observed in the Pokrovsk and Toretsk directions, with no changes to the frontline on the Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia axes.

In recent days, rumors have spread about a concentration of Ukrainian forces on the Zaporizhzhia axis, where Russian command has redeployed some RuAF units to reinforce the grouping in the Kursk region. There are even reports of potential offensive actions; however, we have yet to see any visual confirmation. However, we do not rule out an intensification of positional battles and localized Ukrainian attacks on this axis due to the enemy's vulnerabilities.

In the Kursk direction, there has also been no significant progress in recent days. The frontline continues to shift in certain areas, with ongoing fighting for specific settlements. However, we do not anticipate attempts to advance deeper into Russian territory at this time. In the near future, the AFU will likely focus on advancing along the Ukraine-Russia border, aiming to capture the Glushkovsky district, which is comparable in size to the already occupied part of the region. After capturing this area, Ukrainian forces will likely plan to establish defenses along the Seym River.

Meanwhile, Russian forces continue to build fortifications along the road from Lgov to Kurchatov. It is worth noting that this does not necessarily indicate an imminent advance by the AFU in that direction.

General Oleksandr Syrskyi, the Commander-in-Chief of the AFU, presented a map on the General Staff’s YouTube channel showing the zone of Ukrainian forces’ control in the Kursk region, covering an area of 1,263 square kilometers [488 square mi]. We believe that in some areas, the boundary marked by Syrskyi coincides with zones where the AFU currently have only a presence, rather than full control, and are actively engaged in combat. Twitter military analyst Def Mon compared the General Staff’s map with his own, marking Syrskyi's control line in purple, the boundary of the combat zone according to his assessment in blue, and the RuAF-controlled zone in red. The contested area lies between the blue and red lines. By averaging these evaluations, one can create the most plausible map of the captured part of Russian territory and the extent of the AFU’s eventual foothold. The only significant change will be the likely capture of the Glushkovsky district.

It is worth noting that the reinforced concrete bridges in the village of Glushkovo and the villages of Zvannoye and Karyzh have been destroyed. Earlier reports indicated the construction of a pontoon crossing east of Glushkovo; however, it later became known that there were at least two pontoon crossings. Reports of strikes on these crossings have surfaced, while NASA’s Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) satellite data confirms fire hotspots on the right bank of the Seym River, where Russian troops are stationed. The AFU is targeting not only the pontoon crossings themselves but also Russian equipment accumulating near the river.

Ukrainian far-right social activist and YouTuber Serhii Sternenko has published a video showing FPV kamikaze drone strikes on various military engineering vehicles geolocated north of Glushkovo, west of the village of Shagarovo. In particular, drones attacked a pontoon park truck and an excavator working on the riverbank. As we explained earlier, pontoon crossings are much easier to damage than regular bridges, though they can be relatively easily to rebuild in a different location, as satellite images have shown.

The destruction of permanent bridges, as well as strikes on pontoon crossings, greatly complicates the supply of Russian troops in the Glushkovsky district, particularly in the village of Tyotkino. This does not mean that these forces have already been surrounded and will have to surrender, as personnel could, in a worst case scenario, escape by swimming across the small river. However, it is becoming increasingly difficult to supply these forces or withdraw military equipment when they are being targeted by kamikaze drones and HIMARS MLRS. Therefore, the RuAF are more likely to be displaced rather than encircled near Tyotkino, as the AFU are pressuring Russian forces to leave the area.

On Aug, 20, the pro-Russian Telegram channel Northern Channel, which claims affiliation with the Group of Troops "North," reported that servicemen from the 810 Guards Naval Infantry Brigade engaged in a skirmish in a forest near the village of Kauchuk (just west of the village of Kromskiye Byki and northeast of the village of Korenevo), resulting in numerous casualties and injuries. We have not yet seen any photo or video evidence to confirm this, but Kauchuk is indeed contested, making the report plausible.

Pro-Russian Telegram channels have published videos reportedly showing Russian airstrikes on a Ukrainian armored vehicle column attempting to break through to Korenevo. The videos have been geolocated near the village of Korenevo. It is worth noting that the Russian Armed Forces are located in the urban-type settlement of Korenevo on the right bank of the Krepna River, while the AFU control the village of Korenevo on the left bank of the same river.

On Aug. 20, a press release from the Russian MoD, which included an excerpt from a meeting of the Coordination Council on Military Security for the Belgorod, Bryansk and Kursk regions, led many media outlets and Telegram channels to incorrectly conclude that the RuAF had created three new groups of troops, namely "Kursk," "Bryansk" and "Belgorod." In reality, however, these formations have existed since 2022. Moreover, Ukrainian military observer Kostiantyn Mashovets even published estimates of their troop strengths in October of that year. It appears that these groupings were incorporated into a larger formation known as the Group of Troops "North" in April 2024, under the command of Colonel General Aleksandr Lapin. This grouping launched an offensive in the Kharkiv region in May 2024. It remains unclear whether the three aforementioned groupings continue to operate as part of the broader Group of Troops "North" or if they were first fully integrated into a larger ensemble and later split into three distinct units again. We do not believe that the recent mentions of these groups of troops suggest any imminent large-scale Ukrainian foray into the Bryansk or Belgorod regions, although incursions by sabotage groups are continuing to this day.

After his visit to Beslan, the site of a deadly school siege in 2004, Putin appeared to "engage" with the people of Vladikavkaz, with propaganda media showing footage of a cheering crowd. This kind of "crisis PR" was similarly observed at the end of June 2023, when Putin "went to the people" in Derbent following Yevgeny Prigozhin's armed rebellion. This suggests that the situation in the Kursk region has delivered a significant political blow to Putin.

At the same time, we observe that crucial issues like conscripts being captured, killed or stationed in border areas are barely covered by national media. Additionally, there are increasing reports that conscripts are being coerced into signing contracts, with some being transferred to the Kursk region even if they did not sign a contract.

The National Police of Ukraine reported that on the evening of Aug. 20, the RuAF struck the village of Malokaterynivka in the Kushuhum community, Zaporizhzhia region. An unidentified munition hit the Levada children’s café, injuring four children aged 11, 14, 15, and 17, as well as an 18-year-old female teenager. The 15-year-old teenager later succumbed to his injuries in an intensive care unit.