Sitrep for Dec. 16-18, 2024 (as of 10 a.m. UTC+3)
Frontline Situation Update
Over the past few days, there have been virtually no significant changes on the frontline in Ukraine. The Russian Armed Forces have made minor advances in the South Donetsk direction, near the villages of Novyi Komar and Makarivka, located to the north and south of Velyka Novosilka, respectively.
In the Kurakhove direction, Russian forces have taken control of the pocket along the Sukhi Yaly River. The area around the village of Hannivka, previously marked as contested on the DeepState map, is now under Russian control, and the Russian-occupied zone now extends to the Trudove–Uspenivka line. In the Pokrovsk direction, the RuAF continue to gradually expand the salient toward the town of Pokrovsk.
In the Toretsk and Chasiv Yar directions, as well as in the Kharkiv region, there have been no changes. However, in the Kupiansk direction, Russian forces continue their attempts to expand the bridgehead on the western bank of the Oskil River, but the Armed Forces of Ukraine are holding them back for now.
The main news in recent days remains the involvement of North Korean soldiers in combat in the Kursk direction, now officially confirmed by Pentagon spokesman Patrick Ryder. He also reported casualties among these troops, including both wounded and killed. While distinguishing North Korean soldiers from members of some of Russia's indigenous peoples can be difficult, there is ample reason to believe that the numerous young soldiers of Asian appearance are indeed from North Korea. Evidence includes frontline video footage, reports from wounded soldiers in a Kursk hospital and visual accounts of bodies left on the battlefield. A notable difference between Russian and North Korean soldiers is their age: Russian assault troops are typically middle-aged men (40-45 years old), whereas North Korean forces observed appear to be younger, usually around 20-25 years old. According to the Wall Street Journal, the North Korean soldiers spotted in the Kursk region may be conscripts with limited experience.
The lack of footage showing Russian soldiers near North Korean personnel raises questions. For example, while there are videos of North Korean troops crossing a field on foot, no footage has emerged showing them being transported to enemy positions in armored personnel carriers. Initially, North Korean troops were thought to be attached to RuAF units, such as the marines, and to have participated in joint combat training exercises over the past month. This reinforces the impression that our earlier hypothesis is likely correct: North Korean forces are being used as a sort of expeditionary corps. In this scenario, coordination would be handled by North Korean generals accompanying the troops.
The introduction of additional forces has led to advances in the northwestern part of the Ukrainian bridgehead near the village of Kremyanoye. Another axis of attack is centered on the southeastern section of the bridgehead near the village of Plyokhovo. Pro-Russian forces are now striking Ukrainian positions in the Kursk region with converging assaults from opposite directions.
While reports continue to circulate about the involvement of North Korean troops in combat near Plyokhovo, no conclusive evidence has yet emerged. It is possible that the operational zones have been divided, with Russian marines from the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade likely conducting the southeastern offensive, while DPRK soldiers may be leading the assault in the northwest. It remains too early to assess the success of these attacks. However, it remains unclear whether the deployment of an additional 12,000 troops to the Kursk region will significantly alter the situation. If rumors of 20,000 supplementary North Korean soldiers being sent to Russia prove accurate, this force would represent 40% of the 50,000-strong Russian contingent in the area.
The tactics employed by DPRK units have also raised questions. Advancing platoons across open fields are highly vulnerable to cluster munition strikes, a strategy ill-suited for successful assaults. Despite reports suggesting that North Korean troops have received training in UAV piloting, only infantry units have been observed in combat thus far. Artillery and drone support is likely still provided by Russian forces.
Separately, a video has surfaced showing an unidentified munition being used against Ukrainian vehicles and buildings in the Sumy region. The footage reveals an unfamiliar targeting interface. Based on the speed and trajectory of the munition, it could be a North Korean-supplied Bulsae ATGM.
Andrey Belousov, Russia’s Minister of Defense, announced during the expanded meeting of the MoD dedicated to the results of 2024, that the ministry's efforts are focused on ensuring full readiness for a potential military conflict with NATO over the next decade. According to Belousov, decisions made at NATO summits and outlined in doctrinal documents point to the likelihood of such a confrontation.
This statement is significant as, if a ceasefire agreement is reached in 2025, similar claims about a potential clash with NATO could be used to justify delaying the demobilization of military personnel and maintaining substantial defense spending.
We have decided not to comment on the data presented during the meeting, as it not only appears implausible but also contradicts prior statements by Russian authorities.
Donald Trump criticized the decision to permit Ukraine to strike targets within Russian territory using high-precision Western weaponry, calling it "a big mistake." He expressed outrage that the Biden administration granted this authorization without consulting him just weeks before his inauguration. In Trump’s opinion, Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Vladimir Putin should be prepared to negotiate a ceasefire agreement, although the specific terms remain unclear.
Throughout this year, the initiative has primarily rested with the Russian side, apart from the AFU offensive in the Kursk region. However, this does not mean that the RuAF are free from challenges related to military personnel and equipment shortages. A gradual decline in the quality and availability of equipment is evident. For instance, a recent video shows a Soviet-era ATS-59G artillery tractor (introduced in 1970) repurposed to transport personnel to forward positions. The ATS has been retrofitted with metal plates (likely not armor), rubberized fabric and chain-link grids.
Yuriy Boyko, advisor to the Ukrainian prime minister and a member of Ukrenergo’s supervisory board, stated that a distinctive feature of Russia's recent large-scale missile attack on Ukraine's power grid on Dec. 13 was its focus on interstate energy infrastructure facilities. According to Boyko, the goal of the attack was to undermine Ukraine's ability to export and import energy or even to completely disconnect its power grids from Europe. It is worth noting that in November 2022 and April-May 2024, the RuAF had already targeted the Dobrotvirska Thermal Power Plant in the Lviv region, located 35 kilometers [22 mi] from the Ukraine-Poland border. The plant’s substation serves as a critical link between the two countries' power transmission networks.
A scandal has erupted in Ukraine over instances of assaults, abuse and extortion in the 211th Pontoon Bridge Brigade. According to Ukrainska Pravda, officers in the unit were taking bribes ranging from 5,000 to 20,000 hryvnias [$120–$480] to avoid filing reports on violations or documenting them. In cases of non-payment, they threatened soldiers with reassignment to infantry units and deployment in frontline attacks. It is also claimed that most of the assaults were carried out by Vladyslav Pastukh, the platoon commander, who is the son of the chief of staff and the godson of Brigade Commander Oleh Poberezhniuk. Following the scandal, Pastukh was transferred to another unit, and his father compensated the soldiers who had filed reports. However, no investigation into the abuse of soldiers was initiated. Pastukh Sr. was charged with a misdemeanor for failing to penalize his subordinates. Later, the AFU General Staff responded to the situation, and Commander-in-Chief of the AFU, General Oleksandr Syrskyi sent a commission from the Military Law Enforcement Service to the 211th Brigade for an inspection.
Currently, the primary challenge facing the AFU is a shortage of personnel. Such violent practices in some units, combined with a lack of weapons, have significantly contributed to soldiers refusing to enlist and deserting the frontline.
In the early hours of Dec. 17 in Moscow, a bomb planted on an electric scooter killed Lieutenant General Igor Kirillov, head of the Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Protection Troops of the RuAF, along with his aide Ilya Polikarpov. Just a day earlier, on Dec. 16, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) had accused Kirillov of using chemical weapons against the AFU. According to sources from Reuters, BBC and RBC-Ukraine, Kirillov’s murder was part of an SBU special operation.
Mykhailo Podolyak, Advisor to the Head of the Office of the President of Ukraine, denied Ukrainian involvement, stating that "Ukraine does not employ terrorist methods." However, we find this explanation unconvincing. We believe Kirillov was targeted mainly because he was an accessible high-ranking MoD official, whose security was neglected due to the perception that he played an insignificant role in the war and was unlikely to attract the attention of Ukrainian intelligence.
On the morning of Dec. 18, it was reported that the Federal Security Service (FSB) had detained a suspect in the murder—a citizen of Uzbekistan. The suspect claimed to have been recruited by Ukrainian intelligence services, who promised him $100,000 and a European passport in exchange for committing the crime. Following their instructions, he traveled to Moscow, obtained an improvised explosive device and placed it on an electric scooter near Kirillov's residence. Additionally, the suspect rented a vehicle and installed cameras that streamed the events to Dnipro. Investigators believe the explosive device was detonated remotely.
Kirillov is primarily known for his statements about Western biolabs, "combat mosquitoes," the development of chemical weapons and a "dirty bomb" in Ukraine, as well as the alleged planned seizure of the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant. We do not believe that he gave direct orders to use tear gas on the frontline, as claimed by the SBU, and we do not think his death will have any impact on the course of the war.
Deputy Chief of the Main Military-Political Directorate of the Russian MoD and commander of the Akhmat special forces Apti Alaudinov was awarded the title of Honorary Professor by the South-West State University in Kursk. In August, after the start of the AFU’s operation in the Kursk region, Alaudinov predicted that the entire war, which he called the special military operation, would be over in three months.
Rinaz Gubaydullin, born March 17, 2005, in the village of Nusa, Tatarstan, signed a contract with the MoD and went to war a few weeks before his 19th birthday. On Feb. 20, 2024, he left the town of Arsk and was sent to the frontline almost immediately. According to his mother, he stopped communicating on March 1. On Nov. 29, it was revealed that Gubaydullin had been killed on March 4, less than two weeks after signing his contract and before reaching his 19th birthday.
War in Syria
Dutch Foreign Minister Caspar Veldkamp stated that the European Union considers the withdrawal of Russian troops from Syria a prerequisite for lifting sanctions on the country. According to Veldkamp, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which has seized power in Syria, must respect minority rights and "disengage from all kinds of obligations the Assad regime undertook regarding Russian military presence in the country."
The United Kingdom has sent a delegation to Syria to engage with the interim government and civil society. David Lammy, Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs of the UK, stated that the country may maintain contacts with HTS despite the group’s designation as a terrorist organization.
Russia’s State Duma [lower house of the Federal Assembly of Russia] has passed a bill that will allow organizations to be "temporarily" removed from the list of terrorist entities if they "cease activities aimed at promoting and supporting terrorism." This measure is likely intended to facilitate Russia’s contacts with both the Taliban and HTS.
The future of Russia’s military bases in Syria remains uncertain. The recently initiated partial withdrawal of equipment from the Khmeimim airbase continues.