dispatches
November 6

Sitrep for Nov. 4-6, 2024 (as of 10:30 a.m. UTC+3)

Donald Trump has won the US election, securing enough electoral votes. His inauguration is set for Jan. 20, 2025, at 12:00 pm EST, when he will formally succeed President Joe Biden, who will remain in office until then.

In the interim, the Biden Administration is expected to continue maximizing its support for Ukraine, as reflected in recent large military aid packages. The fate of the lend-lease program remains uncertain, as the previous legislation authorizing the scheme expired last fall without being renewed. However, we expect the current administration to deliver the maximum amount of aid within the remaining $20 billion loan facility before the term officially ends.

It remains unclear who Trump will appoint as Secretary of Defense. His first term saw frequent turnover in this position, making it difficult to predict how this key role might be filled in a second term. However, Trump’s team appears to be better prepared the second time around, with a clearer sense of its policy goals and a stronger mandate from the electorate.

We anticipate that securing a formal end to the conflict, even in the form of a temporary peace agreement, will likely be a top priority for the incoming administration. Though it seems unlikely that Trump will meet all of Vladimir Putin’s conditions, Ukraine will likely face strong pressure to make concessions. Given that Ukraine heavily relies on US financial support, military aid and the limits on its use, Washington will hold considerable leverage of Kyiv’s decisions.

A halt of the Ukraine war would grant Putin time to prepare for future confrontations and could signal other authoritarian leaders that they, too, might face minimal resistance from the West if they initiate a conflict. Additionally, we do not rule out that Putin could secure a partial easing or rollback of some sanctions during Trump’s second term. Trump’s victory also risks driving new divisions within NATO—he has previously issued harsh, often inaccurate critiques of allied countries’ defense budgets.

Frontline Situation Update

Recent trends continue to develop: Russian forces have advanced in the Kurakhove direction, occupying areas of the pocket near the village of Kurakhivka, thereby straightening the frontline. The Ukrainian DeepState project has not marked these areas as captured as of yet.

Russian advances are also noted to the northwest of the village of Vyshneve and southwest of the village of Tsukuryne in the Pokrovsk direction, as well as near the villages of Bohoiavlenka and Yasna Poliana in the Vuhledar direction.

All of these advances are still largely attacks advancing from one defensive line to another. If the RuAF had broken through Ukrainian defensive lines, there would be no pauses in between advances, contrary to what we currently observe. Thus, the situation for the Ukrainian forces is very difficult, but not critical. At the same time, the RuAF do not encounter significant resistance during these local advances as the AFU cannot significantly slow down the enemy, and typically retreat to the next positions, after which the situation repeats itself.

The weather on the frontline continues to change. The first snow has already fallen in the Kursk and Kharkiv regions. If the temperature fluctuates around zero degrees Celsius [32ÂşF], muddy conditions will intensify and combat operations will slow down.

Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov commented to Politico that, according to his information, soldiers from North Korea are already involved in battles in the Kursk region. No objective evidence of this has been published yet. Other Ukrainian officials have also mentioned battles with the participation of North Korean soldiers.

Meanwhile, Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated that 11,000 North Korean soldiers are currently in the Kursk region, yet there has still been no response from Ukraine’s allies.

During a meeting in Kyiv, Lithuanian Defense Minister Laurynas Kasčiūnas and Rustem Umerov signed an agreement for the joint production of drones and electronic warfare systems. Laurynas Kasčiūnas also brought 230 vehicles and 240 mine detectors to Ukraine as part of a mine-clearing coalition. This is of particular importance, as the issue of landmines in Ukraine will remain present for many years. The situation in Ukraine also illustrates why the international community has been trying to move away from the use of landmines and cluster munitions.

On Nov. 1, the pro-Russian Telegram channel Fighterbomber [associated with the Russian Air and Space Force] posted a message that could be interpreted as a veiled announcement of the loss of a Sukhoi Su-34 fighter-bomber aircraft. On Nov. 3, an obituary was published for the Su-34 pilot-navigator Arman Bigalinov, who died on Oct. 31. This can be considered an indirect confirmation of the aircraft's loss. Still, the circumstances surrounding the pilot-navigator’s death and the fate of the second pilot remain unknown.

A year ago, a Russian soldier sent a video to the Astra Telegram channel, in which he talked about a murder committed by the commander of the 2nd Battalion of the 1430th Regiment. This regiment, consisting of mobilized soldiers from the Moscow region, was stationed in the Zaporizhzhia region in the spring of 2023. Six soldiers went shopping in a nearby town, and one of them, Aleksey Serov, bought two bottles of bootleg liquor. When the commander found the soldiers drunk, he called them to attention and shot Serov during a confrontation. The next day, the commanders gathered all the witnesses and suggested they cover up what had happened by staging Serov's death as having occurred during combat, so his widow could receive compensation. Otherwise, the commanders threatened he would report the incident to military investigators as an attack by a group of soldiers on their commander, forcing him to use his weapon in self-defense. In that case, Serov's fellow soldiers would have been considered surviving accomplices in the assault and would be investigated. The soldiers chose the first option and remained silent for a long time, but were eventually transferred to other units. One of them, Stanislav Raevsky, recorded a video address and sent it to Astra, asking that the story be published in case of his death. He was killed near Bakhmut on July 13, 2023.

The Wall Street Journal, citing Western intelligence services, reported that certain Russian agents, acting through intermediaries, decided to send an incendiary device intended to start a fire in the cargo hold of a passenger or cargo plane bound for the United States or Canada.

These devices were activated in July at DHL logistics hubs: one in Leipzig, Germany, and another in Birmingham, United Kingdom. The investigation revealed that the devices contained an incendiary mixture, based on magnesium, hidden inside electric massagers. Intelligence services believe that the purpose of this covert Russian operation was to test the possibility of placing such a device on a plane bound for North America. Lithuanian police arrested a suspect who had sent four such devices. Two were dispatched from a DHL office in Vilnius, where the sender identified himself as Igor Prudnikov. However, the investigation uncovered his real name—Aleksandr Suranovas, who allegedly acted under the direction of Russian intelligence services. Other suspects have also been arrested in the course of the investigation.

As we noted two sitreps ago, Western countries primarily interpret a possible escalation of the conflict not as World War III or the use of nuclear weapons, but rather as sabotage operations like these, which have already begun.

At a briefing by the Ministry of Defense on Nov. 5, Lieutenant General Igor Kirillov, head of the Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Protection Troops of the RuAF, stated that Ukraine had planned to capture the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant, which allegedly could have led to a radiation disaster. He also presented a slide of the "failed plan by the Ukrainian leadership to capture the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant," according to which the operation involved "20,000 personnel, 27 tanks, 50 other armored vehicles, 30 tube artillery units and 5 MLRS." The use of one tank for every 740 personnel is as implausible as the arrows on his map, drawn without considering the terrain. Additionally, Kirillov stated that Ukraine has the capability to create a "dirty bomb."

On Nov. 5, a Ukrainian UAV hit a multi-apartment residential building in Belgorod, injuring one person. In a video recorded by witnesses, a black cloud—a trace from an air defense system—can be seen in the sky behind the drone, but the video quality does not allow for determining whether it was the result of a missile hitting the UAV. Moreover, before hitting the building, the drone flipped over, indicating it likely malfunctioned. It is most likely that the impact occurred due to a failure of a Russian air defense system rather than a targeted strike.

A video has emerged showing a Ukrainian FPV drone chasing a Russian military UAZ Bukhanka van in the Kherson region. Shortly before the drone strikes the vehicle, the rear doors open, and a wounded person on a stretcher is thrown out.