Sitrep for Dec. 11-13, 2024 (as of 9:30 a.m. UTC+3)
Frontline Situation Update
In the Kurakhove direction, the situation in the pocket along the Sukhi Yaly River valley continues to unfold unexpectedly. A week ago, we assumed that Ukrainian forces were beginning to withdraw from this pocket to avoid encirclement. However, this has proven not to be the case. Russian forces have taken positions in the village of Veselyi Hai, currently situated in the central part of the pocket. While it would be logical to assume that there are no Ukrainian forces remaining east of these positions, a video from the village of Yelyzavetivka has surfaced, proving otherwise. The footage, captured by a drone, shows a two-man Ukrainian assault engineering group ambushed and eliminated in a residential area.
Holding onto this territory does not provide a significant defensive advantage for the Donetsk region. Like the analysts at DeepState, we remain unclear why the Armed Forces of Ukraine have not yet withdrawn from this area.
In the town of Kurakhove, Russian soldiers filmed a flag photo op on a grain elevator located along the reservoir’s shore, between two long-destroyed bridges. To enter the building and reach the roof, the assault group created a breach in the wall using explosives. At present, a significant portion of the town’s built-up area is contested, but it seems that Russian forces are now positioned to take the town entirely without physically cutting off the N-15 highway, a critical supply route.
Kurakhove holds strategic importance not so much as a settlement but because of its well-prepared and heavily fortified positions, some of which have already been captured by Russian forces. Nevertheless, there is an impression that, for Ukrainian military officials, simply maintaining partial control over a settlement serves more as a symbolic milestone for reporting purposes than as a meaningful military objective.
In the previous sitrep, we described the formation of the salient in the area of ​​the village of Zhovte in the Pokrovsk direction, as well as the fighting for the village of Shevchenko. In recent days, the RuAF have advanced westward from the village of Novotroitske southwest of Shevchenko. Additionally, west of the village of Tsukuryne, Russian forces captured the village of Zoria and moved into the village of Sontsivka.
In the Kursk region, Russian troops succeeded in recapturing several positions in the eastern part of the Ukrainian bridgehead and advanced south of Sudzha, west of the village of Cherkasskaya Konopelka.
Ukrainian and Russian Strikes
The General Staff of the AFU reported on an attack on the oil-loading terminal of the Druzhba pipeline in the Bryansk region in the early hours of Dec. 11. The strike was confirmed by footage of a fire and a statement from Governor Aleksandr Bogomaz. However, no further information about the consequences of the attack is available yet. Ukrainian media and Telegram channels have claimed that diesel fuel for the Russian army was being loaded at this oil loading terminal, but we have not seen any confirmation of this.
On the same night, Ukrainian forces hit a military unit and an aircraft repair plant near the Taganrog airfield with ATACMS tactical ballistic missiles. One of the impacts was geolocated in a parking area on the plant's premises, damaging a boiler house—likely the facility referenced by the city's mayor, Svetlana Kambulova. A video has been published showing the aftermath of the strike on the barracks of the military unit where the 5th Air Forces Group of the 6995th air base is stationed, revealing significant damage. According to the ASTRA media outlet, one soldier was killed and 41 were injured. The Russian Ministry of Defense acknowledged the use of ATACMS missiles in the attack but claimed that out of the six missiles launched, two were shot down by the Pantsir-S1 surface-to-air missile and anti-aircraft artillery system, while the remaining four were deflected by electronic warfare systems. An ATACMS missile component was discovered in a parking lot near a barracks, showing no signs of interception by an anti-aircraft missile. It remains unclear whether Russian EW systems can effectively disrupt these missiles, which are equipped with both GPS and inertial navigation systems.
In our previous sitrep, we reported on the Dec. 10 Russian missile strike on a private clinic in the city of Zaporizhzhia. Rescue operations concluded on Dec. 12, with the death toll rising to 11 and the number of injured reaching 22.
Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh has stated that Russia may fire another Oreshnik missile in the coming days, with the US Department of Defense citing intelligence indicating preparations for a launch. We continue to believe that a repeat Oreshnik strike would have little military value. The missile is both costly and inefficient, and a single launch seemed sufficient to signal Russia’s willingness to use missiles capable of reaching Western Europe.
Western Assistance
Time magazine has named President-elect Donald Trump its 2024 Person of the Year. In the accompanying interview, Trump expressed strong disapproval of long-range missile strikes into Russian territory, arguing, “We’re just escalating this war and making it worse.” As we have previously noted, we do not believe this stance to be supported by evidence.
According to Ukraine’s Ambassador to the US, Oksana Markarova, the House of Representatives has removed the Ukraine lend-lease program from the draft US defense budget for 2025. She noted that the Senate’s draft did include the provision, but it was omitted from the version approved by the House. It is worth noting that Republicans currently hold the majority in Congress, and many of them advocate reducing aid to Ukraine, with some even calling to stop it completely.
The US has announced a new $ 500 million military aid package for Ukraine under the PDA program, which means that supplies will come directly from the US military reserves. The package will include:
- Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems (c-UAS) munitions;
- Ammunition for HIMARS;
- 155mm and 105mm artillery ammunition;
- ​High-speed Anti-radiation missiles (HARMs);
- Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS);
- Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles (MRAPs), High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) and light tactical vehicles;
- Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN) protective equipment;
- Javelin and AT-4 anti-armor systems, Tube-launched, Optically guided, Wire-tracked (TOW) missiles;
- Small arms ammunition;
- Demolitions equipment and munitions;
- Spare parts, ancillary equipment, services, training and transportation.
Conscription, Mobilization and Contract Military Service
On Oct. 4, Sakhalin Governor Vasily Limarenko announced the death of conscripted soldier Nikita Molochkovskyi in the Donetsk region. Six months earlier, the serviceman had filed a lawsuit against his unit's command, trying to prove that he had not signed a military contract. On December 11, sources familiar with the case told the Sibir.Realii [part of the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty network] online outlet that the Institute of Forensic Medicine and Criminology confirmed: the signature on the contract issued in Molochkovskyi's name was indeed not his. According to Molochkovskyi's relatives, all conscripts from his company were sent to Ukraine using forged signatures. This practice of falsifying signatures on contracts was known even before the full-scale invasion, but it can be assumed that due to the current shortage of personnel, this problem has only worsened.
It is worth noting that, according to statistics from the Judicial Department under the Supreme Court of Russia, real prison terms are not handed down for evading regular conscription. Therefore, we urge people to avoid conscription by any means possible: receiving a fine or, in rare cases, a suspended sentence is far better than becoming disabled or being killed in the war.
In October, we already reported that commanders were signing contracts on behalf of conscripts from the 90th Tank Division, stationed in the Chelyabinsk region. Now, relatives of conscripts serving in one of this division’s units in Chebarkul report that soldiers are being coerced into signing contracts with the Ministry of Defense. They are being promised a year of "staff service" in the same region, but if they refuse, they are threatened with deployment to Russia's border regions, from where they are told they will "return as cargo 200" (a military term for KIAs).
On Dec. 9, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree, which, as we understand, equates service members killed or injured in the border regions of Russia to participants in the "special military operation." The decree removes the "territorial criteria" for the operation, meaning that in the event of a soldier's death while performing combat tasks, their family members will now be eligible for a one-time payment similar to the families of those killed in the invasion of Ukraine.
On Dec. 12, Ukrainian media reported the murder of Mikhail Shatsky, deputy chief designer at the Mars Design Bureau, in the Moscow region. According to Hromadske, Shatsky worked on modernizing Kh-59 cruise missiles to the Kh-69 level, which are used in strikes against Ukraine, the development of new drones, and advocating for integrating artificial intelligence into UAVs and space systems. While many suspect Ukrainian intelligence services, neither the Security Service of Ukraine [SBU] nor the Main Directorate of Intelligence [HUR] has claimed responsibility. A criminal motive is theoretically possible but seems unlikely.
War in Syria
There is still no evidence of a full evacuation of Russian military bases in Syria, including the naval base in Tartus and the Khmeimim airbase. On Dec. 11, pro-Russian propagandist Anastasia Kashevarova wrote that an agreement had been reached for the Russian contingent to remain in Syria for 75 days, after which it would be withdrawn. Meanwhile, Bloomberg, citing sources in Moscow, Europe and the Middle East, reported that Russia is close to a deal with the new Syrian authorities allowing Russia to keep the bases. The Russian Ministry of Defense believes they have an informal mutual understanding with Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), but this situation could change due to Syria's political instability.