Sitrep for Nov. 6-8, 2024 (as of 9 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

Michael Kofman and other military analysts have shared their findings from their latest trip to Ukraine in a recent episode of the "War on the Rocks" podcast. While they acknowledged that the Armed Forces of Ukraine face significant challenges in the Donetsk region, Kofman noted that a collapse of the frontline does not appear imminent—a view that aligns with our own assessment. However, for the first time since the start of the war, shortages of personnel have overtaken shortages of equipment and ammunition as the primary issue confronting the AFU. Following their summer visit to Ukraine, the analysts had expressed cautious optimism about the prospects of a reinvigorated mobilization in the AFU, believing that stricter measures could stabilize the frontline, provided that promised Western military aid arrived on time. However, their outlook has now grown more pessimistic due to accrued personnel shortages—not only from insufficient recruitment figures, but also because new recruits are being assigned to newly formed brigades rather than experienced units that have suffered attrition. Sending recruits to brigades with staffing levels of 50-60% instead would enable conducting joint combat training exercises more effectively. By contrast, newly formed brigades often prove significantly less effective in both offensive and defensive operations.

The analysts also criticized the operation in the Kursk region. In their view, the AFU should have envisioned it as a relatively short raid. After boosting morale and demonstrating to the West both the capabilities of the Ukrainian military and the absence of Russian "red lines," the AFU could have withdrawn back to their territory, successfully concluding the operation. However, the decision to hold on to occupied territory in Russia has stretched the frontline at a time when the AFU is already grappling with personnel shortages, making defending other parts of the front even more difficult.

Separately, Kofman emphasized that Ukraine holds a significant advantage over Russia in both the number and quality of drones. In recent sitreps, we cited examples of successful Ukrainian developments in this area.

It is worth noting that this section of the podcast did not include any comments about the participation of North Korean soldiers in the war—this topic will likely be addressed in future installments.

According to the Ukrainian DeepState project, a new wave of the Russian counteroffensive has begun in the Kursk region: the Russian Armed Forces are attacking the Ukrainian salient near the villages of Olgovka and Kremyanoye, advancing toward the village of Pogrebki in the northern part and from the village of Zelyony Shlyakh in the southwestern part of the salient. Their goal is to encircle the Ukrainian grouping in this area. There are also reports of attacks on Ukrainian positions near the town of Sudzha and the village of Darino, south of the village of Lyubimovka. However, no significant advances have been observed so far.

It is worth noting that it is the Kursk region where North Korean soldiers have reportedly been deployed. Pro-Russian Telegram channels have shared images showing Type 73 machine guns, which are in service with the DPRK army, at the disposal of Russian soldiers. We suspect that Russian servicemen have obtained them as a result of a trade with North Korean soldiers.

Meanwhile, an article in the New York Times reports that North Korean soldiers are already participating in combat together with the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade of the RuAF and have reportedly suffered their first losses. Earlier, the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ukrainian MoD (GUR) had stated that DPRK troops were being sent to support this brigade. However, we have yet to see independent confirmation of these claims.

Additionally, a recent report suggested that wounded North Korean soldiers are occupying hospital beds in the Kursk region, allegedly displacing planned hospitalizations for local residents. We find this report lacks credibility.

Residents of border districts in the Kursk region, which are located within an active combat zone, gathered in the main square of Kursk, demanding that regional authorities provide them with housing certificates as compensation for the loss of their homes, which were destroyed in recent attacks. Currently, such certificates are issued only to those officially registered as living (i.e., with permanent residence) within five kilometers [3.1 mi] from the border. As we have repeatedly stated, a zone of this range—or broader—should have been resettled from the very beginning of the war. Following this protest, Aleksey Smirnov, Governor of the Kursk region, announced that displaced residents would be eligible for rental housing compensation. However, to qualify for compensation, displaced residents must meet several conditions: rental and utility expenses must exceed 22% of the household’s average total income, they must not have any housing outside the "affected areas," and they must have a regular income "from employment or other activities." This policy raises concerns for those without regular income, such as elderly residents, who are left without clear support options. It is evident that if the regional budget has hundreds of thousands of rubles available for sign-up bonuses, authorities should also be able to allocate funds to help those forced to leave their homes.

The Pokrovsk and Kurakhove directions remain the most active sectors of the frontline. In recent days, Russian forces have advanced westward from Selydove and the villages of Vyshneve and Tsukuryne, capturing the village of Novooleksiivka, southwest of Vyshneve, and raising a flag on video. Moving forward, the RuAF will probably advance here toward Sontsivka south of Novodmytrivka, in the direction of the N-15 highway, aiming to disrupt Ukrainian supply lines to Kurakhove.

South of this highway, the RuAF are advancing from the village of Maksymivka, and are now about 10 km [6.2 mi] away from the highway, making it increasingly hazardous for Ukrainian soldiers. How long the AFU will be able to hold Kurakhove depends on the manpower available in this area. Ukrainian territorial defense units, defending the Vuhledar direction near Maksymivka and Yasna Poliana, are generally considered weaker than regular mechanized brigades and may be struggling to contain the Russian offensive.

A video has emerged showing a Russian Sukhoi Su-25 attack aircraft firing at a target at "point-blank range" near the village of Antonivka, north of Vodiane. This once again demonstrates the AFU’s shortage of air defense systems along this part of the frontline, including short-range systems like MANPADS.

Western Assistance

Some analysts suggest that Donald Trump’s return to power could benefit Ukraine, arguing that the Biden administration’s delayed and limited aid could have led to a slow defeat for Ukraine had Kamala Harris continued similar policies. We disagree with this perspective. Despite logistical issues and local retreats, the AFU’s problems were potentially resolvable. With effective mobilization efforts and adequate support, Ukraine could stabilize the frontline. Additionally, strengthening sanctions and exerting greater political pressure on Russia could further improve the situation. However, the arrival of an unpredictable and unstable Trump could lead to a complete cessation of military aid to Ukraine both by US and its European allies. In this scenario, European countries may redirect resources to bolster their own defenses, fearing that the US under Trump may not uphold NATO commitments in the event of a Russian attack on a member state.

We do not share the view that Trump would actively support Ukraine to project an image of strength on the global stage. Rather, he would likely prioritize fulfilling his campaign promise to end the war, irrespective of ceasefire conditions.

From a pragmatic standpoint, although Russia continues to make territorial gains, Putin has reasons to want negotiations and a ceasefire. The current slow advances consume vast resources without bringing him closer to his primary goal of installing a puppet regime in Ukraine. A ceasefire would allow Putin to leverage a potential Trump second term to seek partial sanctions relief, rebuild Russia’s economy, and restock military equipment and ammunition, preparing for a possible renewed attempt to capture Kyiv in a few years.

We do not consider Trump’s 2017 decision to strike Syrian military facilities, after evidence had surfaced of chemical weapons use, to be a strong example of responding to war crimes. The one-off missile strike caused some infrastructure damage at a few airfields, but had no significant impact on the war’s outcome.

Likewise, the 2018 US airstrike on pro-Syrian militia and Wagner Group mercenaries near Khasham in Syria does not indicate Trump’s willingness to escalate or confront Russia directly. In that instance, the Wagner Group had attacked a site with American soldiers, posing a direct threat to their lives. In such circumstances, the US military command makes decisions that would be consistent under any president.

Politico reports that the Biden administration is trying to send as much military aid to Ukraine as possible before Trump takes office on Jan. 20. As of today, over $6 billion of the congressional funds remain unutilized, including over $4 billion under the Presidential Drawdown Authority program (which provides aid directly from US Army stockpiles) and slightly more than $2 billion under the USAI program (which involves placing orders with arms manufacturers).

New NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte has stated that NATO member states are now going to spend over 2% of their GDP on defense, thanks in part to Trump. According to Rutte, Trump’s criticism during his first term helped push countries in the right direction, motivating increased defense spending. However, this statement has nothing to do with reality, since countries that have a common border with Russia increased their defense spending only after Russia attacked Ukraine in 2022, while those that do not border on Russia, with the exception of the UK, still spend less than 2% on defense, and quite a few of them have reduced their military expenditures in recent years.

Ukrainian and Russian Strikes

On the morning of Nov. 6, Ukrainian UAVs based on light aircraft struck the port in Kaspiysk, in Russia’s constituent Republic of Dagestan. Some footage shows air defenses in action; however, it remains unclear what exactly was hit by drones. The CyberBoroshno project analyzed satellite images of the port, which revealed that all ships and boats, except for one, departed the port following the strike. However, the images do not show any visible damage to the remaining vessel. We have also not seen any evidence of damage to port infrastructure.

Following an article stating that only 30% of ammunition supplied to the frontline is currently Russian-made, open-source researcher Just BeCause examined satellite images of Russian ammunition storage bases and reported that they have all been depleted. The depletion of Soviet-era ammunition stockpiles is not new to us, as the last Soviet-made projectiles were observed on the frontline in early 2023. The Russian army is now using recently produced projectiles along those purchased from partners, including North Korea. It is worth noting that satellite images only allow the assessment of open storage bases.

The commander of the 5th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade, Major General Pavel Klimenko, was killed in Ukraine. In April 2024, soldiers from this brigade tortured to death an American citizen, RT [Russia Today] contributor and Donbas conflict veteran, Russell Bentley. Afterward, they blew up his body to cover their tracks. Four servicemen from this brigade are currently under investigation in connection to this murder. Also in April, Klimenko’s soldiers tortured Vladimir Frolov, a music teacher who had been illegally mobilized. Frolov had a third-degree disability and sought to be demobilized for health reasons, but was instead subjected to torture in a basement torture chamber belonging to the brigade. According to an investigation by the Astra Telegram channel, Klimenko organized a torture camp for Russian soldiers in an abandoned Petrovskaya mine in Donetsk, where soldiers were tortured to force them to surrender their wages and compensation for injuries to their commanders. According to Donetsk human rights activists, brigade commanders forced soldiers to sign powers of attorney, seizing even death gratuity payments, and used torture to compel severely wounded soldiers to continue fighting.

According to the Dos’ye Shpiona [Spy Dossier] Telegram channel, Klimenko was riding a motorcycle with his subordinates near Krasnohorivka when he was injured by an FPV drone and later died in the hospital. The circumstances surrounding his death seem somewhat suspicious. Krasnohorivka is located 15 km [9.3 mi] from the frontline—within the range of Ukrainian drones, but long-range FPV drone strikes are uncommon. As of the time of this sitrep, Ukrainian forces have not released footage of the strike.

The pro-Russian Telegram channel Fighterbomber [associated with the Russian Air and Space Force] has published another mournful post with a photo of a Kamov Ka-52 (Hokum B) attack helicopter, stating that the helicopter's commander was killed and the navigator was wounded. The circumstances of the helicopter’s loss remain unknown.