Sitrep for Nov. 1-4, 2024 (as of 9:30 a.m. UTC+3) 

Frontline Situation Update

The Russian Armed Forces have captured the village of Kurakhivka, almost completely occupying the pocket north of the Kurakhove Reservoir. Although the Ukrainian DeepState project has not marked the areas between the villages of Vovchenka and Ostrivske and south of Ostrivske in red (i.e. as controlled by Russian forces) on their map, this territory can now be considered captured. If there are Ukrainian troops left there, those are very unlikely to be able to break out of the encirclement. The project must have not yet received enough visual data to mark these areas as captured by the RuAF.

The next objective for Russian forces appears to be to cut the N-15 Zaporizhzhia-Donetsk highway, which runs through the town of Kurakhove. As we have already mentioned, the Kurakhove area is quite heavily fortified making a frontal attack from the village of Maksymilianivka very challenging. Russian forces may attempt to bypass those numerous fortifications along the northern shore of the reservoir through the village of Illinivka to reach the highway between the villages of Dachne and Kostyantynopil. At the same time, the RuAF are advancing towards the same route from the south—from the villages of Yasna Poliana, Maksymivka; and Trudove and Bohoiavlenka, probably intending to occupy territory south of the Sukhi Yaly River, which is a natural barrier, to facilitate further advances. In Maksymivka, Russian soldiers have hoisted a Russian flag on a building, suggesting that the village has been captured.

Using the situation in the Donetsk region as an example, we would like to remind our readers that despite the significant advances by Russian forces, the frontline is not on the brink of collapse, as there has not been a decisive breakthrough of Ukrainian defensive lines. We believe the main limiting factor for Russia is a shortage of military equipment within its army. It is likely that if the RuAF could advance with armored vehicles, they might have indeed reached operational depths on certain fronts.

In recent days, Russian forces have made slight advances in the Pokrovsk direction, west of the captured village of Tsukuryne.

In the Kursk region, no Russian advances have been observed, likely due in part to Russian troops being unable to break through Ukraine’s defensive line. It is worth noting that the Armed Forces of Ukraine had prepared defenses on the occupied territory.

No confirmed reports have emerged of DPRK troops participating in combat operations. However, Ukrainian intelligence has released details on the equipment used by soldiers from North Korea. In particular, they are equipped with 60mm mortars, which are not standard in the RuAF. These could possibly be Chinese Type 31 or Type 63-1 mortars (or Type 63, for which North Korea manufactures shells). This caliber allows for a firing range of around 2 km [1.24 mi]— a limited reach in modern warfare, especially given that even drones can travel farther.

Additionally, North Korean soldiers are reported to have AK-12 rifles, RPK/PKM machine guns, RPG-7 grenade launchers, and SVD sniper rifles — all of which could come from Russian stockpiles. They are reported to be equipped with North Korean-made Bulsae ATGMs, often translated as Phoenix or Firebird. They are also stated to have received some night-vision devices, thermal cameras and collimator sights.

There have apparently been no additional armored vehicles deployed to the Kursk region. A video purportedly showing a trainload of Russian military equipment in the Kursk region was recently published; however, it was later determined that the footage was filmed further north in the Oryol region. While the convoy was moving westward, it could still find its way to the Kursk region. Notably, the train was not transporting armored vehicles, but BAZ-69092 trucks and two-axle utility trailers—likely 5I57 or 5I7A diesel generators. We believe this equipment to be part of an air-defense system, likely an S-400.

Consequently, the evidence suggests that North Korean assault infantry units will be equipped with anti-tank missile systems, but lack armored support, making them better suited for defensive rather than offensive operations.

A Ukrainian service member from a drone unit operating within a naval infantry brigade in the Kursk region has claimed that North Korean soldiers have been trained to use FPV and DJI quadcopter drones. The origin of this information remains unclear. Basic quadcopter piloting skills can typically be acquired with a few hours of training, excluding special techniques for operating in jammer-heavy environments or high winds. By contrast, FPV drone piloting is significantly more challenging and requires a much longer training period.

Last week, we shared footage of a Ukrainian drone striking a Russian reconnaissance UAV, which had been programmed to perform evasive maneuvers, from below. Serhii Sternenko, a Ukrainian far-right social activist and Youtuber, has published a compilation of successful drone interceptions of enemy UAVs from below.

A Russian company has presented a prototype of a hand-launched UAV interceptor that automatically locks on to targets based on their thermal signatures. We were somewhat surprised to find that the sensitivity of the heat-seeking head was sufficient to detect small electric-powered UAVs, which emit very little heat. The bulkiness of this system and its limited ammunition will likely restrict its use to the point defense of anti-air assets in the rear.

Pro-Russian bloggers report that the Russian army has begun disbanding UAV units and reassigning drone operators to assault troops. Allegedly, over more than two years of war, many ad-hoc units dedicated to drones emerged, and Russia’s Minister of Defense Andrey Belousov aims to restructure these efforts by creating specialized UAV technical battalions to assist in defense, support infantry attacks, and provide artillery targeting. Meanwhile, the existing irregular units are being disbanded, and their operators are being reassigned to assault troops.

The head of Ukraine’s Center for Countering Disinformation under the National Security and Defense Council, Andriy Kovalenko, reported that Google updated its maps and accidentally published satellite images of Ukrainian military facilities, likely including positions of the Patriot system at Zhulyany Airport. It is worth noting that the images were taken about a year ago, and their release does not compromise Ukraine’s defense capability, as Russian forces obtained this information long ago via their own and private Chinese satellites, and possibly even drones.

Ukrainian and Russian Strikes

On Nov. 1, Russian forces struck a police station building in the city of Kharkiv, presumably with two S-300/S-400 modified surface-to-air missiles. One policeman was killed and 50 people were injured, 36 of them being police officers. It is worth noting that police forces, with the exception of members of the Liut Brigade of the Special Tasks Patrol Police under the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine who are engaged on the frontline, are not considered combatants and therefore cannot be legitimate military targets.

In the early hours of Nov. 4, Russian forces once again struck Kharkiv. Allegedly, a FAB-250 bomb equipped with a Universal Gliding and Correction (UMPK) hit tram tracks near the Peremoha metro station on the northern outskirts of the city. Currently, 15 people are reported injured. The impact also damaged the nearby Rost supermarket, shattered windows in neighboring buildings and affected parked cars in the area.

The Russian state-owned RIA Novosti news agency, citing the Investigative Committee, reported that a Ukrainian drone reached the village of Durovo-Bobrik in the Kursk region and dropped some kind of ammunition on the grounds of a women's convent, killing two civilians. Video footage released after the resulting fire had been extinguished does not clarify which damage was caused by the munition explosion and which by the subsequent fire, making it impossible to determine the potential power and type of munition. It is worth noting that it is common practice for authorities in Russian border regions to claim that any destruction or civilian casualties are caused by Ukrainian drones, even when there are no fragments or other evidence to substantiate their claims.

Durovo-Bobrik is located about 10 kilometers [6.2 mi] from the frontline, and apart from drones, some mortar and artillery shells can cover that distance. Therefore, since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, we have been calling for evacuating civilians from areas close to forward positions to avoid collateral damage.

According to data collected by CIT volunteers in summaries of strikes on civilian infrastructure in Ukraine and Russia, in October 2024, from Sept. 30 to Oct. 31, at least 219 civilians were killed and 1,255 sustained injuries of varying severity as a result of strikes and attacks on both sides of the frontline.

Western Assistance

The USA has announced a new military aid package, with an estimated value of $425 million. The capabilities in this announcement include:

• Munitions for National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS);
• Stinger anti-aircraft missiles;
• Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems (c-UAS) equipment and munitions;
• Air-to-ground munitions (probably Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW) glide bombs);
• Ammunition for High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS);
• 155mm and 105mm artillery ammunition;
• Tube-launched, Optically tracked, Wire-guided (TOW) missiles;
• Javelin and AT-4 anti-armor systems;
• Stryker Armored Personnel Carriers;
• Small arms and ammunition;
• Medical equipment;
• Demolitions equipment and munitions;
• Spare parts, ancillary equipment, services, training, and transportation.