Sitrep for Dec. 13-16, 2024 (as of 10 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

At the Vremivka salient, the Russian Armed Forces have recently reoccupied the previously liberated village of Novyi Komar, once again partially encircling the village of Velyka Novosilka. Additionally, to the south, Russian forces forded the Mokri Yaly River near the occupied village of Blahodatne and began advancing northeast from the village of Rivnopil, targeting the villages of Neskuchne and Storozheve.

If Ukrainian forces remain in the village of Makarivka, located south of Blahodatne and currently marked as controlled by the Armed Forces of Ukraine on the map, they find themselves nearly encircled. The only exit through a narrow 1.5-kilometer-wide [1 mi]contested corridor poses significant challenges. This situation raises concerns, particularly given past instances where Ukrainian command has struggled to organize timely withdrawals of units from operational encirclements.

For example, in the Kurakhove direction, in the pocket along the Sukhi Yaly River, after Russian forces entered the village of Veselyi Hai, Ukrainian troops were still reported holding positions in the village of Yelyzavetivka. Later, strikes on retreating Ukrainian soldiers were filmed in the village of Hannivka, along with a flag photo op by Russian forces. This sequence of events now suggests that the pocket in this area has been effectively captured by Russian forces. As visual evidence confirming the sustained Russian presence continues to emerge, the remaining parts of this pocket will likely be marked as under Russian control on DeepState maps.

Near the village of Sukhi Yaly, Russian forces have advanced toward the village of Zelenivka, which is located approximately 3.5 kilometers [2 mi] from the N-15 highway.

In the town of Kurakhove, Russian soldiers staged another flag photo op on the Kurakhove City Council building, having rushed into the town’s westernmost part. However, video footage shows them running from cover to cover, making it inconclusive whether they fully control this section. Despite this uncertainty, DeepState's map now marks nearly the entire southern part of Kurakhove as under Russian control. This development suggests that the complete capture of Kurakhove may soon follow, potentially leading to the RuAF seizing the entire fortified area, including territories east of Dachne and Zelenivka. However, it is unlikely that the RuAF will secure the entire area by the end of December, with fighting expected to continue into the new year.

There have been no noticeable changes in the Pokrovsk direction.

In the Kharkiv region, in the Kupiansk direction, Russian forces are expanding their bridgehead on the western bank of the Oskil River near the village of Masiutivka. This bridgehead is necessary for an attack on both parts of the town of Kupiansk divided by a water barrier. The RuAF can attack the town's eastern part by advancing from the village of Synkivka, while to attack its western part they need to move along the corresponding bank of the river.

In the Kursk region, where last week the RuAF managed to liberate the village of Plyokhovo in the southeastern part of the Ukrainian bridgehead, fighting has intensified in the northwestern part near the village of Kremyanoye, reportedly, with the participation of North Korean soldiers. To support this claim, drone footage has been published showing a full platoon of about 40 soldiers moving across a field. This movement stands out as highly unusual, as Russian forces are typically observed operating in smaller groups of 3-5 soldiers, or occasionally up to 10.

It is important to note that the available videos do not provide conclusive evidence that the individuals shown are North Korean soldiers. Similarly, it is impossible to make out the faces of the soldiers in the footage of rows of dead bodies, which were published by Ukrainian officer Robert "Madyar" Brovdi and Serhii Sternenko, a Ukrainian far-right social activist and YouTuber.

In some cases, the faces of the killed military personnel are covered with hoods, making it impossible to verify their nationality. Even in videos where the faces are visible, it remains difficult to assert that these are North Korean soldiers; they could just as easily be Russian soldiers of Asian appearance.

None of the imagery provides sufficient evidence to confirm North Korean military involvement in the fighting. Unsubstantiated claims of their participation have been circulating since early November, so Volodymyr Zelenskyy's recent statement referencing North Korean troops does not serve as definitive proof.

Pro-Russian milblogger Romanov has published a photo of soldiers of both Slavic and Asian appearance. Notably, the Slavic soldiers appear significantly older than the Asian soldiers. This detail is relevant, as most Russian volunteer fighters are middle-aged men. While this could suggest the younger group might indeed be North Korean soldiers, the photograph may have been taken in the rear, for example, at a training range, rather than on the frontline.

There have been no changes to the frontline in the Kursk region so far. In the fighting for the previously liberated village of Plyokhovo, according to pro-Russian milbloggers Romanov and Kotenok, soldiers from North Korea allegedly took part. However, it was soon revealed that they had been misled by false insider information. In a chat where both are members, an unnamed administrator of a major pro-Russian channel briefly posted a claim about a successful assault on Plyokhovoby North Korean special forces. According to well-known LostArmour user Wayne Howell, the rumor was planted as a form of retaliation against Romanov for disclosing classified information. In reality, Plyokhovo was taken by marines from the 810th Brigade of the RuAF.

The Ukrainian Air Force reported the loss of a Sukhoi Su-25 Grach (Frogfoot) attack aircraft and the death of its pilot, presumably after the plane was shot down. This is not surprising, as Su-25 aircraft, which have recently been used as carriers for AASM Hammer precision-guided bombs, lack the speed and maneuverability to safely approach the range required for the effective deployment of such bombs. The use of these aircraft for launching glide bombs involves significant risks. Even Western aircraft avoid operating near the frontline due to the threat of being shot down.

At the EU summit scheduled for Dec. 18-19, President of France Emmanuel Macron is going to start a discussion regarding the deployment of a peacekeeping mission in Ukraine in the event of a ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine. Although many European officials deem such discussions premature, some argue it is prudent to prepare in advance for Donald Trump’s inauguration and subsequent negotiations. Meanwhile, the NATO summit on Dec. 18 will welcome the leaders of Ukraine, the UK, France, Germany, Italy and Poland to discuss the ongoing situation in Ukraine.

It is assumed that the peacekeeping forces will consist of five brigades, totaling 40,000 personnel. Analyst Michael Kofman notes that maintaining such a contingent would require approximately 120,000 troops, taking into account the need for rotation. However, it remains unclear which countries are ready to contribute such a substantial number of soldiers.

The extent of authority granted to these peacekeeping forces in the event of a ceasefire violation by either party also remains unclear. If their role is only to record violations, their presence will not prevent Russia from disrupting the agreements, as was seen in Azerbaijan's actions in Nagorno-Karabakh. Conversely, if European peacekeepers are authorized to return fire in response to ceasefire violations, this could result in casualties among their ranks—a scenario that seems highly unlikely given the political repercussions for the European nations involved.

Strikes and Sabotage Acts

On the morning of Dec. 15 a Ukrainian UAV, a modified version of the light Aeroprakt A-22 aircraft, again struck the Russian riot police base in Grozny. No casualties were reported. Given the drone's small payload, it is unlikely to cause significant physical damage. However, the primary impact of such strikes appears to be psychological and reputational.

The Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine (GUR) carried out several sabotage operations. On Dec. 13, three locomotives were set on fire in Krasnodar.

The following day, Dec. 14, a Su-27P fighter jet (mistakenly identified as a Su-30 in the GUR's statement) was burned at an airfield in Krymsk in the same region. However, the extent of the damage remains uncertain.

Additionally, a video was released showing the explosion of a railway track on a bridge near the Ulyanovsk Motor Plant, which manufactures car engines for UAZ vehicles. The extent of damage from this incident also remains unclear.

It is worth noting that due to a lengthy kill chain, Russian forces are largely incapable of launching missile strikes against moving targets. On Dec. 14, Ukrainian forces conducted an exceptionally complex and effective attack. Operatives from the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) initially sabotaged railway tracks while a train carrying fuel tankers was passing near the village of Oleksiivka in the Bilmak district of the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia region, close to the city of Berdiansk. Following the train's derailment, the 14th Separate Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Regiment targeted the locomotive and the last tanker with Switchblade 600 loitering munitions to prevent recovery efforts and salvage of the fuel tanks. Subsequently, HIMARS MLRS rockets struck the remaining section of the train. Geolocation of the attack site confirms that the overland railway in southern Ukraine has been at least partially restored and is operational. Notably, fuel supplies to Crimea via the Crimean Bridge and ferry crossings have ceased.

On Dec. 15, stormy weather in the Kerch Strait caused the wreckage of two tankers carrying fuel oil from Syzran and Saratov to the port of Kavkaz for export.

On Dec. 14, a Ukrainian soldier was killed by an improvised explosive device in Dnipro. A suspect has been detained. He is believed to have been recruited by Russian intelligence.

War in Syria

Russian forces have begun at least a partial withdrawal of military equipment from the Khmeimim airbase. Recent Maxar satellite images reveal that S-400 SAM system launchers have been removed from their positions.

The images also show a Kamov Ka-52 (Hokum B) attack helicopter prepared for transport, with its rotor blades removed, and an Antonov An-124 Ruslan military transport aircraft with its nose section open for loading.

Even if Russia retains control of the Khmeimim airbase and the port of Tartus, the scale of the RuAF’s presence in Syria is likely to decrease. Bases in other regions previously held by Russian troops—such as Manbij, Qamishli, Shayrat and Tiyas—are expected to be closed.

In his interview to Syria TV, Abu Muhammad al-Julani, now referring to himself by his real name, Ahmad al-Sharaa, has stated that Russia should be given a chance to review its relations with Syria to ensure mutual benefit. He emphasized that Syria is not seeking provocations, is open to a constructive dialogue and suggested that Moscow should reconsider the existing strategic agreements in light of the recent change in Syria's leadership.

According to Reuters, Russian wheat supplies to Syria have been suspended due to the current uncertainty surrounding the country’s governance and complications with payments. It is likely that food supplies could become a bargaining chip in negotiations with Syria’s new leadership, particularly regarding the future of Russian military bases in the country.

Reuters journalists also spoke with close aides to Bashar al-Assad, regional diplomats, senior Iranian military officials and government figures to piece together an account of the final days of the Assad regime. On Nov. 28, as anti-Assad forces launched an assault on Aleppo’s suburbs, Assad flew to Moscow seeking additional support. His request was denied, with Russia prioritizing its war in Ukraine. Upon returning to Syria, he also sought assistance from Iran but was given a similar answer.

In the days leading up to his escape, Assad revealed his plans to no one in his inner circle. Just hours before fleeing to Moscow, he addressed a meeting of roughly 30 military and security leaders, assuring them that Russian reinforcements were on their way and urging ground troops to hold their positions. According to an aide, Assad concluded his work on Saturday, telling his chief of staff that he was heading home. Instead, he went to the airport and, on the morning of Dec. 8, departed for the Khmeimim airbase. From there, Russian forces transported him to Moscow, where he was reunited with his family.

Even Assad’s younger brother, Maher, the commander of Syria’s elite 4th Armored Division, was kept in the dark. Once source reported that Maher later managed to flee to Iraq by helicopter before continuing on to Russia. Assad’s maternal cousins, Ehab and Iyad Makhlouf, were similarly left uninformed. Following the fall of Damascus, the Makhloufs attempted to escape to Lebanon by car but were ambushed by rebels on the way. Ehab was reportedly killed and Iyad wounded. However, the incident has not been officially confirmed and could not be independently verified by Reuters.

Three members of Assad’s inner circle revealed that he had initially sought asylum in the United Arab Emirates but was turned down. The UAE, according to them, was wary of the international fallout from sheltering a figure sanctioned by the US and Europe for using chemical weapons during the civil war—allegations Assad has consistently denied as fabricated.