Sitrep for Nov. 19-22, 2024 (as of 10 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

The situation for the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the Kurakhove direction is becoming increasingly dangerous. Russian forces have completely captured the village of Dalnie within the pocket along the Sukhi Yaly River and are advancing toward the village of Uspenivka from both the north and the southwest—from the village of Maksymivka. Simultaneously, Russian troops are gradually narrowing the pocket by advancing from the east, making its capture seem ineluctable.

The Russian Armed Forces continue their offensive on the fortified area of the town of Kurakhove, establishing a crossing in the eastern part of the Kurakhove Reservoir and securing positions on its southern bank. This maneuver enables them to use boats to mount assaults on Kurakhove from the north. Fighting has persisted in the eastern part of the town for over a week, with additional advances now occurring from Dalnie. As a result, Kurakhove is already semi-encircled. For resupply and potential retreat, the AFU can still use the N-15 highway heading west, though this route may be compromised if Russian forces manage to advance closer. Based on current developments, we estimate that this fortified area could fall within the next six weeks.

In the South Donetsk direction, Russian forces have advanced near the villages of Novodonetske, Zolota Nyva and east of Rozdolne. It appears that Russian forces are initiating efforts to encircle the Vremivka salient. These maneuvers include advancing from the east, along the Novodonetske-Shakhtarske line, and from the west, in the vicinity of Rivnopil and possibly Novosilka.

For the first time in a long time, noticeable changes have been observed in the Kursk region, where Russian forces have managed to liberate the salient near the villages of Olgovka and Kremyanoye. According to Russia’s Ministry of Defense, part of the Ukrainian forces near the Olgovskaya wood were blocked and destroyed, although no visual evidence has been provided.

There have been ongoing claims about North Korean soldiers participating in combat in this area since early November. However, no substantial changes to the frontline had been observed in the Kursk direction until this recent operation. A photo has emerged showing a deceased soldier of Asian appearance in Russian uniform, equipped with AK-12 magazines and a patch with the North Korean flag and an image of Kim Jong-un. However, it was later revealed that the patch had been digitally altered, with the original showing the "V" insignia used by Russian troops.

The BBC has published an exclusive report based on data obtained from the UK’s Open Source Centre. Analysis of satellite imagery revealed that, since March 2024, Russia has supplied North Korea with over a million barrels of oil. At least a dozen tankers have made 43 trips, traveling empty to Russia and returning fully loaded. According to David Lammy, UK Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs, "the oil is payment for the weapons and troops Pyongyang has sent Moscow to fuel its war in Ukraine."

The Frontelligence Insight team, founded by Ukrainian military analyst Tatarigami, analyzed satellite images of the Khalino airfield near Kursk from 2022 and 2024. The new images show the addition of shelters for aircraft and, reportedly, concrete blocks dividing parking areas for the aircraft. This airfield is only 100 kilometers [62 mi] away from the Russia-Ukraine border, placing it within the range of Western long-range missiles. It is possible that this airfield is being prepared as a staging base, where aircraft will arrive, refuel and proceed to combat missions.

Similar construction has also been observed at an airfield in Krymsk, Krasnodar region, although it is more than 330 kilometers [205 mi] away from the frontline.

The newly announced military aid package from the United States is set to include anti-personnel mines.

Both anti-personnel and anti-tank mines have proven to be highly effective weapons for deterring enemy attacks. For instance, it has been repeatedly observed that when the lead vehicle in a convoy hits a mine, the remaining vehicles often detonate additional mines while attempting to maneuver around damaged vehicles. Similarly, anti-personnel mines not only impede infantry advancement but also complicate the clearing of anti-tank mines, especially under continuous drone strikes. It is not yet clear which specific types of anti-personnel mines are planned in the current US package, but Ukraine has previously received Claymore mines with remote detonation capabilities.

Ukrainian and Russian Strikes

On Nov. 20, Ukrainian forces launched a Storm Shadow missile strike on an estate in the village of Maryino in the Kursk region, where a facility belonging to the Russian Presidential Property Management Department is located. Satellite images from July 12, 2024 show signs of construction of a facility resembling an underground bunker. Seven years ago, a "communications signal node" mark appeared on the estate's territory on the Wikimapia service. Given the affiliation of the facility, it is most likely not a military communications hub but an FSO [Russia's Federal Protective Service] facility. Judging by the geolocation of the strikes, several missiles targeted the bunker, while several more hit other facilities on the estate, including a greenhouse and a gym. Although Maryino is located close enough to the border to be within the range of GMLRS, Storm Shadow missiles were likely used for their penetrating warheads, which are ideal for striking hardened targets like bunkers.

According to the Wall Street Journal, a high-ranking North Korean general was wounded in the strike. The Dos’ye Shpiona [Spy Dossier] Telegram channel reported the deaths of 18 servicemen and the wounding of 33 others, most of whom were officers from the Southern and Eastern Military Districts, but also included three North Koreans. On Nov. 21, Putin admitted that the strike on the command post of the Group of Troops "North" and some kind of "anti-aircraft combat" (although no signs of the latter were seen in the video of the strikes) resulted in casualties, but he claimed they belonged to the externаl security units and service personnel.

In the coming weeks, we expect Ukrainian forces to launch new strikes on known military facilities in Russia, though such strikes will become less frequent as the list of reconnoitered targets is exhausted.

The Oreshnik Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile

In the early hours of Nov. 21, Russia launched an unusual missile strike on the Yuzhmash factory in Dnipro as part of a combined attack that also involved Kinzhal hypersonic missiles and Kh-101 cruise missiles. The assault injured three people and caused damage to several buildings, according to local reports. The Ukrainian Air Force initially claimed the strike involved an intercontinental ballistic missile launched from Russia’s Astrakhan region. Residents of the Voronezh region, located near the launch site, shared images purportedly showing the missile’s smoke trail. Later in the evening, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated that Russia had deployed a missile with characteristics resembling those of an ICBM.

Video footage from Dnipro captured the descent of six distinct spark trails, believed to be either warheads accompanied by heavy decoy reentry vehicles or missile debris.

Initial reports of an ICBM launch were met with skepticism by many analysts. The pro-Russian Voevoda Telegram channel, run by a Russian helicopter pilot, asserted that the strike was carried out with a Kinzhal hypersonic missile. Later that evening, Vladimir Putin announced in a televised address that a new IRBM called the Oreshnik had been used in the strike. Putin characterized the strike as a response to US plans to develop and deploy intermediate and short-range missiles, emphasizing that Russia would respond "decisively and in mirror-like manner" to any perceived escalation. In an unusual remark, Putin promised that Russia would notify civilian populations in advance of future missile strikes, urging them to leave potential target zones. This pledge contrasts with Russia’s past actions, as the country issued no warnings prior to using missiles such as the Kh-101, Kinzhal or Iskander, which have all caused extensive damage to civilian infrastructure. The deployment of the Oreshnik missile appears to be a political signal, demonstrating Moscow’s willingness to use weapons capable of reaching Western Europe. However, these missiles are unlikely to be used again in the war, due to their high cost and limited military effectiveness.

ICBMs are defined as ballistic missiles with a range of over 5,500 km [3,418 mi]—the distance between the European part of Russia and the eastern coast of the United States. IRBMs, as they are referred to in Russian terminology, typically have a range of more than 1,000 km [621 mi] but less than 5,500 km. There are no fundamental structural differences between the two; depending on the payload, the same missile can serve as either an ICBM or an IRBM. For ICBMs, a circular error probable (CEP) of a few hundred meters is considered as good accuracy. This makes the use of such missiles with conventional (non-nuclear) warheads impractical, as their high launch costs are not justified, and achieving precision strikes is nearly impossible. Moreover, due to the high speed of these missiles, even if a high-explosive fragmentation warhead explodes in the air near the target, its effectiveness is reduced as the fragments are dispersed into the ground.

On Oct. 1, 2024, Iran launched IRBMs at Israel but failed to effectively strike any targets due to their insufficient accuracy. Iranian missiles were not developed for conventional use but are designed to be potentially equipped with nuclear warheads in the future if the capability arises.

Missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads, such as 9K720 Iskander mobile short-range ballistic missiles, Kinzhal missiles or Kh-101 missiles, have long been used in the war in Ukraine. However, news about such missile strikes does not cause global panic. Thus, we do not interpret the launch of the Oreshnik missile as an indication of an imminent nuclear weapons deployment. Preparations for the use of tactical nuclear weapons would be apparent to US intelligence in advance, as nuclear warheads are stored in special facilities.

Initially, Putin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov told TASS [Russian state-owned news agency] that Russia had not informed the US or other countries about the launch, as there is no obligation to notify about IRBM launches. However, about an hour later, he clarified that Russia had informed the US with an automatic message through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center 30 minutes before the launch.

Additionally, the United States is capable of independently detecting such launches. US officials were aware of the preparations for the strike and warned Ukraine several days in advance, even temporarily closing the US Embassy in Kyiv. During a briefing, Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh stated that the missile used was an IRBM based on the RS-26 Rubezh intermediate-range ballistic missile and that Russia had notified the US about its launch. The Biden administration also reiterated that it sees no signs suggesting the possible use of nuclear weapons and, therefore, does not intend to change its policy or revoke the authorization for precision strikes on Russian territory with US-made missiles.

With the time remaining until Trump’s inauguration on Jan. 20, the Biden administration is working to provide as much support to Ukraine as possible. State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller announced that a request to write off half of Ukraine’s economic assistance debt, totaling $4.65 billion, had been submitted to Congress.

Zelenskyy has promised to increase the funding for AFU brigades in order to enhance their ability to independently procure UAVs. This decision appears significant, since it will increase brigades’ flexibility in selecting the UAVs they order. Current practices show that specific “jammers” used at different sectors of the frontline require different types of UAVs with varying frequencies. Allowing UAV procurement at the brigade level, rather than through centralized supplies, will better meet the actual military needs at specific sectors of the frontline.

Under the Recruit program, Russia's constituent Republic of Bashkortostan continues to pay 50,000 rubles [$500] to individuals who help recruit anyone willing to sign a contract with the Russian MoD. According to the local DOSAAF, Russian Army, Air Force and Navy Volunteer Society, ever since the program was launched in August 2024, over 2,300 payment applications have been submitted. However, this can hardly be seen as evidence of the program’s success, as many of these applications likely involve individuals who intended to sign the contract regardless.

In Yekaterinburg, the widow of 53-year-old Ilmar, who died in a combat zone on Dec. 3, 2023, has been denied regional and presidential compensation for his death. The death notice cites acute heart failure as the cause, though his family claims he had no prior health issues. Since his death was not directly linked to combat operations, the military commissariat informed his wife that she is only eligible for standard insurance payouts, excluding other benefits.