Sitrep for Jan. 13-15, 2025 (as of 9:30 a.m. UTC+3)
Frontline Situation Update
In the Kurakhove direction, according to DeepState, the Russian Armed Forces have captured the village of Yantarne in the Sukhi Yaly River valley, where the Russian flag had previously been raised by RuAF soldiers. This leaves the village of Dachne as the only remaining settlement in the bulge near Kurakhove not under Russian control. Russian troops continue advancing along the northern bank of the Vovcha River from the village of Shevchenko toward Andriivka. There is a crossing in the village of Kostiantynopil just to the south of Andriivka. Whether the crossing has survived months of fighting remains unclear. Holding the remaining pocket west of Kurakhove seems untenable for the Armed Forces of Ukraine and an organized withdrawal should be considered to avoid encirclement, which is likely once Russian forces reach the Vovcha River and cut the N-15 highway.
In the Pokrovsk direction, Russian forces continue their westward advance across the entire frontline, from Zelene and Shevchenko to the village of the same name near the Kurakhove Reservoir. Recent progress has enabled the RuAF to cut a Pokrovsk supply route passing through the village of Kotlyne.
The road and railway in the area were already within range of Russian weapons, and the next objective appears to be cutting the road to Pavlohrad in the Dnipropetrovsk region. Meanwhile, they are also attempting to cut supply routes to the village of Kostiantynivka by advancing from Vozdvyzhenka. Currently, the road to Pavlohrad remains the most reliable supply line for Pokrovsk, with Russian forces now less than 10 km [6.2 mi] away from it.
DeepState also reports significant Russian progress in the town of Chasiv Yar, where only a small portion of the town remains under Ukrainian control, including the district with apartment blocks.
No major changes have been observed in other sectors of the frontline.
Reports have started to emerge in the Western press, including The New York Times and The Associated Press, detailing encounters between Ukrainian troops and North Korean soldiers in the Kursk region. According to Ukrainian soldiers quoted in these articles, the arrival of DPRK troops has significantly complicated the situation in the Kursk direction. North Korean soldiers are described as better trained, more disciplined, physically resilient, and mentally unyielding compared to their Russian counterparts. Some accounts even liken them to the Wagner mercenaries of 2022 in terms of combat effectiveness.
We view these statements as typical wartime folklore, akin to Russian propaganda tales of NATO generals or foreign mercenaries fighting in Ukraine. While young, highly motivated North Korean troops may appear more formidable next to Russia’s fatigued, demoralized and often older assault forces, their tactics—such as advancing through minefields, disregarding UAV threats, and showing little concern for their own lives or those of others—do not reflect a high degree of professionalism (it is worth noting that Ukrainian mobilized troops are also, on average, over 40 years old).
We do not consider leaving wounded soldiers behind or the philosophy of "die rather than surrender" to be hallmarks of combat effectiveness either. Similar tactics, employed either by regular Russian troops or Wagner mercenaries—many of whom were ex-convicts—have been dubbed “meat assaults.” At first, the Wagner Group mainly recruited former soldiers with experience in the Chechen and Afghan wars. However, by 2022, heavy losses forced them to replace seasoned fighters with less experienced and poorly trained recruits, including prisoners.
While "meat assault" tactics yield limited results, they are overall not particularly effective. To date, North Korean soldiers have not achieved any significant success in the Kursk region. To the best of our knowledge, the main battlefield gains in the sector of the front are attributable to RuAF units.
​​Ukrainian and Russian Strikes
On the evening of Jan. 13, the AFU launched ATACMS tactical ballistic missiles and Storm Shadow cruise missiles, presumably targeting the Bryansk Chemical Plant in the town of Seltso in the Bryansk region, which produces gunpowder and explosives and is part of the Techmash holding company involved in the execution of state defense orders. One of the videos shows multiple explosions typical of a cluster warhead. Since the distance to this plant from Ukrainian territory is about 130 km [81 mi], it is difficult to imagine what kind of weapon, other than an ATACMS missile with a cluster munition warhead, could have been used for the strike. We have not previously recorded the use of these missiles against targets in the Bryansk region. At the same time, in December 2024, ATACMS missiles were reportedly used in a combined attack with Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG missiles targeting the Rostov region.
In the early hours of Jan. 14, the largest combined air attack on Russian territory since the full-scale invasion took place. The Ministry of Defense reported the interception of six ATACMS missiles, eight Storm Shadow missiles and 180 drones, including 146 outside the "special military operation" zone. Industrial facilities in the town Aleksin, Tula region were attacked: the Aleksin Chemical Plant, Tulachermet plant and the Aleksin Thermal Power Plant, with local residents reporting explosions and publishing videos of drones being shot down. The already struck Kristall oil depot in the town of Engels, Saratov region and the oil refinery in the city of Saratovwere also attacked. In addition, a liquefied petroleum gas cluster base and a Transneft oil pumping station in the town Almetyevsk were attacked in Russia’s constituent Republic of Tatarstan. The extent of the damage is not yet entirely clear.
At the meeting of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief's Headquarters of the AFU, a decision was made to halt the formation of new brigades. From now on, mobilized soldiers will be sent to reinforce existing units. This decision is the result of pressure from journalists, the public, and the military. It remains unclear what initially led to the decision to form such a large number of new brigades at the expense of reinforcing existing ones.
This may have been due to the reporting system of brigade commanders, who might have underreported their losses, leading the Ukrainian high command to have a distorted picture of unit readiness. As a result, new recruits were directed toward creating reserves and new brigades. Amid complaints about a lack of personnel and the slow pace of mobilization, the decision to form 14 new brigades at once was unexpected. The demand for sugarcoating the situation and falsifying reports is partly influenced by Ukrainian society, which is reluctant to accept negative information from the frontline or critical analyses of the war.
Additionally, the situation could have been impacted by the system of cooperation with Western partners. The United States and European countries have provided training and equipment in proportion to the number of newly formed units, while older brigades have not been adequately supplied with equipment and weaponry. According to Volodymyr Zelenskyy, ensuring proper provisioning from Ukraine’s allies is a priority before discussing the expansion of the AFU by lowering the mobilization age.
In recent days, reports have emerged about Ukrainian Air Force technicians being reassigned to infantry duties. Zelenskyy has instructed officials to clarify the matter and ensure that the number of specialists required for combat tasks is not reduced.
Western Assistance
German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius announced that Ukraine has received its first RCH 155 self-propelled howitzer. It is worth noting that a total of 54 such howitzers are planned for delivery by the end of 2025. In this case, the term "delivery" may refer to the provision of the system to Ukrainian forces for training at a range in Europe, rather than its actual transport to Ukraine.
During the presentation of this SPH in the German city of Kassel, Ukraine’s ambassador highlighted that while the RCH 155 wheeled howitzer will be the first combat vehicle in the AFU based on the Boxer platform, another Boxer system armed with a 30mm caliber weapon is expected later. This likely refers to the Boxer RCT30 infantry fighting vehicle. It is currently unknown how many such vehicles will be delivered to Ukraine; some sources report it could be nine units.
US President Joe Biden spoke about his foreign policy, stating that his administration's goals were to support Ukraine and to prevent a conflict between two nuclear powers. In our view, this assessment underscores that the US administration's fears of nuclear war significantly influenced the timing of arms deliveries and the restrictions on the use of Western long-range weapons against targets inside Russia.
According to senior US officials, the Biden administration is advocating for the transfer of frozen Russian Central Bank assets to a special escrow account that would be released only upon the conclusion of peace between Russia and Ukraine. To implement this idea, the US is seeking the support of European countries, where most of these reserves are held. However, EU representatives have so far remained skeptical of the scheme. At the same time, the Trump team supports the initiative, believing that the confiscation of assets would push Moscow toward negotiations and help speed up the end of the Russia-Ukraine war. It remains unclear how the transfer of frozen funds to a special account would provide additional funding to support Ukraine.
On Jan. 17, negotiations will be held in Moscow between Putin and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian. According to the Kommersant daily newspaper, citing Iranian diplomatic sources, an agreement on cooperation between Russia and Iran in the fields of security and defense is expected to be signed. A similar agreement was concluded by Russian authorities with North Korea in June 2024, when Putin visited the DPRK. It is likely that the agreement with Iran will lead to the supply of additional weapons. While the presence of Iranian soldiers in the Kursk region seems highly unlikely, the chances of North Korean soldiers appearing were previously assessed in the same way.
Conscription, Mobilization and Contract Military Service
Vladislav Shapsha, the governor of the Kaluga region, has introduced a bill into the regional Legislative Assembly to increase the regional payment for enlisting in the RuAF from 600,000 rubles [$5,840] to 2 million rubles [$19,500].
In Chuvashia [Russia’s constituent republic], volunteer fighters have been promised 1.4 million rubles [$13,600] from Jan. 1, up from 1 million rubles [$9,720]. In the Smolensk region, the payment has been raised to 1.1 million rubles [$10,690], up from 600,000 rubles [$5,830], and in Bashkortostan [Russia's constituent republic], a one-time payment of 1.6 million rubles [$15,550] is offered to volunteer fighters until March 31 (previously 505,000 rubles [$4,900]). It is worth noting that the largest regional sign-up bonus is currently set in the Samara region—signing a contract there between Jan. 1 and Feb. 1, 2025, can earn 3.6 million rubles [$35,000].
In the border regions of Russia, conscripts continue to be killed. Aleksandr S., born in 2004, was killed in the Bryansk region as a result of a mortar attack near the village of Balyshovka.
The spring conscription campaign is scheduled to begin on April 1, and we strongly recommend avoiding statutory military service by any means possible. We encourage reaching out to trusted projects that assist deserters and refuseniks: Idite Lesom!, Kovcheg [Ark] and Movement of Conscientious Objectors.
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