Sitrep for Dec. 18-20, 2024 (as of 9 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

The DeepState monitoring project reported that by the end of the week, the pocket in the Sukhi Yaly River valley in the Kurakhove direction had been entirely overrun by Russian forces, with some Ukrainian troops unable to retreat in time. The entrenched practice of holding pockets of territory at seemingly any cost has caused vulnerabilities along various sections of the frontline and risks facilitating the creation of a much larger bulge around Kurakhove. Had the Armed Forces of Ukraine redeployed reinforcements and withdrawn troops from this pocket to other positions, Russian advances in the Kurakhove and South Donetsk directions might have been significantly slower, potentially averting the encirclement of the Kurakhove fortified area.

As of now, the Russian Armed Forces have reached nearly the entire length of the Sukhi Yaly River, capturing the villages of Kostiantynopilske and Suhi Yaly, as well as the village of Zelenivka. The river’s source lies in Russian-controlled territory, and there are only about four kilometers [2.5 mi] of river left to cover before it merges with the Vovcha River near Kostiantynopil. If Russian troops advance from Zelenivka—or the village of Ulakly, three kilometers [2 mi] away—the N-15 highway, the sole supply route for Ukrainian troops in Kurakhove’s fortified area, could be severed. Should this occur, Ukrainian units in Kurakhove and the village of Dachne would face the grim task of having to break through near-total encirclement to escape.

During the past week, North Korean soldiers have been actively participating in combat in the Kursk region. However, it is still difficult to draw definitive conclusions about their effectiveness. On the one hand, their presence has allowed pro-Russian forces to advance in the northwestern part of the Ukrainian bridgehead, moving from the village of Kremyanoye toward the village of Kruglenkoye, located west of Malaya Loknya. On the other hand, there is a noticeable lack of understanding of the modern realities of the Russian-Ukrainian war among North Korean soldiers. The widespread use of drone technologies by both sides has made it impossible to concentrate large amounts of equipment or large groups of soldiers near forward positions without being detected. Such targets are quickly identified by drones (including those equipped with thermal imaging) and subjected to strikes. Despite this being widely known for quite some time, early video footage of North Korean soldiers shows them operating in large groups in open terrain, making them easy to detect and target, including by cluster munitions. In other videos, North Korean soldiers are seen freezing in place upon spotting a drone, seemingly unaware of what the device is or the danger it poses. There is also footage of a North Korean soldier emotionally describing his reaction to the appearance of drones overhead, suggesting a lack of familiarity with such threats.

The first fighting involving North Korean soldiers was expected as early as early November, but actual clashes only began in early December. We assumed that throughout the month of November, operational coordination between Russian and North Korean soldiers was taking place, allowing troops to practice interaction and cooperation. Additionally, during this time, North Korean soldiers were expected to learn that drones are one of the main threats on the frontline and that their use has significantly changed combat tactics. However, based on the aforementioned videos, these kinds of preparations do not appear to have occurred.

In the absence of open source intelligence, we cannot independently assess the level of losses among North Korean soldiers or verify statements made by various officials. According to a South Korean lawmaker cited by the Yonhap News Agency, South Korean intelligence reports that North Korea has lost 100 soldiers killed and 1,000 wounded in action. We find this assessment unrealistic due to the extraordinarily improbable kill-to-wound ratio of 1:10 in the current war.

A new video showing a trainload of DPRK-made Koksan M1989 170mm self-propelled howitzers has been published. It is currently unclear whether this is a new trainload or the one previously spotted in Krasnoyarsk in November. The deployment of these SPHs on the frontline has not yet been documented, unlike the Phoenix (Bulsae) ATGM mentioned in the previous sitrep.

Ukrainian and Russian Strikes

On the evening of Dec. 18, two explosions occurred near the Northern Fleet naval base in Severomorsk, Murmansk region, one of which was captured on a CCTV camera of a residential building in Murmansk. The exact location of the explosion is currently unknown. It may have occurred at the Severomorsk-1 military airfield or an ammunition depot 11 km [7 mi] from Murmansk. The cause of the explosion cannot be determined from the available video. A drone strike cannot be ruled out, although there have been no eyewitness reports of drones or statements from the Ministry of Defense on this matter. Successful strikes over such a long distance—about 1,900 km [1,180 mi]—have not been previously reported. However, it is worth noting that Ukrainian UAVs were shot down in the Murmansk region in August and September 2024. It is also possible that the explosion was caused by non-war-related factors.

On Dec. 18, Ukraine launched Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG missiles at a facility in Kamensk-Shakhtinsky, Rostov region—the Kamensky Chemical Plant, which produces rocket engine fuel. This information was declassified by the CIA in 2011 and reported in Russian media after the explosion on July 29 and the Ukrainian missile strike on Sept. 23, 2024. Some footage shows air defense activity, and a video of debris matching the Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG missile has also been published. The MoD confirmed the strike and stated that ATACMS tactical ballistic missiles were also used against the plant.

On the morning of Dec. 20, Russia launched a massive combined attack on Kyiv and several other Ukrainian cities, which the Russian MoD called a response to the Ukrainian strike on Kamensk-Shakhtinsky. As a result, according to Kyiv Mayor Vitalii Klytschko, one person was killed and ten were injured. Another two people were killed as a result of massive shelling against the city of Kherson.

The pro-Russian Telegram channel Fighterbomber, associated with the Russian Air and Space Force, published a mournful post reporting the loss of another Kamov Ka-52 (Hokum B) attack helicopter along with its crew. Preliminary information suggests that a RuAF air defense system was responsible for the incident.

Western Assistance

The United Kingdom will allocate a new military aid package to Ukraine worth £225 million [$282 million]. The funds will be distributed as follows:

£92 million [$115 million] for equipment to bolster Ukraine’s navy, including small boats, reconnaissance drones, uncrewed surface vessels, loitering munitions and mine countermeasure drones;
£68 million [$85 million] for air defense equipment, including radars, decoy land equipment and counter-drone electronic warfare systems;
£26 million [$85 million] for support and spare parts for systems previously delivered to Ukraine;
£39 million [$85 million] for the delivery of more than 1,000 counter-drone electronic warfare systems and for joint procurement of respirators and equipment to enhance the protective capabilities of the AFU.

Additionally, the UK will continue to train Ukrainian soldiers.